385) Reforma ortográfica: sofrimento auto-imposto (sem hifen agora?)

Amanhã, dia 1 de janeiro de 2009, entra em vigor a mais recente (não será certamente a última) reforma da ortografia da língua portuguesa, supostamente para aproximar os povos e as nações que se utilizam dessa língua latina.
Acho que teremos meses, talvez anos, de confusão pela frente, com uma profusão de formas gráficas, algumas certas, outras erradas, outras ainda a meio caminho entre o antigo e alguma outra forma que certamente não será a oficial, antes que se fixem os novos hábitos.
Em todo caso, fazendo a minha parte, não como instrutor, mas como simples comentarista, transcrevo uma matéria da revista brasileira Veja, sobre o tema, esperando contribuir para o esclarecimento (ou não) de todos.
Em todo caso, boa confusão para todos, a partir de agora...

A última do português
Especial Idioma
Revista Veja, 31 de dezembro de 2008

A partir de 1º de janeiro, os brasileiros passam a escrever diferente: caem o trema e alguns acentos, mudam as regras do hífen – e instalam-se as dúvidas.
O novo acordo ortográfico, enfim, é uma dessas decisões sobre as quais não parece haver acordo.
Isabela Boscov

LÍNGUA TEM DONO?
Agora, como se diz, Inês é morta. A partir deste 1º de janeiro, quando no Brasil começa a vigorar o novo acordo ortográfico firmado entre os países de língua portuguesa, as idéias perderão um pouquinho de altura e virarão ideias; já os vôos, livres do circunflexo e transformados em voos, ganharão teto; o anti-semitismo não terá mais o hífen, passando a ser antissemitismo, mas não perderá sua feiúra – que, no primeiro dia de 2009, amanhecerá simplesmente feiura. Para os que foram alfabetizados já dentro das normas da última reforma ortográfica, a de 1971, o ano vai começar repleto não apenas das resoluções habituais, como também de dúvidas. Para os que aprenderam a escrever entre a reforma de 1943 e a de 1971 e ainda acham estranho escrever ele sem um bom circunflexo no e tônico, os problemas se multiplicam. E, para aqueles que estudaram em cartilhas ainda mais antigas, com seus prohibidos e collocar, as esperanças de reformar a própria ortografia são mínimas.

Cozido em fogo brando desde 1986, esquecido e então requentado, o acordo que pretende unificar a maneira como os cidadãos lusófonos do mundo grafam seu idioma é uma dessas decisões sobre as quais, ironicamente, quase nenhum acordo é possível. Uma das raras concordâncias dos gramáticos: o aprendizado da ortografia está estreitamente ligado à memória visual e manual. A mão "puxa" a palavra, em um processo de assimilação que começa no primeiro banco de escola. Driblar essa memória da mão é árduo. Um segundo ponto de consenso: o acordo não está em um estágio ótimo de maturação. E aí começam as divergências. Para alguns estudiosos, ele não é nem sequer bom; para outros, é bom o suficiente. "E bom, depois de mais de 100 anos tentando colocar o português nos trilhos do bom senso, já está de bom tamanho", diz Evanildo Bechara, titular da área de lexicografia e lexicologia da Academia Brasileira de Letras e decano dos gramáticos brasileiros, que liderou a etapa final de negociação do acordo.

O novo acordo não reforma a língua portuguesa. Essa continua a mesma, sujeita às evoluções naturais de todas as línguas e ampla o bastante para abarcar as diferentes maneiras como é usada nos oito países em que é idioma oficial (veja o mapa abaixo). O que o acordo tenta atender é a aspiração – acadêmica, sobretudo – a uma grafia única, em que as diferenças sejam reduzidas ao mínimo. No português, essas diferenças incidem nos aspectos que merecem a classificação de "fatos da língua", e não de "fatos da ortografia". Um exemplo: polêmica e polémica têm e manterão grafia diversa no Brasil e em Portugal porque são pronunciadas de forma diversa. Deste lado do Atlântico, consagramos pelo uso o e fechado. Já os lusófonos originais preferem o e aberto. Por isso também os portugueses continuam a reflectir, enquanto aqui refletimos, se o acordo é acessível. Eles emitem o som daquele c a mais; nós, não. Esses são "fatos da língua", que ninguém pretende reformar. O que o acordo quer eliminar são os sinais que – supostamente – nada mais exprimem. Como o circunflexo que deixará de existir em enjoo ou o acento agudo de heroico, abandonados por Portugal desde 1945. Na mão inversa, os portugueses deixarão de escrever adoptar e colecção, passando a adotar e coleção, porque na verdade não pronunciam aquele p e aquele c. "Não os pronunciamos, assim como o c de actor ou o p de cepticismo, mas eles carregam informação fonética, já que ‘forçam’ a tônica da palavra", argumenta o jornalista e escritor português João Pereira Coutinho, autor de uma excelente coluna na Folha de S.Paulo.

Coutinho, que em seus textos para o jornal usa as versões brasileiras de vocábulos (como fumante em vez de fumador), acha que o acordo é um "brutalíssimo erro" – de natureza científica, por sua visão concentradora da língua, de natureza política, já que os países africanos mal foram consultados na sua elaboração, e também de ordem filosófica, porque procura aniquilar as diferentes músicas, por assim dizer, que se ouvem ao ler textos em grafias diversas da nativa. Ele resume, assim, as críticas disparadas pelos detratores do acordo. Mas outros aspectos pesam na discussão. Há, por exemplo, as visões diversas sobre a natureza da ortografia. Alguns gramáticos de peso postulam que, como tudo o mais num idioma, também ela deve mudar ou não segundo os ditames do uso, sem interferência de academias; outros gramáticos, igualmente de peso, crêem (ou, a partir de janeiro, creem) que não existe razão para o português abranger duas grafias oficiais quando idiomas mais difundidos, como o espanhol, com seus 400 milhões de usuários e 22 academias de letras, só precisam de uma. O grosso das objeções, contudo, se dirige aos termos específicos do presente acordo.

O texto capitaneado durante parte das décadas de 80 e 90 pelos acadêmicos Antônio Houaiss (daqui) e João Malaca Casteleiro (de lá) contém vários pontos facultativos, muitas imprecisões e grande quantidade de etecéteras. Importante: esse texto não foi revisto. Ele foi assinado, na forma redigida lá atrás, em 29 de setembro último. E, do jeito que está, abre espaço para interpretações subjetivas e para a continuidade de diferenças em "fatos de ortografia" entre Portugal, Brasil e os outros signatários. "Portugal e Brasil são como dois navios singrando paralelos, que se acenam a uma distância de 20 metros. Quando o acordo entrar em vigor, a distância será reduzida em 3 metros, que não valem o imenso custo da reforma", opina Cláudio Moreno, doutor em letras pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul. Esse custo é tanto social como financeiro. A partir de 2010, os ministérios da Educação e da Cultura só autorizarão a compra de livros que sigam a nova ortografia. Em tempo, todas as bibliotecas escolares do país terão de ser renovadas, ainda que seu conteúdo não se tenha tornado superado. E todos os dicionários terão de ser reeditados (estima-se que apenas o Ministério da Educação encomendará 8 milhões de exemplares nos próximos anos). Uma parte significativa desse movimento editorial será custeada pelo contribuinte. Ninguém definiu, ainda, como os milhares de professores do país serão treinados – nem como garantir que o contingente de despreparados para a função (que é grande, imenso) não se acrescente à confusão de alunos que mal e mal conseguem escrever um bilhete. "Estamos fazendo a reforma no susto", critica o professor Pasquale Cipro Neto, um dos mais dedicados gramáticos do Brasil.

Cipro Neto conta uma história divertida. Num vagão de trem, em Portugal, sentou-se à frente dele uma senhora que lia um tablóide policial intitulado O Crime. O professor leu e releu as manchetes – e não entendeu metade delas. Não por razões remotamente relacionadas à ortografia, claro, mas pelas expressões que, num texto de cunho popular, tornam o português lusitano quase estrangeiro para um brasileiro – o que faz pensar na blague do escritor Oscar Wilde segundo a qual americanos e ingleses eram povos separados por uma mesma língua. Ora, o princípio que norteia o acordo ortográfico é o de facilitar o trâmite do português no mundo. Mas as diferenças de grafia na norma culta da língua são mínimas e não interferem na sua compreensão. As dos textos educativos e literários provenientes das diferentes nações lusófonas podem ser lidas e compreendidas em qualquer rincão do mundo em que se fale o português. Muitos dos escritores de Portugal vetam qualquer alteração ortográfica ou de vocabulário nas edições brasileiras de seu texto, e não consta que tenham perdido um só leitor por esse motivo. Já as diferenças culturais e de uso da língua entre os signatários do acordo são, conforme o caso, impenetráveis, como constatou Cipro Neto em sua inspeção de O Crime. Elas é que tornam tão rica a experiência de um idioma compartilhado por várias nações. E são elas que, na prática, impedirão, por exemplo, a difusão de material didático brasileiro em países lusófonos da África, como chegaram a sonhar as editoras.

