Os Dez anos do Euro: Passado de orgulho, Futuro de Incertezas
Patrícia Nasser de Carvalho e Elói Martins Senhoras
Mundorama, 9 de julho de 2009
A criação de um espaço monetário único entre Estados soberanos e politicamente independentes é um fenômeno com poucos paralelos históricos, o que torna os dez anos de surgimento do euro em um marco significativo nos processos de integração regional. O surgimento da moeda única chamada euro nada mais foi que um dos pilares econômicos dentro de uma trajetória maior de convergência e cooperação entre os países europeus desde o final da Segunda Grande Mundial no multifacetado processo de integração regional que hoje consubstancia a União Européia.
Firmado por chefes europeus de Estado em 1992, o Tratado de Maastricht transformou-se em um ponto decisivo para a estratégia de integração monetária através de um enfoque gradualista de transição rumo a uma zona monetária. Na primeira etapa, os países do Sistema Monetário Europeu (SME) aboliram todos os controles de capitais que ainda persistiam, e foi aumentado o grau de cooperação entre os Bancos Centrais. Na segunda etapa foi criado o Instituto Monetário Europeu (IME), precursor do Banco Central Europeu (BCE), que tinha por funções o reforço da cooperação dos Bancos Centrais Nacionais. Na terceira etapa foram fixados os câmbios entre as distintas moedas nacionais de forma irrevogável e o BCE começou a operar, emitindo a moeda européia, que se convertiria em uma divisa de pleno direito.
Em 1999, na terceira etapa, a transição para a moeda única foi realizada inicialmente por 11 países que a utilizavam apenas na contabilidade empresarial como uma divisa virtual de referência durante os dois primeiros anos.
O euro somente entrou em circulação enquanto papel moeda e moedas metálicas a partir de 2002, e desde então, a União Européia se expandiu por meio de adesões principalmente originadas da Europa Oriental. Dos 27 países-membros que aderiram ao processo de integração regional da União Européia, 16 aderiram ao euro, conformando assim uma zona monetária única.
A formação desta zona monetária única trouxe uma representativa inflexão geopolítica para o continente europeu desde a derrubada do Muro de Berlim e do fim da União Soviética, uma vez que estes eventos trouxeram a desmontagem de estruturas do passado, enquanto que o euro engendrou uma ousada aposta no futuro que têm sido importante junto a outras políticas para retirar o continente de uma situação de perda de dinamismo econômico desde os anos 1980 conhecida como euroesclerosis.
Passados dez anos desde o seu surgimento, a centralidade do euro como divisa nas relações econômicas internacionais atesta para um sucesso de empreendimento para sair da crise européia, que se via com cautela em 1999, pois de fato, a moeda comum tornou-se a expressão máxima do desdobramento histórico da cooperação européia, cujo processo gerou a superação de divergências e obstáculos de toda ordem à integração por mais de cinqüenta anos. Este desempenho afirmativo vai em desencontro às previsões dos economistas mais céticos, especialmente da Inglaterra e dos Estados Unidos à época do lançamento do euro, que não estavam convencidos de que a moeda única conseguiria vingar ou, mesmo se conseguisse, não perduraria.
Os dez anos do euro mostram que gradativamente os representantes dos Bancos Centrais dos Estados membros conseguiram superar os prognósticos mais sombrios, diagnóstico este que também contradiz a crença dos cidadãos europeus quanto ao futuro da participação do euro no sistema monetário internacional à época de seu lançamento.
O mérito da moeda única está ainda no fato de que, no início do século XXI, o euro se transformou rapidamente na segunda moeda de referência do Sistema Monetário Internacional e alcançou alto valor no mercado financeiro. Aos dez anos, o euro é capaz de proporcionar menores riscos aos investimentos e maior estabilidade monetária em função dos mecanismos de coordenação cambial nas economias européias em relação a períodos anteriores.
A despeito do sucesso relativo do euro ao longo destes 10 anos, a adesão de países com características distintas na União Européia complexifica a zona monetária do euro e por isso torna menos clara a capacidade amortecedora frente às crises, demonstrando que apesar dos sinais positivos da união monetária é necessário uma boa dose de sobriedade, por dois motivos.
Em primeiro lugar, se nominalmente no campo monetário-financeiro o êxito do euro é evidente, na economia real o seu desempenho se apresenta mais preocupante uma vez que a moeda única ainda não resultou em um crescimento econômico mais efetivo nos países que a adotaram. Por um lado, a valorização do euro trouxe o fortalecimento no âmbito do Sistema Monetário Internacional nos últimos anos, embora, por outro, tenha provocado efeitos negativos para o comércio internacional de muitos Estados membros da União Européia, com grande impacto na demanda por exportações, componente importante para o crescimento de uma economia.
Em segundo lugar, a coincidência do aniversário dos dez anos do euro com os sinais da crise financeira internacional fez arrefecer as celebrações do aniversário de 10 anos uma vez que desde o colapso do banco norte-americano Lehman Brothers, em setembro de 2008, que transbordou as fronteiras norte-americanas, os países europeus passaram a sofrer com as tempestades financeiras, embora em menor medida do que a economia estadunidense.
A situação de incertezas em que se encontra a União Européia a “divide” em dois grupos nesse momento: de um lado, os Estados fundadores que questionam, cada vez mais, a eficiência do fragmentado sistema comunitário de regulação financeira e, até mesmo, se a associação ao euro realmente vale à pena, tendo em vista os riscos que oferecem as economias orientais. De outro, os países da Europa Central e Oriental, tradicionalmente mais instáveis, em degradante situação macroeconômica, tanto do setor pública, quanto do privado.
O decenário é um momento impar na história do euro pois ao demarcar uma celebração de sucesso atesta o que pode ser considerado o maior desafio desde o seu lançamento: enfrentar a crise internacional e, ao mesmo tempo, balancear necessidades tão distintas dos Estados membros, por meio de uma política monetária comum, sem tornar o continente europeu em uma colcha de retalhos
Patrícia Nasser de Carvalho é Economista e doutoranda pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas – UNICAMP.
Elói Martins Senhoras é Professor assistente do Departamento de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal de Roraima – UFRR.
Quarta-feira, Julho 15, 2009
Terça-feira, Julho 14, 2009
464) Barreiras à entrada: artigo da The Economist
Idea
Barriers to entry, exit and mobility
The Economist, July 13th 2009
The idea that there are barriers preventing firms from entering markets and barriers preventing them from leaving requires that we view markets as similar to fields surrounded by gates of differing sizes and complexity. The gates have to be surmounted by firms wishing to enter or to leave.
To some extent the gates can be both raised and lowered, not just by those inside the fields but also by those outside wishing to enter. Typical barriers to entry include patents, licensing agreements and exclusive access to natural resources. A patented pharmaceutical, for instance, gives the patent holder exclusive rights for a certain period (usually a maximum of seven years) to manufacture and sell that pharmaceutical within a specified market.
The economies of scale (see article) that can be gained from being large and established in a particular field can also act as a barrier to entry. If new entrants calculate that they need to sell large volumes before they can hope to be competitive with existing firms, this acts as a deterrent to their ambition. When, for instance, did a new entrant last try to begin manufacturing for the mass car market?
Barriers to entry can also be erected by governments. Regulations covering the financial services industry are designed to act as a barrier to rogues and villains. But inevitably they also deter many honest businesses too. Forty years ago, foreign banks could not operate in Britain unless they had an office within walking distance of the Bank of England, then the industry’s regulator. Needless to say, property prices in the City of London’s “Square Mile” were among the highest in the world and acted as a powerful barrier to entry for newcomers.
Well-established firms in a particular field or market may be tempted to raise the barriers when they see a newcomer approaching their patch. They can do this, for instance, by lowering their prices, thus making the newcomers’ products less competitive. Moreover, lowering prices may be an easy option for the incumbents since their prices may have been higher than the free-market level because of the barriers.
Monopolies exist where there are insurmountable barriers to entry. If there were no (or only low) barriers, other firms would enter such markets to participate in the monopoly profits.
Barriers to exit make it more difficult for a company to get out of a particular business than it would otherwise have been. They include things like the cost of laying off staff, and contractual obligations such as the payment of rent. For a classic high-street bank with a large number of staff and a wide network of branches, the barriers to exit from traditional banking businesses can be considerable.
Paradoxically, firms sometimes decide for themselves to erect barriers that hinder their own exit from a market. This can be a strategic ploy designed to convey to their competitors the message that they are committed to that market, and that they are not going to leave it in a hurry.
Old ideas about barriers to entry were given a new twist with the development of e-commerce. By using the internet, firms can sometimes surmount traditional barriers with an ease not previously available. Economies of scale, for instance, do not apply in quite the same way.
Much of the deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s was designed by free-market-oriented governments to lower barriers to entry in industries ranging from airlines to stockbroking. But it had only limited success. A 1996 study of the airline industry by the American government’s General Accounting Office, for example, illustrated the complex way in which barriers to entry become tightly woven into the fabric of an industry. The study found that three things—namely, limits on take-off and landing slots at certain major airports; the existence of long-term leases giving airlines the exclusive use of airport gates; and rules prohibiting flights of less than a certain distance—continued to impede new airlines’ access to airports.
Despite this, in recent years a number of low-cost carriers have managed to some extent to circumvent these barriers by using secondary airports and by marketing tickets via the internet.
Further reading
Geroski, P., “Market Dynamics and Entry”, Blackwell, 1991
Geroski, P., Gilbert, R. and Jacquemin, A. (eds), “Barriers to Entry and Strategic Competition”, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990
Karakaya, F. and Stahl, M.J., “Entry Barriers and Market Entry Decisions”, Quorum Books, 1991
Yip, George, “Barriers to Entry: A Corporate Strategy Perspective”, Lexington Books, 1982
Barriers to entry, exit and mobility
The Economist, July 13th 2009
The idea that there are barriers preventing firms from entering markets and barriers preventing them from leaving requires that we view markets as similar to fields surrounded by gates of differing sizes and complexity. The gates have to be surmounted by firms wishing to enter or to leave.
To some extent the gates can be both raised and lowered, not just by those inside the fields but also by those outside wishing to enter. Typical barriers to entry include patents, licensing agreements and exclusive access to natural resources. A patented pharmaceutical, for instance, gives the patent holder exclusive rights for a certain period (usually a maximum of seven years) to manufacture and sell that pharmaceutical within a specified market.
The economies of scale (see article) that can be gained from being large and established in a particular field can also act as a barrier to entry. If new entrants calculate that they need to sell large volumes before they can hope to be competitive with existing firms, this acts as a deterrent to their ambition. When, for instance, did a new entrant last try to begin manufacturing for the mass car market?
Barriers to entry can also be erected by governments. Regulations covering the financial services industry are designed to act as a barrier to rogues and villains. But inevitably they also deter many honest businesses too. Forty years ago, foreign banks could not operate in Britain unless they had an office within walking distance of the Bank of England, then the industry’s regulator. Needless to say, property prices in the City of London’s “Square Mile” were among the highest in the world and acted as a powerful barrier to entry for newcomers.
Well-established firms in a particular field or market may be tempted to raise the barriers when they see a newcomer approaching their patch. They can do this, for instance, by lowering their prices, thus making the newcomers’ products less competitive. Moreover, lowering prices may be an easy option for the incumbents since their prices may have been higher than the free-market level because of the barriers.
Monopolies exist where there are insurmountable barriers to entry. If there were no (or only low) barriers, other firms would enter such markets to participate in the monopoly profits.
Barriers to exit make it more difficult for a company to get out of a particular business than it would otherwise have been. They include things like the cost of laying off staff, and contractual obligations such as the payment of rent. For a classic high-street bank with a large number of staff and a wide network of branches, the barriers to exit from traditional banking businesses can be considerable.
Paradoxically, firms sometimes decide for themselves to erect barriers that hinder their own exit from a market. This can be a strategic ploy designed to convey to their competitors the message that they are committed to that market, and that they are not going to leave it in a hurry.
Old ideas about barriers to entry were given a new twist with the development of e-commerce. By using the internet, firms can sometimes surmount traditional barriers with an ease not previously available. Economies of scale, for instance, do not apply in quite the same way.
Much of the deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s was designed by free-market-oriented governments to lower barriers to entry in industries ranging from airlines to stockbroking. But it had only limited success. A 1996 study of the airline industry by the American government’s General Accounting Office, for example, illustrated the complex way in which barriers to entry become tightly woven into the fabric of an industry. The study found that three things—namely, limits on take-off and landing slots at certain major airports; the existence of long-term leases giving airlines the exclusive use of airport gates; and rules prohibiting flights of less than a certain distance—continued to impede new airlines’ access to airports.
Despite this, in recent years a number of low-cost carriers have managed to some extent to circumvent these barriers by using secondary airports and by marketing tickets via the internet.
Further reading
Geroski, P., “Market Dynamics and Entry”, Blackwell, 1991
Geroski, P., Gilbert, R. and Jacquemin, A. (eds), “Barriers to Entry and Strategic Competition”, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990
Karakaya, F. and Stahl, M.J., “Entry Barriers and Market Entry Decisions”, Quorum Books, 1991
Yip, George, “Barriers to Entry: A Corporate Strategy Perspective”, Lexington Books, 1982
Domingo, Julho 12, 2009
463) Comparando Brasil e Argentina: uma visao historica
Primeiro vou transcrever um artigo de Carlos Escudé, no jornal argentino La Nación.
Depois, abaixo da transcrição, vou comentar rapidamente sobre quão equivocado é esse artigo.
El valor estratégico de las alianzas
La Argentina y Brasil, cara a cara
Carlos Escudé
La Nación, Viernes 10 de julio de 2009
La cercanía del Bicentenario exige un examen crítico de nuestros éxitos y fracasos. En ese tren, las comparaciones entre nuestro país y su vecino lusohablante pueden parecer odiosas, pero son necesarias. En verdad, quizás uno de los mejores indicios de cómo le fue a la Argentina a lo largo de las diferentes etapas de su historia resida en cómo se comparaba con Brasil en cada una de ellas.
Nuestro vecino nació con ventaja. El Imperio que, como resultado de un pacto de familia, se desgajó pacíficamente de su mãe pátria , no atravesó una crisis de independencia y era mucho más fuerte que las nacientes Provincias Unidas.
No obstante, los éxitos cosechados por nuestra Generación del 80, ya visibles en los tiempos del Centenario, revirtieron esa ventaja. Durante varias décadas tuvimos la primacía. Una comparación realizada por el industrial Torcuato Di Tella, en 1941, publicada en la emblemática Revista de Economía Argentina , indicaba que por esos tiempos un trabajador argentino podía comprar un overol con diez horas de trabajo, mientras un belga o un alemán requerían el doble de tiempo y un italiano tanto como treinta y dos horas.
Brasil ni figuraba en la lista. Y las cifras de aquel patriarca de nuestra industria coinciden con las del conocido economista británico Alfred Maizels, quien en una obra de 1963 mostró que, hacia 1937, el producto per cápita argentino era superior a los de Austria y Finlandia, y llegaba al doble del italiano y casi al triple del japonés. Otra vez, Brasil ni figuraba. Económicamente, la Argentina y Brasil estaban más allá de toda comparación.
Increíblemente, la misma ventaja se registraba en el plano militar. Según las cuidadosas investigaciones de archivo de Stanley Hilton, un estudio del estado mayor brasileño de la década de 1920, estimaba que la Argentina podía movilizar 379.000 hombres casi inmediatamente, mientras que Brasil demoraría mucho más para movilizar 136.000. También se explayaba con lujo de detalle sobre cuánto más abundante y avanzado era el armamento argentino.
Las evaluaciones de la Misión Militar Francesa al Brasil coincidían. En un informe confidencial, el general Maurice Gamelin observaba que, en Rio Grande do Sul, el Brasil se encontraba " en infériorité flagrante ". Los británicos comentaban que convertir los soldados brasileños en algo parecido a un ejército era " a lost cause ". Y las conclusiones del agregado militar norteamericano, en 1925, eran similares. Hilton, Frank McCann y Gary Frank, los principales estudiosos de la dimensión militar de esta materia, coinciden en que esta situación se mantuvo durante toda la década de 1930.
El punto de inflexión fue la Segunda Guerra Mundial. A partir de esa instancia crucial, Estados Unidos, la gran potencia en ascenso, se desempeñó como un árbitro que proporcionaba al país que le resultaba más confiable todo lo que le quitaba al que le parecía sospechoso.
Este arbitraje tendencioso, favorable a Brasil, comenzó antes del ingreso de Washington en la contienda, pero después de la caída de Francia, cuando ya estaba claro que habría que defenderse de Alemania. El favoritismo fue el fruto de una vieja relación especial entre Estados Unidos y Brasil, cultivada con inteligencia por Itamaraty desde los tiempos del barón de Rio Branco.
La hora de la verdad llegó en septiembre de 1940, cuando ambos países firmaron un acuerdo por el establecimiento de un polo siderúrgico en Volta Redonda, con financiación norteamericana. A su vez, el oportuno pacto terminó con el juego pendular de Brasil frente a Washington y a Berlín. Según documentos desenterrados por McCann, Estados Unidos adjudicó a la naciente industria del acero brasileña la misma prioridad que a proyectos similares en Estados Unidos. Como consecuencia, un agradecido presidente Getulio Vargas escribió al subsecretario Sumner Welles: "No olvidaré cuánto les debemos a usted y al Departamento de Estado por este feliz resultado".
En cuanto Estados Unidos ingresó en la guerra, el apoyo a Brasil fue acompañado por una comprensible animadversión militante contra la Argentina, que el historiador Joseph Tulchin llamó "persecución". En las medidas palabras de mi respetado colega Mario Rapoport, nuestra neutralidad descerrajó una política de sanciones por parte de esa potencia.
Este auténtico boicot, que se documentó por vez primera en mi libro de 1983, Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la declinación argentina, 1942-49 , significó privar a la Argentina de todos los insumos necesarios para su desarrollo industrial. Se nos cercó para que no pudiéramos importar combustibles, a la vez que, según documentó Hilton, se otorgó a Brasil la misma prioridad que a Gran Bretaña en materia de importaciones de petróleo.
A partir de ese momento la actitud favorable a nuestro vecino, que se había jugado con las democracias en la guerra, se acentuó de manera radical. Los documentos norteamericanos exhumados por Hilton permiten aseverar que, en abril de 1945, se decidió en Washington que Brasil debía potenciarse para que "tuviera la misma relación con el continente sudamericano que Estados Unidos tiene con el norteamericano, y reducir a la Argentina al poder relativo de México o Canadá".
La contracara de esta decisión, que puede consultarse en los documentos publicados por el Departamento de Estado (FRUS 1945, vol. 9), fue la Export Policy I de Estados Unidos hacia nuestro país, del 3 de febrero de 1945, que disponía: "La exportación de bienes de capital debe mantenerse en los mínimos actuales. Es esencial no permitir la expansión de la industria pesada en la Argentina".
En el ámbito militar, el árbitro obró con la misma decisión. La liberalidad de la legislación norteamericana en materia de apertura de secretos nos permite saber que, hacia principios de 1944, el objetivo de alterar el equilibrio militar entre la Argentina y Brasil se convirtió en una política oficial de Estados Unidos, por razones que no estaban relacionadas con el esfuerzo bélico.
Por cierto, un memorial del presidente Franklin D. Roosevelt del 12 de enero de ese año es elocuente. Dice: "Estoy totalmente de acuerdo [?] en que deberíamos proceder duramente con la Argentina. Al mismo tiempo, creo que es esencial que nos movamos inmediatamente para fortalecer al Brasil. Esto debe incluir armas y municiones norteamericanas [?] como para darle una fuerza de combate efectiva cerca de la frontera argentina, del orden de dos o tres regimientos motorizados".
A esas alturas, la suerte estaba echada. Brasil emergería de la Segunda Guerra Mundial como la potencia regional en ciernes de la América del Sur. Y la Argentina surgiría con un conjunto de problemas políticos crónicos que aún no ha conseguido resolver.
Eventualmente, Brasil se convertiría en una potencia por completo fuera de nuestro alcance. Hechos y procesos posteriores, tanto o más importantes que los que transcurrieron durante el período descripto, acentuarían nuestra declinación. Pero de todos los factores que influyeron en nuestro deterioro relativo, el que he presentado aquí es el que mejor puede documentarse. No es el producto de teorías ni el resultado de conjeturas opinables.
No obstante, no hemos perdido en todos los planos. Por el contrario, y a diferencia de aquellos tiempos que no deben añorarse, desde hace un cuarto de siglo nuestras relaciones con Brasil se caracterizan más por la cooperación que por la competencia. Hemos superado las hipótesis de conflicto de antaño. Nuestras desavenencias ya no son geopolíticas, sino comerciales, como las que caracterizan a Estados Unidos y Canadá.
Por cierto, Brasil es una potencia emergente benigna y una de las menos agresivas del orbe. Su presencia en el corazón geográfico de nuestra región ha contribuido a su paz y estabilidad, que es un ejemplo para el mundo.
Por eso, hoy podemos compararnos con ánimo erudito, sin temor a herir sensibilidades que ya están añejadas. Estas sólo agregan sabor al placer de conocer mejor el valor estratégico de las alianzas.
============
O autor é um velho conhecido dos que trabalham com relacoes internacionais, especialmente as da Argentina e das relacoes bilaterais Brasil-Argentina.
Pois ele está TOTALMENTE ERRADO, ao considerar os fatores que explicam a decadencia economica argentina e a relativa ascencao do Brasil.
Eu poderia até tratar mais detidamente o assunto, mas vou ser breve.
Ele se engana totalmente ao explicar nossa ascensao como sendo o resultado de um tratamento mais favoravel dos EUA, ao passo que a Argentina foi supostamente tratada a pao e agua pelos EUA, durante a IIGM e logo apos.
Esta nao é a causa principal das trajetorias divergentes dos dois paises do Cone Sul.
A Argentina comecou a decair bem antes, já no pós IGM e sobretudo depois da revolucao de 1930, que significou a ascensao dos militares na politica argentina.
Escudé nao diz, por exemplo, que os oficiais fascistas do GOU fizeram com que a Argentina fosse uma aliada objetiva dos nazistas durante quase toda a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Ele nao poderia esperar que os EUA fossem trata-la da mesma forma que ao Brasil, uma nacao aliada durante a guerra.
A Argentina, pela sua politica supostamente neutralista, mas objetivamente pro-nazista nao foi convidada ao encontro inter-americano de Chapultepec, em janeiro de 1945, no Mexico, como tampouco à Conferencia de San Francisco, de criacao da ONU (depois eles se corrigiram e puderam assinar a Carta).
Mas, a ajuda americana nao tem nada a ver com a ascensao do Brasil, e sim nosso maior crescimento e industrializacao, obtido a partir dos anos 1950 e continuado na era militar.
Durante todo o seculo XX, a Argentina só fez decair, por seus proprios erros cometidos em materia de politica economica, na verdade por falta de legalidade, simplesmente.
Em 1910, o PIB per capita argentino representava 70pc do PIB per capita americano. Hoje nao representa mais de 33 pc.
O Brasil tinha um PIB per capita inferior a 15 por cento do dos EUA, proporcao que se eleveu a 25pc nos anos 1970, mas voltou a cair depois, por forca do nosso nao crescimento ou crescimento lento.
A verdade é que os argentinos ficaram atrasados (relativamente) em relacao ao Brasil, nao por tratamento privilegiado dos EUA, mas por seu proprios erros e fracassos.
Certas verdades precisam ser ditas...
-------------
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Depois, abaixo da transcrição, vou comentar rapidamente sobre quão equivocado é esse artigo.
El valor estratégico de las alianzas
La Argentina y Brasil, cara a cara
Carlos Escudé
La Nación, Viernes 10 de julio de 2009
La cercanía del Bicentenario exige un examen crítico de nuestros éxitos y fracasos. En ese tren, las comparaciones entre nuestro país y su vecino lusohablante pueden parecer odiosas, pero son necesarias. En verdad, quizás uno de los mejores indicios de cómo le fue a la Argentina a lo largo de las diferentes etapas de su historia resida en cómo se comparaba con Brasil en cada una de ellas.
Nuestro vecino nació con ventaja. El Imperio que, como resultado de un pacto de familia, se desgajó pacíficamente de su mãe pátria , no atravesó una crisis de independencia y era mucho más fuerte que las nacientes Provincias Unidas.
No obstante, los éxitos cosechados por nuestra Generación del 80, ya visibles en los tiempos del Centenario, revirtieron esa ventaja. Durante varias décadas tuvimos la primacía. Una comparación realizada por el industrial Torcuato Di Tella, en 1941, publicada en la emblemática Revista de Economía Argentina , indicaba que por esos tiempos un trabajador argentino podía comprar un overol con diez horas de trabajo, mientras un belga o un alemán requerían el doble de tiempo y un italiano tanto como treinta y dos horas.
Brasil ni figuraba en la lista. Y las cifras de aquel patriarca de nuestra industria coinciden con las del conocido economista británico Alfred Maizels, quien en una obra de 1963 mostró que, hacia 1937, el producto per cápita argentino era superior a los de Austria y Finlandia, y llegaba al doble del italiano y casi al triple del japonés. Otra vez, Brasil ni figuraba. Económicamente, la Argentina y Brasil estaban más allá de toda comparación.
Increíblemente, la misma ventaja se registraba en el plano militar. Según las cuidadosas investigaciones de archivo de Stanley Hilton, un estudio del estado mayor brasileño de la década de 1920, estimaba que la Argentina podía movilizar 379.000 hombres casi inmediatamente, mientras que Brasil demoraría mucho más para movilizar 136.000. También se explayaba con lujo de detalle sobre cuánto más abundante y avanzado era el armamento argentino.
Las evaluaciones de la Misión Militar Francesa al Brasil coincidían. En un informe confidencial, el general Maurice Gamelin observaba que, en Rio Grande do Sul, el Brasil se encontraba " en infériorité flagrante ". Los británicos comentaban que convertir los soldados brasileños en algo parecido a un ejército era " a lost cause ". Y las conclusiones del agregado militar norteamericano, en 1925, eran similares. Hilton, Frank McCann y Gary Frank, los principales estudiosos de la dimensión militar de esta materia, coinciden en que esta situación se mantuvo durante toda la década de 1930.
El punto de inflexión fue la Segunda Guerra Mundial. A partir de esa instancia crucial, Estados Unidos, la gran potencia en ascenso, se desempeñó como un árbitro que proporcionaba al país que le resultaba más confiable todo lo que le quitaba al que le parecía sospechoso.
Este arbitraje tendencioso, favorable a Brasil, comenzó antes del ingreso de Washington en la contienda, pero después de la caída de Francia, cuando ya estaba claro que habría que defenderse de Alemania. El favoritismo fue el fruto de una vieja relación especial entre Estados Unidos y Brasil, cultivada con inteligencia por Itamaraty desde los tiempos del barón de Rio Branco.
La hora de la verdad llegó en septiembre de 1940, cuando ambos países firmaron un acuerdo por el establecimiento de un polo siderúrgico en Volta Redonda, con financiación norteamericana. A su vez, el oportuno pacto terminó con el juego pendular de Brasil frente a Washington y a Berlín. Según documentos desenterrados por McCann, Estados Unidos adjudicó a la naciente industria del acero brasileña la misma prioridad que a proyectos similares en Estados Unidos. Como consecuencia, un agradecido presidente Getulio Vargas escribió al subsecretario Sumner Welles: "No olvidaré cuánto les debemos a usted y al Departamento de Estado por este feliz resultado".
En cuanto Estados Unidos ingresó en la guerra, el apoyo a Brasil fue acompañado por una comprensible animadversión militante contra la Argentina, que el historiador Joseph Tulchin llamó "persecución". En las medidas palabras de mi respetado colega Mario Rapoport, nuestra neutralidad descerrajó una política de sanciones por parte de esa potencia.
Este auténtico boicot, que se documentó por vez primera en mi libro de 1983, Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la declinación argentina, 1942-49 , significó privar a la Argentina de todos los insumos necesarios para su desarrollo industrial. Se nos cercó para que no pudiéramos importar combustibles, a la vez que, según documentó Hilton, se otorgó a Brasil la misma prioridad que a Gran Bretaña en materia de importaciones de petróleo.
A partir de ese momento la actitud favorable a nuestro vecino, que se había jugado con las democracias en la guerra, se acentuó de manera radical. Los documentos norteamericanos exhumados por Hilton permiten aseverar que, en abril de 1945, se decidió en Washington que Brasil debía potenciarse para que "tuviera la misma relación con el continente sudamericano que Estados Unidos tiene con el norteamericano, y reducir a la Argentina al poder relativo de México o Canadá".
La contracara de esta decisión, que puede consultarse en los documentos publicados por el Departamento de Estado (FRUS 1945, vol. 9), fue la Export Policy I de Estados Unidos hacia nuestro país, del 3 de febrero de 1945, que disponía: "La exportación de bienes de capital debe mantenerse en los mínimos actuales. Es esencial no permitir la expansión de la industria pesada en la Argentina".
En el ámbito militar, el árbitro obró con la misma decisión. La liberalidad de la legislación norteamericana en materia de apertura de secretos nos permite saber que, hacia principios de 1944, el objetivo de alterar el equilibrio militar entre la Argentina y Brasil se convirtió en una política oficial de Estados Unidos, por razones que no estaban relacionadas con el esfuerzo bélico.
Por cierto, un memorial del presidente Franklin D. Roosevelt del 12 de enero de ese año es elocuente. Dice: "Estoy totalmente de acuerdo [?] en que deberíamos proceder duramente con la Argentina. Al mismo tiempo, creo que es esencial que nos movamos inmediatamente para fortalecer al Brasil. Esto debe incluir armas y municiones norteamericanas [?] como para darle una fuerza de combate efectiva cerca de la frontera argentina, del orden de dos o tres regimientos motorizados".
A esas alturas, la suerte estaba echada. Brasil emergería de la Segunda Guerra Mundial como la potencia regional en ciernes de la América del Sur. Y la Argentina surgiría con un conjunto de problemas políticos crónicos que aún no ha conseguido resolver.
Eventualmente, Brasil se convertiría en una potencia por completo fuera de nuestro alcance. Hechos y procesos posteriores, tanto o más importantes que los que transcurrieron durante el período descripto, acentuarían nuestra declinación. Pero de todos los factores que influyeron en nuestro deterioro relativo, el que he presentado aquí es el que mejor puede documentarse. No es el producto de teorías ni el resultado de conjeturas opinables.
No obstante, no hemos perdido en todos los planos. Por el contrario, y a diferencia de aquellos tiempos que no deben añorarse, desde hace un cuarto de siglo nuestras relaciones con Brasil se caracterizan más por la cooperación que por la competencia. Hemos superado las hipótesis de conflicto de antaño. Nuestras desavenencias ya no son geopolíticas, sino comerciales, como las que caracterizan a Estados Unidos y Canadá.
Por cierto, Brasil es una potencia emergente benigna y una de las menos agresivas del orbe. Su presencia en el corazón geográfico de nuestra región ha contribuido a su paz y estabilidad, que es un ejemplo para el mundo.
Por eso, hoy podemos compararnos con ánimo erudito, sin temor a herir sensibilidades que ya están añejadas. Estas sólo agregan sabor al placer de conocer mejor el valor estratégico de las alianzas.
============
O autor é um velho conhecido dos que trabalham com relacoes internacionais, especialmente as da Argentina e das relacoes bilaterais Brasil-Argentina.
Pois ele está TOTALMENTE ERRADO, ao considerar os fatores que explicam a decadencia economica argentina e a relativa ascencao do Brasil.
Eu poderia até tratar mais detidamente o assunto, mas vou ser breve.
Ele se engana totalmente ao explicar nossa ascensao como sendo o resultado de um tratamento mais favoravel dos EUA, ao passo que a Argentina foi supostamente tratada a pao e agua pelos EUA, durante a IIGM e logo apos.
Esta nao é a causa principal das trajetorias divergentes dos dois paises do Cone Sul.
A Argentina comecou a decair bem antes, já no pós IGM e sobretudo depois da revolucao de 1930, que significou a ascensao dos militares na politica argentina.
Escudé nao diz, por exemplo, que os oficiais fascistas do GOU fizeram com que a Argentina fosse uma aliada objetiva dos nazistas durante quase toda a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Ele nao poderia esperar que os EUA fossem trata-la da mesma forma que ao Brasil, uma nacao aliada durante a guerra.
A Argentina, pela sua politica supostamente neutralista, mas objetivamente pro-nazista nao foi convidada ao encontro inter-americano de Chapultepec, em janeiro de 1945, no Mexico, como tampouco à Conferencia de San Francisco, de criacao da ONU (depois eles se corrigiram e puderam assinar a Carta).
Mas, a ajuda americana nao tem nada a ver com a ascensao do Brasil, e sim nosso maior crescimento e industrializacao, obtido a partir dos anos 1950 e continuado na era militar.
Durante todo o seculo XX, a Argentina só fez decair, por seus proprios erros cometidos em materia de politica economica, na verdade por falta de legalidade, simplesmente.
Em 1910, o PIB per capita argentino representava 70pc do PIB per capita americano. Hoje nao representa mais de 33 pc.
O Brasil tinha um PIB per capita inferior a 15 por cento do dos EUA, proporcao que se eleveu a 25pc nos anos 1970, mas voltou a cair depois, por forca do nosso nao crescimento ou crescimento lento.
A verdade é que os argentinos ficaram atrasados (relativamente) em relacao ao Brasil, nao por tratamento privilegiado dos EUA, mas por seu proprios erros e fracassos.
Certas verdades precisam ser ditas...
-------------
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
462) Construindo a desigualdade no Brasil
Como sempre, os espertos se organizam para ganhar renda de todos os demais brasileiros.
Apenas uma correção neste texto: onde está dito OMC, leia-se, na verdade, GATT.
Prêmio indevido
Miriam Leitão
O Globo, 11.07.2009
Os brasileiros viram numa mesma semana os dois piores lados da questão dos impostos. Primeiro, o governo tira dinheiro demais da sociedade numa carga tributária extravagante; segundo, o dinheiro volta para o privilégio de uns poucos. O episódio do crédito-prêmio de IPI, uma farra com dinheiro público que se recusa a morrer, é a exata tradução de como se concentra renda no Brasil.
O Ministério da Fazenda garante que não está negociando o reconhecimento do crédito-prêmio de IPI, ao contrário do que se afirma no Congresso. O procurador-geral da Fazenda Nacional, Luís Inácio Adams, admite que todo dia aparece alguém com uma proposta na Fazenda: — A posição da Fazenda é que o que dá segurança ao Estado brasileiro é o Supremo julgar a questão. E o assunto está no Supremo.
Essa questão pode produzir um custo bilionário para o Tesouro e beneficiar os exportadores. Eles querem receber retroativamente subsídios à exportação extintos em 1983. Adams deu as razões para não ceder.
— No dia que assinarmos qualquer acordo estaremos admitindo que o benefício vigorou até 2002. Teremos uma corrida ao Judiciário por parte de quem não usou o crédito-prêmio. Pelos dados da Fiesp, pelo menos 40% das empresas nunca abateram impostos com base nisso. Além do mais, vamos abrir imediatamente uma briga com os parceiros comerciais porque o créditoprêmio era na verdade um benefício financeiro, porque excedia o imposto pago no produto — explicou.
A base aliada de forma explícita tem pressionado para o governo ceder. Se o fizer, o Tesouro pode perder mais de R$ 200 bi. É uma história tão velha quanto feia pela qual se tira dinheiro da sociedade para o bolso dos exportadores, da Fiesp, dos bancos, dos grandes advogados, de alguns tributaristas.
Esse subsídio nasceu na primeira encarnação de Delfim Netto no governo, em 1969. Chama-se crédito-prêmio, mas a palavra-chave na expressão era "prêmio". Premiados por exportar, os empresários ganhavam a devolução muito acima do imposto realmente pago. Se no Brasil muita gente confundia isso com desoneração das exportações feitas em todos os países, nossos parceiros comerciais não foram bobos.
Concluíram que aquilo era subsídio financeiro ao exportador. O que é proibido pelas regras do comércio internacional. O Brasil enfrentou uma forte elevação de tarifas contra nossos produtos e foi obrigado pela Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) a recuar.
O crédito-prêmio foi extinto em 1983, mas a briga judicial aproveita-se de supostas contradições em portarias e decretos para dizer que ele nunca acabou. Outros admitem ele ter sido extinto, mas só em 1990. No Congresso, o lobby exportador quer aprovar propostas para que o prazo seja 2002.
Roberto Giannetti da Fonseca, um dos defensores dos exportadores, em nota para a coluna diz que "o desembolso para a União seria de R$ 62 bilhões". Pela nota, se for considerado que o benefício acabou em 1990, "o Fisco teria que cobrar retroativamente aos exportadores todos os impostos compensados". Segundo Giannetti, isso provocaria a falência de "centenas de milhares de empresas e levaria milhões de trabalhadores ao desemprego".
O que houve no passado é que os exportadores entraram na Justiça e, antes que ela julgasse, passaram a usar os supostos créditos.
Inúmeras empresas foram mais sensatas. O governo diz que na Fiesp se admite que 40% das empresas não usaram os benefícios. Outras fontes acham que o grupo dos sensatos é muito maior. Mas quem utilizou o benefício usa o argumento do fato consumado.
Esse caso é exemplar porque mostra como se formam os dutos que levam dinheiro de todos os contribuintes para uns poucos. Como se concentra renda no Brasil. Há inúmeras ações na Justiça com os mais espetaculares argumentos para manter vivo o subsídio. Uma das tentativas foi particularmente engraçada: ela sustentava que alíquota zero é diferente de isenção. Portanto, mesmo em produtos cuja alíquota de IPI era zero, o exportador poderia se creditar de 15% do valor do produto. E por que 15%? Por que esta seria a “tarifa modal?.
Esse é um assunto que vai e volta. Os exportadores e seus lobistas aproveitaram esse momento peculiar da vida nacional e atacaram via Congresso. Em duas MPs relatadas pela oposição e pelo governo foi pendurada a mesma ideia: o crédito-prêmio teria sobrevivido mais 19 anos. Em vez de ter acabado em 1983, teria vivido até o fim de 2002. E com alíquota de 15% que vem a ser a maior compensação permitida na época em que foi criado o imposto.
Ou seja, em cada US$ 100 exportados de 1983 até 2002, o exportador teria direito a uma compensação igual a US$ 15. Um esqueletão bilionário.
Se colar, consumase mais um ato de transferência dos impostos de todos para o bolso de alguns.
A carga tributária de 2008 foi o que se viu: insuportável.
O Estado brasileiro toma dinheiro demais da sociedade, devolve serviços pífios e está sempre sem dinheiro. A explicação está nos dutos criados para transferir riqueza para os ricos e muitos ricos.
Essa tentativa de ressuscitar um subsídio inaceitável no comércio internacional é uma dessas formas. Muita gente defende essa maluquice.
O Brasil não é desigual por acaso.
Apenas uma correção neste texto: onde está dito OMC, leia-se, na verdade, GATT.
Prêmio indevido
Miriam Leitão
O Globo, 11.07.2009
Os brasileiros viram numa mesma semana os dois piores lados da questão dos impostos. Primeiro, o governo tira dinheiro demais da sociedade numa carga tributária extravagante; segundo, o dinheiro volta para o privilégio de uns poucos. O episódio do crédito-prêmio de IPI, uma farra com dinheiro público que se recusa a morrer, é a exata tradução de como se concentra renda no Brasil.
O Ministério da Fazenda garante que não está negociando o reconhecimento do crédito-prêmio de IPI, ao contrário do que se afirma no Congresso. O procurador-geral da Fazenda Nacional, Luís Inácio Adams, admite que todo dia aparece alguém com uma proposta na Fazenda: — A posição da Fazenda é que o que dá segurança ao Estado brasileiro é o Supremo julgar a questão. E o assunto está no Supremo.
Essa questão pode produzir um custo bilionário para o Tesouro e beneficiar os exportadores. Eles querem receber retroativamente subsídios à exportação extintos em 1983. Adams deu as razões para não ceder.
— No dia que assinarmos qualquer acordo estaremos admitindo que o benefício vigorou até 2002. Teremos uma corrida ao Judiciário por parte de quem não usou o crédito-prêmio. Pelos dados da Fiesp, pelo menos 40% das empresas nunca abateram impostos com base nisso. Além do mais, vamos abrir imediatamente uma briga com os parceiros comerciais porque o créditoprêmio era na verdade um benefício financeiro, porque excedia o imposto pago no produto — explicou.
A base aliada de forma explícita tem pressionado para o governo ceder. Se o fizer, o Tesouro pode perder mais de R$ 200 bi. É uma história tão velha quanto feia pela qual se tira dinheiro da sociedade para o bolso dos exportadores, da Fiesp, dos bancos, dos grandes advogados, de alguns tributaristas.
Esse subsídio nasceu na primeira encarnação de Delfim Netto no governo, em 1969. Chama-se crédito-prêmio, mas a palavra-chave na expressão era "prêmio". Premiados por exportar, os empresários ganhavam a devolução muito acima do imposto realmente pago. Se no Brasil muita gente confundia isso com desoneração das exportações feitas em todos os países, nossos parceiros comerciais não foram bobos.
Concluíram que aquilo era subsídio financeiro ao exportador. O que é proibido pelas regras do comércio internacional. O Brasil enfrentou uma forte elevação de tarifas contra nossos produtos e foi obrigado pela Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) a recuar.
O crédito-prêmio foi extinto em 1983, mas a briga judicial aproveita-se de supostas contradições em portarias e decretos para dizer que ele nunca acabou. Outros admitem ele ter sido extinto, mas só em 1990. No Congresso, o lobby exportador quer aprovar propostas para que o prazo seja 2002.
Roberto Giannetti da Fonseca, um dos defensores dos exportadores, em nota para a coluna diz que "o desembolso para a União seria de R$ 62 bilhões". Pela nota, se for considerado que o benefício acabou em 1990, "o Fisco teria que cobrar retroativamente aos exportadores todos os impostos compensados". Segundo Giannetti, isso provocaria a falência de "centenas de milhares de empresas e levaria milhões de trabalhadores ao desemprego".
O que houve no passado é que os exportadores entraram na Justiça e, antes que ela julgasse, passaram a usar os supostos créditos.
Inúmeras empresas foram mais sensatas. O governo diz que na Fiesp se admite que 40% das empresas não usaram os benefícios. Outras fontes acham que o grupo dos sensatos é muito maior. Mas quem utilizou o benefício usa o argumento do fato consumado.
Esse caso é exemplar porque mostra como se formam os dutos que levam dinheiro de todos os contribuintes para uns poucos. Como se concentra renda no Brasil. Há inúmeras ações na Justiça com os mais espetaculares argumentos para manter vivo o subsídio. Uma das tentativas foi particularmente engraçada: ela sustentava que alíquota zero é diferente de isenção. Portanto, mesmo em produtos cuja alíquota de IPI era zero, o exportador poderia se creditar de 15% do valor do produto. E por que 15%? Por que esta seria a “tarifa modal?.
Esse é um assunto que vai e volta. Os exportadores e seus lobistas aproveitaram esse momento peculiar da vida nacional e atacaram via Congresso. Em duas MPs relatadas pela oposição e pelo governo foi pendurada a mesma ideia: o crédito-prêmio teria sobrevivido mais 19 anos. Em vez de ter acabado em 1983, teria vivido até o fim de 2002. E com alíquota de 15% que vem a ser a maior compensação permitida na época em que foi criado o imposto.
Ou seja, em cada US$ 100 exportados de 1983 até 2002, o exportador teria direito a uma compensação igual a US$ 15. Um esqueletão bilionário.
Se colar, consumase mais um ato de transferência dos impostos de todos para o bolso de alguns.
A carga tributária de 2008 foi o que se viu: insuportável.
O Estado brasileiro toma dinheiro demais da sociedade, devolve serviços pífios e está sempre sem dinheiro. A explicação está nos dutos criados para transferir riqueza para os ricos e muitos ricos.
Essa tentativa de ressuscitar um subsídio inaceitável no comércio internacional é uma dessas formas. Muita gente defende essa maluquice.
O Brasil não é desigual por acaso.
461) Relacoes raciais nos EUA: revisando o passado
Uma matéria sobre o futuro da mais antiga associação de defesa dos interesses da comunidade negra nos EUA.
100 Years Old, NAACP Debates Its Current Role
By Krissah Thompson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, July 12, 2009
NEW YORK -- In the beginning, the purpose of the nation's oldest civil rights organization was well defined: to achieve equal justice under the law for black Americans.
One hundred years later, as 5,000 members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People gather here to set an agenda, little is so clear-cut.
The NAACP faces a slew of questions: Has the election of the first black U.S. president marked the end of the civil rights agenda? Must an organization traditionally focused on the plight of black Americans expand its mission? What should a black civil rights organization do in 2009?
The NAACP has long been a prism through which to view the puzzle of race in America, and the current uncertainty promises to be a presence at its week-long centennial convention, which will include addresses from President Obama and Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr.
The association's president, Benjamin Todd Jealous -- who at 36 is the youngest person to ever lead the organization -- acknowledges the pride his membership takes in hosting the first black president and attorney general but argues that their ascension does not negate the need for the NAACP. In many ways, the convention this week sets out to prove that point.
Jealous began the year by laying out his vision for an organization focused not solely on old civil rights battles, but on human rights as well. He envisions an NAACP primarily serving a black constituency but with a broader outlook.
"We are a very black organization, but we are not a black organization. There is a difference. It's the difference between being able to play the black position on the field and being able to play any position," Jealous said. "We are from our origin a multiracial, multiethnic human rights organization."
In his approach is a subtle nod to the need to respond to modern times by recalibrating the NAACP's approach to issues of race. The association, which claims more than half a million members, will host conversations on the impact of racial disparities in the criminal justice system on African American and Latino communities and on the meaning of recent Supreme Court decisions as they relate to affirmative action. It will also host a diverse panel of youth activists who are working with people of various races, ethnicities and backgrounds to deal with national and global human rights issues.
"We have succeeded in many ways -- Obama and Holder are examples of that -- but we are very much focused on the work ahead," Jealous said yesterday at the convention's opening news conference, standing with the president of the LatinoJustice PRLDEF to show solidarity in their support for Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor.
Hazel N. Dukes, longtime president of the NAACP New York State Conference, agreed, saying, "The NAACP is alive and well." Referring to the 2,000 young people attending sessions this week, she said, "We're teaching them our history."
But appreciating the association's venerable history and finding a way forward are separate issues, historians and young activists said.
David Garrow, a civil rights historian and author of the book "Bearing the Cross," a biography of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., argues that there has been a shift away from the traditional notion of black civil rights because of the steady growth in black civic participation and decline of civil rights-era protest organizations.
So is NAACP at 100 facing the end of the civil rights era?
"It's just sort of a definitional question," Garrow said. "It's a conundrum of the label. . . . The transition from one era to another in terms of African American civil rights is really marked by the movement of African Americans into civic life and government. One could say that the election of Barack Obama marks the end of an era. It signifies the complete inclusion of black people at all levels of politics."
The presence of a black man in the nation's highest office has become a stand-in for the 1960s civil rights movement's ideal of fuller social integration of black and white communities, Garrow said. Core concerns of that time, such as geographic integration and redistribution of income, are no longer central to the discussion.
Young activists are defining their work in different terms. Basheer Jones, a 24-year-old talk radio host in Cleveland, is not a member of the NAACP; he says the organization has been out of touch. But he is attending his first NAACP convention -- at the invitation of an older member -- and calls himself a community activist, not a civil rights activist.
"This new generation of leadership has to be different. We have to have the same courage and enthusiasm, but we have to unite a little bit more despite your religion, your socioeconomic status," said Jones, who believes the current struggle is class-based. "It's a different time."
Rinku Sen, an Oakland activist who is president of the Applied Research Center, a think tank on race, said the landscape for a civil rights agenda has shifted with the country's demographics. She sees the NAACP's decision to broaden its mission beyond the black community as timely but probably difficult.
"There are a lot of new players in the game as immigrant communities have matured," Sen said. "People have the urge to come together but often find it difficult to build staying power for those alliances, and quite a lot of that loops back to racial dynamics and our inability to resolve them. There are real differences in how groups pushing for racial justice experience the problem. African Americans, Latino immigrants and South Asian Muslims don't fit in exactly the same place in the hierarchy."
Darren Hutchinson, a professor at American University's Washington College of Law, said the NAACP may face an even larger problem moving into its second century.
Americans are dealing with "racial exhaustion," he said. "A lot of people are tired of talking about race. They have to find a new language for dealing with these issues."
Jewel Shears, who joined the New Jersey chapter of the NAACP last week, said the weariness some have about the subject inspired her activism. "Race is something that we have to keep talking about with all of the disparities that exist," she said. "We have to do our due diligence to help the cause."
Jealous pointed to a "constant drumbeat of racism" to make his point.
"On the one hand, we see the image of a black man getting off Air Force One. On the other hand, we see photos of kids getting turned away from a swimming pool," he said. "We can't be post-racial until we are post-racism, and until we get there, we will be on the watch."
100 Years Old, NAACP Debates Its Current Role
By Krissah Thompson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, July 12, 2009
NEW YORK -- In the beginning, the purpose of the nation's oldest civil rights organization was well defined: to achieve equal justice under the law for black Americans.
One hundred years later, as 5,000 members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People gather here to set an agenda, little is so clear-cut.
The NAACP faces a slew of questions: Has the election of the first black U.S. president marked the end of the civil rights agenda? Must an organization traditionally focused on the plight of black Americans expand its mission? What should a black civil rights organization do in 2009?
The NAACP has long been a prism through which to view the puzzle of race in America, and the current uncertainty promises to be a presence at its week-long centennial convention, which will include addresses from President Obama and Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr.
The association's president, Benjamin Todd Jealous -- who at 36 is the youngest person to ever lead the organization -- acknowledges the pride his membership takes in hosting the first black president and attorney general but argues that their ascension does not negate the need for the NAACP. In many ways, the convention this week sets out to prove that point.
Jealous began the year by laying out his vision for an organization focused not solely on old civil rights battles, but on human rights as well. He envisions an NAACP primarily serving a black constituency but with a broader outlook.
"We are a very black organization, but we are not a black organization. There is a difference. It's the difference between being able to play the black position on the field and being able to play any position," Jealous said. "We are from our origin a multiracial, multiethnic human rights organization."
In his approach is a subtle nod to the need to respond to modern times by recalibrating the NAACP's approach to issues of race. The association, which claims more than half a million members, will host conversations on the impact of racial disparities in the criminal justice system on African American and Latino communities and on the meaning of recent Supreme Court decisions as they relate to affirmative action. It will also host a diverse panel of youth activists who are working with people of various races, ethnicities and backgrounds to deal with national and global human rights issues.
"We have succeeded in many ways -- Obama and Holder are examples of that -- but we are very much focused on the work ahead," Jealous said yesterday at the convention's opening news conference, standing with the president of the LatinoJustice PRLDEF to show solidarity in their support for Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor.
Hazel N. Dukes, longtime president of the NAACP New York State Conference, agreed, saying, "The NAACP is alive and well." Referring to the 2,000 young people attending sessions this week, she said, "We're teaching them our history."
But appreciating the association's venerable history and finding a way forward are separate issues, historians and young activists said.
David Garrow, a civil rights historian and author of the book "Bearing the Cross," a biography of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., argues that there has been a shift away from the traditional notion of black civil rights because of the steady growth in black civic participation and decline of civil rights-era protest organizations.
So is NAACP at 100 facing the end of the civil rights era?
"It's just sort of a definitional question," Garrow said. "It's a conundrum of the label. . . . The transition from one era to another in terms of African American civil rights is really marked by the movement of African Americans into civic life and government. One could say that the election of Barack Obama marks the end of an era. It signifies the complete inclusion of black people at all levels of politics."
The presence of a black man in the nation's highest office has become a stand-in for the 1960s civil rights movement's ideal of fuller social integration of black and white communities, Garrow said. Core concerns of that time, such as geographic integration and redistribution of income, are no longer central to the discussion.
Young activists are defining their work in different terms. Basheer Jones, a 24-year-old talk radio host in Cleveland, is not a member of the NAACP; he says the organization has been out of touch. But he is attending his first NAACP convention -- at the invitation of an older member -- and calls himself a community activist, not a civil rights activist.
"This new generation of leadership has to be different. We have to have the same courage and enthusiasm, but we have to unite a little bit more despite your religion, your socioeconomic status," said Jones, who believes the current struggle is class-based. "It's a different time."
Rinku Sen, an Oakland activist who is president of the Applied Research Center, a think tank on race, said the landscape for a civil rights agenda has shifted with the country's demographics. She sees the NAACP's decision to broaden its mission beyond the black community as timely but probably difficult.