Na maioria das línguas, a ortografia evoluiu e se consolidou no decorrer de séculos, obedecendo a uma necessidade de ordem numérica: quanto maior o número de "usuários" regulares da linguagem escrita, maior também a necessidade de que se chegasse a formas consensuais para grafá-la. A ortografia inglesa terminou por cristalizar-se numa forma muito próxima da atual com a explosão do mercado editorial no século XIX. Nunca houvera tanta gente escrevendo, publicando e lendo – e assim sedimentando regras. A ortografia dos idiomas, assim, tem uma infância, uma juventude e uma maturidade. Quando Pero Vaz de Caminha escreveu ao rei de Portugal anunciando a descoberta do Brasil, em 1500 (veja o quadro), a grafia do português estava na sua infância. As poucas pessoas alfabetizadas do período escreviam conforme ouviam, em grafias díspares, quase pessoais, e aproximadas da que era então a língua do saber – o latim. Como na maioria dos idiomas, também os grandes escritores tiveram papel preponderante na fixação da ortografia portuguesa. Até hoje escrevemos Cingapura com c, e não com s, como nas outras línguas de origem européia, porque Luís de Camões (1524-1580), o fundador da literatura em língua portuguesa com a epopéia Os Lusíadas, assim grafou a palavra. Na virada do século XIX para o XX, a ortografia portuguesa estava já transitando da juventude para a idade adulta: lendo-se as edições originais de autores como Eça de Queiroz e Machado de Assis podem-se contar uns tantos circunflexos e consoantes dobradas, mais uns phs e chrs, que caíram em desuso – mas nada que faça o leitor tropeçar nas linhas, como na hoje quase indecifrável carta de Caminha.

Segundo explica Mauro Villar, filólogo do Instituto Houaiss e defensor do novo acordo, o passo decisivo para a maturidade foi dado pelo foneticista português Gonçalves Viana, que em 1904 publicou o livro Ortografia Nacional, de importância incalculável na análise das tendências fonéticas do idioma e das notações que melhor as traduzem. Em 1911, Portugal adotou a ortografia de Viana como a oficial, no que foi seguido depois pelo Brasil. Na década de 40, contudo, os dois países tomaram caminhos diversos. Em 1943, por decisão do presidente Getúlio Vargas, fez-se uma reforma que eliminou inconsistências e unificou internamente a ortografia. Em 1945, Portugal propôs uma outra reforma – a que eliminou o trema e outros acentos que agora vão cair aqui. O Brasil chegou a assiná-la, mas recuou. Daí a existência de duas ortografias oficiais para o português.

Pelos termos do acordo promulgado em setembro deste ano, os brasileiros terão quatro anos para se adequar às novas regras, e os portugueses, seis. Na opinião de Pasquale Cipro Neto, uma vez que os grandes jornais e revistas do país (inclusive VEJA e todas as outras publicações da Editora Abril) passarão a escrever pela nova ortografia a partir deste 1º de janeiro, a reforma logo deve ganhar contorno de fato consumado. A hifenização, que um amigo do acadêmico Evanildo Bechara certa feita chamou "infernização", deverá ser a maior dificuldade. As regras antigas eram difíceis, e as novas continuam a sê-lo. "Ninguém sabia usar o hífen, e todos permanecerão sem sabê-lo", diz Cipro Neto. Manual, só no fim de fevereiro. Esse é o prazo dado pela editora Global para colocar na praça o Vocabulário Ortográfico oficial, uma "bula" com 360.000 palavras cujos originais Bechara e seus colaboradores entregaram na semana passada. Tudo resolvido? Nem tanto. No que depender do próprio Bechara, um cavalheiro cujo conhecimento da língua só é comparável à sensatez, o Vocabulário Ortográfico talvez venha a precisar de uma edição revista ao fim dos quatro anos de adaptação. "Poderíamos imaginar uma regra pela qual só se usaria hífen se, ao juntar dois termos, a pronúncia saísse errada. Um exemplo é o de ‘sub-região’. Sem hífen, o desavisado poderia ler ‘su-bregião’. Se, com a junção, a pronúncia não mudar, nada de hífen", especula o estudioso. Seria mesmo lindo, e fácil, e coerente. Mas vai acontecer? "Ora, tenham um pouco de fé no bom senso dos acadêmicos daqui e de lá." E o bom senso, enfatize-se, nunca precisou de hífen para ser bom.

384) Global Economic Prospects 2009, World Bank

Historic commodity price boom ends with slowing global growth

The world financial crisis has dimmed short-term prospects for developing countries and the volume of world trade is likely to contract for the first time since 1982. The sharp slowdown has caused commodity prices to plummet, ending a historic five-year boom.

Global Economic Prospects 2009
Prospects for the Global Economy (interactive, multilingual)

Complete report and summary of commodities analysis

December 9, 2008
A new World Bank report, Global Economic Prospects 2009, examines the impact of the financial crisis on GDP growth across the world, noting a marked slowdown everywhere, including in formerly resilient developing countries. Subtitled Commodities at the Crossroads, the report finds that future demand and supply of key commodities like oil and food can be balanced given the right policies in the energy and agriculture sectors.

Global slump hits developing world
In its global economic outlook section, the report predicts that global GDP growth will slip from 2.5 percent in 2008 to 0.9 percent in 2009. Developing country growth is expected to decline from a resilient 7.9 percent in 2007 to 4.5 percent in 2009. Growth in rich countries next year will likely be negative.

“We see that the global economy is transitioning from a long period of strong growth led by developing countries to one of great uncertainty as the ongoing financial crisis has shaken markets worldwide,” said Hans Timmer, Manager, Global Trends, in the World Bank’s Development Prospects Group. “The slowdown in developing countries is very significant because the credit squeeze directly hits investments, which were a key pillar supporting the strong performance of the developing world during the past 5 years.”

With tighter credit conditions and less appetite for risk, investment growth in the developing world is projected to fall from 13 percent in the 2007 to 3.5 percent in 2009, deeply significant because a third of GDP growth can be attributed to it.

Timmer and other economists at the World Bank project that world trade will contract by 2.1 percent in 2009. This is the first time since 1982 that world trade will shrink. All countries will be affected by this drop in exports, which reflects not only the sharp slowdown in global demand, but also the reduced availability of export credits.

Outlook for developing regions
In East Asia and the Pacific, GDP growth slowed to an estimated 8.5 percent in 2008 and is expected to drop to 6.7 percent in 2009. The region has been hit by a heavy sell-off of equities and sharp downturns in export volumes. China’s growth is projected to slow from 9.4 percent in 2008 to 7.5 percent in 2009, but the government’s recently announced $586 billion stimulus program may edge China’s growth back to 8.5 percent in 2010.

GDP growth in Europe and Central Asia is expected to slow to 5.3 percent in 2008, falling to 2.7 percent in 2009. The downturn is being driven by lower investment tied to difficult financing conditions and weaker export market demand. Russia’s growth will likely be 6 percent in 2008, down from 8.1 percent in 2007, as the banking crisis and low oil prices remain in play.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, GDP growth—expected to be 4.4 percent in 2008—is at risk, pressuring private sector investment. As commodity prices weaken, major exporters like Argentina may record current account deficits. Others like Brazil and Mexico will see a drop in exports to the recession-hit United States and Europe. The regional outlook is expected to worsen in 2009, with GDP dropping to 2.1 percent, driven by a decline in capital spending.

The Middle East and North Africa region appears to have held up well in 2008, growing at an unchanged 5.8 percent in 2008, but the aggregate number hides substantial swings in trade, current account positions and external financing requirements. With oil exporters facing diminished revenues in 2009, regional growth is expected to be just 3.9 percent in 2009.

Growth in South Asia eased to 6.3 percent in 2008 from 8.4 percent in 2007 and is expected to slip to 5.4 percent in 2009. High food and fuel prices, tighter credit conditions, and weaker foreign demand have led to worsening external accounts and slower investment growth. The downturn is most apparent in India and Pakistan, where industrial production fell sharply.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, growth expanded to 5.4 percent in 2008, and is expected to ease to 4.6 percent in 2009. But the contribution of net exports to African GDP growth may fall, and many countries are exposed to terms-of-trade shocks. Higher food and fuel prices have also widened the poverty gap, raising the risk of social unrest.

The report’s complete projections can be found on a companion website, Prospects for the Global Economy, which is available in English, Chinese, French, and Spanish.

Commodities at the crossroads
Recent sharp declines in oil and food prices mark the end of what has been the most historic commodity price boom of the past century. Like earlier booms, this one was driven by strong global economic growth and has come to an end with the abrupt slowdown in the global economy precipitated by the financial crisis.

The exceptional duration of this five-year commodity boom, the number of commodities involved, and the heights that prices reached reflect the resilience of developing country growth during this period.

Between early 2003 and mid-2008, oil prices climbed by 320 percent in dollar terms, and internationally traded food prices by 138 percent. But the prolonged boom is clearly over, even as the social and human consequences of historic high prices linger. Prices across the board have fallen, giving up much of their earlier gains, due to slower GDP growth, increased supplies, and revised expectations.

However, they still remain a lot higher than they were at the start of the boom and are expected to remain higher than during the 1990s over the next 20 years, owing to biofuel-driven demand for food grains. Oil prices are likely to average about $75 a barrel next year and, for the next five years, real food prices worldwide are expected to remain about 25 percent higher than they were in the 1990s.

Long-term demand and supply prospects for oil, metals and food
Despite the fall in commodity prices, concerns persist about long-term demand and supply, and about the impact of high commodity prices on poor people. The report’s authors examine whether the world might be heading into a prolonged period of insufficiency, with—as some fear—dwindling supplies of oil, metals, and food grains, and ever-increasing prices. They also look at how poor people are affected and how best they can be helped.

“We find that speculation about looming shortages of food and energy are not well founded, and that the world won’t run out of key commodities given the right policies,” said Andrew Burns, lead author of the report, “How things actually play out over the next 20 years depends on governments taking steps to reduce oil dependence, promote alternative energy, combat climate change, and boost farm productivity.”

Why won’t commodities quickly grow scarce? The world economy is entering a phase of slower growth, due to slower population growth, ageing in high-income countries and slower growth in some large fast-growing developing countries as income levels catch up. Also, technological progress has reduced the energy and food resources used per unit of GDP. China’s metal demand—which accounts for a global rise in metal intensity—is expected to stabilize, then decline in step with the rest of the world.