"There are a lot of new players in the game as immigrant communities have matured," Sen said. "People have the urge to come together but often find it difficult to build staying power for those alliances, and quite a lot of that loops back to racial dynamics and our inability to resolve them. There are real differences in how groups pushing for racial justice experience the problem. African Americans, Latino immigrants and South Asian Muslims don't fit in exactly the same place in the hierarchy."
Darren Hutchinson, a professor at American University's Washington College of Law, said the NAACP may face an even larger problem moving into its second century.
Americans are dealing with "racial exhaustion," he said. "A lot of people are tired of talking about race. They have to find a new language for dealing with these issues."
Jewel Shears, who joined the New Jersey chapter of the NAACP last week, said the weariness some have about the subject inspired her activism. "Race is something that we have to keep talking about with all of the disparities that exist," she said. "We have to do our due diligence to help the cause."
Jealous pointed to a "constant drumbeat of racism" to make his point.
"On the one hand, we see the image of a black man getting off Air Force One. On the other hand, we see photos of kids getting turned away from a swimming pool," he said. "We can't be post-racial until we are post-racism, and until we get there, we will be on the watch."
Sábado, Julho 11, 2009
460) Um realista nuclear: esqueça a desnuclearização...
Pelo menos alguém que não cultiva a hipocrisia e o auto-engano: o ex-Secretário da Defesa James Schlesinger...
-------------
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
* OPINION: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW
* Wall Street Journal, JULY 11, 2009
Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World
The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat.
By MELANIE KIRKPATRICK
'Nuclear weapons are used every day." So says former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaking last month at his office in a wooded enclave of Maclean, Va. It's a serene setting for Doomsday talk, and Mr. Schlesinger's matter-of-fact tone belies the enormity of the concepts he's explaining -- concepts that were seemingly ignored in this week's Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev.
We use nuclear weapons every day, Mr. Schlesinger goes on to explain, "to deter our potential foes and provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection."
Mr. Obama likes to talk about his vision of a nuclear-free world, and in Moscow he and Mr. Medvedev signed an agreement setting targets for sweeping reductions in the world's largest nuclear arsenals. Reflecting on the hour I spent with Mr. Schlesinger, I can't help but think: Do we really want to do this?
For nuclear strategists, Mr. Schlesinger is Yoda, the master of their universe. In addition to being a former defense secretary (Nixon and Ford), he is a former energy secretary (Carter) and former director of central intelligence (Nixon). He has been studying the U.S. nuclear posture since the early 1960s, when he was at the RAND Corporation, a California think tank that often does research for the U.S. government. He's the expert whom Defense Secretary Robert Gates called on last year to lead an investigation into the Air Force's mishandling of nuclear weapons after nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly flown across the country on a B-52 and nuclear fuses were accidently shipped to Taiwan. Most recently, he's vice chairman of a bipartisan congressional commission that in May issued an urgent warning about the need to maintain a strong U.S. deterrent.
But above all, Mr. Schlesinger is a nuclear realist. Are we heading toward a nuclear-free world anytime soon? He shoots back a one-word answer: "No." I keep silent, hoping he will go on. "We will need a strong deterrent," he finally says, "and that is measured at least in decades -- in my judgment, in fact, more or less in perpetuity. The notion that we can abolish nuclear weapons reflects on a combination of American utopianism and American parochialism. . . . It's like the [1929] Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy . . . . It's not based upon an understanding of reality."
In other words: Go ahead and wish for a nuclear-free world, but pray that you don't get what you wish for. A world without nukes would be even more dangerous than a world with them, Mr. Schlesinger argues.
"If, by some miracle, we were able to eliminate nuclear weapons," he says, "what we would have is a number of countries sitting around with breakout capabilities or rumors of breakout capabilities -- for intimidation purposes. . . . and finally, probably, a number of small clandestine stockpiles." This would make the U.S. more vulnerable.
Mr. Schlesinger makes the case for a strong U.S. deterrent. Yes, the Cold War has ended and, yes, while "we worry about Russia's nuclear posture to some degree, it is not just as prominent as it once was." The U.S. still needs to deter Russia, which has the largest nuclear capability of any potential adversary, and the Chinese, who have a modest (and growing) capability. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has no influence on North Korea or Iran, he says, or on nonstate actors. "They're not going to be deterred by the possibility of a nuclear response to actions that they might take," he says.
Mr. Schlesinger refers to the unanimous conclusion of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which he co-led with Chairman William Perry. The commission "strongly" recommended that further discussions with the Russians on arms control are "desirable," he says, and that "we should proceed with negotiations on an extension of the START Treaty." That's what Mr. Obama set in motion in Moscow this week. The pact -- whose full name is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty -- expires in December. But what's the hurry? Mr. Schlesinger warns about rushing to agree on cuts. "The treaty . . . can be extended for five years. And, if need be, I would extend it for five years."
There's another compelling reason for a strong U.S. deterrent: the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which protects more than 30 allies world-wide. "If we were only protecting the North American continent," he says, "we could do so with far fewer weapons than we have at present in the stockpile." But a principal aim of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is "to provide the necessary reassurance to our allies, both in Asia and in Europe." That includes "our new NATO allies such as Poland and the Baltic States," which, he notes dryly, continue to be concerned about their Russian neighbor. "Indeed, they inform us regularly that they understand the Russians far better than do we."
The congressional commission warned of a coming "tipping point" in proliferation, when more nations might decide to go nuclear if they were to lose confidence in the U.S. deterrent, or in Washington's will to use it. If U.S. allies lose confidence in Washington's ability to protect them, they'll kick off a new nuclear arms race.
That's a reason Mr. Schlesinger wants to bring Japan into the nuclear conversation. "One of the recommendations of the commission is that we start to have a dialogue with the Japanese about strategic capabilities in order both to help enlighten them and to provide reassurance that they will be protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In the past, that has not been the case. Japan never was seriously threatened by Soviet capabilities and that the Soviets looked westward largely is a threat against Western Europe. But now that the Chinese forces have been growing into the many hundreds of weapons, we think that it's necessary to talk to the Japanese in the same way that we have talked to the Europeans over the years."
He reminds me of the comment of Japanese political leader Ichiro Ozawa, who said in 2002 that it would be "easy" for Japan to make nuclear warheads and that it had enough plutonium to make several thousand weapons. "When one contemplates a number like that," Mr. Schlesinger says, "one sees that a substantial role in nonproliferation has been the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Without that, some and perhaps a fair number of our allies would feel the necessity of having their own nuclear capabilities."
He worries about "contagion" in the Middle East, whereby countries will decide to go nuclear if Iran does. "We've long talked about Iran as a tipping point," he says, "in that it might induce Turkey, which has long been protected under NATO, Egypt [and] Saudi Arabia to respond in kind . . . There has been talk about extending the nuclear umbrella to the Middle East in the event that the Iranians are successful in developing that capacity."
Mr. Schlesinger expresses concerns, too, about the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, all of which are more than 20 years old. "I am worried about the reliability of the weapons . . . as time passes. Not this year, not next year, but as time passes and the stockpile ages." There is a worry, too, about the "intellectual infrastructure," he says, as Americans who know how to make nuclear weapons either retire or die. And he notes that the "physical infrastructure" is now "well over 60 years" old. Some of it "comes out of the Manhattan Project."
The U.S. is the only major nuclear power that is not modernizing its weapons. "The Russians have a shelf life for their weapons of about 10 years so they are continually replacing" them. The British and the French "stay up to date." And the Chinese and the Indians "continue to add to their stockpiles." But in the U.S., Congress won't even so much as fund R&D for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. "The RRW has become a toxic term on Capitol Hill," Mr. Schlesinger says. Give it a new name, he seems to be suggesting, and try again to get Congress to fund it. "We need to be much more vigorous about life-extension programs" for the weapons.
Finally, we chat about Mr. Schlesinger's nearly half-century as a nuclear strategist. Are we living in a world where the use of nuclear weapons is more likely than it was back then? "The likelihood of a nuclear exchange has substantially gone away," he says. That's the good news. "However, the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States" is greater.
During his RAND years, in the 1960s, Mr. Schlesinger recalls that "we were working on mitigating the possible effects [of a nuclear attack] through civil defense, which, may I say parenthetically, we should be working on now with respect, certainly, to the possibility of a terrorist weapon used against the United States. . . . We should have a much more rapid response capability. . . . We're not as well organized as we should be to respond."
Mr. Schlesinger sees another difference between now and when he started in this business: "Public interest in our strategic posture has faded over the decades," he says. "In the Cold War, it was a most prominent subject. Now, much of the public is barely interested in it. And that has been true of the Congress as well," creating what he delicately refers to as "something of a stalemate in expenditures."
He's raising the alarm. Congress, the administration and Americans ignore it at their peril.
Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of the Journal's editorial page.
-------------
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
* OPINION: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW
* Wall Street Journal, JULY 11, 2009
Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World
The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat.
By MELANIE KIRKPATRICK
'Nuclear weapons are used every day." So says former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaking last month at his office in a wooded enclave of Maclean, Va. It's a serene setting for Doomsday talk, and Mr. Schlesinger's matter-of-fact tone belies the enormity of the concepts he's explaining -- concepts that were seemingly ignored in this week's Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev.
We use nuclear weapons every day, Mr. Schlesinger goes on to explain, "to deter our potential foes and provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection."
Mr. Obama likes to talk about his vision of a nuclear-free world, and in Moscow he and Mr. Medvedev signed an agreement setting targets for sweeping reductions in the world's largest nuclear arsenals. Reflecting on the hour I spent with Mr. Schlesinger, I can't help but think: Do we really want to do this?
For nuclear strategists, Mr. Schlesinger is Yoda, the master of their universe. In addition to being a former defense secretary (Nixon and Ford), he is a former energy secretary (Carter) and former director of central intelligence (Nixon). He has been studying the U.S. nuclear posture since the early 1960s, when he was at the RAND Corporation, a California think tank that often does research for the U.S. government. He's the expert whom Defense Secretary Robert Gates called on last year to lead an investigation into the Air Force's mishandling of nuclear weapons after nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly flown across the country on a B-52 and nuclear fuses were accidently shipped to Taiwan. Most recently, he's vice chairman of a bipartisan congressional commission that in May issued an urgent warning about the need to maintain a strong U.S. deterrent.
But above all, Mr. Schlesinger is a nuclear realist. Are we heading toward a nuclear-free world anytime soon? He shoots back a one-word answer: "No." I keep silent, hoping he will go on. "We will need a strong deterrent," he finally says, "and that is measured at least in decades -- in my judgment, in fact, more or less in perpetuity. The notion that we can abolish nuclear weapons reflects on a combination of American utopianism and American parochialism. . . . It's like the [1929] Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy . . . . It's not based upon an understanding of reality."
In other words: Go ahead and wish for a nuclear-free world, but pray that you don't get what you wish for. A world without nukes would be even more dangerous than a world with them, Mr. Schlesinger argues.
"If, by some miracle, we were able to eliminate nuclear weapons," he says, "what we would have is a number of countries sitting around with breakout capabilities or rumors of breakout capabilities -- for intimidation purposes. . . . and finally, probably, a number of small clandestine stockpiles." This would make the U.S. more vulnerable.
Mr. Schlesinger makes the case for a strong U.S. deterrent. Yes, the Cold War has ended and, yes, while "we worry about Russia's nuclear posture to some degree, it is not just as prominent as it once was." The U.S. still needs to deter Russia, which has the largest nuclear capability of any potential adversary, and the Chinese, who have a modest (and growing) capability. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has no influence on North Korea or Iran, he says, or on nonstate actors. "They're not going to be deterred by the possibility of a nuclear response to actions that they might take," he says.
Mr. Schlesinger refers to the unanimous conclusion of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which he co-led with Chairman William Perry. The commission "strongly" recommended that further discussions with the Russians on arms control are "desirable," he says, and that "we should proceed with negotiations on an extension of the START Treaty." That's what Mr. Obama set in motion in Moscow this week. The pact -- whose full name is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty -- expires in December. But what's the hurry? Mr. Schlesinger warns about rushing to agree on cuts. "The treaty . . . can be extended for five years. And, if need be, I would extend it for five years."
There's another compelling reason for a strong U.S. deterrent: the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which protects more than 30 allies world-wide. "If we were only protecting the North American continent," he says, "we could do so with far fewer weapons than we have at present in the stockpile." But a principal aim of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is "to provide the necessary reassurance to our allies, both in Asia and in Europe." That includes "our new NATO allies such as Poland and the Baltic States," which, he notes dryly, continue to be concerned about their Russian neighbor. "Indeed, they inform us regularly that they understand the Russians far better than do we."
The congressional commission warned of a coming "tipping point" in proliferation, when more nations might decide to go nuclear if they were to lose confidence in the U.S. deterrent, or in Washington's will to use it. If U.S. allies lose confidence in Washington's ability to protect them, they'll kick off a new nuclear arms race.
That's a reason Mr. Schlesinger wants to bring Japan into the nuclear conversation. "One of the recommendations of the commission is that we start to have a dialogue with the Japanese about strategic capabilities in order both to help enlighten them and to provide reassurance that they will be protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In the past, that has not been the case. Japan never was seriously threatened by Soviet capabilities and that the Soviets looked westward largely is a threat against Western Europe. But now that the Chinese forces have been growing into the many hundreds of weapons, we think that it's necessary to talk to the Japanese in the same way that we have talked to the Europeans over the years."
He reminds me of the comment of Japanese political leader Ichiro Ozawa, who said in 2002 that it would be "easy" for Japan to make nuclear warheads and that it had enough plutonium to make several thousand weapons. "When one contemplates a number like that," Mr. Schlesinger says, "one sees that a substantial role in nonproliferation has been the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Without that, some and perhaps a fair number of our allies would feel the necessity of having their own nuclear capabilities."
He worries about "contagion" in the Middle East, whereby countries will decide to go nuclear if Iran does. "We've long talked about Iran as a tipping point," he says, "in that it might induce Turkey, which has long been protected under NATO, Egypt [and] Saudi Arabia to respond in kind . . . There has been talk about extending the nuclear umbrella to the Middle East in the event that the Iranians are successful in developing that capacity."
Mr. Schlesinger expresses concerns, too, about the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, all of which are more than 20 years old. "I am worried about the reliability of the weapons . . . as time passes. Not this year, not next year, but as time passes and the stockpile ages." There is a worry, too, about the "intellectual infrastructure," he says, as Americans who know how to make nuclear weapons either retire or die. And he notes that the "physical infrastructure" is now "well over 60 years" old. Some of it "comes out of the Manhattan Project."
The U.S. is the only major nuclear power that is not modernizing its weapons. "The Russians have a shelf life for their weapons of about 10 years so they are continually replacing" them. The British and the French "stay up to date." And the Chinese and the Indians "continue to add to their stockpiles." But in the U.S., Congress won't even so much as fund R&D for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. "The RRW has become a toxic term on Capitol Hill," Mr. Schlesinger says. Give it a new name, he seems to be suggesting, and try again to get Congress to fund it. "We need to be much more vigorous about life-extension programs" for the weapons.
Finally, we chat about Mr. Schlesinger's nearly half-century as a nuclear strategist. Are we living in a world where the use of nuclear weapons is more likely than it was back then? "The likelihood of a nuclear exchange has substantially gone away," he says. That's the good news. "However, the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States" is greater.
During his RAND years, in the 1960s, Mr. Schlesinger recalls that "we were working on mitigating the possible effects [of a nuclear attack] through civil defense, which, may I say parenthetically, we should be working on now with respect, certainly, to the possibility of a terrorist weapon used against the United States. . . . We should have a much more rapid response capability. . . . We're not as well organized as we should be to respond."
Mr. Schlesinger sees another difference between now and when he started in this business: "Public interest in our strategic posture has faded over the decades," he says. "In the Cold War, it was a most prominent subject. Now, much of the public is barely interested in it. And that has been true of the Congress as well," creating what he delicately refers to as "something of a stalemate in expenditures."
He's raising the alarm. Congress, the administration and Americans ignore it at their peril.
Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of the Journal's editorial page.
459) Um texto sobre logica e racionalismo
Transcrevendo a parte inicial de um texto relevante:
Lógica e argumentação
Desidério Murcho (24 de Junho de 2009)
King's College London
Lógica e argumentação (do blog Crítica)
"Uma das razões mais importantes para estudar filosofia é aprender a formar e defender pontos de vista próprios."
Mark Sainsbury
A argumentação é um instrumento sem o qual não podemos compreender melhor o mundo nem intervir nele de modo a alcançar os nossos objectivos; não podemos sequer determinar com rigor quais serão os melhores objectivos a ter em mente. Os seres humanos estão sós perante o universo; têm de resolver os seus problemas, enfrentar dificuldades, traçar planos de acção, fazer escolhas. Para fazer todas estas coisas precisamos de argumentos. Será que a Terra está imóvel no centro do universo? Que argumentos há a favor dessa ideia? E que argumentos há contra ela? Será que Bin-Laden é responsável pelo atentado de 11 de Setembro? Que argumentos há a favor dessa ideia? E que argumentos há contra? Será que foi o réu que incendiou propositadamente a mata? Será que o aborto é permissível? Será que Cristo era um deus? Será que criaremos mais bem-estar se o Estado for o dono da maior parte da economia? Será possível curar o cancro? E a Sida? O que é a consciência? Será que alguma vez houve vida em Marte? Queremos respostas a todas estas perguntas, e a muitas mais. Mas as respostas não nascem das árvores nem dos livros estrangeiros; temos de ser nós a procurar descobri-las. Para descobri-las temos de usar argumentos. E quando argumentamos podemos enganar-nos; podemos argumentar bem ou mal. É por isso que a lógica é importante.
Para ler a integralidade deste importante ensaio, clicar aqui.
Lógica e argumentação
Desidério Murcho (24 de Junho de 2009)
King's College London
Lógica e argumentação (do blog Crítica)
"Uma das razões mais importantes para estudar filosofia é aprender a formar e defender pontos de vista próprios."
Mark Sainsbury
A argumentação é um instrumento sem o qual não podemos compreender melhor o mundo nem intervir nele de modo a alcançar os nossos objectivos; não podemos sequer determinar com rigor quais serão os melhores objectivos a ter em mente. Os seres humanos estão sós perante o universo; têm de resolver os seus problemas, enfrentar dificuldades, traçar planos de acção, fazer escolhas. Para fazer todas estas coisas precisamos de argumentos. Será que a Terra está imóvel no centro do universo? Que argumentos há a favor dessa ideia? E que argumentos há contra ela? Será que Bin-Laden é responsável pelo atentado de 11 de Setembro? Que argumentos há a favor dessa ideia? E que argumentos há contra? Será que foi o réu que incendiou propositadamente a mata? Será que o aborto é permissível? Será que Cristo era um deus? Será que criaremos mais bem-estar se o Estado for o dono da maior parte da economia? Será possível curar o cancro? E a Sida? O que é a consciência? Será que alguma vez houve vida em Marte? Queremos respostas a todas estas perguntas, e a muitas mais. Mas as respostas não nascem das árvores nem dos livros estrangeiros; temos de ser nós a procurar descobri-las. Para descobri-las temos de usar argumentos. E quando argumentamos podemos enganar-nos; podemos argumentar bem ou mal. É por isso que a lógica é importante.
Para ler a integralidade deste importante ensaio, clicar aqui.
Sexta-feira, Julho 10, 2009
458) Contestando Karl Popper: uma visao criticao seu racionalismo
Debunking Popper: A Critique of Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism
Nicholas Dykes
Philosophical Notes No. 65
ISSN 0267-7091 - ISBN 1 85637 580 3
An occasional publication of the Libertarian Alliance,
Suite 35, 2 Lansdowne Row, Mayfair, London W1J 6HL.
© 2003: Libertarian Alliance; Nicholas Dykes.
Nicholas Dykes is a British-Canadian writer currently living in England. Married, with two children, he is the author of Fed up with Government? (Hereford, UK: Four Nations, 1991), the 300-page manifesto for a putative British 'Libertarian Party'; A Tangled Web of Guesses: A Critical Assessment of the Philosophy of Karl Popper (London: Libertarian Alliance, 1996); and of 'Debunking Popper', Reason Papers, #24, Fall 1999.
The views expressed in this publication are those of its author, and
not necessarily those of the Libertarian Alliance, its Committee,
Advisory Council or subscribers.
FOR LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
INTRODUCTION1
Karl Popper was without question one of the most eminent philosophers of the 20th Century. Author of several ground-breaking and highly influential books, and of hundreds of articles; winner of many rare prizes and other honours, such as a British knighthood; and founder of two new schools of thought, Critical Rationalism and Evolutionary Epistemology: few thinkers have made more extensive contributions to the intellectual life of their times. When he died in 1994, after a career spanning nearly 70 years, many agreed with his fellow philosophers Anthony Quinton and Rom Harré that Popper was "this century's most important philosopher of science," and "the last of the great logicians."2
As the name Critical Rationalism may suggest, Popper regarded a critical attitude as the most important virtue a philosopher could possess. Indeed, he called criticism "the lifeblood of all rational thought" [PKP2 977]3 and, as his obituarists implied, it was towards science, and the logic of science, that his critical powers were chiefly directed. In his magnum opus, The Open Society and its Enemies, he wrote: "... all criticism consists in pointing out ... contradictions or discrepancies, and scientific progress consists largely in the elimination of contradictions wherever we find them. This means, however, that science proceeds on the assumption that contradictions are impermissible and avoidable ... once a contradiction is admitted, all science must collapse" [OSE2 39].
It is thus surprising to discover that Popper himself hardly lived up to this ideal of non contradiction. When one examines Critical Rationalism, for example, one soon notices that it is based on questionable premises; that its internal logic is seriously flawed; that it is inconsistent with other elements of Popper's thought; and that it leads to conflicts with his own publicly stated convictions.
Acknowledgements
Before beginning, the author would like to express his sincere thanks to David Conway, Anthony Flew, David Kelley, Tibor Machan and David Miller for valuable observations or criticisms which led to the reworking of many passages; to Kevin McFarlane and Brian Micklethwait for encouragement and practical help; and to The Estate of Karl Popper for kind permission to reproduce copyright material.
1. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM
Critical Rationalism has also been referred to, by Popper himself and by others, as the theory of falsification, or falsificationism, and as fallibilism. It would be tempting, for the sake of brevity, to employ 'fallibilism' throughout, but the term is also associated with the founder of Pragmatism, C.S. Peirce, who actually coined it long before Popper began his career.4 This paper therefore follows the lead of later Popperians such as W.W. Bartley III5 and David Miller6 in employing Critical Rationalism, which in any case better encompasses Popper's thought.
The Critical Rationalism of Karl Popper [henceforth CR] begins by rejecting induction as a scientific method. The actual method of science, Popper maintained, is a continuous process of conjecture and refutation: "The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are controlled by criticism; that is, by attempted refutations, which include severely critical tests. They may survive these tests; but they can never be positively justified: they can be established neither as certainly true nor even as 'probable'..." [C&R vii].
Elsewhere, Popper put the matter more succinctly: "all knowledge is hypothetical" [OKN 30] or "All knowledge remains... conjectural" [RASC xxxv]; and it is in the form 'all knowledge is conjectural' that the essence of his philosophy has been captured - and has influenced others.7
CR was originally developed by Popper to demarcate science from non-science. He stated that for scientific knowledge to be considered knowledge it had to be refutable: "'In so far as scientific statements refer to the world of experience, they must be refutable ... in so far as they are irrefutable, they do not refer to the world of experience'" [OSE2 13].
It follows that we can never attain certainty: "The quest for certainty... is mistaken.... though we may seek for truth... we can never be quite certain that we have found it" [OSE2 375]. "No particular theory may ever be regarded as absolutely certain.... No scientific theory is sacrosanct..." [OKN 360]. "Precision and certainty are false ideals. They are impossible to attain and therefore dangerously misleading..." [UNQ 24]. He summed up with an oft-repeated aphorism: "We never know what we are talking about" [UNQ 27].
Accordingly, Popper refused to grant any philosophical value to definitions: "Definitions do not play any very important part in science.... Our 'scientific knowledge'... remains entirely unaffected if we eliminate all definitions" [OSE2 14]. "Definitions never give any factual knowledge about 'nature' or about the 'nature of things'" [C&R 20-21]. "Definitions.... are never really needed, and rarely of any use" [RASC xxxvi].
Although he held these positions all his working life, Popper did acknowledge that they were open to criticism: "nothing is exempt from criticism ... not even this principle of the critical method itself" [OSE2 379].
2. THE FIRST PREMISE OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM
Popper built his philosophy on foundations borrowed from Hume and Kant. His first premise was wholehearted acceptance of Hume's attack on induction. The second, to be addressed in the next section, was agreement with Kant's view that it is our ideas which give form to reality, not reality which gives form to our ideas.
Hume, whom Popper called "one of the most rational minds of all ages" [PKP2 1019], is renowned for elaborating the 'problem of induction' - a supposedly logical proof that generalisations from observation are invalid. Most later philosophers have accepted Hume's arguments, and libraries have been filled with attempts to solve his 'problem.'
Popper thought he had the answer. "I believed I had solved the problem of induction by the simple discovery that induction by repetition did not exist" [UNQ 52; c.f. OKN 1ff & PKP2 1115]. What really took place, according to Popper, was CR, knowledge advancing by means of conjecture and refutation: "... in my view here is no such thing as induction" [LSCD 40]; "what characterises the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested" [LSCD 42].
Hume, said Popper, had shown that: "there is no argument of reason which permits an inference from one case to another... and I completely agree" [OKN 96]. Elsewhere he referred to induction as "a myth" which had been "exploded" by Hume [UNQ 80]. He further asserted that "There is no rule of inductive inference - inference leading to theories or universal laws - ever proposed which can be taken seriously even for a minute" [UNQ 146-7; see also RASC 31].
The Problem with 'The Problem'
Popper's solution was certainly correct in one respect. The problem of induction would indeed vanish if there were no such thing as induction. However, the issue would be resolved much more positively were it to turn out that Hume had been wrong, and that there never had been any problem with induction in the first place. And, in point of fact, this is the case. Despite his great skill as a thinker and writer, Hume missed the point. Induction does not depend for its validity on observation, but on the Law of Identity.