Demand in developing countries for new cars and trucks is likely to drive 75 percent of additional energy needs between now and 2030, so efficiency gains in transport are critical. These gains potentially include hybrid, electric, and hydrogen-powered cars.

With slowing population growth, the world is unlikely to run out of food. But supply might not keep pace with demand in some countries with fast growing populations, especially in Africa. These countries need to boost domestic agricultural productivity by improving rural road networks and increasing agricultural research and development.

“Climate change could cause agricultural productivity to decline by as much as 25 percent by 2080 if nothing is done,” said Burns, “There is no reason for complacency and lots of room for policy action, including supporting improved technologies.”

Food prices will likely continue to be more sensitive to oil prices as a result of increased biofuel production from food crops. However, new technologies such as non-grain-based biofuels and other energy alternatives could make grain-based biofuels uneconomical.

Commodity exports and economic growth
Another key finding from the report is that commodity exports can promote growth given the right policies. In particular, the report notes that although resource-dependent countries tend to grow slowly, resource-rich countries tend to be high-income countries.

The report concludes that rather than commodity dependence causing slow growth and poverty, it is slow growth – the failure to develop the non-commodity sectors of an economy – that explains commodity dependence.

Resource-rich countries have managed their recent windfall revenues more prudently than in the past, and so are better prepared for the current decline in prices. But countries with new-found resources and those heavily reliant on bank lending may be at risk.

Impact of high commodity prices on poverty
Finally, the report notes that high commodity prices—particularly of food—have had a profound impact on poverty, pushing 130 to 155 million people below the poverty line just between December 2005 and December 2007. The worst impact was in urban areas. While government policies reacted swiftly to offset the worst effects of the higher prices, many of these efforts were poorly targeted and expensive.

“ Looking forward, social assistance programs need to be better targeted so that the next time these programs are scaled up during a crisis, a much larger share of the aid reaches those most in need.” concluded Burns. “Action is also needed at the global level to discourage export bans of food grains, strengthen agencies like the World Food Programme, and improve information about and coordination of existing domestic grain reserves.”

Extracts:
Prospects for the Global Economy
Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodity Markets at the Crossroads

Outlook summary
The stresses in U.S. financial markets that first emerged in the summer of 2007 transformed themselves into a full-blown global financial crisis in the fall of 2008. As the crisis intensified, the effects of financial turmoil on developing countries increased in step, as risk aversion sent spreads soaring, equity markets tumbling, exchange rates falling and capital flows into decline. In this climate, growth prospects for both high-income and developing countries have deteriorated substantially, and a movement of global growth from 2.5 percent in 2008 to 0.9 percent in 2009 appears to be in the cards.

Forecast summary
A table summarizing the forecast. More detailed information is available here.

Financial markets
The worsening financial environment reached a climax in September 2008, with the sudden collapse of several major financial institutions in the United States, raising fears that escalating financial pressures could pose a systemic risk to the international financial system. Authorities in the United States and Europe undertook extraordinary measures to stabilize the banking system and to get credit markets functioning once more. But as credit conditions tightened, emerging markets began to feel the effects of the credit and capital market squeeze in high-income markets, and these effects will heighten, even as measures to consolidate banking systems begin to take hold.

Global outlook
The United States, Japan and the Euro Area are anticipated to fall into simultaneous recession during the second half of 2008, before gradual recovery sets in during the first half of 2009. Recovery for the group in 2010 is predicated on continued progress in stabilizing international financial markets, and thawing the flow of credit from its current frozen status. OECD GDP may decline by 0.1 percent in 2009 and revive to 2.0 percent in 2010. For developing countries, growth will be affected by the OECD downturn through depressed trade flows, falling oil and non-energy commodity prices, as well as disruption to financial flows. Softer investment growth in 2009 is expected to reduce aggregate growth to 4.5 percent, down from 6.3 percent in 2008. Recovery in 2010 should follow that in the high-income countries, with growth rebounding to a 6.1 percent pace.

Regional summaries
Growth will fall below 5 percent for the aggregate of developing countries in 2009, for the first time since the downturn of the early 1990s. Aside from the falloff in trade, spillover effects from the financial meltdown in the high-income economies will have a dampening effect on investment spending in emerging markets, a key source of growth over the past five years. Growth outturns vary by region, depending on the vulnerability of countries within a region to financial stress in international markets.

World trade
World trade is expected to decline by some 2.1 percent during 2009, the first such falloff since 1982. With import demand turning to negative ground across the OECD countries, developing countries will find it quite difficult to generate any positive gains in exports, serving to take a toll on growth. At the same time, dramatic changes in the terms of trade across oil-exporters and oil-importing countries will amplify the effects on current account stemming from trade volumes.

Commodity markets
Following a surge in crude oil-, foods and raw materials prices over 2006 to mid-2008, as oil prices gained some 150 percent over its 2005 levels to peak at $145/bbl, and foods (especially grains) advanced about 75 percent, prices began to retrench, largely as signs of impending recession reduced expectations for demand for energy, metals, food- and feedstuffs. The earlier ratcheting of international commodity prices served to boost inflation across the globe, more so in developing countries, and had the effect for net food-importing countries of exacerbating poverty for segments of the poor across a wide spectrum of countries. The sequential plummeting of prices will offer a degree of relief on the inflation front—opening up some fiscal room for countercyclical measures—while yielding large shifts in global current account balances in the next years.

Key risks and uncertainties
The large-scale deterioration in financial markets and underlying economic conditions has combined to create an extremely uncertain environment for market participants—and forecasters alike. A wide range of possible outcomes for the global economy is possible at this juncture.

Long-term prospects and poverty forecast
Despite the current downturn and heightened uncertainties, the forecast for developing countries through 2015 is broadly in line with last year’s forecast predicated on a relatively rapid rebound. This forecast combined with the significant progress in reducing extreme poverty since 1990 in some key large regions implies that at the global level the goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015 is expected to be reached—though not in all regions, notably Sub-Saharan Africa. This year’s poverty forecast nonetheless represents a significant change from the past as it reflects the results of a new and broader survey of consumer prices (also known as purchasing power parities) across developing countries. The new price survey reveals that prices paid by consumers in developing countries are higher than previously estimated and thus—for a given poverty line—the percentage of poor is higher. For the benchmark year of 1990, the percentage of poor in developing countries is now estimated to have been 41.6 percent rather than 28.7 percent using the old price survey—changing the 2015 goal to 20.8 percent instead of 14.4 percent. In aggregate, the number of poor living in extreme poverty is estimated to have been nearly 1.4 billion in 2005.

Regional outlooks
This section offers more-detailed discussion of recent developments, issues in the outlook and projections and risks through 2010 for low-and middle income countries and World Bank regions.

383) China: movimento Carta 08 pede democracia e reformas profundas

O precedente mais imediato desta iniciativa, abaixo transcrita, situa-se exatamente um século atrás, quando estudantes começaram manifestações pacíficas para modernizar o então sistema imperial, acabar com a autocracia e criar um moderno sistema parlamentar na China.
O resultado foi a revolução republicana de Sun-Yat Sen, em 1911, que acabou com a monarquia e tentou instalar um regime republicano parlamentar.
Não foi possivel estabilizar um regime democrático, inclusive porque a China vivia submetida ao regime de concessões em favor das principais potências imperiais européias, EUA inclusive, a partir dos tratados desiguais de 1844 (que terminaram apenas um século depois, em plena Segunda Guerra) que concederam Honk-Kong para a GB por um século e impuseram o sistema de extra-territorialidade em favor dos estrangeiros, que inclusive dispunham de zonas exclusivas em várias cidades e portos.
A China, já humilhada pelo Japão em 1895, mergulhou, a partir dos anos 1920, num quadro de guerras intermitentes entre generais e chefes regionais, o que impeliu o Japão a invadi-la e submetê-la, a partir da Mandchuria, em 1931.
O resto foi história, de guerra ou de totalitarismo, inclusive o massacre de Nanquim, perpetrado pelos japoneses, em 1937, e a guerra civil depois da derrota do Japão, em 1945, que culminou com a vitória dos comunistas em 1949, e a expulsão dos nacionalistas para Taiwan.
Talvez a Carta 08 consiga seus objetivos, dentro de mais uma geração, provavelmente, quando a prosperidade for suficiente para que o Partido Comunista admita uma liberalização ampliada...
A China NUNCA conheceu democracia, jamais... (como a Russia, aliás...).
-------------
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

China's Charter 08
The New York Review of Books, Volume 56, Number 1 · January 15, 2009
Translated from the Chinese by Perry Link

The document below, signed by more than two thousand Chinese citizens, was conceived and written in conscious admiration of the founding of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, where, in January 1977, more than two hundred Czech and Slovak intellectuals formed a

loose, informal, and open association of people...united by the will to strive individually and collectively for respect for human and civil rights in our country and throughout the world.

The Chinese document calls not for ameliorative reform of the current political system but for an end to some of its essential features, including one-party rule, and their replacement with a system based on human rights and democracy.

The prominent citizens who have signed the document are from both outside and inside the government, and include not only well-known dissidents and intellectuals, but also middle-level officials and rural leaders. They chose December 10, the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the day on which to express their political ideas and to outline their vision of a constitutional, democratic China. They want Charter 08 to serve as a blueprint for fundamental political change in China in the years to come. The signers of the document will form an informal group, open-ended in size but united by a determination to promote democratization and protection of human rights in China and beyond.

Following the text is a postscript describing some of the regime's recent reactions to it.
—Perry Link

I. FOREWORD
A hundred years have passed since the writing of China's first constitution. 2008 also marks the sixtieth anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the thirtieth anniversary of the appearance of the Democracy Wall in Beijing, and the tenth of China's signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We are approaching the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracy student protesters. The Chinese people, who have endured human rights disasters and uncountable struggles across these same years, now include many who see clearly that freedom, equality, and human rights are universal values of humankind and that democracy and constitutional government are the fundamental framework for protecting these values.

By departing from these values, the Chinese government's approach to "modernization" has proven disastrous. It has stripped people of their rights, destroyed their dignity, and corrupted normal human intercourse. So we ask: Where is China headed in the twenty-first century? Will it continue with "modernization" under authoritarian rule, or will it embrace universal human values, join the mainstream of civilized nations, and build a democratic system? There can be no avoiding these questions.

The shock of the Western impact upon China in the nineteenth century laid bare a decadent authoritarian system and marked the beginning of what is often called "the greatest changes in thousands of years" for China. A "self-strengthening movement" followed, but this aimed simply at appropriating the technology to build gunboats and other Western material objects. China's humiliating naval defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895 only confirmed the obsolescence of China's system of government. The first attempts at modern political change came with the ill-fated summer of reforms in 1898, but these were cruelly crushed by ultraconservatives at China's imperial court. With the revolution of 1911, which inaugurated Asia's first republic, the authoritarian imperial system that had lasted for centuries was finally supposed to have been laid to rest. But social conflict inside our country and external pressures were to prevent it; China fell into a patchwork of warlord fiefdoms and the new republic became a fleeting dream.

The failure of both "self- strengthening" and political renovation caused many of our forebears to reflect deeply on whether a "cultural illness" was afflicting our country. This mood gave rise, during the May Fourth Movement of the late 1910s, to the championing of "science and democracy." Yet that effort, too, foundered as warlord chaos persisted and the Japanese invasion [beginning in Manchuria in 1931] brought national crisis.

Victory over Japan in 1945 offered one more chance for China to move toward modern government, but the Communist defeat of the Nationalists in the civil war thrust the nation into the abyss of totalitarianism. The "new China" that emerged in 1949 proclaimed that "the people are sovereign" but in fact set up a system in which "the Party is all-powerful." The Communist Party of China seized control of all organs of the state and all political, economic, and social resources, and, using these, has produced a long trail of human rights disasters, including, among many others, the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), the June Fourth [Tiananmen Square] Massacre (1989), and the current repression of all unauthorized religions and the suppression of the weiquan rights movement [a movement that aims to defend citizens' rights promulgated in the Chinese Constitution and to fight for human rights recognized by international conventions that the Chinese government has signed]. During all this, the Chinese people have paid a gargantuan price. Tens of millions have lost their lives, and several generations have seen their freedom, their happiness, and their human dignity cruelly trampled.

During the last two decades of the twentieth century the government policy of "Reform and Opening" gave the Chinese people relief from the pervasive poverty and totalitarianism of the Mao Zedong era, and brought substantial increases in the wealth and living standards of many Chinese as well as a partial restoration of economic freedom and economic rights. Civil society began to grow, and popular calls for more rights and more political freedom have grown apace. As the ruling elite itself moved toward private ownership and the market economy, it began to shift from an outright rejection of "rights" to a partial acknowledgment of them.

In 1998 the Chinese government signed two important international human rights conventions; in 2004 it amended its constitution to include the phrase "respect and protect human rights"; and this year, 2008, it has promised to promote a "national human rights action plan." Unfortunately most of this political progress has extended no further than the paper on which it is written. The political reality, which is plain for anyone to see, is that China has many laws but no rule of law; it has a constitution but no constitutional government. The ruling elite continues to cling to its authoritarian power and fights off any move toward political change.

The stultifying results are endemic official corruption, an undermining of the rule of law, weak human rights, decay in public ethics, crony capitalism, growing inequality between the wealthy and the poor, pillage of the natural environment as well as of the human and historical environments, and the exacerbation of a long list of social conflicts, especially, in recent times, a sharpening animosity between officials and ordinary people.

As these conflicts and crises grow ever more intense, and as the ruling elite continues with impunity to crush and to strip away the rights of citizens to freedom, to property, and to the pursuit of happiness, we see the powerless in our society—the vulnerable groups, the people who have been suppressed and monitored, who have suffered cruelty and even torture, and who have had no adequate avenues for their protests, no courts to hear their pleas—becoming more militant and raising the possibility of a violent conflict of disastrous proportions. The decline of the current system has reached the point where change is no longer optional.

II. OUR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
This is a historic moment for China, and our future hangs in the balance. In reviewing the political modernization process of the past hundred years or more, we reiterate and endorse basic universal values as follows:

Freedom. Freedom is at the core of universal human values. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom in where to live, and the freedoms to strike, to demonstrate, and to protest, among others, are the forms that freedom takes. Without freedom, China will always remain far from civilized ideals.

Human rights. Human rights are not bestowed by a state. Every person is born with inherent rights to dignity and freedom. The government exists for the protection of the human rights of its citizens. The exercise of state power must be authorized by the people. The succession of political disasters in China's recent history is a direct consequence of the ruling regime's disregard for human rights.

Equality. The integrity, dignity, and freedom of every person—regardless of social station, occupation, sex, economic condition, ethnicity, skin color, religion, or political belief—are the same as those of any other. Principles of equality before the law and equality of social, economic, cultural, civil, and political rights must be upheld.

Republicanism. Republicanism, which holds that power should be balanced among different branches of government and competing interests should be served, resembles the traditional Chinese political ideal of "fairness in all under heaven." It allows different interest groups and social assemblies, and people with a variety of cultures and beliefs, to exercise democratic self-government and to deliberate in order to reach peaceful resolution of public questions on a basis of equal access to government and free and fair competition.

Democracy. The most fundamental principles of democracy are that the people are sovereign and the people select their government. Democracy has these characteristics: (1) Political power begins with the people and the legitimacy of a regime derives from the people. (2) Political power is exercised through choices that the people make. (3) The holders of major official posts in government at all levels are determined through periodic competitive elections. (4) While honoring the will of the majority, the fundamental dignity, freedom, and human rights of minorities are protected. In short, democracy is a modern means for achieving government truly "of the people, by the people, and for the people."

Constitutional rule. Constitutional rule is rule through a legal system and legal regulations to implement principles that are spelled out in a constitution. It means protecting the freedom and the rights of citizens, limiting and defining the scope of legitimate government power, and providing the administrative apparatus necessary to serve these ends.

III. WHAT WE ADVOCATE
Authoritarianism is in general decline throughout the world; in China, too, the era of emperors and overlords is on the way out. The time is arriving everywhere for citizens to be masters of states. For China the path that leads out of our current predicament is to divest ourselves of the authoritarian notion of reliance on an "enlightened overlord" or an "honest official" and to turn instead toward a system of liberties, democracy, and the rule of law, and toward fostering the consciousness of modern citizens who see rights as fundamental and participation as a duty. Accordingly, and in a spirit of this duty as responsible and constructive citizens, we offer the following recommendations on national governance, citizens' rights, and social development:

1. A New Constitution. We should recast our present constitution, rescinding its provisions that contradict the principle that sovereignty resides with the people and turning it into a document that genuinely guarantees human rights, authorizes the exercise of public power, and serves as the legal underpinning of China's democratization. The constitution must be the highest law in the land, beyond violation by any individual, group, or political party.

2. Separation of Powers. We should construct a modern government in which the separation of legislative, judicial, and executive power is guaranteed. We need an Administrative Law that defines the scope of government responsibility and prevents abuse of administrative power. Government should be responsible to taxpayers. Division of power between provincial governments and the central government should adhere to the principle that central powers are only those specifically granted by the constitution and all other powers belong to the local governments.

3. Legislative Democracy. Members of legislative bodies at all levels should be chosen by direct election, and legislative democracy should observe just and impartial principles.

4. An Independent Judiciary. The rule of law must be above the interests of any particular political party and judges must be independent. We need to establish a constitutional supreme court and institute procedures for constitutional review. As soon as possible, we should abolish all of the Committees on Political and Legal Affairs that now allow Communist Party officials at every level to decide politically sensitive cases in advance and out of court. We should strictly forbid the use of public offices for private purposes.

5. Public Control of Public Servants. The military should be made answerable to the national government, not to a political party, and should be made more professional. Military personnel should swear allegiance to the constitution and remain nonpartisan. Political party organizations must be prohibited in the military. All public officials including police should serve as nonpartisans, and the current practice of favoring one political party in the hiring of public servants must end.

6. Guarantee of Human Rights. There must be strict guarantees of human rights and respect for human dignity. There should be a Human Rights Committee, responsible to the highest legislative body, that will prevent the government from abusing public power in violation of human rights. A democratic and constitutional China especially must guarantee the personal freedom of citizens. No one should suffer illegal arrest, detention, arraignment, interrogation, or punishment. The system of "Reeducation through Labor" must be abolished.

7. Election of Public Officials. There should be a comprehensive system of democratic elections based on "one person, one vote." The direct election of administrative heads at the levels of county, city, province, and nation should be systematically implemented. The rights to hold periodic free elections and to participate in them as a citizen are inalienable.

8. Rural–Urban Equality. The two-tier household registry system must be abolished. This system favors urban residents and harms rural residents. We should establish instead a system that gives every citizen the same constitutional rights and the same freedom to choose where to live.

9. Freedom to Form Groups. The right of citizens to form groups must be guaranteed. The current system for registering nongovernment groups, which requires a group to be "approved," should be replaced by a system in which a group simply registers itself. The formation of political parties should be governed by the constitution and the laws, which means that we must abolish the special privilege of one party to monopolize power and must guarantee principles of free and fair competition among political parties.

10. Freedom to Assemble. The constitution provides that peaceful assembly, demonstration, protest, and freedom of expression are fundamental rights of a citizen. The ruling party and the government must not be permitted to subject these to illegal interference or unconstitutional obstruction.