Hume stated, in essence, that since all ideas are derived from experience we cannot have any valid ideas about future events - which have yet to be experienced. He therefore denied that the past can give us any information about the future. He further denied that there is any necessary connection between cause and effect. We experience only repeated instances, we cannot experience any "power" that actually causes events to take place. Events are entirely "loose and separate.... conjoined but never connected."8
According to Hume, then, one has no guarantee that the hawthorn in an English hedge will not bear grapes next autumn, nor that the thistles in a nearby field won't produce figs. The expectation that the thorn will produce red berries, and the thistles purple flowers, is merely the result of "regular conjunction" which induces an "inference of the understanding."9 In Hume's view, there is no such thing as objective identity, there is only subjective "custom" or "habit."
However, Hume also wrote: "When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false"10 and the idea that one might gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles is surely absurd enough to qualify. And false is what Hume's opinions most certainly are. Left standing, they lead to what he himself called "the flattest of all contradictions, viz. that it is possible for the same thing both to be and not to be."11
The crux of the case against Hume was stated in 1916 by H.W.B. Joseph in An Introduction to Logic: "A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be."12 Hume's whole argument - persuasive though it may be - is, to borrow Joseph's words, "in flat conflict with the Law of Identity."13
Existence implies identity. It is not possible to exist without being something, and a thing can only be what it is: A is A. Any actions of that thing form part of its identity: "the way in which it acts must be regarded as a partial expression of what it is."14 Thus to deny any connection between a thing, its actions, and their consequences, is to assert that the thing is not what it is; it is to defy the Law of Identity.
It is not necessary to prolong this discussion. Entities exist. They possess identity. By careful observation - free from preconception - we are able to discover the identities of the entities we observe. Thereafter, we are fully entitled to assume that like entities will cause like events, the form of inference we call induction. And, because it rests on the axiom of the Law of Identity, correct induction - free from contradiction - is a valid route to knowledge. The first premise of CR is therefore false.
There is nonetheless a substantial grain of truth in Hume's position, or few philosophers would have followed him. The grain lies in the precision of our knowledge of future events. Hume denied all knowledge of the future because we can have no experience of it. As we have seen, this is not true, it overlooks the Law of Identity. What is true, is that our prediction of events is limited by the unforeseeable. An 'O' ring may fail and destroy an otherwise reliable spacecraft; an icy road surface may cause a pristine Rolls-Royce to crash. For, no matter how sound our judgement nor wide our experience, we cannot possibly have complete, certain and absolute knowledge of future events. We are not omniscient: all kinds of unforeseen happenings may intervene to spoil even the best laid of our plans. Further, new information about old subjects continuously comes to light and, over time, things can evolve or change. Nonetheless, armed with the Law of Identity, there is no reason to allow the unforeseeable to turn us into sceptics. The universe is not a series of "loose and separate events" any more than time is a series of discrete, unrelated segments of duration.
It should also be noted that, in fact, all knowledge of entities, and all knowledge of language, is acquired inductively. A child's knowledge of apples, for example, is based on a very limited sampling. A student's knowledge of the word 'inference' is founded on a similarly narrow acquaintance. If it were true that induction is a myth, then all knowledge of external reality, all language, and all human thought - which depends on knowledge of reality and on language - would be myths as well, including, of course, CR.
3. POPPER'S KANTIAN PREMISE
Popper described himself as an "unorthodox Kantian" [UNQ 82]; i.e., he accepted part of Kant's epistemology, but not all of it: "Kant was right that it is our intellect which imposes its laws - its ideas, its rules - upon the inarticulate mass of our 'sensations' and thereby brings order to them. Where he was wrong is that he did not see that we rarely succeed with our imposition" [OKN 68n31; c.f. OKN 328, C&R 48-9].
Popper's Kantianism reveals itself most clearly in his view of our senses, which he saw as creative modifiers of incoming data, not as neutral 'windows on the world': "Classical epistemology which takes our sense perceptions as 'given', as the 'data' from which our theories have to be constructed by some process of induction, can only be described as pre-Darwinian. It fails to take account of the fact that the alleged data are ... adaptive reactions, and therefore interpretations which incorporate theories and prejudices and which, like theories, are impregnated with conjectural expectations... there can be no pure perception, no pure datum..." [OKN 145].15
A Fundamental Difficulty
Popper's Kantian premise raises enough issues for a book. In this short paper, there is room only for a single objection. Namely, if it is true that our senses are pre-programmed; if it is true that "there is no sense organ in which anticipatory theories are not genetically incorporated" [OKN 72]; then what flows into our minds is determined and what flows out of them is subjective. If our senses are not neutral, if they organise incoming data using pre-set theories built into them by evolution, then they do not provide us with unalloyed information, but only with prescriptions, the content of which is determined by our genetic make up. Whatever is thereafter produced inside our heads - cut off as it is from any objective contact with reality - must be subjective.
Popper's Kantian premise thus deprives CR of universality. Since it is ultimately the product of the pre-programmed interpretation of the data which entered Popper's mind, CR is a theory which can only be applied to Popper. According to his own view of his contact with reality, he would not be able to verify the relevance of CR to anybody else.
Solipsism looms, yes, but that is a natural consequence of all theories of determinism. For if thought, or the basis of thought, is determined; whether by social class, or the subconscious, or whatever determinant is preferred; then the deterministic theory itself must be determined, according to the theory, and can only be relevant to the person who expounds it. Everybody else is determined by their class, subconscious, genes, material substrate, environment, or whatever it is that is supposed to do the determining. All theories of determinism are, to use Brand Blanshard's term, 'self-stultifying.'16
The objection is analogous to the one raised by Anthony Flew against those philosophers - e.g. Hume and Kant - who claim that we can only have knowledge of our own sense impressions. If sense data are all we can know, solipsism is the inevitable result: "mental images .... are (necessarily) private ... and (logically) cannot be accessible to public observation."17
Objectivity
In Unended Quest Popper observed bluntly that "there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation" [UNQ 51]. Although this appears to rule out the possibility of objectivity, that was not Popper's intention. Rather, again following Kant perhaps, he thought the basis for objectivity lay elsewhere: "the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested" [LSCD 44]. He later restated this slightly differently: "it is the public character of science... which preserves the objectivity of science" [POH 155-6].
Unfortunately, these assertions do not bear the weight placed upon them. For if Popper's Kantian premise were true (i.e., if anticipatory theories are genetically incorporated into our sense organs and, therefore, there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation) then senses would not cease to be prejudiced merely by being multiplied. The defective logic could hardly be more clear. One cannot offer as an universal affirmative proposition 'all human senses are prejudiced, i.e. subjective' then ask one's readers to accept that pooling the senses of many persons yields objectivity. If senses are subjective individually they are subjective collectively.18
To conclude under this head, it is plain - even after only a very brief treatment - that Popper's Kantian premise, far from providing CR with a secure footing, leads instead to insuperable problems, not least of which are conflicts with Popper's own rejection of determinism and subjectivism in such works as The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Universe.
4. LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES
Popper called conjecture and refutation a "new way of knowing" [OSE2 383]. However, from a common sense point of view, it can immediately be objected that we do not normally claim to 'know' something which is unjustifiable, tentative or hypothetical. Knowledge, for most people - and for most scientists - is something which it is possible to be sure of, to justify, to validate, to prove; in other words, to know.
Conjecture, on the other hand, is by definition not knowledge. According to Chambers English Dictionary, a conjecture is "an opinion formed on slight or defective evidence or none: an opinion without proof: a guess". Since one cannot define an idea by means of other ideas which are contrary to it, it is clearly illegitimate to place knowledge in the same category as conjecture. More pointedly, the proposition "all knowledge remains conjectural" is a contradiction in terms.
The objection gathers strength when one notices that Popper's proposition is itself not conjectural. Universal and affirmative, it states that "All knowledge remains conjectural" - which is a claim to knowledge. The proposition thus asserts what it denies and is self-contradictory on a second count.19
Another immediate problem is that the notion of 'conjecture' depends for its intelligibility upon the prior concept of 'knowledge.' The idea of a 'conjecture' arose precisely to designate a form of mental activity which was unlike knowledge, and to distinguish clearly from knowledge an idea put forward as opinion without proof. In the Objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand this error is known as 'the fallacy of the stolen concept.' A classic example was Proudhon's claim that 'property is theft.' But the concept of 'theft' depends on the prior concept of 'property' and would be unintelligible without it.20 In exactly the same way, and to repeat, the concept of 'conjecture' cannot be understood apart from the prior concept of knowledge - from which it is to be distinguished. For example, 'Northern Dancer might win the Kentucky Derby' was once a conjecture. When the horse did come first, its win became an item of knowledge.
The invalidity of the proposition 'All knowledge remains conjectural' becomes even more apparent when one considers that Popper employed a large vocabulary of English and German words all of which he had to learn, and to know, in order to express any or all of his ideas. There is little conjectural about the words of a language: either the German word Forschung means 'scientific discovery' or it does not. Similarly, in all his philosophical and scientific work Popper depended on a broad range of core concepts - evolution, energy, light, atom, mass, force, etc - all of which are normally recognised as unalterable brute facts, not as conjectures. 'All knowledge is conjectural' may sound intriguing, but throughout his career Popper actually worked within a framework of knowledge, not of conjecture.
A further problem arises when one considers the concept of 'growth' in Popper's claim that knowledge grows through conjectures and refutations. (The subtitle of his book by that name is The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.) A legitimate response to this assertion is: 'What exactly is it that grows?' The concept of growth implies the existence of a thing, a body, an entity of some sort, that which grows. It may well be true that conjectures and refutations play a role in the growth of knowledge, but they could hardly do this without some knowledge to work on. The growth of knowledge via conjecture and refutation presupposes pre-existing knowledge, not pre-existing conjectures.21
That the growth of knowledge implies knowledge is another illustration of Popper's dependence on something he attempted to deny, effectively 'stealing' a concept. CR is supposed to replace our commonsense idea of inductively-acquired knowledge with a more accurate one of a continuous process of conjecture and refutation. But that process would be meaningless without something for the process to process, and that something is knowledge, not conjecture.
Lastly, the proposition 'all knowledge is conjectural' is simply not true. The writer's observation that 'the sun is shining' is not conjectural, it is a fact known to him and countless other observers. At 11am on 5 May 2003 in western England the sun is shining. The observation is no more conjectural than 'George Bush is President of the USA (at time of writing),' or 'Einstein's grandparents are dead,' or 'the French for 'yes' is 'oui,'' or '2 plus 2 = 4.' These statements are true. They are demonstrable to any sane person; either ostensibly, or through the presentation of evidence beyond reasonable doubt, via simple common sense, or by means of logic. They constitute knowledge, not conjecture.
5. PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE
Other problems surface when one considers actually employing conjecture and refutation; i.e., when one looks at CR in practice. Briefly stated, the method urges us to conjecture, then to subject the resultant theory to severely critical tests. If it survives those tests, we are permitted to grant the theory a degree of verisimilitude, the more stringent the tests, the higher the degree.
The first problem is the method's apparent arbitrariness. The conjecture or theory to be tested - and Popper said the bolder the better - would presumably be selected by the tester. But no criterion for selection is given.22 We might be referred to an earlier CR exercise, but since that route risks infinite regress (via earlier and earlier CR exercises), the conjecture to be tested must fall outside the scope of CR. Therefore, unless further information is provided, it is not obvious how the charge of arbitrariness can be resisted.
Consequently, the whole approach smacks of straw men. If a conjecture survives all CR tests, it could merely be that a 'virtuous straw man' (the conjecture) has one by one fended off an army of lesser straw men (the tests). But nothing would be proven by all this. Not only do we still require evidence of the worthwhileness of the conjecture, some other method is needed to show that the opposing arguments are truly exhaustive and not just straw. To use an analogy: it is perfectly possible for a dangerous lunatic to pass a driving test. Even the most stringent 'advanced driver' courses ever devised may not uncover the explosive unroadworthiness of 'the nut behind the wheel.'
The method of conjecture and refutation also appears to be a form of question begging. It must surely assume some measure of truth in the conjecture under examination, or there would be little point in the exercise. Put simply, the method states: 'My proposition deserves examination. Nothing in the process of examination undermined my proposition. Ergo my proposition has verisimilitude.' It may well have, but the proposition's soundness has not been established by that reasoning. One recalls the famously circular Ontological Argument for the existence of God: 'God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived. If 'that than which' didn't exist, it couldn't be 'the greatest'. Therefore God exists.' But the argument assumes in its first premise that which it sets out to establish and is clearly invalid.
The fact of the matter is that the truth of a proposition rests on the correct identification of the referents and relationships involved, not on any prior or subsequent argumentation. In any design, philosophical or practical, if a false identification is incorporated, whole libraries of arguments may not reveal the consequent flaws. A building can be the most beautiful ever built, but a single misplaced decimal point in a stress calculation can bring it crashing down. As Popper so rightly said: "contradictions are impermissible and avoidable... once a contradiction is admitted, all science must collapse" [OSE2 39].
6. REFUTABILITY AS A CRITERION OF DEMARCATION
CR claims to distinguish science from non-science by the refutability of scientific theories. Popper's standard example was Newtonian physics, so radically displaced by Einstein.23 On the other hand, Popper maintained, there were theories such as those of Marx and Freud, which were non-science because irrefutable. This was Popper's famous 'criterion of demarcation,' which he developed as a young man and held to all his life.
Relatively few philosophers have embraced it however. Tom Settle, a major contributor to P.A. Schilpp's massive festschrift, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, stated firmly in 1970: "As a criterion of demarcation between science and nonscience, Popper's 'falsifiability'-plus-a-critical-policy does not work" [PKP2 719]. Other contributors evidently agreed; among them A.J. Ayer, William C. Kneale, Imre Lakatos, Grover Maxwell, and Hilary Putnam.
One can understand the importance of the distinction to the young Popper. Fascinated by science, he was surrounded by true-believing Marxists and Freudians all of whom claimed science on their side while espousing doctrines which seemed to Popper obviously false. Nonetheless, 'refutability' seems to miss the mark. The ideas of Marx or Freud stand or fall on their conformity to logic and the available evidence - in exactly the same way as the ideas of Newton or Einstein. Marxism and Freudianism failed to survive as viable theories due to myopic concentration on a narrow range of data, false interpretations of evidence, and logical inconsistency. They never were 'irrefutable.' They failed precisely because they could be, and were, refuted; either by contrary evidence, by exposure of contradictions, or by the resolute refusal of reality to conform to their predictions. It wasn't refutability which made them unscientific, it was inaccuracy and/or illogicality.
Science is distinguished by its strict adherence to physical evidence. Non-science, on the other hand, is invariably characterised by preconception, followed by a cavalier disregard for, or rationalisation of, anything that doesn't fit into the preconceived schema. In one sense, this is what Popper was saying. But, due perhaps to his dislike of definitions, he homed in on the wrong identifying characteristic.
There are other, more serious, criticisms of Popper's theory of demarcation. Grover Maxwell pointed out that 'All men are mortal' is a perfectly sound scientific statement which is not falsifiable [PKP1 292]. Popper defended himself robustly [PKP2 1037ff], but Maxwell seemed to have the stronger case. Maxwell might also have taxed Popper about mathematics. The axioms of mathematics cannot be refuted. According to the demarcation theory, therefore, mathematics is not a science. But physics is inseparable from mathematics. Quantum mechanics, for example, could hardly be expressed without it. So physics cannot be a science either. Much the same could be said about logic. The Law of Contradiction, etc, cannot be refuted, so logic is not a science.
There is besides the singularly Popperian problem of Marxism. Marxism was one of the theories which led Popper to develop his conception of demarcation in the first place: "I had been shocked by the fact that the Marxists... were able to interpret any conceivable event as a verification of their theories" [UNQ 41-2]. Yet in "Replies to my Critics" Popper changed his tune: "Marxism was once a scientific theory"; "Marxism was once a science" [PKP2 984-5]. No doubt Popper would have swamped this objection with distinctions between Marx and Marxism,24 but the notion that Marxism could both be and not be a science does little to inspire confidence in Popper's theory of demarcation.
7. POPPER'S VIA NEGATIVA
One of the most troubling aspects of Popper's philosophy is his devout refusal to consider anything positive, a negativity which reminds one of the via negativa of medieval theology.25 The scholastic principle, "we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not" is remarkably similar to Popper's assertion that "natural laws.... do not assert that something exists or is the case; they deny it" [LSCD 69]. CR is invariably concerned with what is not, never with what is. Yet the negative 'it is not' cannot be uttered without implying the positive 'it.' A negative implies a positive, unless one is actually denying the existence of an entity, but that is a different issue.
That negative implies positive was clearly understood by Popper. He referred to "the notion of falsity - that is, of untruth - and thus, by implication, the notion of truth" [UNQ 98]. But he did not seem to see that truth implies a 'what is' question every time CR tells us what is not. It is a stolen concept situation: the idea of 'falsity' depends upon the logically prior idea of 'truth.' Or, as Anthony O'Hear has expressed it: "there can, in fact, be no falsification without a background of accepted truth."26
Grover Maxwell also noted this problem. He pointed out that many theories are in fact positively confirmed [PKP1 292ff]. Yet Popper continued to insist in "Replies to My Critics" that, "we certainly are not justified in reasoning from an instance to the truth of the corresponding law.... we are justified in reasoning from a counterinstance to the falsity of the corresponding universal law" [PKP2 1020].
However, recalling Popper's Kantian premise, one might reasonably enquire at this point: if all observations are theory-laden, and thereby suspect, what justifies our placing any confidence in negative observations? The procedure of observation is identical whether one is seeking evidence in favour of a theory, or testing for evidence against it. If our senses are automatically suspect, as Popper maintained, negative or falsifying instances deserve no more credibility than positive or confirming ones.
Further, remembering Popper's Humian premise, one immediately wants to ask: If we are not allowed to argue from positive instances to true laws, why are we allowed to argue from counterinstances to negative laws (we were told above that "natural laws... deny"). The reasoning process is the same. Collecting disconfirmations and arguing negatively scarcely differs from collecting confirmations and arguing positively. Both are inductive procedures and, as such, have been disallowed in advance by Popper's rejection of induction.
Certainly, a single negative instance suffices to refute any universal proposition. Australian black swans falsified the belief that all adult swans were white. Popper was perfectly correct to remind us of this, and also that one or more positive instances do not necessarily establish universal propositions. But colour never was the defining characteristic of swans. The discovery of black ones did not entitle Popper to assert that their essential features - long necks, powerful wings, etc - were equally suspect.
The bottom line which CR must confront, however, is that one cannot falsify a scientific theory without inference from observed instances. However much Popper may have rejected induction, his own method was in fact dependent upon it.27
8. TRUTH, FACTS AND REALISM
As a metaphysical realist, Popper upheld the correspondence theory of truth: "A statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts" [OKN 46]. Although he reiterated this frequently [e.g. OSE2 369ff, UNQ 140ff], only once did he go into detail about what he meant by 'fact.' "Facts are something like a common product of language and reality... they are reality pinned down by descriptive statements.... New linguistic means not only help us to describe new kinds of facts; in a way, they even create new kinds of facts. In a certain sense, these facts obviously existed before the new means were created.... But in another sense we might say that these facts do not exist as facts before they are singled out from the continuum of events and pinned down by statements - the theories which describe them" [C&R 214].
Unfortunately, neither the lines quoted, nor the rest of the passage in the book, clarify the meaning of the word 'fact.' Since Popper's claim that 'truth means correspondence to the facts' cannot be evaluated without such clarification, we turn again to Chambers Dictionary, which defines 'fact' as "reality, a real state of things, as distinguished from a mere statement or belief." But if this definition is correct, it leads immediately to another problem with CR.
CR states that for knowledge to be regarded as scientific it must be falsifiable. Plainly then, if an item of 'knowledge' is falsified, it can no longer be regarded as a fact. In Popper's own words, a false conjecture "contradicts some real state of affairs;" "falsifications... indicate the points where we have touched reality" [C&R 116]. What we are left with are conjectures which have not yet been falsified. But a yet-to-be-falsified conjecture can hardly be called a fact, 'a real state of things.' It is rather 'a mere statement or belief' from which facts are to be distinguished.
Remembering that we have been forbidden to regard as certain anything which we may think we know about facts, all knowledge is conjectural; and that our senses are suspect because 'theory impregnated;' we are led to the seemingly inevitable conclusion that we can never know any facts. All we can 'know' are falsifiable conjectures which, as we have just seen, are not facts. Further, if this is the case, we can never find out what is true. For if truth means correspondence with the facts, as Popper assured us it did, and we cannot know any facts, then we cannot know any truth.
It could be argued that this is precisely Popper's whole philosophy. That might be correct. But so arguing would not remove the incompatibility between Critical Rationalism and Popper's espousal of the correspondence theory of truth.
It would also appear that CR conflicts with another foundation of Popper's thought, his realism. "Denying realism" he stated, "amounts to megalomania (the most widespread occupational disease of the professional philosopher)" [OKN 41]. He himself had always been: "a commonsense realist.... I was interested in the real world, in the cosmos, and I was thoroughly opposed to every idealism..." [OKN 322-3]. A few pages later he wrote: "whether our man-made theories are true or not depends upon the real facts; real facts, which are, with very few exceptions, emphatically not man-made. Our man-made theories may clash with these real facts, and so, in our search for truth, we may have to adjust our theories or to give them up" [OKN 328-9].
One must agree with these sentiments. But, if the arguments just outlined are correct, it is CR which is in need of adjustment. For if CR does deny us any knowledge of real facts, the theory not only contradicts realism, it leaves one with no good reason to be a realist. Secondly, if the reasoning in other sections of this essay is correct, then CR conflicts with the fact that, having discovered such real facts as the existence of the works of Karl Popper, say, we can and do have true knowledge of reality. No matter which way one looks at it, CR seems out of place in the mind of anyone who aspires to be a realist.
9. DEFINITION AND CONTRADICTION
Popper's espousal of the correspondence theory also conflicts with his scorn for definitions. When we assert that a statement corresponds to the facts we mean that the words we are employing accurately describe a specific, external, state of affairs. But we could not assert correspondence if our words did not have precise meanings; i.e. did not have precise definitions.
Popper liked to aver, provocatively, that we never know what we are talking about. But if his aphorism were true, a statement such as 'arsenic is poisonous' would be vacuous. Yet arsenic does exist. It is a chemical substance which, ingested above a certain concentration, is very likely to kill a human being. Which means, arsenic is poisonous. The statement is true, it corresponds to the facts. But it is only true because the words employed are accurately defined.
The correspondence theory of truth refers to human ideas. Whether one calls those ideas 'concepts,' 'statements,' 'propositions' or 'theories,' we are only able to hold them in consciousness, to relate them to facts, and to communicate them, via the medium of words. Words are the audio-visual symbols of our ideas. In a very real sense they link us to reality. Which means that if their definitions are vague or shifting, we cannot hope to arrive at any reliable truth: no definitions, no correspondence theory. As Aristotle said: "not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning, our reasoning with one another, and indeed with ourselves, has been annihilated."28
Even more serious is the matter of contradictions. Although he held contradictions to be "impermissible and avoidable" [OSE2 39] Popper had previously dismissed the Laws of Thought (which of course include the Law of Contradiction) as "psychologism" and "a thing of the past" [LSCD 98]. Whatever the merit of that judgement, it is difficult to see how we can uncover contradictions if definitions "never give any factual knowledge about 'nature' or about the 'nature of things'" [C&R 20-21] which statement must imply that there is no significant connection between words and facts. Indeed, it is hard to see how logic and the Law of Contradiction are possible if discussions of the meaning of words - i.e., of their relationship to facts - are "tiresome phantoms" or "verbal quibbles" as Popper insisted [e.g. C&R 28, or TOU xxi].
The upshot here is that the Law of Contradiction, far from being all-important to science, as Popper so vigorously implied, seems excluded by CR. If all identifications are conjectural, just 'guesses,' and definitions of no value, we would not be able to identify subject and attribute positively enough to show that they do, or do not, belong together.
10. POPPER'S THREE WORLD THEORY
Early in his career, Popper began developing a theory in which he split reality into three parts: the physical world, or the world of facts; the world of consciousness, of mental processes and events; and a third world, the products of the human mind, which he called 'objective knowledge.' Popper obviously regarded the theory as important and described it in detail several times [e.g. OKN 106ff, & 152ff]. The following is from his autobiography, Unended Quest: "If we call the world of... physical objects... the first world, and the world of subjective experiences... the second world, we may call the world of statements in themselves the third world. (I now prefer to call these... 'world 1', 'world 2', and 'world 3')" [UNQ 180-1].
After asking us to imagine a picture; distinguishing between the actual picture, one's mental image of it, and one's thoughts about that image; Popper used his own mental processes to illustrate the generation of a world 3 thought which, once written down, and "formulated in language so clearly that I can look at it critically from various sides" becomes "the thought in the objective sense, the world 3 object which I am trying to grasp.... The decisive thing seems to me that we can put objective thoughts - that is, theories - before us in such a way that we can criticize them and argue about them. To do so, we must formulate them in some more or less permanent (especially linguistic) form.... Books and journals can be regarded as typical world 3 objects..." [UNQ 182]. He added, "we may include in world 3 in a more general sense all the products of the human mind, such as tools, institutions, and works of art" [UNQ 187].
Popper described world 3 somewhat paradoxically as both "man-made" and "autonomous:" "the third world, the world of objective knowledge... is man-made. But... this world exists to a large extent autonomously... it generates its own problems, especially those connected with methods of growth; and... its impact on any one of us, even on the most original of creative thinkers, vastly exceeds the impact which any of us can make upon it" [OKN 147].
Problems
First, there seems little conjectural about the theory of worlds 1, 2, & 3. In none of Popper's several presentations is the theory offered as an hypothesis. Rather, it is laid out as a discovery, as what Popper thought the facts to be.
Second, the idea of objective knowledge appears directly to contradict CR. If knowledge can exist objectively, it is not clear how it remains at the same time conjectural. The exercise of studying Popper, for instance, depends on the existence of a dozen or so world 3 objects - his books. Now, either those books exist and say what they say or they don't, there is simply no room for conjecture.
Third, it not clear how we gain access to this objective third world when our brains and senses are 'impregnated' with inborn expectations, and are thus incapable of unadulterated contact with reality. World 3 may exist, 'out there,' objectively, but Popper said, "there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation" [OKN 51]. It would therefore be difficult to know if we were actually observing world 3, or to identify what we were observing in it.
Further, when thoughts have been objectified as world 3 artefacts, it is not apparent how they accord with Popper's rejection of definitions. Once CR is part of an objective world 3, then either the words 'Critical Rationalism' correspond to the world 3 fact that there is such a scientific method, or they do not. We have a genus (scientific methods) and a species (Popper's method) whose differentia is the process of conjecture and refutation. Calling Popper's method syllogistic, or dialectical, would be manifestly wrong. Thus it would be perfectly in order, not a 'tiresome quibble,' to argue about the definition of CR with anyone who maintained, say, that conjecture and refutation was merely Logical Positivism in disguise. Their assertion would be untrue; it would not correspond to the objective, world 3 facts.