11. Freedom of Expression. We should make freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and academic freedom universal, thereby guaranteeing that citizens can be informed and can exercise their right of political supervision. These freedoms should be upheld by a Press Law that abolishes political restrictions on the press. The provision in the current Criminal Law that refers to "the crime of incitement to subvert state power" must be abolished. We should end the practice of viewing words as crimes.

12. Freedom of Religion. We must guarantee freedom of religion and belief, and institute a separation of religion and state. There must be no governmental interference in peaceful religious activities. We should abolish any laws, regulations, or local rules that limit or suppress the religious freedom of citizens. We should abolish the current system that requires religious groups (and their places of worship) to get official approval in advance and substitute for it a system in which registry is optional and, for those who choose to register, automatic.

13. Civic Education. In our schools we should abolish political curriculums and examinations that are designed to indoctrinate students in state ideology and to instill support for the rule of one party. We should replace them with civic education that advances universal values and citizens' rights, fosters civic consciousness, and promotes civic virtues that serve society.

14. Protection of Private Property. We should establish and protect the right to private property and promote an economic system of free and fair markets. We should do away with government monopolies in commerce and industry and guarantee the freedom to start new enterprises. We should establish a Committee on State-Owned Property, reporting to the national legislature, that will monitor the transfer of state-owned enterprises to private ownership in a fair, competitive, and orderly manner. We should institute a land reform that promotes private ownership of land, guarantees the right to buy and sell land, and allows the true value of private property to be adequately reflected in the market.

15. Financial and Tax Reform. We should establish a democratically regulated and accountable system of public finance that ensures the protection of taxpayer rights and that operates through legal procedures. We need a system by which public revenues that belong to a certain level of government—central, provincial, county or local—are controlled at that level. We need major tax reform that will abolish any unfair taxes, simplify the tax system, and spread the tax burden fairly. Government officials should not be able to raise taxes, or institute new ones, without public deliberation and the approval of a democratic assembly. We should reform the ownership system in order to encourage competition among a wider variety of market participants.

16. Social Security. We should establish a fair and adequate social security system that covers all citizens and ensures basic access to education, health care, retirement security, and employment.

17. Protection of the Environment. We need to protect the natural environment and to promote development in a way that is sustainable and responsible to our descendants and to the rest of humanity. This means insisting that the state and its officials at all levels not only do what they must do to achieve these goals, but also accept the supervision and participation of nongovernmental organizations.

18. A Federated Republic. A democratic China should seek to act as a responsible major power contributing toward peace and development in the Asian Pacific region by approaching others in a spirit of equality and fairness. In Hong Kong and Macao, we should support the freedoms that already exist. With respect to Taiwan, we should declare our commitment to the principles of freedom and democracy and then, negotiating as equals and ready to compromise, seek a formula for peaceful unification. We should approach disputes in the national-minority areas of China with an open mind, seeking ways to find a workable framework within which all ethnic and religious groups can flourish. We should aim ultimately at a federation of democratic communities of China.

19. Truth in Reconciliation. We should restore the reputations of all people, including their family members, who suffered political stigma in the political campaigns of the past or who have been labeled as criminals because of their thought, speech, or faith. The state should pay reparations to these people. All political prisoners and prisoners of conscience must be released. There should be a Truth Investigation Commission charged with finding the facts about past injustices and atrocities, determining responsibility for them, upholding justice, and, on these bases, seeking social reconciliation.

China, as a major nation of the world, as one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and as a member of the UN Council on Human Rights, should be contributing to peace for humankind and progress toward human rights. Unfortunately, we stand today as the only country among the major nations that remains mired in authoritarian politics. Our political system continues to produce human rights disasters and social crises, thereby not only constricting China's own development but also limiting the progress of all of human civilization. This must change, truly it must. The democratization of Chinese politics can be put off no longer.

Accordingly, we dare to put civic spirit into practice by announcing Charter 08. We hope that our fellow citizens who feel a similar sense of crisis, responsibility, and mission, whether they are inside the government or not, and regardless of their social status, will set aside small differences to embrace the broad goals of this citizens' movement. Together we can work for major changes in Chinese society and for the rapid establishment of a free, democratic, and constitutional country. We can bring to reality the goals and ideals that our people have incessantly been seeking for more than a hundred years, and can bring a brilliant new chapter to Chinese civilization.

—Translated from the Chinese by Perry Link

POSTSCRIPT
The planning and drafting of Charter 08 began in the late spring of 2008, but Chinese authorities were apparently unaware of it or unconcerned by it until several days before it was announced on December 10. On December 6, Wen Kejian, a writer who signed the charter, was detained in the city of Hangzhou in eastern China and questioned for about an hour. Police told Wen that Charter 08 was "different" from earlier dissident statements, and "a fairly grave matter." They said there would be a coordinated investigation in all cities and provinces to "root out the organizers," and they advised Wen to remove his name from the charter. Wen declined, telling the authorities that he saw the charter as a fundamental turning point in history.

Meanwhile, on December 8, in Shenzhen in the far south of China, police called on Zhao Dagong, a writer and signer of the charter, for a "chat." They told Zhao that the central authorities were concerned about the charter and asked if he was the organizer in the Shenzhen area.

Later on December 8, at 11 PM in Beijing, about twenty police entered the home of Zhang Zuhua, one of the charter's main drafters. A few of the police took Zhang with them to the local police station while the rest stayed and, as Zhang's wife watched, searched the home and confiscated books, notebooks, Zhang's passport, all four of the family's computers, and all of their cash and credit cards. (Later Zhang learned that his family's bank accounts, including those of both his and his wife's parents, had been emptied.) Meanwhile, at the police station, Zhang was detained for twelve hours, where he was questioned in detail about Charter 08 and the group Chinese Human Rights Defenders in which he is active.

It was also late on December 8 that another of the charter's signers, the literary critic and prominent dissident Liu Xiaobo, was taken away by police. His telephone in Beijing went unanswered, as did e-mail and Skype messages sent to him. As of the present writing, he's believed to be in police custody, although the details of his detention are not known.

On the morning of December 9, Beijing lawyer Pu Zhiqiang was called in for a police "chat," and in the evening the physicist and philosopher Jiang Qisheng was called in as well. Both had signed the charter and were friends of the drafters. On December 10—the day the charter was formally announced—the Hangzhou police returned to the home of Wen Kejian, the writer they had questioned four days earlier. This time they were more threatening. They told Wen he would face severe punishment if he wrote about the charter or about Liu Xiaobo's detention. "Do you want three years in prison?" they asked. "Or four?"

On December 11 the journalist Gao Yu and the writer Liu Di, both well-known in Beijing, were interrogated about their signing of the Charter. The rights lawyer, Teng Biao, was approached by the police but declined, on principle, to meet with them. On December 12 and 13 there were reports of interrogations in many provinces—Shaanxi, Hunan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and others—of people who had seen the charter on the Internet, found that they agreed with it, and signed. With these people the police focused on two questions: "How did you get involved?" and "What do you know about the drafters and organizers?"

The Chinese authorities seem unaware of the irony of their actions. Their efforts to quash Charter 08 only serve to underscore China's failure to uphold the very principles that the charter advances. The charter calls for "free expression" but the regime says, by its actions, that it has once again denied such expression. The charter calls for freedom to form groups, but the nationwide police actions that have accompanied the charter's release have specifically aimed at blocking the formation of a group. The charter says "we should end the practice of viewing words as crimes," and the regime says (literally, to Wen Kejian) "we can send you to prison for these words." The charter calls for the rule of law and the regime sends police in the middle of the night to act outside the law; the charter says "police should serve as nonpartisans," and here the police are plainly partisan.

Charter 08 is signed only by citizens of the People's Republic of China who are living inside China. But Chinese living outside China are signing a letter of strong support for the charter. The eminent historian Yu Ying-shih, the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, writers Ha Jin and Zheng Yi, and more than 160 others have so far signed.

On December 12, the Dalai Lama issued his own letter in support of the charter, writing that "a harmonious society can only come into being when there is trust among the people, freedom from fear, freedom of expression, rule of law, justice, and equality." He called on the Chinese government to release prisoners "who have been detained for exercising their freedom of expression."

—Perry Link, December 18, 2008

382) Um novo Bretton Woods? Talvez, mas parece dificil

From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods
A New Multilateral Trade Agenda
By Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian
From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009

Summary: Trade problems are an underlying cause of the financial crisis. To truly revive the world economy, a new trade consensus is necessary.

AADITYA MATTOO is Lead Economist in the Development Research Group of the World Bank. ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN is a Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and at the Center for Global Development.

When the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations was launched, in 2001, the price of oil was $25 a barrel, a ton of rice cost $170, China's current account surplus was two percent of the country's GDP, U.S. financial institutions were at the vanguard of globalization, and the term "sovereign wealth fund" could have been mistakenly thought to refer to the retirement kitty of an aging monarch.

As of November 10, 2008, oil was going for $65 a barrel, and rice for $515 a ton. China and the oil-producing states have trillions of dollars at their disposal. The U.S. financial system, in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, is teetering between socialization and oblivion. As all these changes have unfolded, the governments involved in the Doha talks have, Nero-like, spent too much time dwelling on minor issues while ignoring the burning questions. After the failure of the recent round of negotiations this past July in Geneva, the international community will be tempted to resuscitate the Doha process. Indeed, as part of calls to reshape the international financial system -- under a proposed Bretton Woods II -- British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has pushed for the completion of the Doha Round.

But this effort to revive Doha seems inadequate because the existing Doha agenda does not respond to the challenges posed by increasing global integration. Fluctuating commodity prices, threats to the economic security of middle-class workers, financial instability, and environmental insecurity have significant global implications that demand a multilateral response. Going forward, a new round of Bretton Woods talks is needed to develop a more ambitious agenda than Doha has and to involve a broader set of institutions than just the World Trade Organization (WTO).