The existence of objective world 3 ideas also seems to conflict with Popper's rejection of 'essentialism' - the real existence of concepts - which formed an integral part of his notorious attack on Aristotle29 and underlay his dislike of definitions. Surely it is unreasonable on the one hand to lambaste essentialism - the idea that concepts are, or have, real 'essences,' which exist in our own reality or in another dimension - while claiming on the other hand that concepts have a separate existence in world 3.30
Another awkward question must be 'Why should we stop at worlds 1, 2, and 3?' The basis for the theory is fundamental difference in kind, the worlds are "utterly different" [UNQ 181]. However, in The Open Universe, Popper suggested the possibility of a world 4 of art [TOU 115] and a world 5 of human institutions [TOU 154]. He also spoke of "the gulf which separates the human brain from the animal brain" [TOU 122]. But if we are dividing reality according to fundamental differences in kind, animal consciousness ought to be world 6; and if art gets a world of its own, surely commerce is sufficiently different to qualify as world 7 - 'utterly different' things should not be left together. So plants would require a separate world from animals; elephants from amoebas; inanimate things from animate, etc. The logic of Popper's argument thus seems to lead to an Aristotelian universe of distinct entities grouped according to the identifying characteristic (or 'essence') of each kind, an inference Popper would have disliked.
Finally, the 'autonomy' of man-made, objective knowledge shows a marked kinship to Aristotle's concept of potentiality. Popper often used number theory to explain world 3: "natural numbers are the work of men," he stated. However "unexpected new problems arise as an unintended by-product of the sequence of natural numbers.... These problems are clearly autonomous. They are in no sense made by us; rather, they are discovered by us; and in this sense they exist, undiscovered, before their discovery" [OKN 160-1]. That is fair enough, but is it not merely another way of saying that the future is not actual but potential; that unknown future advances do not actually exist, yet must exist as potential in the known?
In this regard it is instructive to look at Popper's idea (in physics) of "the measures of possibilities" which he called "objective probabilities" or "propensities" [TOU 105] and thought of as "physically real" [QTSP 133]. These provide "a programme for a theory of change... which would allow us to interpret any real state of the world as both an actualisation or realisation of some of the potentialities or propensities of its preceding states, and also as a field of dispositions or propensities to realise the next state" [QTSP 198].
Leaving aside the problem of how 'physically real possibilities' fit into the category of conjectural knowledge, Popperian 'propensity' appears so similar to Aristotelian 'potentiality' - "all movement or change means the realisation (or 'actualisation') of some of the potentialities inherent in the essence of a thing" [OSE2 6] - that, in fairness, one must note that Popper dismissed Aristotle's ideas about potentiality as "pretentious jargon" [OSE2 7].
Popperian Idealism
Another problem with Popper's three-world theory concerns idealism. Popper rejected idealism with characteristic bluntness: "To me, idealism appears absurd" [OKN 41]; "I was thoroughly opposed to every idealism" [OKN 323]. Yet when one examines Popper's three-world theory, idealist overtones fairly spring from the page.
For instance, in one of his several discussions of worlds 1, 2 & 3, he wrote: "I regard world 3 as being essentially the product of the human mind. It is we who create world 3 objects.... these objects have their own inherent or autonomous laws which create unintended and unforeseeable consequences.... [these] repercussions on us are as great as, or greater than, those of our physical environment" [UNQ 186]. Elsewhere he wrote of "the 'objective mind' or 'spirit'" [OKN 149]; and that "the third world is... superhuman", it "transcends its makers" [OKN 159]. But surely the notion of a transcendent mind or spirit which effects human beings more than their physical environment is a straightforward depiction of idealism?
In The Open Universe, the idealist element seems even plainer: "we ought to admit the existence of an autonomous part of World 3; a part which consists of objective thought contents which are independent of, and clearly distinct from, the subjective or personal thought processes by which they are grasped, and whose grasp they can causally influence. I thus assert that there exist autonomous World 3 objects which have not yet taken up either World 1 shape or World 2 shape, but which, nevertheless, interact with our thought processes" [TOU 119-20]. It would be hard to describe 'independent, autonomous, objective thought contents which influence human thought processes' in other than idealist terms.
In The Self and Its Brain Popper's idealism becomes explicit. The thesis of the work, a joint effort by Popper and neuroscientist Sir John Eccles, consists of a revival of Cartesian dualism. Without admitting a mental substance, the authors defend "interactionism", the theory that "the self-conscious mind is an independent entity" [TSIB 355], which interacts with the physical brain: "something totally different from the physical system acts in some way on the physical system" [TSIB 472]. Early in the book, Popper wrote of "unembodied" World 3 objects [TSIB 41ff]. Towards the end, he stated: "the World 3 object is a real object which exists, but exists nowhere.... In a sense World 3 is a kind of Platonic world of ideas, a world which exists nowhere but which does have an existence and which does interact, especially, with human minds" [TSIB 450, see also 43ff, and OKN 154]. Popper may have consciously rejected idealism as absurd, but his thinking in the above passages is clearly identifiable as idealism - even if he was unconscious of that fact, and even if his idealism is of a somewhat novel kind.31
There is no doubt much more that could be said about Popper's three-world theory but there is no further space available here. Suffice it to say that it is this world we seek to understand; and while idealist philosophers from Plato onward have speculated about other worlds, not one of their conjectures has deepened our understanding of this one. In the words of John Searle: "We live in one world, not two or three or twenty-seven."32
11. ESTABLISHED THEORIES
The last major area of difficulty with CR to be examined in this paper concerns theories which have successfully withstood criticism. Popper did allow that after scientific theories have passed a great number of severe tests, "their tentativeness may cease to be obvious" [POH 131]. But if asked about 'established' theories he was very likely to point to Isaac Newton's "unquestionable truths" [UNQ 37] which, seemingly unassailable for over 200 years, were pushed aside by the "Einsteinian revolution" [UNQ 81].
Yet theories do exist which, in fact, are positively confirmed, as Grover Maxwell has pointed out [PKP1 292ff]. Copernicus's heliocentric theory, for example, was indeed hypothetical in 1543 because the instruments did not then exist with which to prove it. But now that huge telescopes and space probes have eliminated any rational doubt that the earth revolves around the sun, it would seem bizarre to maintain that heliocentricity remains conjectural.
Another famous theory is that of Harvey and the circulation of the blood. Once, that was indeed a bold conjecture. But if one were to declaim nowadays that Harvey's theory is refutable, or that we don't know what we are talking about when we say that blood circulates in the human body, one should expect laughter from one's audience.33
Popper was evidently aware of this problem. He once wrote about the "realisation" of the "conjecture" of an atomic bomb [TSIB 47]. But if a conjecture is realised it is very difficult to see how it remains a conjecture. One might fairly retort, rather, that this one admission blows apart the notion of demarcation by refutability and the whole of CR along with it.
There is also the awkward subject of evolution. Popper called Darwinism "a brilliant scientific hypothesis" about "a host of biological and palaeontological observations." He added: "I see in modern Darwinism the most successful explanation of the relevant facts" [POH 106]. Later, he confirmed that he was "very ready to accept evolution as a fact" [UNQ 167].34 But it is not easy to see how a 'fact' can be based on observations when Popper has told us that there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation. Nor did he explain why we should suddenly accept an 'hypothesis' as a fact and not as a conjecture.
Popper's problem was of course that the theory of evolution is just about as inductive as one can get, yet he wanted us to believe that induction is a myth. He found no way out of this impasse, and in the end decided that the only solution was to evade the issue: "I have come to the conclusion that Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research programme" [UNQ 168].35
12. THE ULTIMATE TEST
Critical Rationalism urges us to submit our theories to severely critical tests. For a philosophy, the most critical test of all may be whether its proponents actually follow it. The example was set by Hume, who admitted that he found his scepticism hard to live by. Popper evidently experienced the same difficulty. It is easy enough to say, "our scientific theories must always remain hypotheses" [OSE2 12] but it is much more difficult to abide by that principle consistently. Thus Popper's use of the words 'knowledge,' 'know,' 'truth' and 'fact' often seemed to conflict with CR. He wrote, for instance: "Matter... consists of complex structures about whose constitution we know a great deal" [TOU 152-3]. He urged us to pay attention to the "invariant content or meaning" of a theory "upon which its truth depends" [OKN 240]. He referred to "universal laws" as "part of our common knowledge" [POH 145]; to "objectively true" statements [TOU 119]; to the 'fact' that "theories or expectations are built into our very sense organs" [OKN 146], and to the "undoubted" fact that "we can learn from experience" [C&R 291]. All these assertions seem to defy, in one way or another, the idea that knowledge remains conjectural.
Popper's philosophical premises also led him into more serious confusions. For example, he explicitly rejected as "utterly naïve and completely mistaken" what he called "the bucket theory of the mind" [OKN 61], the idea that "before we can know or say anything about the world, we must first have had perceptions - sense experiences" [OKN 341]. Yet earlier he had stated: "I readily admit that only observation can give us 'knowledge concerning facts', and that we can... become aware of facts only by observation" [LSCD 98].
Popper's attitude to 'the laws of nature' was just as perplexing. In Open Society he called natural law a "a strict unvarying regularity.... A law of nature is unalterable; there are no exceptions to it.... laws of nature... can be neither broken nor enforced. They are beyond human control..." [OSE1 57-58, c.f. OKN 196]. But such absolutist claims are difficult to reconcile with the actual discovery of natural laws when, according to Popper: "There can be no valid reasoning from singular observation statements to universal laws of nature" [RASC 32, c.f. OKN 359].
In like vein, Popper's use of illustrations often involved disregard of his own dicta. In Realism and the Aim of Science, when once again attacking induction, he told us that "mere supporting instances are as a rule too cheap... they cannot carry any weight" [RASC 130]; and that, "confirming instances are not worth having" [RASC 256]. However, when he had earlier sought to demonstrate the case that "practically every... 'chance observation' is an example of the refutation of some conjecture or assumption or expectation," he unhesitatingly drew attention to scientific discoveries by Pasteur, Roentgen, Crookes, Becquerel, Poincaré and Fleming to reinforce his point [RASC 40].
The trait of employing what he sought to deny can be found throughout Popper's work. Take his critique of Plato's politics. In Volume 1 of Open Society Popper went through the Republic, Laws, etc, with a sort of remorseless philosophical laser. Yet not once did he give any hint that he regarded the object of his study as conjectural. His method was purely and simply inductive. He took Plato's dialogues as fact, examined them line by line in search of evidence, and generalised his (very firm) conclusions.36
Another failing was Popper's occasional lack of response to important criticisms of his philosophy. As a critical rationalist, to whom criticism was "the lifeblood of all rational thought," this was serious indeed. There was, for example, the incisive refutation of the falsification principle published by the famous American philosopher Brand Blanshard. Blanshard noted that particular propositions such as 'some swans are white' can only be falsified by showing that 'no swans are white.' Since the latter would be self-evidently untrue, 'some swans are white' is a perfectly valid scientific statement which cannot be falsified.
This simple observation, which demolished both the central pillar of CR and Popper's long-cherished notion of demarcation by refutability, was published by Blanshard in 196437 but to this writer's knowledge Popper never attempted to rebut it. Certainly, there was no mention of it in Replies to my Critics, published ten years later, which would have been the perfect place for a response. Blanshard's critique has also been ignored by the Critical Rationalist scholar David Miller,38 and by the well-known British Popperian Bryan Magee, whose little book Popper has maintained through ten editions that: "Popper's seminal achievement has been to offer an acceptable solution to the problem of induction."39
As a footnote here, it may be recorded that Popper was not renowned for living up to his philosophy in his professional life. His obituary in The Times recorded his reputation as "a difficult man." The Daily Telegraph commented, "Popper's belief in his own infallibility was remarkable."40 Later, The Times Magazine reported that Popper's students at the London School of Economics found him so intolerant of criticism that they used to joke about "The Open Society, by one of its enemies."41
Popper and Marx
Popper's most egregious lapse as a critical rationalist concerns Karl Marx. Like so many young men of his era, Popper early embraced Marxism, but unlike so many, he also early rejected it - as an economic theory: he never discarded the Marxian ideal of social betterment for the working class, and for most of his life remained a dedicated interventionist and welfare-statist. Thus in Open Society, while criticising Marxism, he presented an almost fulsome portrait of Marx the man as a brilliantly original thinker and philanthropist, and as one of the "liberators of mankind" [OSE2 122].
In 1948, however, Leopold Schwartzschild published The Red Prussian. In this critical biography, based on original sources such as the Marx-Engels correspondence, Marx emerged as anything but a philanthropist. He was in fact a disgraceful sponger and drunkard, as deceitful and vindictive as he was lazy, who loathed and despised the workers ("those asses") and whose only real animus was a deep lust for power. Nor was Marx's thinking either original or based on original research. He borrowed most of his ideas from other socialists42 and his best-known thesis was pulled out of thin air without a shred of fact to support it. When he did bestir himself to try and corroborate "our view" - and found that the historical and economic data flatly contradicted him - he ignored or suppressed the evidence.43
Although Popper read The Red Prussian "some years" after it came out [OSE2 396], he never corrected or modified the glowing portrait of Marx he had given us in Open Society. It took him some 15 years even to acknowledge his awareness of the "shattering" evidence which had so drastically falsified his most famous work [OSE2 396].
In 1986, Anthony Flew, in his Introduction to a new edition of Schwartzschild's book, gently chastised Popper for not correcting his false picture of Marx.44 The publisher sent a copy to Popper, and two years later Popper wrote to Flew saying, "I wish to explain my final note [on Schwartzschild]. (1) Routleges [sic] never told me in time of a new reprint. I had to squeeze things in, at the last moment. (2) I was personally shattered by Schwartzschild's book; and it was only my view of Marx's moral stature that was shattered. The reason that my view of Marx's status as a scientist was not shattered is very simple: I had not had a very high opinion to start with, but I had given him all the benefit of the doubt; and my opinion had slowly deteriorated, both while writing the book and after.... it was only when I now read your Introduction that I saw I ought to have referred to my changed view of Marx's scientific sincerity. I therefore accept your criticism fully."45
This explanation is not really satisfactory. Popper saw the 'shattering' evidence about Marx in the late 1940s or early 1950s, yet his "final note" was not penned until 1965. In between, there were no less than four new editions of Open Society in which he could have published a revised judgement of Marx. In the end, all he gave us was a reluctant, 150-word appendix on the last page of the last edition (1966).
It is also hard to accept that Popper's opinion of Marx had not been very high. When someone writes, for example, that Marx's theory of surplus value was "brilliant" and "a theoretical success of the first order" [OSE2 172-3]; that Marx's exploitation theory "deserves the greatest respect" [OSE2 178]; and that Marx made "serious and most important contributions to social science" [OSE2 253]; it does not look as though the writer's opinion is 'deteriorating.'
There is besides the problem that Popper later had a perfect opportunity to retract his portrait of Marx. In 1966, Professor H.B. Acton of Edinburgh University wrote that, according to Popper, "Marx was primarily concerned with achieving freedom for individual men and women" and that nothing published in the twenty years since Open Society had appeared required "any radical modification" of this view [PKP2 876]. Yet, in his 1974 response to Acton, Popper merely pleaded guilty to having "idealized the picture of Marxism" over some minor points: there was not one word about Schwartzschild [PKP2 1162-5].46
CONCLUSION47
This paper is not the first to subject Popper's Critical Rationalism to detailed criticism. P.A. Schilpp's The Philosophy of Karl Popper contains several less than sympathetic essays, as does Anthony O'Hear's Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems. And of course O'Hear earlier devoted a whole book to the matter. Other writers have been led to outright rejection. When The Logic of Scientific Discovery first appeared, Popper's famous contemporary Hans Reichenbach asserted bluntly: "The results of this book appear to me completely untenable... I cannot understand how Popper could possibly believe that with respect to the problem of induction his investigations mean even the slightest advance."48
Nonetheless, although this paper rejects Popper's main theses, it should not be construed to imply that study of his work is valueless. Far from it. Popper wrote well and clearly, and books such as The Open Society and its Enemies, The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Universe, while flawed or incomplete, are full of valuable insights, astute observations, and stimulating, sometimes inspiring, prose.
A critical attitude, particularly a self-critical one, is also every bit as important in philosophy as Popper thought it was, even if he did not always exercise his own. Subjecting one's pet theories to the kind of penetrating analysis Popper was so good at is the healthiest mental activity one can undertake. Conviction is much easier to come by than rectitude and we must always be on guard against "cocksureness" - as Popper so rightly warned us [OSE2 387].
It is also well worth keeping in mind that even if Popper was mistaken in his overall rejection of induction, CR does share with induction one of its most important elements - disconfirmation - an element which has not lost one iota of its importance since Francis Bacon first drew our attention to it in the 17th Century. We are not omniscient. We are fallible. Disconfirming instances must be sought and, where not found, anticipated at any and all times.
One famous instance cited by Popper was the discovery of deuterium in water, or 'heavy' water: "Prior to this discovery, nothing more certain and more settled could be imagined in the field of chemistry than our knowledge of water.... This historical incident is typical... we cannot foresee which parts of our scientific knowledge may come to grief one day" [OSE2 374-5].
There is much truth in that. But "come to grief" overstates the case. And that is where Popper went wrong: he focused on disconfirmation to the exclusion of everything else. He tried to elevate an important but isolated premise to the status of a philosophical system. Critical Rationalism is not a replacement for induction, it is an exaggerated focus on the negative element of induction.
The Objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand was referred to earlier. Although as unacademic as Popper was academic, Rand did share with him a number of philosophic premises; such as dedication to metaphysical realism, opposition to conceptual realism, and rejection of determinism and subjectivism. Indeed Wallace Matson has suggested that Rand and Popper had "much in common." His view has been partially endorsed by Robert Hollinger, who has written of "parallels" between the two thinkers.49
This paper will therefore conclude by conjecturing that when Popper said, "in science there is no 'knowledge'... in the sense which implies finality" [OSE2 12] what he may have been after was Rand's insight that concepts are open-ended.50
For if Rand had been confronted with Einstein's rewrite of Newton; or a black swan where there had only been white ones; or the discovery of a new kind of water; she would not have said, as Popper did, that our previous knowledge had been "overthrown" or had "come to grief" or that "the belief in scientific certainty... is just wishful thinking" [OSE2 374]. Rather, she would have said simply that our knowledge had been expanded.
The description of concepts as 'open-ended' does appear to be the Philosopher's Stone which Popper sought but never found. He correctly saw that there is a problem with most people's idea of certainty, yet never quite fought his way through to an acceptable solution.
But be that as it may. Whatever one may think of Popper, or of Rand, the open-endedness of concepts certainly seems to be a more fruitful, less fraught, and more commonsensical qualification of certainty that "We never know what we are talking about."
NOTES
1. This paper is a much abbreviated and amended version of Nicholas Dykes, A Tangled Web of Guesses: A Critical Assessment of the Philosophy of Karl Popper (London: Libertarian Alliance, 1996). "Debunking Popper" was previously published in Reason Papers, A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative Studies, Tibor R. Machan, Editor; Number 24, Fall 1999, pp. 5-25. It has been slightly modified for the present publication, which was prompted by the celebrations during 2002 marking the centenary of Popper's birth. The epigraph is from Karl Popper, Realism and the Aims of Science, p. 258.
2. In obituaries in The Guardian and The Independent, 19 September 1994.
3. Letters and numbers in square brackets refer to works by Karl Popper. Viz.: OSE1/2 - The Open Society and its Enemies, Volumes 1& 2(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Ed., 1966); POH - The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961); LSCD - The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1972); C&R - Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge, 1989); OKN - Objective Knowledge (London: Oxford, 1972); PKP1/2 - The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Books 1 and 2 P.A. Schilpp Ed, The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XIV, Books 1 & II (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1974); UNQ - Unended Quest (London: Fontana/Collins, 1976); RASC - Realism and the Aim of Science (London: Routledge, 1992); TOU - The Open Universe (London: Hutchinson, 1982); QTSP - Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (London: Hutchinson, 1983); TSIB - The Self and Its Brain, with John C. Eccles (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); AWP - A World of Propensities (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes, 1990). Re style, double inverted commas are used for actual quotations, single ones for emphasis. Where a quotation begins a sentence, initial letters are sometimes capitalised to assist readability. Italics are in the original.
4. E. Freeman and H. Skolimowski noted that Peirce anticipated some of Popper's central ideas [PKP1 464ff]. Popper acknowledged this [PKP2 1072] though he did not read Peirce until the 1950s. He added, "I feel proud of so eminent a predecessor" [PKP2 1119]. The author is indebted to David Conway for pointing out that Peirce coined the word 'fallibilism.'
5. Bartley developed 'Comprehensive Critical Rationalism.' See Evolutionary Epistemology, Theory of Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge, G. Radnitsky, and W.W. Bartley III eds. (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987). C.f. I.C. Jarvie's review, Critical Review 2/1.
6. David Miller, Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defense (Lasalle, Ill: Open Court, 1994). Though vigorously written, this book did not seem to solve the problems raised by this paper, nor others raised by Anthony O'Hear in Karl Popper (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). See also Anthony O'Hear, ed., Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. The proposition is used as a first premise by Jan C. Lester in Escape from Leviathan: Liberty, Welfare, & Anarchy Reconciled (London: Macmillan, 2000). Eminent scientists who have acknowledged Popper's influence include Jacob Bronowski, John Eccles, Peter Medawar, and John Maynard Smith.
8. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 3rd Ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch Eds. (Oxford: Oxford U.P. 1975), p. 74.
9. Ibid., p. 96.
10. Ibid.
11. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1 (London: Fontana/Collins, 1975), p. 63.
12. H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1916) p. 408.
13. Ibid., p. 408.
14. Ibid.
15. Popper's notion of innate cerebral content is deeply problematic but space permits no discussion. For details, see OKN 26-7, 63, 71-2, 258; C&R 27, 47-8; TSIB 116, & AWP 37, 46.
16. Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis (Lasalle, Ill: Open Court, 1964) p. 39. See Nathaniel Branden "The Contradiction of Determinism", The Objectivist Newsletter, May 1963.
17. Anthony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (1961, 1966; Bristol, UK: Thoemmes, 1997), p. 31. The author is indebted to Professor Flew for this point.
18. J.W.N. Watkins noted that if our senses were actually unreliable we wouldn't be here [PKP1 404]. Popper half acknowledged this [PKP2 1114, AWP 32].
19. 'Knowledge remains conjectural' resembles the traditional sceptic's claim that "knowledge is impossible," which is an obvious self-contradiction. Popper allowed that "the term 'conjectural knowledge' may be claimed to be a contradiction in terms" [OKN 76], but did not explain why he chose to use it. Imre Lakatos observed: "The difference between total scepticism and humble fallibilism is so small that one frequently feels that one is engaged in a mere verbal quibble" [PKP1 260].
20. Nathaniel Branden, 'The Stolen Concept,' The Objectivist Newsletter, January, 1963. Proudhon might have had landed property partly in mind. If so, his dictum is not entirely wrong, since so much landed property has been stolen from original owners by conquest or eviction.
21. Popper touched on this: "the growth of knowledge consists in the modification of previous knowledge [OKN 71]." He attempted to resolve the infinite regress by positing 'inborn dispositions and expectations.'
22. Tom Settle has made the same complaint. On the question of which hypothesis to choose he wrote, "we get no good guidance from Popper" [PKP2 702].
23. Einstein was Popper's "hero" [AWP 8]. There are over 120 references to him in just three books: LSCD, C&R and OKN.
24. C.f. Anthony O'Hear, Karl Popper, op cit., p. 97.
25. George H. Smith, Atheism: The Case against God (Buffalo NY: Prometheus Books, 1989), p. 51ff.
26. Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems, op cit., p. 4.
27. The same point has been made by Peter Lipton: "There is no reliable route to falsification that does not use induction…" "Popper and Reliabilism," Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems, op cit., p. 43. The author is indebted to Dr Lipton for sharpening his focus on this issue.
28. Cited by John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 116.
29. OSE2 1-26. See Tangled Web, op cit., pp. 18-20, for a detailed examination of Popper's odd critique.
30. Popper saw this weakness and later referred to worlds 12&3 as "modified essentialism" [PKP2 1115]. For further criticism see O'Hear, Karl Popper, Ch. IX.
31. Two earlier critics who pointed out Popper's idealism were Anthony O'Hear: "Popper's Platonism" (O'Hear, p. 181) and J.W.N. Watkins: "Popper's objectivism is a very mitigated version of Platonism" [PKP1 399]. However, both would have agreed with Feigl and Meehl that for Plato 'Ideas' exist extra to mankind; whereas, for Popper, objective knowledge is man-made [PKP1 543]. Popper may have been led to idealism by his scepticism - an ancient pattern. O'Hear concludes his study: "having torn ideas from their living context, Popper was led both to his radical scepticism and to his postulation of an abstract world of ideas…" (O'Hear, p. 207).
32. John Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness (London: Granta Books, 1997), p. 88.
33, C.f. C&R 41n8: "most dissectors of the heart before Harvey observed the wrong things - those which they expected to see." But this is to argue for Baconian objectivity, against CR. Harvey broke free in a way Popper thought impossible.
34. Confusingly, Popper also wrote that Darwinism, "has very little content and very little explanatory power, and it is therefore far from satisfactory.... we should try hard to improve upon Darwinism, or to find some alternative" [PKP2 1084]. He may have meant Lamarck; c.f. RASC 94 & TSIB 425.
35. C.f. John Maynard Smith: "[It is] an occupational risk of biologists to claim, towards the end of their careers, that problems which they have not solved are insoluble." Did Darwin Get it Right? Essays on Games, Sex, and Evolution (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 249. See also UNQ 187: "theories which deny what they cannot explain," and TOU 151, "The solution... is the denial." Popper and induction?
36. For criticism of Popper's view of Plato see R. Levinson, In Defense of Plato (Cambridge Mass: Harvard U. Press, 1953); and J. Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1953), also PKP2 859. For Popper's replies, see OSE1 323 and PKP2 1159.
37. Reason and Analysis, op cit., p. 228.
38. At least, not in his Critical Rationalism (1994), op cit., which would have been the appropriate place to discuss it.
39. Bryan Magee, Popper (London: Fontana, 1973, 1985), p. 22.
40. Both obituaries appeared on 19 September 1994.
41. Jim McCue, "Mind Reading," 13 May 1995, p. 21. Confirmed by Frederick Raphael in Popper (London: Phoenix, 1998), p. 12.
42. For one confirmation of Marx's plagiarism, see James J. Martin, Men against the State (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1970), p. 56, n. 2.
43. Anthony Flew, "Introduction to the 1986 Edition," in Leopold Schwartzschild, The Red Prussian (London: Pickwick Books, 1986), p. 7.
44. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
45. Karl Popper to Anthony Flew, private letter, 1988. The author is deeply indebted to Professor Flew for providing a copy.
46. For a detailed discussion of Popper's attitude to Marx, see Tangled Web, op cit., pp. 26-29.
47. Since this paper rejects CR on logical grounds, it has not been thought necessary to discuss CR's buttress concepts: 'degrees of testability,' 'corroboration,' 'verisimilitude,' etc. These are analyzed in O'Hear, Karl Popper, Ch. 3, and defended by David Miller, Critical Rationalism, Ch. 10 and passim. For accounts of Popper's ethics and politics, see Tangled Web, op cit., pp. 24-26 & 29-30.
48. Quoted on the dust jacket of the 1972 Hutchinson edition.
49. Wallace Matson, "Rand on Concepts," and R. Hollinger, "Ayn Rand's Epistemology in Historical Perspective," in The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, D. Den Uyl & D. Rasmussen Eds. (Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 22 & 56.
50. "... a concept is an 'open-end' classification, which includes the yet-to-be-discovered characteristics of a given group of existents." Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (New York: The Objectivist Inc, 1967), p. 60.
Libertarian Alliance home
Nicholas Dykes
Philosophical Notes No. 65
ISSN 0267-7091 - ISBN 1 85637 580 3
An occasional publication of the Libertarian Alliance,
Suite 35, 2 Lansdowne Row, Mayfair, London W1J 6HL.
© 2003: Libertarian Alliance; Nicholas Dykes.
Nicholas Dykes is a British-Canadian writer currently living in England. Married, with two children, he is the author of Fed up with Government? (Hereford, UK: Four Nations, 1991), the 300-page manifesto for a putative British 'Libertarian Party'; A Tangled Web of Guesses: A Critical Assessment of the Philosophy of Karl Popper (London: Libertarian Alliance, 1996); and of 'Debunking Popper', Reason Papers, #24, Fall 1999.
The views expressed in this publication are those of its author, and
not necessarily those of the Libertarian Alliance, its Committee,
Advisory Council or subscribers.
FOR LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
INTRODUCTION1
Karl Popper was without question one of the most eminent philosophers of the 20th Century. Author of several ground-breaking and highly influential books, and of hundreds of articles; winner of many rare prizes and other honours, such as a British knighthood; and founder of two new schools of thought, Critical Rationalism and Evolutionary Epistemology: few thinkers have made more extensive contributions to the intellectual life of their times. When he died in 1994, after a career spanning nearly 70 years, many agreed with his fellow philosophers Anthony Quinton and Rom Harré that Popper was "this century's most important philosopher of science," and "the last of the great logicians."2
As the name Critical Rationalism may suggest, Popper regarded a critical attitude as the most important virtue a philosopher could possess. Indeed, he called criticism "the lifeblood of all rational thought" [PKP2 977]3 and, as his obituarists implied, it was towards science, and the logic of science, that his critical powers were chiefly directed. In his magnum opus, The Open Society and its Enemies, he wrote: "... all criticism consists in pointing out ... contradictions or discrepancies, and scientific progress consists largely in the elimination of contradictions wherever we find them. This means, however, that science proceeds on the assumption that contradictions are impermissible and avoidable ... once a contradiction is admitted, all science must collapse" [OSE2 39].
It is thus surprising to discover that Popper himself hardly lived up to this ideal of non contradiction. When one examines Critical Rationalism, for example, one soon notices that it is based on questionable premises; that its internal logic is seriously flawed; that it is inconsistent with other elements of Popper's thought; and that it leads to conflicts with his own publicly stated convictions.
Acknowledgements
Before beginning, the author would like to express his sincere thanks to David Conway, Anthony Flew, David Kelley, Tibor Machan and David Miller for valuable observations or criticisms which led to the reworking of many passages; to Kevin McFarlane and Brian Micklethwait for encouragement and practical help; and to The Estate of Karl Popper for kind permission to reproduce copyright material.
1. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM
Critical Rationalism has also been referred to, by Popper himself and by others, as the theory of falsification, or falsificationism, and as fallibilism. It would be tempting, for the sake of brevity, to employ 'fallibilism' throughout, but the term is also associated with the founder of Pragmatism, C.S. Peirce, who actually coined it long before Popper began his career.4 This paper therefore follows the lead of later Popperians such as W.W. Bartley III5 and David Miller6 in employing Critical Rationalism, which in any case better encompasses Popper's thought.
The Critical Rationalism of Karl Popper [henceforth CR] begins by rejecting induction as a scientific method. The actual method of science, Popper maintained, is a continuous process of conjecture and refutation: "The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are controlled by criticism; that is, by attempted refutations, which include severely critical tests. They may survive these tests; but they can never be positively justified: they can be established neither as certainly true nor even as 'probable'..." [C&R vii].
Elsewhere, Popper put the matter more succinctly: "all knowledge is hypothetical" [OKN 30] or "All knowledge remains... conjectural" [RASC xxxv]; and it is in the form 'all knowledge is conjectural' that the essence of his philosophy has been captured - and has influenced others.7
CR was originally developed by Popper to demarcate science from non-science. He stated that for scientific knowledge to be considered knowledge it had to be refutable: "'In so far as scientific statements refer to the world of experience, they must be refutable ... in so far as they are irrefutable, they do not refer to the world of experience'" [OSE2 13].
It follows that we can never attain certainty: "The quest for certainty... is mistaken.... though we may seek for truth... we can never be quite certain that we have found it" [OSE2 375]. "No particular theory may ever be regarded as absolutely certain.... No scientific theory is sacrosanct..." [OKN 360]. "Precision and certainty are false ideals. They are impossible to attain and therefore dangerously misleading..." [UNQ 24]. He summed up with an oft-repeated aphorism: "We never know what we are talking about" [UNQ 27].
Accordingly, Popper refused to grant any philosophical value to definitions: "Definitions do not play any very important part in science.... Our 'scientific knowledge'... remains entirely unaffected if we eliminate all definitions" [OSE2 14]. "Definitions never give any factual knowledge about 'nature' or about the 'nature of things'" [C&R 20-21]. "Definitions.... are never really needed, and rarely of any use" [RASC xxxvi].
Although he held these positions all his working life, Popper did acknowledge that they were open to criticism: "nothing is exempt from criticism ... not even this principle of the critical method itself" [OSE2 379].
2. THE FIRST PREMISE OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM
Popper built his philosophy on foundations borrowed from Hume and Kant. His first premise was wholehearted acceptance of Hume's attack on induction. The second, to be addressed in the next section, was agreement with Kant's view that it is our ideas which give form to reality, not reality which gives form to our ideas.
Hume, whom Popper called "one of the most rational minds of all ages" [PKP2 1019], is renowned for elaborating the 'problem of induction' - a supposedly logical proof that generalisations from observation are invalid. Most later philosophers have accepted Hume's arguments, and libraries have been filled with attempts to solve his 'problem.'
Popper thought he had the answer. "I believed I had solved the problem of induction by the simple discovery that induction by repetition did not exist" [UNQ 52; c.f. OKN 1ff & PKP2 1115]. What really took place, according to Popper, was CR, knowledge advancing by means of conjecture and refutation: "... in my view here is no such thing as induction" [LSCD 40]; "what characterises the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested" [LSCD 42].
Hume, said Popper, had shown that: "there is no argument of reason which permits an inference from one case to another... and I completely agree" [OKN 96]. Elsewhere he referred to induction as "a myth" which had been "exploded" by Hume [UNQ 80]. He further asserted that "There is no rule of inductive inference - inference leading to theories or universal laws - ever proposed which can be taken seriously even for a minute" [UNQ 146-7; see also RASC 31].
The Problem with 'The Problem'
Popper's solution was certainly correct in one respect. The problem of induction would indeed vanish if there were no such thing as induction. However, the issue would be resolved much more positively were it to turn out that Hume had been wrong, and that there never had been any problem with induction in the first place. And, in point of fact, this is the case. Despite his great skill as a thinker and writer, Hume missed the point. Induction does not depend for its validity on observation, but on the Law of Identity.
Hume stated, in essence, that since all ideas are derived from experience we cannot have any valid ideas about future events - which have yet to be experienced. He therefore denied that the past can give us any information about the future. He further denied that there is any necessary connection between cause and effect. We experience only repeated instances, we cannot experience any "power" that actually causes events to take place. Events are entirely "loose and separate.... conjoined but never connected."8
According to Hume, then, one has no guarantee that the hawthorn in an English hedge will not bear grapes next autumn, nor that the thistles in a nearby field won't produce figs. The expectation that the thorn will produce red berries, and the thistles purple flowers, is merely the result of "regular conjunction" which induces an "inference of the understanding."9 In Hume's view, there is no such thing as objective identity, there is only subjective "custom" or "habit."
However, Hume also wrote: "When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false"10 and the idea that one might gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles is surely absurd enough to qualify. And false is what Hume's opinions most certainly are. Left standing, they lead to what he himself called "the flattest of all contradictions, viz. that it is possible for the same thing both to be and not to be."11
The crux of the case against Hume was stated in 1916 by H.W.B. Joseph in An Introduction to Logic: "A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be."12 Hume's whole argument - persuasive though it may be - is, to borrow Joseph's words, "in flat conflict with the Law of Identity."13
Existence implies identity. It is not possible to exist without being something, and a thing can only be what it is: A is A. Any actions of that thing form part of its identity: "the way in which it acts must be regarded as a partial expression of what it is."14 Thus to deny any connection between a thing, its actions, and their consequences, is to assert that the thing is not what it is; it is to defy the Law of Identity.
It is not necessary to prolong this discussion. Entities exist. They possess identity. By careful observation - free from preconception - we are able to discover the identities of the entities we observe. Thereafter, we are fully entitled to assume that like entities will cause like events, the form of inference we call induction. And, because it rests on the axiom of the Law of Identity, correct induction - free from contradiction - is a valid route to knowledge. The first premise of CR is therefore false.
There is nonetheless a substantial grain of truth in Hume's position, or few philosophers would have followed him. The grain lies in the precision of our knowledge of future events. Hume denied all knowledge of the future because we can have no experience of it. As we have seen, this is not true, it overlooks the Law of Identity. What is true, is that our prediction of events is limited by the unforeseeable. An 'O' ring may fail and destroy an otherwise reliable spacecraft; an icy road surface may cause a pristine Rolls-Royce to crash. For, no matter how sound our judgement nor wide our experience, we cannot possibly have complete, certain and absolute knowledge of future events. We are not omniscient: all kinds of unforeseen happenings may intervene to spoil even the best laid of our plans. Further, new information about old subjects continuously comes to light and, over time, things can evolve or change. Nonetheless, armed with the Law of Identity, there is no reason to allow the unforeseeable to turn us into sceptics. The universe is not a series of "loose and separate events" any more than time is a series of discrete, unrelated segments of duration.
It should also be noted that, in fact, all knowledge of entities, and all knowledge of language, is acquired inductively. A child's knowledge of apples, for example, is based on a very limited sampling. A student's knowledge of the word 'inference' is founded on a similarly narrow acquaintance. If it were true that induction is a myth, then all knowledge of external reality, all language, and all human thought - which depends on knowledge of reality and on language - would be myths as well, including, of course, CR.
3. POPPER'S KANTIAN PREMISE
Popper described himself as an "unorthodox Kantian" [UNQ 82]; i.e., he accepted part of Kant's epistemology, but not all of it: "Kant was right that it is our intellect which imposes its laws - its ideas, its rules - upon the inarticulate mass of our 'sensations' and thereby brings order to them. Where he was wrong is that he did not see that we rarely succeed with our imposition" [OKN 68n31; c.f. OKN 328, C&R 48-9].
Popper's Kantianism reveals itself most clearly in his view of our senses, which he saw as creative modifiers of incoming data, not as neutral 'windows on the world': "Classical epistemology which takes our sense perceptions as 'given', as the 'data' from which our theories have to be constructed by some process of induction, can only be described as pre-Darwinian. It fails to take account of the fact that the alleged data are ... adaptive reactions, and therefore interpretations which incorporate theories and prejudices and which, like theories, are impregnated with conjectural expectations... there can be no pure perception, no pure datum..." [OKN 145].15
A Fundamental Difficulty
Popper's Kantian premise raises enough issues for a book. In this short paper, there is room only for a single objection. Namely, if it is true that our senses are pre-programmed; if it is true that "there is no sense organ in which anticipatory theories are not genetically incorporated" [OKN 72]; then what flows into our minds is determined and what flows out of them is subjective. If our senses are not neutral, if they organise incoming data using pre-set theories built into them by evolution, then they do not provide us with unalloyed information, but only with prescriptions, the content of which is determined by our genetic make up. Whatever is thereafter produced inside our heads - cut off as it is from any objective contact with reality - must be subjective.
Popper's Kantian premise thus deprives CR of universality. Since it is ultimately the product of the pre-programmed interpretation of the data which entered Popper's mind, CR is a theory which can only be applied to Popper. According to his own view of his contact with reality, he would not be able to verify the relevance of CR to anybody else.
Solipsism looms, yes, but that is a natural consequence of all theories of determinism. For if thought, or the basis of thought, is determined; whether by social class, or the subconscious, or whatever determinant is preferred; then the deterministic theory itself must be determined, according to the theory, and can only be relevant to the person who expounds it. Everybody else is determined by their class, subconscious, genes, material substrate, environment, or whatever it is that is supposed to do the determining. All theories of determinism are, to use Brand Blanshard's term, 'self-stultifying.'16
The objection is analogous to the one raised by Anthony Flew against those philosophers - e.g. Hume and Kant - who claim that we can only have knowledge of our own sense impressions. If sense data are all we can know, solipsism is the inevitable result: "mental images .... are (necessarily) private ... and (logically) cannot be accessible to public observation."17
Objectivity
In Unended Quest Popper observed bluntly that "there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation" [UNQ 51]. Although this appears to rule out the possibility of objectivity, that was not Popper's intention. Rather, again following Kant perhaps, he thought the basis for objectivity lay elsewhere: "the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested" [LSCD 44]. He later restated this slightly differently: "it is the public character of science... which preserves the objectivity of science" [POH 155-6].
Unfortunately, these assertions do not bear the weight placed upon them. For if Popper's Kantian premise were true (i.e., if anticipatory theories are genetically incorporated into our sense organs and, therefore, there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation) then senses would not cease to be prejudiced merely by being multiplied. The defective logic could hardly be more clear. One cannot offer as an universal affirmative proposition 'all human senses are prejudiced, i.e. subjective' then ask one's readers to accept that pooling the senses of many persons yields objectivity. If senses are subjective individually they are subjective collectively.18
To conclude under this head, it is plain - even after only a very brief treatment - that Popper's Kantian premise, far from providing CR with a secure footing, leads instead to insuperable problems, not least of which are conflicts with Popper's own rejection of determinism and subjectivism in such works as The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Universe.
4. LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES
Popper called conjecture and refutation a "new way of knowing" [OSE2 383]. However, from a common sense point of view, it can immediately be objected that we do not normally claim to 'know' something which is unjustifiable, tentative or hypothetical. Knowledge, for most people - and for most scientists - is something which it is possible to be sure of, to justify, to validate, to prove; in other words, to know.
Conjecture, on the other hand, is by definition not knowledge. According to Chambers English Dictionary, a conjecture is "an opinion formed on slight or defective evidence or none: an opinion without proof: a guess". Since one cannot define an idea by means of other ideas which are contrary to it, it is clearly illegitimate to place knowledge in the same category as conjecture. More pointedly, the proposition "all knowledge remains conjectural" is a contradiction in terms.
The objection gathers strength when one notices that Popper's proposition is itself not conjectural. Universal and affirmative, it states that "All knowledge remains conjectural" - which is a claim to knowledge. The proposition thus asserts what it denies and is self-contradictory on a second count.19
Another immediate problem is that the notion of 'conjecture' depends for its intelligibility upon the prior concept of 'knowledge.' The idea of a 'conjecture' arose precisely to designate a form of mental activity which was unlike knowledge, and to distinguish clearly from knowledge an idea put forward as opinion without proof. In the Objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand this error is known as 'the fallacy of the stolen concept.' A classic example was Proudhon's claim that 'property is theft.' But the concept of 'theft' depends on the prior concept of 'property' and would be unintelligible without it.20 In exactly the same way, and to repeat, the concept of 'conjecture' cannot be understood apart from the prior concept of knowledge - from which it is to be distinguished. For example, 'Northern Dancer might win the Kentucky Derby' was once a conjecture. When the horse did come first, its win became an item of knowledge.
The invalidity of the proposition 'All knowledge remains conjectural' becomes even more apparent when one considers that Popper employed a large vocabulary of English and German words all of which he had to learn, and to know, in order to express any or all of his ideas. There is little conjectural about the words of a language: either the German word Forschung means 'scientific discovery' or it does not. Similarly, in all his philosophical and scientific work Popper depended on a broad range of core concepts - evolution, energy, light, atom, mass, force, etc - all of which are normally recognised as unalterable brute facts, not as conjectures. 'All knowledge is conjectural' may sound intriguing, but throughout his career Popper actually worked within a framework of knowledge, not of conjecture.
A further problem arises when one considers the concept of 'growth' in Popper's claim that knowledge grows through conjectures and refutations. (The subtitle of his book by that name is The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.) A legitimate response to this assertion is: 'What exactly is it that grows?' The concept of growth implies the existence of a thing, a body, an entity of some sort, that which grows. It may well be true that conjectures and refutations play a role in the growth of knowledge, but they could hardly do this without some knowledge to work on. The growth of knowledge via conjecture and refutation presupposes pre-existing knowledge, not pre-existing conjectures.21
That the growth of knowledge implies knowledge is another illustration of Popper's dependence on something he attempted to deny, effectively 'stealing' a concept. CR is supposed to replace our commonsense idea of inductively-acquired knowledge with a more accurate one of a continuous process of conjecture and refutation. But that process would be meaningless without something for the process to process, and that something is knowledge, not conjecture.
Lastly, the proposition 'all knowledge is conjectural' is simply not true. The writer's observation that 'the sun is shining' is not conjectural, it is a fact known to him and countless other observers. At 11am on 5 May 2003 in western England the sun is shining. The observation is no more conjectural than 'George Bush is President of the USA (at time of writing),' or 'Einstein's grandparents are dead,' or 'the French for 'yes' is 'oui,'' or '2 plus 2 = 4.' These statements are true. They are demonstrable to any sane person; either ostensibly, or through the presentation of evidence beyond reasonable doubt, via simple common sense, or by means of logic. They constitute knowledge, not conjecture.
5. PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE
Other problems surface when one considers actually employing conjecture and refutation; i.e., when one looks at CR in practice. Briefly stated, the method urges us to conjecture, then to subject the resultant theory to severely critical tests. If it survives those tests, we are permitted to grant the theory a degree of verisimilitude, the more stringent the tests, the higher the degree.
The first problem is the method's apparent arbitrariness. The conjecture or theory to be tested - and Popper said the bolder the better - would presumably be selected by the tester. But no criterion for selection is given.22 We might be referred to an earlier CR exercise, but since that route risks infinite regress (via earlier and earlier CR exercises), the conjecture to be tested must fall outside the scope of CR. Therefore, unless further information is provided, it is not obvious how the charge of arbitrariness can be resisted.
Consequently, the whole approach smacks of straw men. If a conjecture survives all CR tests, it could merely be that a 'virtuous straw man' (the conjecture) has one by one fended off an army of lesser straw men (the tests). But nothing would be proven by all this. Not only do we still require evidence of the worthwhileness of the conjecture, some other method is needed to show that the opposing arguments are truly exhaustive and not just straw. To use an analogy: it is perfectly possible for a dangerous lunatic to pass a driving test. Even the most stringent 'advanced driver' courses ever devised may not uncover the explosive unroadworthiness of 'the nut behind the wheel.'
The method of conjecture and refutation also appears to be a form of question begging. It must surely assume some measure of truth in the conjecture under examination, or there would be little point in the exercise. Put simply, the method states: 'My proposition deserves examination. Nothing in the process of examination undermined my proposition. Ergo my proposition has verisimilitude.' It may well have, but the proposition's soundness has not been established by that reasoning. One recalls the famously circular Ontological Argument for the existence of God: 'God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived. If 'that than which' didn't exist, it couldn't be 'the greatest'. Therefore God exists.' But the argument assumes in its first premise that which it sets out to establish and is clearly invalid.
The fact of the matter is that the truth of a proposition rests on the correct identification of the referents and relationships involved, not on any prior or subsequent argumentation. In any design, philosophical or practical, if a false identification is incorporated, whole libraries of arguments may not reveal the consequent flaws. A building can be the most beautiful ever built, but a single misplaced decimal point in a stress calculation can bring it crashing down. As Popper so rightly said: "contradictions are impermissible and avoidable... once a contradiction is admitted, all science must collapse" [OSE2 39].
6. REFUTABILITY AS A CRITERION OF DEMARCATION
CR claims to distinguish science from non-science by the refutability of scientific theories. Popper's standard example was Newtonian physics, so radically displaced by Einstein.23 On the other hand, Popper maintained, there were theories such as those of Marx and Freud, which were non-science because irrefutable. This was Popper's famous 'criterion of demarcation,' which he developed as a young man and held to all his life.
Relatively few philosophers have embraced it however. Tom Settle, a major contributor to P.A. Schilpp's massive festschrift, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, stated firmly in 1970: "As a criterion of demarcation between science and nonscience, Popper's 'falsifiability'-plus-a-critical-policy does not work" [PKP2 719]. Other contributors evidently agreed; among them A.J. Ayer, William C. Kneale, Imre Lakatos, Grover Maxwell, and Hilary Putnam.
One can understand the importance of the distinction to the young Popper. Fascinated by science, he was surrounded by true-believing Marxists and Freudians all of whom claimed science on their side while espousing doctrines which seemed to Popper obviously false. Nonetheless, 'refutability' seems to miss the mark. The ideas of Marx or Freud stand or fall on their conformity to logic and the available evidence - in exactly the same way as the ideas of Newton or Einstein. Marxism and Freudianism failed to survive as viable theories due to myopic concentration on a narrow range of data, false interpretations of evidence, and logical inconsistency. They never were 'irrefutable.' They failed precisely because they could be, and were, refuted; either by contrary evidence, by exposure of contradictions, or by the resolute refusal of reality to conform to their predictions. It wasn't refutability which made them unscientific, it was inaccuracy and/or illogicality.
Science is distinguished by its strict adherence to physical evidence. Non-science, on the other hand, is invariably characterised by preconception, followed by a cavalier disregard for, or rationalisation of, anything that doesn't fit into the preconceived schema. In one sense, this is what Popper was saying. But, due perhaps to his dislike of definitions, he homed in on the wrong identifying characteristic.
There are other, more serious, criticisms of Popper's theory of demarcation. Grover Maxwell pointed out that 'All men are mortal' is a perfectly sound scientific statement which is not falsifiable [PKP1 292]. Popper defended himself robustly [PKP2 1037ff], but Maxwell seemed to have the stronger case. Maxwell might also have taxed Popper about mathematics. The axioms of mathematics cannot be refuted. According to the demarcation theory, therefore, mathematics is not a science. But physics is inseparable from mathematics. Quantum mechanics, for example, could hardly be expressed without it. So physics cannot be a science either. Much the same could be said about logic. The Law of Contradiction, etc, cannot be refuted, so logic is not a science.
There is besides the singularly Popperian problem of Marxism. Marxism was one of the theories which led Popper to develop his conception of demarcation in the first place: "I had been shocked by the fact that the Marxists... were able to interpret any conceivable event as a verification of their theories" [UNQ 41-2]. Yet in "Replies to my Critics" Popper changed his tune: "Marxism was once a scientific theory"; "Marxism was once a science" [PKP2 984-5]. No doubt Popper would have swamped this objection with distinctions between Marx and Marxism,24 but the notion that Marxism could both be and not be a science does little to inspire confidence in Popper's theory of demarcation.
7. POPPER'S VIA NEGATIVA
One of the most troubling aspects of Popper's philosophy is his devout refusal to consider anything positive, a negativity which reminds one of the via negativa of medieval theology.25 The scholastic principle, "we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not" is remarkably similar to Popper's assertion that "natural laws.... do not assert that something exists or is the case; they deny it" [LSCD 69]. CR is invariably concerned with what is not, never with what is. Yet the negative 'it is not' cannot be uttered without implying the positive 'it.' A negative implies a positive, unless one is actually denying the existence of an entity, but that is a different issue.
That negative implies positive was clearly understood by Popper. He referred to "the notion of falsity - that is, of untruth - and thus, by implication, the notion of truth" [UNQ 98]. But he did not seem to see that truth implies a 'what is' question every time CR tells us what is not. It is a stolen concept situation: the idea of 'falsity' depends upon the logically prior idea of 'truth.' Or, as Anthony O'Hear has expressed it: "there can, in fact, be no falsification without a background of accepted truth."26
Grover Maxwell also noted this problem. He pointed out that many theories are in fact positively confirmed [PKP1 292ff]. Yet Popper continued to insist in "Replies to My Critics" that, "we certainly are not justified in reasoning from an instance to the truth of the corresponding law.... we are justified in reasoning from a counterinstance to the falsity of the corresponding universal law" [PKP2 1020].
However, recalling Popper's Kantian premise, one might reasonably enquire at this point: if all observations are theory-laden, and thereby suspect, what justifies our placing any confidence in negative observations? The procedure of observation is identical whether one is seeking evidence in favour of a theory, or testing for evidence against it. If our senses are automatically suspect, as Popper maintained, negative or falsifying instances deserve no more credibility than positive or confirming ones.
Further, remembering Popper's Humian premise, one immediately wants to ask: If we are not allowed to argue from positive instances to true laws, why are we allowed to argue from counterinstances to negative laws (we were told above that "natural laws... deny"). The reasoning process is the same. Collecting disconfirmations and arguing negatively scarcely differs from collecting confirmations and arguing positively. Both are inductive procedures and, as such, have been disallowed in advance by Popper's rejection of induction.