A STALLED CONVERSATION

Since the mid-1990s, world trade has grown rapidly, at a pace of approximately six percent a year -- twice as fast as global economic output. During that time, however, WTO members have not adjusted the maximum levels of tariffs and other barriers that they can maintain on goods and services. In other words, overall trade has flourished, but the multilateral process that governs trade has languished.

Trade has grown throughout the world because many governments have increasingly come to believe that openness promotes long-term development. Many unilaterally liberalized their regulations on goods and services. Tariffs on goods have declined from a worldwide average of over 25 percent in 1980 to less than ten percent today. Many states have drastically reduced barriers to foreign investment and international trade in various service sectors, including finance, telecommunications, transport, and retail. Much of this liberalization has taken place in the context of regional trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and a series of agreements between the European Union and its eastern neighbors. Since the early 1990s, the number of such pacts has risen from under 90 to nearly 400.

These parallel unilateral and regional efforts at liberalization ended up robbing the multilateral process of some of its raison d'être. By the time the Doha talks resumed in Geneva last summer, little of consequence was even on the table. In richer developing countries -- a group that includes Brazil, China, and India -- the reforms proposed would have left average tariff rates for agricultural goods unchanged, at about 13.5 percent, and would have reduced tariff rates for manufactured goods only slightly, from 6.4 percent to 5.6 percent.

Supporters of the Doha process concede that its goals when it comes to lowering trade barriers are modest but argue that its real purpose is to provide security for trading partners: legal commitments offer mutual assurances that trade policies will not be reversed. This argument would be compelling if the Doha talks actually contemplated guarantees against states suddenly resorting to punitively high import tariffs, such as those imposed by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. In fact, the Doha proposals did not offer any meaningful guarantees of this kind. For example, under the proposals, the richer developing countries would still have had the leeway to adjust their agricultural tariffs by a margin of about 30 percentage points -- and this is when their actual such tariffs are, on average, already 13.5 percent.

One sign of Doha's limited relevance is that the groups traditionally at the forefront of multilateral liberalization -- private corporations in the intellectual-property, manufacturing, and service sectors -- are now notable by their absence from the process. So modest were Doha's aims this past summer, that even the usual antiglobalization protesters did not bother to show up in Geneva.

UNCERTAIN SUPPLY, UNCERTAIN MARKETS

Fueled by increasing productivity and low inflation, the world economy enjoyed its most pronounced growth spurt ever between 2002 and 2007. But in the last year, abundant supplies have given way to widespread shortages. Rising commodity prices have endangered food and energy security. Over the last three years, the increase in food prices has threatened to push as many as 100 million people into poverty. The current recession has led to a sharp decline in agricultural prices, but food prices are likely to remain high in the medium to long term because many of the underlying factors that have pushed them up -- greater demand in the developing world, high fuel prices, stagnant agricultural productivity, and pressure on agricultural supplies brought about by climate change -- will last.

The pressure on food prices has been exacerbated by restrictions on agricultural exports in a number of developing countries and by biofuel policies in industrial countries. Eighteen developing countries have imposed limitations on exports in order to maintain their domestic supplies. But as a result of such export controls, global food supplies have contracted and prices have risen, further aggravating global food insecurity.

The WTO has been of little help as the crisis has unfolded, because it permits taxes and quotas on agricultural exports. Under normal conditions, subsidies to farmers introduce huge distortions that encourage domestic production and exports. But under abnormal conditions, such as those prevailing now, the opposite occurs: countries tend to prevent exports and liberalize import regulations. If importers face such restrictions from producing countries during bad times, they are unlikely to think of international trade as a reliable means of maintaining food security and instead will be tempted to move toward more self-reliance. A vicious cycle results.

The second threat to food security has come from biofuel policies in the industrialized world. In the United States, the combination of ethanol mandates, tax credits for ethanol producers, and tariffs on imported Brazilian ethanol has meant that more land is being used to produce corn for biofuel and less is being devoted to wheat and soybean production. Other industrial countries have enacted similar policies, which, together with the United States' policies, account for as much as 70 percent of the increase in food prices worldwide, according to research conducted at the World Bank. And yet even as food prices soared and import barriers declined, the Doha talks continued to focus on traditional forms of agricultural protection, such as production subsidies, which have become less relevant. The trade agenda needs to be enlarged to include a discussion of all trade barriers -- on imports and exports -- and biofuel policies, including tariffs on imports.

FUELING GROWTH

The new trade agenda must also include a serious conversation about energy. There has been a dramatic rise in the price of oil since 2002, even though prices have declined from the peaks they reached last summer. Uncertainty about available supplies and increased demand from emerging countries such as China and India have resuscitated fears about energy security and pushed prices up. But another factor is the cartelization of oil markets by oil exporters. The power wielded by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) tends to be high when demand is high, as it is now. Oil is the world's most important traded commodity, yet a striking gap in the global trading system is the absence of any formal rules to prevent collusion by oil-producing states.

Rising oil prices have prompted a number of unilateral responses. Many oil-importing states have attempted to cushion consumers against price increases by subsidizing gasoline and heating fuel, especially for poorer households. In the process, they have sustained high world prices by dampening incentives to reduce consumption. For example, because of government subsidies, consumer prices for energy in India last year rose very little despite sharp increases worldwide. At the same time, states have considered taking unilateral action against OPEC. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives has approved a "NOPEC" bill that would allow the Justice Department to prosecute anticompetitive conduct by OPEC members. Legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate would require action against OPEC member states in retaliation for their collusion on export quotas. But neither U.S. antitrust law nor international trade rules currently offer protection against such collusion, even though it is against the spirit of open multilateral trade.

New multilateral trade rules should target cartels. The best course of action, drawing on precedents set by the WTO (for example, commodity agreements), would be to bring together the world's oil producers (both OPEC members and nonmembers such as Russia) and its oil consumers (represented, for example, by an expanded International Energy Agency) to draft a new set of rules on the global energy trade. Ideally, collusion on supply quotas would be outlawed, but without impairing a state's ability to stabilize prices or conserve its natural resources.

A FAIR EXCHANGE

Another major problem has been the persistent and substantial undervaluation of major currencies, especially the yuan (by about 20-60 percent) and those of some oil-exporting countries (by more than 100 percent). Undervalued currencies are in effect both an import tax and an export subsidy, and the countries that maintain them wind up hurting the profitability of industries in states with which they trade. To escape these adverse effects, capital in the ailing countries tends to relocate elsewhere, leaving immobile, generally low-skilled labor to bear the brunt of these states' declining competitiveness.

This issue increasingly resonates in domestic politics, especially in the United States, where it has prompted calls for action. The Nobel Prize laureates Paul Samuelson and Paul Krugman, among other prominent economists in the United States, have expressed concern about the impact of trade on the living standards of U.S. workers. Some American economists and lawmakers have called for imposing a duty on imports from countries with undervalued exchange rates. But any such unilateral action would be, by definition, partial and hence ineffective. Undervalued currencies affect more than just one country: China's cheap yuan, for example, has an impact not only on the United States and the European Union but also on emerging economies and African countries, whose products compete with China's on the world market.

A multilateral approach may prove more fruitful. Under the historical division of labor between the International Monetary Fund and the WTO, the IMF has jurisdiction over questions relating to exchange rates. But its oversight has been weak at best. Whereas the IMF has been able to influence member countries that have borrowed from it, it has not been successful in affecting economic policy in countries that do not need IMF money. Moreover, the IMF lacks an effective enforcement mechanism. Compounding these problems is the IMF's eroding legitimacy. It lost its status as a trusted interlocutor in emerging markets, particularly in Asia, after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. There, the IMF was seen as having failed to provide enough money to countries in need and as having attached unnecessarily tough conditions to its loans, which many believe aggravated the effects of the crisis. The IMF's governance structure is also outdated; it reflects the receding realities of the Atlantic-centered world of 1945 rather than the rise of Asia in the twenty-first century.

One possibility going forward would be for the IMF and the WTO to cooperate on exchange-rate issues. The IMF would continue to provide technical expertise to assess the valuation of currencies. But because undervalued currencies have serious consequences for global trade, it would make sense to take advantage of the WTO's enforcement mechanism, which is credible and effective. The WTO would not displace the IMF; rather, this arrangement would harness the comparative advantages of each institution.

NOUVEAUX RICHES

A growing concern is the nationalization of finance in the hands of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Governments in the developing world are holding increasingly large amounts of wealth in the form of foreign exchange reserves. Estimates by Morgan Stanley suggest that SWFs hold a total of $2.5 trillion today and that this number will grow to $12 trillion by 2015. The majority of these funds will be held by oil-exporting states, as well as China and other countries in East Asia.

The growth of SWFs has provoked two major fears. The first concern, which is macroeconomic, is that state funds can too easily destabilize global currency and bond markets, by, for example, suddenly shifting their portfolios from one market or sector to another. The second concern, which is microeconomic, is that SWFs could end up controlling sensitive or strategic industries in other countries.

The United States is in the process of adopting legislation that would tighten scrutiny of investments by foreign governments that raise security concerns. Similarly, the European Commission is considering acting to prevent corporate takeovers by publicly controlled foreign investment funds. But such unilateral actions could easily be construed as defensive and protectionist, especially if they are justified in the name of national security -- as was the case when the U.S. Congress scuttled the bid by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, or CNOOC, for the U.S. oil giant UNOCAL in 2005 and blocked Dubai Ports World's efforts to acquire control of U.S. shipping facilities in 2006.

The case for a multilateral approach to regulating SWFs is clear. Exporters of capital want secure access to investment opportunities in foreign markets, and importers of capital have legitimate concerns about the motivations of state investors and the consequences of such transactions. Mutually beneficial bargains are there for the making. The WTO is an appropriate forum for such deals because it already regulates private and government investments in key service sectors, such as finance, telecommunications, and transport. One way to manage such investments would be to require countries importing capital, such as the United States and EU member states, not to impose undue restrictions on investments. In return, SWFs would commit to following certain criteria -- transparency, an arms-length relationship with their national governments, and the pursuit of purely commercial objectives -- modeled after the voluntary code of conduct for SWFs negotiated under the auspices of the IMF in October 2008.

WORKING OFF THAT GLUT

Seismic changes shook the U.S. financial system in 2008. Many icons of capitalism disappeared or fell under government control in a matter of weeks. Whether or not one agrees with the Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf that these changes herald the end of an era of overly complex and underregulated finance, the crisis will certainly lead to a reexamination of national policies and international rules.

Better management of the imbalances that rocked the system must be a priority. Lax regulation, a bubble psychology, and perverse incentives for managers and rating agencies that profited from overestimating the value of assets underlying complex financial instruments were all factors. But one key macroeconomic cause was excess liquidity, which allowed for cheap loans and poor lending standards and kept afloat an unsustainably leveraged housing market. As Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke has explained, this excess liquidity was itself the result of a "global savings glut," by which he meant the large current account surpluses built up by China and the oil-producing states. Preventing the reemergence of such liquidity-fueled bubbles will require limiting such global imbalances in the future, and that calls for a multilateral approach. Cooperation on exchange rates and excessive commodity prices is a good way to start. But multilateral cooperation will also be necessary on the regulation of the financial sector. Although finance has become global, its regulation has remained national. If financial regulation is to remain a purely national question, then individual countries should have the freedom to determine the pace of the integration of their own financial systems into global economic institutions. Negotiations at the WTO or in the context of regional agreements should be more circumspect about pushing financial-sector liberalization and, especially, greater openness to short-term capital inflows.

Another option would be to move toward global regulation of finance. After last fall's crisis, any reconfiguration of the financial systems in the United States and the United Kingdom is likely to limit the leverage of banks and other financial institutions, such as hedge funds. But if other jurisdictions do not adopt similar rules, then national regulators will become concerned about a race to the bottom, with financial institutions fleeing to countries with fewer restrictions. Hence, some form of multilateral cooperation to coordinate national regulation seems necessary and desirable compared to uncoordinated national action. These efforts will require coordination between, on the one hand, the IMF and the WTO, which help guarantee states' financial openness, and, on the other hand, the Bank for International Settlements and the Financial Stability Forum (with expanded membership), which deal with financial regulation. A cooperative approach is necessary to make sure that when countries open themselves up to financial flows, they have the regulatory capacity to manage them, or, when they lack such capacity, they are able to restrict those flows.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS, NOT PROTECTIONISM

Climate change, increasingly recognized as the gravest danger to humanity, will be the subject of international negotiations at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen later this year. As the momentum for acting decisively on the issue picks up, there is growing talk of using trade as an instrument for furthering environmental objectives. In the United States, the most prominent bill under discussion in Congress is on restricting imports from countries that do not act adequately to protect the environment. The European Union has been contemplating enacting similar rules. European and U.S. producers of energy-intensive products, such as chemicals, metals, and paper, are pushing for restrictions on imports coming from China and India, where environmental standards are especially lax.

The international community will have an opportunity to design a new regime to manage both climate change and trade at the Copenhagen summit, the most significant such meeting since the conference in Kyoto in 1997. The key objective of that regime should be to ensure the participation of all the major carbon-emitting countries, including developing nations. The negotiations should therefore exclude up-front the threat of trade sanctions as a tool to force cooperation, as these tend to alienate developing nations. Instead, as Nicholas Stern, former chief economist of the World Bank, has proposed, participation and compliance should be secured through transfers of finance and technology -- particularly since most developing countries see climate change as a problem caused by emissions from the industrial world.

If all countries agree in Copenhagen to reduce carbon emissions across the board, then there will be little basis for trade restrictions in particular sectors. With economy-wide emissions targets, governments would retain the flexibility to mandate reductions across sectors of their economy as they see fit. Accordingly, they would be immune to punitive action from their trading partners in specific sectors. Of course, as under the Montreal Protocol, an international treaty that phases out substances that cause ozone depletion, whatever agreement emerges from Copenhagen could include a provision to allow for trade sanctions. But these trade sanctions should serve as enforcement mechanisms to be put in place only after cooperation is secured, not as sticks to induce cooperation in the first place.

UPDATING THE GUEST LIST

It is an old axiom of trade politics that the will of concentrated interests, typically those of producers and exporters, trumps the will of diffuse interests, usually those of consumers. The genius of the WTO's reciprocal framework was to harness exporters' interests in liberalization to overcome opposition from domestic producers fearful of foreign competition. Consumers were the incidental beneficiaries of reform.

Consumers and other actors with diffuse interests will need to play a more active role in driving the new trade agenda than they have in the past, because they now have more at stake. As evidence of their growing influence, governments in several developing countries have imposed agricultural export taxes, increased fuel subsidies, and tightened anti-inflationary policies. The natural next step is for governments to cooperate on furthering the security-minded interests of their constituents.

One challenge ahead, as the failure of the latest Doha meeting highlighted, will be to resolve differences between the world's traditional powers and its new powers, such as on the pace of liberalization. Although these states' divergent interests would seem to hinder chances for future cooperation in the WTO, the proposed new trade agenda would create more common interests and greater scope for give-and-take between existing and rising powers than have existed until now. All large oil consumers, be they traditional powers (the United States and Europe) or emerging ones (China and India) share an interest in an open energy market without artificial restrictions on supplies. If such a market were achieved, China and India would be less tempted to secure supply sources through costly bilateral deals. On exchange rates, large emerging economies, such as Brazil and South Korea, share an interest in ensuring that China and Middle Eastern states adopt less distortionary exchange-rate policies. Likewise, countries that import capital and those with SWFs all have a stake in keeping investment flowing, which means addressing the legitimate security concerns of host states.

Still, two questions remain: Which countries should participate in the negotiations, and what is the appropriate forum for the talks? It may not be necessary, or even desirable, to continue following the model of the Uruguay Round, in which all countries are invited to discuss all issues and are all bound by any resulting rules. With the failure of the Doha talks, such efforts to create rules that would apply uniformly to an increasingly diverse membership began to seem like dangerous overreaching. Some issues, such as investment by SWFs, would be best resolved by that subset of countries which are most directly involved. In some cases, the benefits of the agreements coming out of these limited talks could be extended to all of the WTO's members.

At the moment, the WTO is the lone official forum for most negotiations on trade issues. That makes it an appropriate venue for discussing trade restrictions in the agricultural sector, but not necessarily for discussing the other major economic issues of the day. Cooperation is needed between the WTO and the IMF on questions involving exchange rates and SWFs. For energy issues, both organizations that represent oil exporters, such as OPEC, and those that represent importers, such as an expanded version of the International Energy Agency, need to be involved. On the environment, and specifically climate change, the WTO should be subordinate to forums such as the upcoming Copenhagen summit.

FROM DOHA TO WASHINGTON

The Doha Round of trade negotiations was one of the more serious attempts at multilateral cooperation in recent years. It might be tempting, therefore, to exaggerate the consequences of its latest failure. But the issues now at stake in Doha are marginal, and, more important, Doha distracts attention from other matters of greater significance, such as the consequences for trade from misaligned exchange rates and environmental protection. Multilateral cooperation is needed to prevent any protectionist measures that these issues may provoke.

The outlook for multilateral cooperation has become cloudy. The United States, the world's acting hegemon, is facing economic disarray and finds itself distracted in Afghanistan and Iraq. Meanwhile, "the rise of the rest," as Fareed Zakaria, the editor of Newsweek International, has described what is happening to emerging powers, has dispersed power and complicated collective action. Despite these difficulties, however, it is time to start working on a new agenda that really matters, rather than trying to resuscitate an inconsequential enterprise. The interests of a more diverse group of actors are now at stake. This calls for a new approach to international cooperation and the reallocation of responsibilities among international institutions. A Bretton Woods II offers exactly this opportunity.

381) Novamente o mercado em discussao...

A FORÇA DOS MERCADOS
Rubem de Freitas Novaes*
O Estado de S. Paulo, 25/03/2004

Quando o Presidente da República estabelece um prazo até julho para que apareçam os bons resultados da atual política econômica e o Ministro José Dirceu, já reassumindo as rédeas da administração federal, informa que a mesma política “não será modificada contra o Ministro Palocci” (reparem na sutileza da ressalva!), ficamos autorizados a imaginar que o governo do PT não esperará as próximas eleições para tentar políticas alternativas, mais ousadas e coerentes com as velhas propostas da esquerda intervencionista. Com boas razões, surgem dúvidas e temores relacionados às possíveis reações do “mercado”. Mas, que “mercado” é este e como se manifesta quando contrariado?

Uns, quando se referem ao “mercado”, pensam nos frenéticos operadores de Bolsa, repassando ordens de compra e venda. Outros, imaginam a figura de economistas bem trajados, repetindo em uníssono as mesmas análises, em entrevistas à imprensa. A alguns outros, ocorre a figura dos “traders” de bancos e corretoras, agarrados a dois telefones, diante de telas repletas de gráficos e informações “on line”. Porém, “mercado” vai muito além destas imagens. É Gerdau e Antônio Ermírio e é Bill Gates e Warren Buffet. E é também o sapateiro da esquina e o barqueiro que vende bugigangas no mais longínquo rio da Amazônia. E não é só nas finanças, na indústria, na prestação de serviços e no comércio que o “mercado” se manifesta. Há o mercado de trabalho, de tecnologia e um vasto mercado para as idéias e as artes.

Com a globalização, estes diversos mercados ganharam novas dimensões. Contadores indianos, por exemplo, são contratados por empresas americanas para trabalhar sem sair de seus locais de origem. Indústrias passaram a ser simples montadoras de partes e peças produzidas por todo o globo terrestre. Inovações se multiplicam em ritmo alucinante e, quase que imediatamente, são incorporadas ao conhecimento generalizado. O comércio de bens e serviços se expande bem como se intensificam os fluxos de recursos humanos em busca das melhores oportunidades de trabalho. No setor financeiro, de maior transparência, impressiona o dinamismo, seja em termos de volume, seja em termos de velocidade dos ajustamentos. E nem falamos das maravilhas da internet!

Muitos se interrogam, ao raciocinar sobre o grande paradoxo de nossos tempos: Por que as teses da esquerda conquistam maiorias expressivas no ambiente acadêmico, na imprensa, nas artes, etc. e não prevalecem na prática? Por que diabos o socialismo, que tantas miragens oferece e está sempre a vencer o debate intelectual, se espatifa e perde terreno na esfera do real? A resposta é simples: é avassaladora a superioridade do capitalismo como forma de organização da produção e de indução a investimentos e inovações. Alemanha Ocidental versus Alemanha Oriental, Coréia do Sul versus Coréia do Norte, Estados Unidos versus União Soviética, onde quer que comparações puderam ser feitas, restou claro o caminho que trazia mais liberdade e prosperidade para as nações.

Mas, não só nas comparações históricas reside a força do capitalismo e dos mercados livres. Na dinâmica político-econômica de um país democrático, forças existem (mão invisível !?) que conspiram contra qualquer caminhada na direção do socialismo e impõem regras de corte capitalista. Se, por hipótese, assume um governo efetivamente liberal, favorável a um estado enxuto, com regras simples e estáveis, respeitador de contratos e direitos de propriedade e indutor do empreendorismo, tudo se encaixa na direção de maiores investimentos e produção. E melhora o emprego e a qualidade de vida da população. Contrariamente, quando se estabelece um governo que vê no Estado a solução de todos os males; que recorre pesadamente ao aumento de tributos e ao endividamento para financiar suas despesas; que faz crescer a burocracia e intervenções discricionárias no domínio econômico; que coloca em risco direitos de propriedade e põe sob dúvidas compromissos assumidos pelo Estado; que estimula atitude negativa da população com relação aos empresários, seguidamente caracterizados como espertalhões, sonegadores de impostos e exploradores da mão-de-obra, então tudo passa a correr na direção contrária ao verdadeiro interesse dos cidadãos.

Não basta a um governo ter um pequeno núcleo favorável à racionalidade econômica e simpático ao empresariado privado. Se os diversos escalões estão impregnados de funcionários com tendências tirânicas e intervencionistas, que vêm na empresa privada algo apenas suportável (e útil, para pagar impostos), o empreendedor sente a aversão e se retrai. É uma questão de pele e cheiro! E, ao se retrair, escasseiam investimentos, mingua a produção, reduz-se a renda e o emprego e a população se desilude, esperando para dar o troco nas urnas.

Sente-se, no Brasil de hoje, a tendência de resolver os problemas sociais com mais programas de governo. Despesas públicas crescentes significarão o estrangulamento ainda maior do setor privado. Poder-se-ia até conquistar alguma expansão, resultante de um crescimento do gasto público e de uma redução artificial dos juros. Mas será um vôo breve! Logo virá a subida do dólar, a inflação, a estagnação, o desemprego e a desesperança.

A experiência mundial tem sido pródiga em demonstrar que apenas o rumo do liberalismo conduz ao progresso sustentado. Governos de esquerda, com tendências socializantes, se já não tinham muita chance de êxito no passado, hoje, com a reação dos mercados amplificada pela globalização, não têm chance alguma. Não andemos para trás neste momento crucial de nossa história!

*O autor é Economista (UFRJ) com Doutorado pela Universidade de Chicago. Foi presidente do SEBRAE e diretor do BNDES

380) Revisitando um velho dialogo entre o mercado e o Estado...

...nem tão velho assim, posto que do início do Governo Lula, e ainda válido em suas grandes linhas.

DIÁLOGO CRUEL
Rubem de Freitas Novaes*
Valor Econômico, 17/02/03

Em artigo publicado no Valor, de 28/08/02, procurei mostrar que o “Mercado” era algo bem maior e melhor do que a imagem distorcida que dele se fazia na Imprensa e na Política. Isto não me impede, no entanto, de aproveitar esta imagem para conceber o seguinte diálogo, tramado no campo da ironia, mas baseado na realidade da nossa atual conjuntura, entre o Presidente Lula e um hipotético “ser” Mercado:

Mercado: - Como está indo Lula?

Lula: - Melhor do que jamais poderia imaginar. Depois de uma vitória expressiva nas urnas, tenho obtido sucesso absoluto no plano interno e no internacional. Aqui, índices nunca alcançados de aprovação popular e sólida maioria construída no Congresso, apesar de certas escaramuças com alguns de nossos radicais. Lá fora, depois de construir uma ponte entre o Fórum Social de Porto Alegre e o Fórum Econômico Mundial, passo a ser considerado o novo símbolo da terceira via, capaz de compatibilizar responsabilidade macroeconômica e combate à pobreza. Já sou íntimo do Bush, do Chirac e do Schröder e estabeleci uma clara liderança na América Latina. Muito bom para começar, não é? E você, como vai?

M: - Eu, como sempre, na expectativa. Não sou muito de me convencer rapidamente das coisas, mas confesso que os primeiros passos de seu governo, na área macroeconômica, me impressionaram favoravelmente. Não pode é perder o ritmo. Para continuar com o meu apoio, pelo menos esta reforma previdenciária tem que sair para valer ainda este ano. Aliás, não é só isto. Tem que enquadrar seus ministros e parlamentares de esquerda para que eu não me lembre que um dia você também já teve sonhos socialistas.

L: - Acho que você está sendo um pouco arrogante e que se equivoca ao imaginar que eu possa ter abandonado as minhas teses antigas. Fala como se eu fosse agora um companheiro seu, o que não é verdade.

M: - Não é, mas é como se fosse. Você não tem alternativas fora das minhas recomendações. Quer queira, quer não, você é prisioneiro das idéias dominantes. Com a globalização dos mercados e com o volume e velocidade dos fluxos financeiros internacionais nenhum governante tem mais condições de desconsiderar impunemente os mandamentos do “Consenso de Washington”.

L: - Engana-se, meu caro. Estamos trabalhando para construir um enorme superávit na balança comercial, dependeremos cada vez menos do capital externo e chegará o ponto em que poderemos dispor de autonomia para traçar os destinos do país, segundo a nossa vontade. Não decepcionarei àqueles que caminharam comigo ao longo das últimas décadas!

M: - Balela! Não há futuro fora das regras estabelecidas pelas grandes nações. Surfa-se a onda gigante ou choca-se contra ela. Não creio também que você vá querer perder o respeito dos principais líderes mundiais, nem dispensar a audiência que conquistou em Davos. Essas coisas, depois que a gente experimenta .... E ainda existem as restrições internas.

L: - A que restrições internas você se refere?

M: - Quem tem a dívida pública do tamanho da sua tem que me tratar muitíssimo bem. Se não me oferecer um belo juro e mostrar que está produzindo superávits primários robustos, deixo de financiar o governo, vem uma baita expansão monetária e o país vai para a hiperinflação.

L: - Presunçoso, hein? Cuidado com a sua recorrente arrogância. A dívida interna pode rapidamente deixar de ser um problema do devedor e ....

M: - E quem disse que eu sou o credor? Isto é coisa do passado. Carrego apenas pequena parcela da dívida. Sou simplesmente administrador da poupança de milhões de indivíduos e empresas, estes sim credores importantes do governo. Não só a legislação protege os ativos da população de arbitrariedades vindas do Executivo, como também é patente a inviabilidade política de uma medida forte contra estes milhões de poupadores.

L: - Você está enveredando por um caminho que não é o nosso. Temos um compromisso com o respeito aos contratos, com a austeridade fiscal e com a defesa da moeda, e você há de convir que temos dado demonstrações claras de que vamos cumpri-lo. Nossa diferenciação será no plano social. Vamos atacar a pobreza de frente e com força. O Estado não se amedrontará diante deste enorme desafio que atravessa gerações.

M: - Realmente vocês têm dado mostras de que respeitam os compromissos de campanha. Inclusive o Ministro Palocci foi muito firme, neste aspecto, em suas discussões com a bancada do PT. Mas não espere de mim muitos elogios por conta disto. Estarei sempre suspendendo o bastão, como na prova do salto com vara, para extrair o máximo de seus esforços. Quanto à questão social, veja bem o que vai fazer! Não gosto de medidas voluntaristas e paternalistas. O Estado tem de criar as condições para que o setor privado se expanda, gerando emprego e renda para a população pobre. Não será dilatando o setor público, nem distribuindo benesses, segundo critérios impostos de cima para baixo, que encontraremos as soluções definitivas para os nossos problemas. Procure dar ênfase à qualificação do capital humano, com investimentos em saúde e educação, e, para a correção da pobreza absoluta, comece a dar mais atenção às idéias do Senador Suplicy, inspiradas no Milton Friedman.

L: - Você está toda a hora me dizendo o que fazer. Quem afinal de contas foi eleito pela população para governar? Você ou eu?

M: - Você, é claro. Mas quem dita as regras sou eu!

* O autor é economista (UFRJ) com doutorado na Universidade de Chicago. E-mail