Certainly, a single negative instance suffices to refute any universal proposition. Australian black swans falsified the belief that all adult swans were white. Popper was perfectly correct to remind us of this, and also that one or more positive instances do not necessarily establish universal propositions. But colour never was the defining characteristic of swans. The discovery of black ones did not entitle Popper to assert that their essential features - long necks, powerful wings, etc - were equally suspect.
The bottom line which CR must confront, however, is that one cannot falsify a scientific theory without inference from observed instances. However much Popper may have rejected induction, his own method was in fact dependent upon it.27
8. TRUTH, FACTS AND REALISM
As a metaphysical realist, Popper upheld the correspondence theory of truth: "A statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts" [OKN 46]. Although he reiterated this frequently [e.g. OSE2 369ff, UNQ 140ff], only once did he go into detail about what he meant by 'fact.' "Facts are something like a common product of language and reality... they are reality pinned down by descriptive statements.... New linguistic means not only help us to describe new kinds of facts; in a way, they even create new kinds of facts. In a certain sense, these facts obviously existed before the new means were created.... But in another sense we might say that these facts do not exist as facts before they are singled out from the continuum of events and pinned down by statements - the theories which describe them" [C&R 214].
Unfortunately, neither the lines quoted, nor the rest of the passage in the book, clarify the meaning of the word 'fact.' Since Popper's claim that 'truth means correspondence to the facts' cannot be evaluated without such clarification, we turn again to Chambers Dictionary, which defines 'fact' as "reality, a real state of things, as distinguished from a mere statement or belief." But if this definition is correct, it leads immediately to another problem with CR.
CR states that for knowledge to be regarded as scientific it must be falsifiable. Plainly then, if an item of 'knowledge' is falsified, it can no longer be regarded as a fact. In Popper's own words, a false conjecture "contradicts some real state of affairs;" "falsifications... indicate the points where we have touched reality" [C&R 116]. What we are left with are conjectures which have not yet been falsified. But a yet-to-be-falsified conjecture can hardly be called a fact, 'a real state of things.' It is rather 'a mere statement or belief' from which facts are to be distinguished.
Remembering that we have been forbidden to regard as certain anything which we may think we know about facts, all knowledge is conjectural; and that our senses are suspect because 'theory impregnated;' we are led to the seemingly inevitable conclusion that we can never know any facts. All we can 'know' are falsifiable conjectures which, as we have just seen, are not facts. Further, if this is the case, we can never find out what is true. For if truth means correspondence with the facts, as Popper assured us it did, and we cannot know any facts, then we cannot know any truth.
It could be argued that this is precisely Popper's whole philosophy. That might be correct. But so arguing would not remove the incompatibility between Critical Rationalism and Popper's espousal of the correspondence theory of truth.
It would also appear that CR conflicts with another foundation of Popper's thought, his realism. "Denying realism" he stated, "amounts to megalomania (the most widespread occupational disease of the professional philosopher)" [OKN 41]. He himself had always been: "a commonsense realist.... I was interested in the real world, in the cosmos, and I was thoroughly opposed to every idealism..." [OKN 322-3]. A few pages later he wrote: "whether our man-made theories are true or not depends upon the real facts; real facts, which are, with very few exceptions, emphatically not man-made. Our man-made theories may clash with these real facts, and so, in our search for truth, we may have to adjust our theories or to give them up" [OKN 328-9].
One must agree with these sentiments. But, if the arguments just outlined are correct, it is CR which is in need of adjustment. For if CR does deny us any knowledge of real facts, the theory not only contradicts realism, it leaves one with no good reason to be a realist. Secondly, if the reasoning in other sections of this essay is correct, then CR conflicts with the fact that, having discovered such real facts as the existence of the works of Karl Popper, say, we can and do have true knowledge of reality. No matter which way one looks at it, CR seems out of place in the mind of anyone who aspires to be a realist.
9. DEFINITION AND CONTRADICTION
Popper's espousal of the correspondence theory also conflicts with his scorn for definitions. When we assert that a statement corresponds to the facts we mean that the words we are employing accurately describe a specific, external, state of affairs. But we could not assert correspondence if our words did not have precise meanings; i.e. did not have precise definitions.
Popper liked to aver, provocatively, that we never know what we are talking about. But if his aphorism were true, a statement such as 'arsenic is poisonous' would be vacuous. Yet arsenic does exist. It is a chemical substance which, ingested above a certain concentration, is very likely to kill a human being. Which means, arsenic is poisonous. The statement is true, it corresponds to the facts. But it is only true because the words employed are accurately defined.
The correspondence theory of truth refers to human ideas. Whether one calls those ideas 'concepts,' 'statements,' 'propositions' or 'theories,' we are only able to hold them in consciousness, to relate them to facts, and to communicate them, via the medium of words. Words are the audio-visual symbols of our ideas. In a very real sense they link us to reality. Which means that if their definitions are vague or shifting, we cannot hope to arrive at any reliable truth: no definitions, no correspondence theory. As Aristotle said: "not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning, our reasoning with one another, and indeed with ourselves, has been annihilated."28
Even more serious is the matter of contradictions. Although he held contradictions to be "impermissible and avoidable" [OSE2 39] Popper had previously dismissed the Laws of Thought (which of course include the Law of Contradiction) as "psychologism" and "a thing of the past" [LSCD 98]. Whatever the merit of that judgement, it is difficult to see how we can uncover contradictions if definitions "never give any factual knowledge about 'nature' or about the 'nature of things'" [C&R 20-21] which statement must imply that there is no significant connection between words and facts. Indeed, it is hard to see how logic and the Law of Contradiction are possible if discussions of the meaning of words - i.e., of their relationship to facts - are "tiresome phantoms" or "verbal quibbles" as Popper insisted [e.g. C&R 28, or TOU xxi].
The upshot here is that the Law of Contradiction, far from being all-important to science, as Popper so vigorously implied, seems excluded by CR. If all identifications are conjectural, just 'guesses,' and definitions of no value, we would not be able to identify subject and attribute positively enough to show that they do, or do not, belong together.
10. POPPER'S THREE WORLD THEORY
Early in his career, Popper began developing a theory in which he split reality into three parts: the physical world, or the world of facts; the world of consciousness, of mental processes and events; and a third world, the products of the human mind, which he called 'objective knowledge.' Popper obviously regarded the theory as important and described it in detail several times [e.g. OKN 106ff, & 152ff]. The following is from his autobiography, Unended Quest: "If we call the world of... physical objects... the first world, and the world of subjective experiences... the second world, we may call the world of statements in themselves the third world. (I now prefer to call these... 'world 1', 'world 2', and 'world 3')" [UNQ 180-1].
After asking us to imagine a picture; distinguishing between the actual picture, one's mental image of it, and one's thoughts about that image; Popper used his own mental processes to illustrate the generation of a world 3 thought which, once written down, and "formulated in language so clearly that I can look at it critically from various sides" becomes "the thought in the objective sense, the world 3 object which I am trying to grasp.... The decisive thing seems to me that we can put objective thoughts - that is, theories - before us in such a way that we can criticize them and argue about them. To do so, we must formulate them in some more or less permanent (especially linguistic) form.... Books and journals can be regarded as typical world 3 objects..." [UNQ 182]. He added, "we may include in world 3 in a more general sense all the products of the human mind, such as tools, institutions, and works of art" [UNQ 187].
Popper described world 3 somewhat paradoxically as both "man-made" and "autonomous:" "the third world, the world of objective knowledge... is man-made. But... this world exists to a large extent autonomously... it generates its own problems, especially those connected with methods of growth; and... its impact on any one of us, even on the most original of creative thinkers, vastly exceeds the impact which any of us can make upon it" [OKN 147].
Problems
First, there seems little conjectural about the theory of worlds 1, 2, & 3. In none of Popper's several presentations is the theory offered as an hypothesis. Rather, it is laid out as a discovery, as what Popper thought the facts to be.
Second, the idea of objective knowledge appears directly to contradict CR. If knowledge can exist objectively, it is not clear how it remains at the same time conjectural. The exercise of studying Popper, for instance, depends on the existence of a dozen or so world 3 objects - his books. Now, either those books exist and say what they say or they don't, there is simply no room for conjecture.
Third, it not clear how we gain access to this objective third world when our brains and senses are 'impregnated' with inborn expectations, and are thus incapable of unadulterated contact with reality. World 3 may exist, 'out there,' objectively, but Popper said, "there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation" [OKN 51]. It would therefore be difficult to know if we were actually observing world 3, or to identify what we were observing in it.
Further, when thoughts have been objectified as world 3 artefacts, it is not apparent how they accord with Popper's rejection of definitions. Once CR is part of an objective world 3, then either the words 'Critical Rationalism' correspond to the world 3 fact that there is such a scientific method, or they do not. We have a genus (scientific methods) and a species (Popper's method) whose differentia is the process of conjecture and refutation. Calling Popper's method syllogistic, or dialectical, would be manifestly wrong. Thus it would be perfectly in order, not a 'tiresome quibble,' to argue about the definition of CR with anyone who maintained, say, that conjecture and refutation was merely Logical Positivism in disguise. Their assertion would be untrue; it would not correspond to the objective, world 3 facts.
The existence of objective world 3 ideas also seems to conflict with Popper's rejection of 'essentialism' - the real existence of concepts - which formed an integral part of his notorious attack on Aristotle29 and underlay his dislike of definitions. Surely it is unreasonable on the one hand to lambaste essentialism - the idea that concepts are, or have, real 'essences,' which exist in our own reality or in another dimension - while claiming on the other hand that concepts have a separate existence in world 3.30
Another awkward question must be 'Why should we stop at worlds 1, 2, and 3?' The basis for the theory is fundamental difference in kind, the worlds are "utterly different" [UNQ 181]. However, in The Open Universe, Popper suggested the possibility of a world 4 of art [TOU 115] and a world 5 of human institutions [TOU 154]. He also spoke of "the gulf which separates the human brain from the animal brain" [TOU 122]. But if we are dividing reality according to fundamental differences in kind, animal consciousness ought to be world 6; and if art gets a world of its own, surely commerce is sufficiently different to qualify as world 7 - 'utterly different' things should not be left together. So plants would require a separate world from animals; elephants from amoebas; inanimate things from animate, etc. The logic of Popper's argument thus seems to lead to an Aristotelian universe of distinct entities grouped according to the identifying characteristic (or 'essence') of each kind, an inference Popper would have disliked.
Finally, the 'autonomy' of man-made, objective knowledge shows a marked kinship to Aristotle's concept of potentiality. Popper often used number theory to explain world 3: "natural numbers are the work of men," he stated. However "unexpected new problems arise as an unintended by-product of the sequence of natural numbers.... These problems are clearly autonomous. They are in no sense made by us; rather, they are discovered by us; and in this sense they exist, undiscovered, before their discovery" [OKN 160-1]. That is fair enough, but is it not merely another way of saying that the future is not actual but potential; that unknown future advances do not actually exist, yet must exist as potential in the known?
In this regard it is instructive to look at Popper's idea (in physics) of "the measures of possibilities" which he called "objective probabilities" or "propensities" [TOU 105] and thought of as "physically real" [QTSP 133]. These provide "a programme for a theory of change... which would allow us to interpret any real state of the world as both an actualisation or realisation of some of the potentialities or propensities of its preceding states, and also as a field of dispositions or propensities to realise the next state" [QTSP 198].
Leaving aside the problem of how 'physically real possibilities' fit into the category of conjectural knowledge, Popperian 'propensity' appears so similar to Aristotelian 'potentiality' - "all movement or change means the realisation (or 'actualisation') of some of the potentialities inherent in the essence of a thing" [OSE2 6] - that, in fairness, one must note that Popper dismissed Aristotle's ideas about potentiality as "pretentious jargon" [OSE2 7].
Popperian Idealism
Another problem with Popper's three-world theory concerns idealism. Popper rejected idealism with characteristic bluntness: "To me, idealism appears absurd" [OKN 41]; "I was thoroughly opposed to every idealism" [OKN 323]. Yet when one examines Popper's three-world theory, idealist overtones fairly spring from the page.
For instance, in one of his several discussions of worlds 1, 2 & 3, he wrote: "I regard world 3 as being essentially the product of the human mind. It is we who create world 3 objects.... these objects have their own inherent or autonomous laws which create unintended and unforeseeable consequences.... [these] repercussions on us are as great as, or greater than, those of our physical environment" [UNQ 186]. Elsewhere he wrote of "the 'objective mind' or 'spirit'" [OKN 149]; and that "the third world is... superhuman", it "transcends its makers" [OKN 159]. But surely the notion of a transcendent mind or spirit which effects human beings more than their physical environment is a straightforward depiction of idealism?
In The Open Universe, the idealist element seems even plainer: "we ought to admit the existence of an autonomous part of World 3; a part which consists of objective thought contents which are independent of, and clearly distinct from, the subjective or personal thought processes by which they are grasped, and whose grasp they can causally influence. I thus assert that there exist autonomous World 3 objects which have not yet taken up either World 1 shape or World 2 shape, but which, nevertheless, interact with our thought processes" [TOU 119-20]. It would be hard to describe 'independent, autonomous, objective thought contents which influence human thought processes' in other than idealist terms.
In The Self and Its Brain Popper's idealism becomes explicit. The thesis of the work, a joint effort by Popper and neuroscientist Sir John Eccles, consists of a revival of Cartesian dualism. Without admitting a mental substance, the authors defend "interactionism", the theory that "the self-conscious mind is an independent entity" [TSIB 355], which interacts with the physical brain: "something totally different from the physical system acts in some way on the physical system" [TSIB 472]. Early in the book, Popper wrote of "unembodied" World 3 objects [TSIB 41ff]. Towards the end, he stated: "the World 3 object is a real object which exists, but exists nowhere.... In a sense World 3 is a kind of Platonic world of ideas, a world which exists nowhere but which does have an existence and which does interact, especially, with human minds" [TSIB 450, see also 43ff, and OKN 154]. Popper may have consciously rejected idealism as absurd, but his thinking in the above passages is clearly identifiable as idealism - even if he was unconscious of that fact, and even if his idealism is of a somewhat novel kind.31
There is no doubt much more that could be said about Popper's three-world theory but there is no further space available here. Suffice it to say that it is this world we seek to understand; and while idealist philosophers from Plato onward have speculated about other worlds, not one of their conjectures has deepened our understanding of this one. In the words of John Searle: "We live in one world, not two or three or twenty-seven."32
11. ESTABLISHED THEORIES
The last major area of difficulty with CR to be examined in this paper concerns theories which have successfully withstood criticism. Popper did allow that after scientific theories have passed a great number of severe tests, "their tentativeness may cease to be obvious" [POH 131]. But if asked about 'established' theories he was very likely to point to Isaac Newton's "unquestionable truths" [UNQ 37] which, seemingly unassailable for over 200 years, were pushed aside by the "Einsteinian revolution" [UNQ 81].
Yet theories do exist which, in fact, are positively confirmed, as Grover Maxwell has pointed out [PKP1 292ff]. Copernicus's heliocentric theory, for example, was indeed hypothetical in 1543 because the instruments did not then exist with which to prove it. But now that huge telescopes and space probes have eliminated any rational doubt that the earth revolves around the sun, it would seem bizarre to maintain that heliocentricity remains conjectural.
Another famous theory is that of Harvey and the circulation of the blood. Once, that was indeed a bold conjecture. But if one were to declaim nowadays that Harvey's theory is refutable, or that we don't know what we are talking about when we say that blood circulates in the human body, one should expect laughter from one's audience.33
Popper was evidently aware of this problem. He once wrote about the "realisation" of the "conjecture" of an atomic bomb [TSIB 47]. But if a conjecture is realised it is very difficult to see how it remains a conjecture. One might fairly retort, rather, that this one admission blows apart the notion of demarcation by refutability and the whole of CR along with it.
There is also the awkward subject of evolution. Popper called Darwinism "a brilliant scientific hypothesis" about "a host of biological and palaeontological observations." He added: "I see in modern Darwinism the most successful explanation of the relevant facts" [POH 106]. Later, he confirmed that he was "very ready to accept evolution as a fact" [UNQ 167].34 But it is not easy to see how a 'fact' can be based on observations when Popper has told us that there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation. Nor did he explain why we should suddenly accept an 'hypothesis' as a fact and not as a conjecture.
Popper's problem was of course that the theory of evolution is just about as inductive as one can get, yet he wanted us to believe that induction is a myth. He found no way out of this impasse, and in the end decided that the only solution was to evade the issue: "I have come to the conclusion that Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research programme" [UNQ 168].35
12. THE ULTIMATE TEST
Critical Rationalism urges us to submit our theories to severely critical tests. For a philosophy, the most critical test of all may be whether its proponents actually follow it. The example was set by Hume, who admitted that he found his scepticism hard to live by. Popper evidently experienced the same difficulty. It is easy enough to say, "our scientific theories must always remain hypotheses" [OSE2 12] but it is much more difficult to abide by that principle consistently. Thus Popper's use of the words 'knowledge,' 'know,' 'truth' and 'fact' often seemed to conflict with CR. He wrote, for instance: "Matter... consists of complex structures about whose constitution we know a great deal" [TOU 152-3]. He urged us to pay attention to the "invariant content or meaning" of a theory "upon which its truth depends" [OKN 240]. He referred to "universal laws" as "part of our common knowledge" [POH 145]; to "objectively true" statements [TOU 119]; to the 'fact' that "theories or expectations are built into our very sense organs" [OKN 146], and to the "undoubted" fact that "we can learn from experience" [C&R 291]. All these assertions seem to defy, in one way or another, the idea that knowledge remains conjectural.
Popper's philosophical premises also led him into more serious confusions. For example, he explicitly rejected as "utterly naïve and completely mistaken" what he called "the bucket theory of the mind" [OKN 61], the idea that "before we can know or say anything about the world, we must first have had perceptions - sense experiences" [OKN 341]. Yet earlier he had stated: "I readily admit that only observation can give us 'knowledge concerning facts', and that we can... become aware of facts only by observation" [LSCD 98].
Popper's attitude to 'the laws of nature' was just as perplexing. In Open Society he called natural law a "a strict unvarying regularity.... A law of nature is unalterable; there are no exceptions to it.... laws of nature... can be neither broken nor enforced. They are beyond human control..." [OSE1 57-58, c.f. OKN 196]. But such absolutist claims are difficult to reconcile with the actual discovery of natural laws when, according to Popper: "There can be no valid reasoning from singular observation statements to universal laws of nature" [RASC 32, c.f. OKN 359].
In like vein, Popper's use of illustrations often involved disregard of his own dicta. In Realism and the Aim of Science, when once again attacking induction, he told us that "mere supporting instances are as a rule too cheap... they cannot carry any weight" [RASC 130]; and that, "confirming instances are not worth having" [RASC 256]. However, when he had earlier sought to demonstrate the case that "practically every... 'chance observation' is an example of the refutation of some conjecture or assumption or expectation," he unhesitatingly drew attention to scientific discoveries by Pasteur, Roentgen, Crookes, Becquerel, Poincaré and Fleming to reinforce his point [RASC 40].
The trait of employing what he sought to deny can be found throughout Popper's work. Take his critique of Plato's politics. In Volume 1 of Open Society Popper went through the Republic, Laws, etc, with a sort of remorseless philosophical laser. Yet not once did he give any hint that he regarded the object of his study as conjectural. His method was purely and simply inductive. He took Plato's dialogues as fact, examined them line by line in search of evidence, and generalised his (very firm) conclusions.36
Another failing was Popper's occasional lack of response to important criticisms of his philosophy. As a critical rationalist, to whom criticism was "the lifeblood of all rational thought," this was serious indeed. There was, for example, the incisive refutation of the falsification principle published by the famous American philosopher Brand Blanshard. Blanshard noted that particular propositions such as 'some swans are white' can only be falsified by showing that 'no swans are white.' Since the latter would be self-evidently untrue, 'some swans are white' is a perfectly valid scientific statement which cannot be falsified.
This simple observation, which demolished both the central pillar of CR and Popper's long-cherished notion of demarcation by refutability, was published by Blanshard in 196437 but to this writer's knowledge Popper never attempted to rebut it. Certainly, there was no mention of it in Replies to my Critics, published ten years later, which would have been the perfect place for a response. Blanshard's critique has also been ignored by the Critical Rationalist scholar David Miller,38 and by the well-known British Popperian Bryan Magee, whose little book Popper has maintained through ten editions that: "Popper's seminal achievement has been to offer an acceptable solution to the problem of induction."39
As a footnote here, it may be recorded that Popper was not renowned for living up to his philosophy in his professional life. His obituary in The Times recorded his reputation as "a difficult man." The Daily Telegraph commented, "Popper's belief in his own infallibility was remarkable."40 Later, The Times Magazine reported that Popper's students at the London School of Economics found him so intolerant of criticism that they used to joke about "The Open Society, by one of its enemies."41
Popper and Marx
Popper's most egregious lapse as a critical rationalist concerns Karl Marx. Like so many young men of his era, Popper early embraced Marxism, but unlike so many, he also early rejected it - as an economic theory: he never discarded the Marxian ideal of social betterment for the working class, and for most of his life remained a dedicated interventionist and welfare-statist. Thus in Open Society, while criticising Marxism, he presented an almost fulsome portrait of Marx the man as a brilliantly original thinker and philanthropist, and as one of the "liberators of mankind" [OSE2 122].
In 1948, however, Leopold Schwartzschild published The Red Prussian. In this critical biography, based on original sources such as the Marx-Engels correspondence, Marx emerged as anything but a philanthropist. He was in fact a disgraceful sponger and drunkard, as deceitful and vindictive as he was lazy, who loathed and despised the workers ("those asses") and whose only real animus was a deep lust for power. Nor was Marx's thinking either original or based on original research. He borrowed most of his ideas from other socialists42 and his best-known thesis was pulled out of thin air without a shred of fact to support it. When he did bestir himself to try and corroborate "our view" - and found that the historical and economic data flatly contradicted him - he ignored or suppressed the evidence.43
Although Popper read The Red Prussian "some years" after it came out [OSE2 396], he never corrected or modified the glowing portrait of Marx he had given us in Open Society. It took him some 15 years even to acknowledge his awareness of the "shattering" evidence which had so drastically falsified his most famous work [OSE2 396].
In 1986, Anthony Flew, in his Introduction to a new edition of Schwartzschild's book, gently chastised Popper for not correcting his false picture of Marx.44 The publisher sent a copy to Popper, and two years later Popper wrote to Flew saying, "I wish to explain my final note [on Schwartzschild]. (1) Routleges [sic] never told me in time of a new reprint. I had to squeeze things in, at the last moment. (2) I was personally shattered by Schwartzschild's book; and it was only my view of Marx's moral stature that was shattered. The reason that my view of Marx's status as a scientist was not shattered is very simple: I had not had a very high opinion to start with, but I had given him all the benefit of the doubt; and my opinion had slowly deteriorated, both while writing the book and after.... it was only when I now read your Introduction that I saw I ought to have referred to my changed view of Marx's scientific sincerity. I therefore accept your criticism fully."45
This explanation is not really satisfactory. Popper saw the 'shattering' evidence about Marx in the late 1940s or early 1950s, yet his "final note" was not penned until 1965. In between, there were no less than four new editions of Open Society in which he could have published a revised judgement of Marx. In the end, all he gave us was a reluctant, 150-word appendix on the last page of the last edition (1966).
It is also hard to accept that Popper's opinion of Marx had not been very high. When someone writes, for example, that Marx's theory of surplus value was "brilliant" and "a theoretical success of the first order" [OSE2 172-3]; that Marx's exploitation theory "deserves the greatest respect" [OSE2 178]; and that Marx made "serious and most important contributions to social science" [OSE2 253]; it does not look as though the writer's opinion is 'deteriorating.'
There is besides the problem that Popper later had a perfect opportunity to retract his portrait of Marx. In 1966, Professor H.B. Acton of Edinburgh University wrote that, according to Popper, "Marx was primarily concerned with achieving freedom for individual men and women" and that nothing published in the twenty years since Open Society had appeared required "any radical modification" of this view [PKP2 876]. Yet, in his 1974 response to Acton, Popper merely pleaded guilty to having "idealized the picture of Marxism" over some minor points: there was not one word about Schwartzschild [PKP2 1162-5].46
CONCLUSION47
This paper is not the first to subject Popper's Critical Rationalism to detailed criticism. P.A. Schilpp's The Philosophy of Karl Popper contains several less than sympathetic essays, as does Anthony O'Hear's Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems. And of course O'Hear earlier devoted a whole book to the matter. Other writers have been led to outright rejection. When The Logic of Scientific Discovery first appeared, Popper's famous contemporary Hans Reichenbach asserted bluntly: "The results of this book appear to me completely untenable... I cannot understand how Popper could possibly believe that with respect to the problem of induction his investigations mean even the slightest advance."48
Nonetheless, although this paper rejects Popper's main theses, it should not be construed to imply that study of his work is valueless. Far from it. Popper wrote well and clearly, and books such as The Open Society and its Enemies, The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Universe, while flawed or incomplete, are full of valuable insights, astute observations, and stimulating, sometimes inspiring, prose.
A critical attitude, particularly a self-critical one, is also every bit as important in philosophy as Popper thought it was, even if he did not always exercise his own. Subjecting one's pet theories to the kind of penetrating analysis Popper was so good at is the healthiest mental activity one can undertake. Conviction is much easier to come by than rectitude and we must always be on guard against "cocksureness" - as Popper so rightly warned us [OSE2 387].
It is also well worth keeping in mind that even if Popper was mistaken in his overall rejection of induction, CR does share with induction one of its most important elements - disconfirmation - an element which has not lost one iota of its importance since Francis Bacon first drew our attention to it in the 17th Century. We are not omniscient. We are fallible. Disconfirming instances must be sought and, where not found, anticipated at any and all times.
One famous instance cited by Popper was the discovery of deuterium in water, or 'heavy' water: "Prior to this discovery, nothing more certain and more settled could be imagined in the field of chemistry than our knowledge of water.... This historical incident is typical... we cannot foresee which parts of our scientific knowledge may come to grief one day" [OSE2 374-5].
There is much truth in that. But "come to grief" overstates the case. And that is where Popper went wrong: he focused on disconfirmation to the exclusion of everything else. He tried to elevate an important but isolated premise to the status of a philosophical system. Critical Rationalism is not a replacement for induction, it is an exaggerated focus on the negative element of induction.
The Objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand was referred to earlier. Although as unacademic as Popper was academic, Rand did share with him a number of philosophic premises; such as dedication to metaphysical realism, opposition to conceptual realism, and rejection of determinism and subjectivism. Indeed Wallace Matson has suggested that Rand and Popper had "much in common." His view has been partially endorsed by Robert Hollinger, who has written of "parallels" between the two thinkers.49
This paper will therefore conclude by conjecturing that when Popper said, "in science there is no 'knowledge'... in the sense which implies finality" [OSE2 12] what he may have been after was Rand's insight that concepts are open-ended.50
For if Rand had been confronted with Einstein's rewrite of Newton; or a black swan where there had only been white ones; or the discovery of a new kind of water; she would not have said, as Popper did, that our previous knowledge had been "overthrown" or had "come to grief" or that "the belief in scientific certainty... is just wishful thinking" [OSE2 374]. Rather, she would have said simply that our knowledge had been expanded.
The description of concepts as 'open-ended' does appear to be the Philosopher's Stone which Popper sought but never found. He correctly saw that there is a problem with most people's idea of certainty, yet never quite fought his way through to an acceptable solution.
But be that as it may. Whatever one may think of Popper, or of Rand, the open-endedness of concepts certainly seems to be a more fruitful, less fraught, and more commonsensical qualification of certainty that "We never know what we are talking about."
NOTES
1. This paper is a much abbreviated and amended version of Nicholas Dykes, A Tangled Web of Guesses: A Critical Assessment of the Philosophy of Karl Popper (London: Libertarian Alliance, 1996). "Debunking Popper" was previously published in Reason Papers, A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative Studies, Tibor R. Machan, Editor; Number 24, Fall 1999, pp. 5-25. It has been slightly modified for the present publication, which was prompted by the celebrations during 2002 marking the centenary of Popper's birth. The epigraph is from Karl Popper, Realism and the Aims of Science, p. 258.
2. In obituaries in The Guardian and The Independent, 19 September 1994.
3. Letters and numbers in square brackets refer to works by Karl Popper. Viz.: OSE1/2 - The Open Society and its Enemies, Volumes 1& 2(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Ed., 1966); POH - The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961); LSCD - The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1972); C&R - Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge, 1989); OKN - Objective Knowledge (London: Oxford, 1972); PKP1/2 - The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Books 1 and 2 P.A. Schilpp Ed, The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XIV, Books 1 & II (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1974); UNQ - Unended Quest (London: Fontana/Collins, 1976); RASC - Realism and the Aim of Science (London: Routledge, 1992); TOU - The Open Universe (London: Hutchinson, 1982); QTSP - Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (London: Hutchinson, 1983); TSIB - The Self and Its Brain, with John C. Eccles (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); AWP - A World of Propensities (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes, 1990). Re style, double inverted commas are used for actual quotations, single ones for emphasis. Where a quotation begins a sentence, initial letters are sometimes capitalised to assist readability. Italics are in the original.
4. E. Freeman and H. Skolimowski noted that Peirce anticipated some of Popper's central ideas [PKP1 464ff]. Popper acknowledged this [PKP2 1072] though he did not read Peirce until the 1950s. He added, "I feel proud of so eminent a predecessor" [PKP2 1119]. The author is indebted to David Conway for pointing out that Peirce coined the word 'fallibilism.'
5. Bartley developed 'Comprehensive Critical Rationalism.' See Evolutionary Epistemology, Theory of Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge, G. Radnitsky, and W.W. Bartley III eds. (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987). C.f. I.C. Jarvie's review, Critical Review 2/1.
6. David Miller, Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defense (Lasalle, Ill: Open Court, 1994). Though vigorously written, this book did not seem to solve the problems raised by this paper, nor others raised by Anthony O'Hear in Karl Popper (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). See also Anthony O'Hear, ed., Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. The proposition is used as a first premise by Jan C. Lester in Escape from Leviathan: Liberty, Welfare, & Anarchy Reconciled (London: Macmillan, 2000). Eminent scientists who have acknowledged Popper's influence include Jacob Bronowski, John Eccles, Peter Medawar, and John Maynard Smith.
8. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 3rd Ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch Eds. (Oxford: Oxford U.P. 1975), p. 74.
9. Ibid., p. 96.
10. Ibid.
11. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1 (London: Fontana/Collins, 1975), p. 63.
12. H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1916) p. 408.
13. Ibid., p. 408.
14. Ibid.
15. Popper's notion of innate cerebral content is deeply problematic but space permits no discussion. For details, see OKN 26-7, 63, 71-2, 258; C&R 27, 47-8; TSIB 116, & AWP 37, 46.
16. Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis (Lasalle, Ill: Open Court, 1964) p. 39. See Nathaniel Branden "The Contradiction of Determinism", The Objectivist Newsletter, May 1963.
17. Anthony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (1961, 1966; Bristol, UK: Thoemmes, 1997), p. 31. The author is indebted to Professor Flew for this point.
18. J.W.N. Watkins noted that if our senses were actually unreliable we wouldn't be here [PKP1 404]. Popper half acknowledged this [PKP2 1114, AWP 32].
19. 'Knowledge remains conjectural' resembles the traditional sceptic's claim that "knowledge is impossible," which is an obvious self-contradiction. Popper allowed that "the term 'conjectural knowledge' may be claimed to be a contradiction in terms" [OKN 76], but did not explain why he chose to use it. Imre Lakatos observed: "The difference between total scepticism and humble fallibilism is so small that one frequently feels that one is engaged in a mere verbal quibble" [PKP1 260].
20. Nathaniel Branden, 'The Stolen Concept,' The Objectivist Newsletter, January, 1963. Proudhon might have had landed property partly in mind. If so, his dictum is not entirely wrong, since so much landed property has been stolen from original owners by conquest or eviction.
21. Popper touched on this: "the growth of knowledge consists in the modification of previous knowledge [OKN 71]." He attempted to resolve the infinite regress by positing 'inborn dispositions and expectations.'
22. Tom Settle has made the same complaint. On the question of which hypothesis to choose he wrote, "we get no good guidance from Popper" [PKP2 702].
23. Einstein was Popper's "hero" [AWP 8]. There are over 120 references to him in just three books: LSCD, C&R and OKN.
24. C.f. Anthony O'Hear, Karl Popper, op cit., p. 97.
25. George H. Smith, Atheism: The Case against God (Buffalo NY: Prometheus Books, 1989), p. 51ff.
26. Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems, op cit., p. 4.
27. The same point has been made by Peter Lipton: "There is no reliable route to falsification that does not use induction…" "Popper and Reliabilism," Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems, op cit., p. 43. The author is indebted to Dr Lipton for sharpening his focus on this issue.
28. Cited by John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 116.
29. OSE2 1-26. See Tangled Web, op cit., pp. 18-20, for a detailed examination of Popper's odd critique.
30. Popper saw this weakness and later referred to worlds 12&3 as "modified essentialism" [PKP2 1115]. For further criticism see O'Hear, Karl Popper, Ch. IX.
31. Two earlier critics who pointed out Popper's idealism were Anthony O'Hear: "Popper's Platonism" (O'Hear, p. 181) and J.W.N. Watkins: "Popper's objectivism is a very mitigated version of Platonism" [PKP1 399]. However, both would have agreed with Feigl and Meehl that for Plato 'Ideas' exist extra to mankind; whereas, for Popper, objective knowledge is man-made [PKP1 543]. Popper may have been led to idealism by his scepticism - an ancient pattern. O'Hear concludes his study: "having torn ideas from their living context, Popper was led both to his radical scepticism and to his postulation of an abstract world of ideas…" (O'Hear, p. 207).
32. John Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness (London: Granta Books, 1997), p. 88.
33, C.f. C&R 41n8: "most dissectors of the heart before Harvey observed the wrong things - those which they expected to see." But this is to argue for Baconian objectivity, against CR. Harvey broke free in a way Popper thought impossible.
34. Confusingly, Popper also wrote that Darwinism, "has very little content and very little explanatory power, and it is therefore far from satisfactory.... we should try hard to improve upon Darwinism, or to find some alternative" [PKP2 1084]. He may have meant Lamarck; c.f. RASC 94 & TSIB 425.
35. C.f. John Maynard Smith: "[It is] an occupational risk of biologists to claim, towards the end of their careers, that problems which they have not solved are insoluble." Did Darwin Get it Right? Essays on Games, Sex, and Evolution (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 249. See also UNQ 187: "theories which deny what they cannot explain," and TOU 151, "The solution... is the denial." Popper and induction?
36. For criticism of Popper's view of Plato see R. Levinson, In Defense of Plato (Cambridge Mass: Harvard U. Press, 1953); and J. Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1953), also PKP2 859. For Popper's replies, see OSE1 323 and PKP2 1159.
37. Reason and Analysis, op cit., p. 228.
38. At least, not in his Critical Rationalism (1994), op cit., which would have been the appropriate place to discuss it.
39. Bryan Magee, Popper (London: Fontana, 1973, 1985), p. 22.
40. Both obituaries appeared on 19 September 1994.
41. Jim McCue, "Mind Reading," 13 May 1995, p. 21. Confirmed by Frederick Raphael in Popper (London: Phoenix, 1998), p. 12.
42. For one confirmation of Marx's plagiarism, see James J. Martin, Men against the State (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1970), p. 56, n. 2.
43. Anthony Flew, "Introduction to the 1986 Edition," in Leopold Schwartzschild, The Red Prussian (London: Pickwick Books, 1986), p. 7.
44. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
45. Karl Popper to Anthony Flew, private letter, 1988. The author is deeply indebted to Professor Flew for providing a copy.
46. For a detailed discussion of Popper's attitude to Marx, see Tangled Web, op cit., pp. 26-29.
47. Since this paper rejects CR on logical grounds, it has not been thought necessary to discuss CR's buttress concepts: 'degrees of testability,' 'corroboration,' 'verisimilitude,' etc. These are analyzed in O'Hear, Karl Popper, Ch. 3, and defended by David Miller, Critical Rationalism, Ch. 10 and passim. For accounts of Popper's ethics and politics, see Tangled Web, op cit., pp. 24-26 & 29-30.
48. Quoted on the dust jacket of the 1972 Hutchinson edition.
49. Wallace Matson, "Rand on Concepts," and R. Hollinger, "Ayn Rand's Epistemology in Historical Perspective," in The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, D. Den Uyl & D. Rasmussen Eds. (Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 22 & 56.
50. "... a concept is an 'open-end' classification, which includes the yet-to-be-discovered characteristics of a given group of existents." Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (New York: The Objectivist Inc, 1967), p. 60.
Libertarian Alliance home
Quarta-feira, Julho 08, 2009
457) Caracteristicas de personalidades críticas
O texto abaixo foi recebido de um correspondente, Roberto Byrro, que leu um post em outro blog meu, sobre críticas a alunos que fazem provas com Português estropiado.
Particularidades psicológicas
O senso crítico – Conhecimento marginal
Carlos Bernardo González Pecotche – Agosto de 1947
Uma das mais acentuadas particularidades do temperamento humano é a que domina as reações do senso crítico. Com a maior freqüência, é dado observar quão longe está o homem de elevar sua crítica aos altos níveis do justo, do exato e tolerável: o habitual é exercer a faculdade crítica em detrimento da dignidade alheia, e é assim que se emitem juízos apressados sobre a conduta, atividade ou idéias do semelhante.
No afã desmedido de se colocar em situação de privilégio perante os demais, o homem se crê no direito de julgar tudo de um plano mais alto, diminuindo, é claro, o tamanho moral daqueles a quem não pode suportar, por terem uma altura maior que a sua. Assim, a crítica se torna, em geral, exagerada, e a boa dose de inveja que em muitos casos a alimenta, satisfaz plenamente sua medida.
A nosso juízo, esta particularidade psicológica é uma das causas, talvez a principal, de grande parte dos seres humanos fracassarem na vida, pois o mesmo mal que esses seres fazem se volta inevitavelmente contra eles, convertendo a intolerância que os consome em implacável verdugo de suas próprias existências. E isto ocorre, precisamente, porque ninguém busca dentro de si as causas que concorrem para submergi-lo em tão inquietantes situações.
Todo juízo adverso que o homem faz do próximo leva em si o germe de um agravo que, mais cedo ou mais tarde, lesa seu próprio conceito.
Como é natural, as pessoas cultas são sempre comedidas em seus juízos e, antes de emiti-los, tratam de guardar a mais estrita imparcialidade. Os homens experientes sabem que a crítica é uma faca de dois gumes, que é necessário manejar com cautela para não se ferir. Por outro lado, as pessoas de pouca cultura, desprovidas da menor consideração, levadas pela paixão a esgrimem com implacável assanho.
O exposto leva a refletir sobre como seria saudável instituir um ensino especial que preparasse os jovens na prática destes conhecimentos, os quais, apesar de influírem tanto na vida humana, permanecem até o presente a considerável distância das preocupações docentes e, por conseguinte, não se encontram em nenhum texto de ensino oficial. É indubitável que tal prática, que diremos ser “do conhecimento marginal” por se achar à margem dos conhecimentos comuns, exerceria uma função moral e social de grande importância, pois permitiria à juventude nutrir-se de elementos verdadeiramente constitutivos de seu caráter e cultura. Teria sido dado assim um grande passo adiante na correção das imperfeições – melhor ainda, das deficiências – que se percebem por trás de cada atitude do indivíduo.
Sempre que se faça uso do juízo com a prudência que a lei humana estabelece, será necessário fazer passar, pelo pronunciamento desse juízo, o pensamento que situa a quem o emite no alvo de sua própria crítica. Tendo isto em conta, haveremos de convir que, se o indivíduo observar que alguém comete um erro, não deverá julgar por isso quem incorreu nele, mas sim o próprio erro, a fim de não incorrer nele. É certo que falamos aqui de modo figurado, sem relacionar nosso ponto de vista com as leis da justiça humana, que não admitem senão seu próprio julgamento.
Depreende-se também de nossa exposição inicial que, se este ou aquele de nossos semelhantes conquistar uma posição destacada, este fato não deverá ser causa de inveja nem motivo para rebaixar seu mérito; pelo contrário, deve-se buscar como conseguiu chegar a ela; e, caso tenha sido acidentalmente, pensar que também nós poderíamos consegui-la de igual maneira.
Não trate o homem de diminuir a felicidade dos outros com uma mesquinhez que não condiz com a nobreza de seus sentimentos, porque com isto diminuirá a própria possibilidade de conquistá-la.
É lamentável observar como a generalidade das pessoas perde o tempo em criticar quem comete um erro ou em invejar quem não o comete e obtém sucesso em suas situações ou posições. Tal coisa ocorre aos que não sabem o que fazer nem em que ocupar o tempo, esse tempo que perdem com um procedimento tão sem transcendência, alheio a suas obrigações e aos deveres que têm perante si mesmos.
Pelo exposto, pode-se apreciar que a prática do “conhecimento marginal”, ao propiciar um conduto a sentimentos generosos, leva, implicitamente, a cultivar as belas qualidades do espírito.
É necessário ensinar a juventude, sem afastá-la dos estudos correntes, a buscar novos e fecundos estímulos para sua vida, abrindo os canais de sua mente a todo conhecimento que facilite o livre desenvolvimento de sua iniciativa.
Se pensarmos que os seres humanos não foram postos sobre a terra para crescerem como as árvores, cravados sempre no mesmo lugar, compreenderemos que uma finalidade muito superior os anima e que, ao se moverem de um ponto a outro e usarem sua inteligência, isso terá de ser para buscar a relação com seus semelhantes e a vinculação com tudo o que suas possibilidades abarquem. É lógico admitir, então, que, se os homens foram postos no mundo com uma finalidade, não seria para depois abandoná-los à sua própria sorte; alguém, acima de todas as vontades humanas, haveria de guiá-los, sustentando suas vidas. Tendo isto presente, de imediato se advertirá que a vida adquire um significado que é necessário considerar em toda a sua extensão.
O cultivo da inteligência, numa incessante superação, fará com que se abram os canais da mente até conectá-los a todas as coisas que interessem à vida humana. Não é nada estranho que, em tais condições, o ser se sinta atraído pelo afã de agigantar seus esforços, a fim de que a vida adquira cada dia maior amplitude e se prolongue até o infinito.
Não é tarefa fácil, entende-se, alcançar tão alta realização, mas nem por isso deixa de ser atraente tentá-lo, pois que, ainda que só se conseguissem escalar alturas menores, estas seriam sempre valiosas para os fins da existência.
Para abrir os canais mentais e encaminhá-los na direção dessas elevadas miras, é preciso submergir a mente, pelo menos em certos instantes, no oceano das idéias; pensar muitas coisas e escolher uma para segui-la com o pensamento até a consumação do propósito perseguido.
Muitos exemplos já houve no mundo; muitos acontecimentos estão registrados na História. Por que, então, não ensinar a extrair deles conseqüências úteis e felizes para a vida? Se a juventude não for guiada pela persuasão do exemplo, seguirá às cegas, de um lado para outro, sem atinar, salvo raras exceções, como se orientar em meio à confusão reinante.
Faz-se necessário, repetimos, que a juventude caminhe na esteira dos exemplos; que se guie por eles, sobretudo por aqueles que deixaram uma pegada mais profunda nos caminhos do mundo; só assim poderá surgir nela a luz de novas inspirações.
O amor ao trabalho conduz, invariavelmente, a uma vida próspera e cheia de possibilidades. Quem nada faz não pode experimentar os momentos felizes reservados ao homem de empresa e iniciativa, mas quem está em constante atividade, quem sempre faz algo, encontra, mesmo nas pequenas coisas, as mais ternas satisfações.
Extraído do livro “Coletânea da Revista Logosofia Tomo II”, pág 249
Particularidades psicológicas
O senso crítico – Conhecimento marginal
Carlos Bernardo González Pecotche – Agosto de 1947
Uma das mais acentuadas particularidades do temperamento humano é a que domina as reações do senso crítico. Com a maior freqüência, é dado observar quão longe está o homem de elevar sua crítica aos altos níveis do justo, do exato e tolerável: o habitual é exercer a faculdade crítica em detrimento da dignidade alheia, e é assim que se emitem juízos apressados sobre a conduta, atividade ou idéias do semelhante.
No afã desmedido de se colocar em situação de privilégio perante os demais, o homem se crê no direito de julgar tudo de um plano mais alto, diminuindo, é claro, o tamanho moral daqueles a quem não pode suportar, por terem uma altura maior que a sua. Assim, a crítica se torna, em geral, exagerada, e a boa dose de inveja que em muitos casos a alimenta, satisfaz plenamente sua medida.
A nosso juízo, esta particularidade psicológica é uma das causas, talvez a principal, de grande parte dos seres humanos fracassarem na vida, pois o mesmo mal que esses seres fazem se volta inevitavelmente contra eles, convertendo a intolerância que os consome em implacável verdugo de suas próprias existências. E isto ocorre, precisamente, porque ninguém busca dentro de si as causas que concorrem para submergi-lo em tão inquietantes situações.
Todo juízo adverso que o homem faz do próximo leva em si o germe de um agravo que, mais cedo ou mais tarde, lesa seu próprio conceito.
Como é natural, as pessoas cultas são sempre comedidas em seus juízos e, antes de emiti-los, tratam de guardar a mais estrita imparcialidade. Os homens experientes sabem que a crítica é uma faca de dois gumes, que é necessário manejar com cautela para não se ferir. Por outro lado, as pessoas de pouca cultura, desprovidas da menor consideração, levadas pela paixão a esgrimem com implacável assanho.
O exposto leva a refletir sobre como seria saudável instituir um ensino especial que preparasse os jovens na prática destes conhecimentos, os quais, apesar de influírem tanto na vida humana, permanecem até o presente a considerável distância das preocupações docentes e, por conseguinte, não se encontram em nenhum texto de ensino oficial. É indubitável que tal prática, que diremos ser “do conhecimento marginal” por se achar à margem dos conhecimentos comuns, exerceria uma função moral e social de grande importância, pois permitiria à juventude nutrir-se de elementos verdadeiramente constitutivos de seu caráter e cultura. Teria sido dado assim um grande passo adiante na correção das imperfeições – melhor ainda, das deficiências – que se percebem por trás de cada atitude do indivíduo.
Sempre que se faça uso do juízo com a prudência que a lei humana estabelece, será necessário fazer passar, pelo pronunciamento desse juízo, o pensamento que situa a quem o emite no alvo de sua própria crítica. Tendo isto em conta, haveremos de convir que, se o indivíduo observar que alguém comete um erro, não deverá julgar por isso quem incorreu nele, mas sim o próprio erro, a fim de não incorrer nele. É certo que falamos aqui de modo figurado, sem relacionar nosso ponto de vista com as leis da justiça humana, que não admitem senão seu próprio julgamento.
Depreende-se também de nossa exposição inicial que, se este ou aquele de nossos semelhantes conquistar uma posição destacada, este fato não deverá ser causa de inveja nem motivo para rebaixar seu mérito; pelo contrário, deve-se buscar como conseguiu chegar a ela; e, caso tenha sido acidentalmente, pensar que também nós poderíamos consegui-la de igual maneira.
Não trate o homem de diminuir a felicidade dos outros com uma mesquinhez que não condiz com a nobreza de seus sentimentos, porque com isto diminuirá a própria possibilidade de conquistá-la.
É lamentável observar como a generalidade das pessoas perde o tempo em criticar quem comete um erro ou em invejar quem não o comete e obtém sucesso em suas situações ou posições. Tal coisa ocorre aos que não sabem o que fazer nem em que ocupar o tempo, esse tempo que perdem com um procedimento tão sem transcendência, alheio a suas obrigações e aos deveres que têm perante si mesmos.
Pelo exposto, pode-se apreciar que a prática do “conhecimento marginal”, ao propiciar um conduto a sentimentos generosos, leva, implicitamente, a cultivar as belas qualidades do espírito.
É necessário ensinar a juventude, sem afastá-la dos estudos correntes, a buscar novos e fecundos estímulos para sua vida, abrindo os canais de sua mente a todo conhecimento que facilite o livre desenvolvimento de sua iniciativa.
Se pensarmos que os seres humanos não foram postos sobre a terra para crescerem como as árvores, cravados sempre no mesmo lugar, compreenderemos que uma finalidade muito superior os anima e que, ao se moverem de um ponto a outro e usarem sua inteligência, isso terá de ser para buscar a relação com seus semelhantes e a vinculação com tudo o que suas possibilidades abarquem. É lógico admitir, então, que, se os homens foram postos no mundo com uma finalidade, não seria para depois abandoná-los à sua própria sorte; alguém, acima de todas as vontades humanas, haveria de guiá-los, sustentando suas vidas. Tendo isto presente, de imediato se advertirá que a vida adquire um significado que é necessário considerar em toda a sua extensão.
O cultivo da inteligência, numa incessante superação, fará com que se abram os canais da mente até conectá-los a todas as coisas que interessem à vida humana. Não é nada estranho que, em tais condições, o ser se sinta atraído pelo afã de agigantar seus esforços, a fim de que a vida adquira cada dia maior amplitude e se prolongue até o infinito.
Não é tarefa fácil, entende-se, alcançar tão alta realização, mas nem por isso deixa de ser atraente tentá-lo, pois que, ainda que só se conseguissem escalar alturas menores, estas seriam sempre valiosas para os fins da existência.
Para abrir os canais mentais e encaminhá-los na direção dessas elevadas miras, é preciso submergir a mente, pelo menos em certos instantes, no oceano das idéias; pensar muitas coisas e escolher uma para segui-la com o pensamento até a consumação do propósito perseguido.
Muitos exemplos já houve no mundo; muitos acontecimentos estão registrados na História. Por que, então, não ensinar a extrair deles conseqüências úteis e felizes para a vida? Se a juventude não for guiada pela persuasão do exemplo, seguirá às cegas, de um lado para outro, sem atinar, salvo raras exceções, como se orientar em meio à confusão reinante.
Faz-se necessário, repetimos, que a juventude caminhe na esteira dos exemplos; que se guie por eles, sobretudo por aqueles que deixaram uma pegada mais profunda nos caminhos do mundo; só assim poderá surgir nela a luz de novas inspirações.
O amor ao trabalho conduz, invariavelmente, a uma vida próspera e cheia de possibilidades. Quem nada faz não pode experimentar os momentos felizes reservados ao homem de empresa e iniciativa, mas quem está em constante atividade, quem sempre faz algo, encontra, mesmo nas pequenas coisas, as mais ternas satisfações.
Extraído do livro “Coletânea da Revista Logosofia Tomo II”, pág 249
Terça-feira, Julho 07, 2009
456) O Governo Mundial do Papa - Rodrigo Constantino
O Governo Mundial do Papa
Rodrigo Constantino
07/07/2009
"A esquerda política nunca entendeu que, se você dá ao governo poder suficiente para criar a ‘justiça social’, você deu a ele poder suficiente para criar o despotismo." (Thomas Sowell)
O Papa Bento XVI divulgou sua nova encíclica Caritas in Veritate, enaltecendo a mais socialista de todas as encíclicas anteriores, Populorum Progressio, escrita pelo Papa Paulo VI em 1967 (ver meu artigo “Altruísmo ou Socialismo?”, no livro Egoísmo Racional). Muitos católicos anticomunistas ainda depositavam esperança de que o novo Papa fosse permanecer razoavelmente afastado da “onda vermelha” que vem conquistando o mundo. No entanto, o fato é que o catolicismo ambíguo oferece farto material para socialistas também, dependendo da preferência do crente. E o Papa Bento XVI parece ter escolhido a crença no governo.
Logo no começo, Bento XVI afirma que seu “venerado predecessor Paulo VI iluminou o grande tema do desenvolvimento dos povos com o esplendor da verdade e com a luz suave da caridade de Cristo”. Essa luz toda não passa de uma condenação direta ao capitalismo, ao lucro e ao livre mercado. E eis que o novo Papa “economista” condena uma “atividade financeira mal utilizada e majoritariamente especulativa” pela crise atual, palavras que costumam sair da boca populista do presidente Lula com freqüência. Não obstante as impressões digitais dos governos em todas as cenas do crime nessa crise, o Papa acha que a solução passa por mais planejamento central: “Assim, a crise torna-se ocasião de discernimento e elaboração de nova planificação”.
Em seguida, o Papa faz uma defesa do welfare state, que seria aplaudido por quase todos os esquerdistas do mundo:
"O mercado, à medida que se foi tornando global, estimulou antes de mais nada, por parte de países ricos, a busca de áreas para onde deslocar as atividades produtivas a baixo custo a fim de reduzir os preços de muitos bens, aumentar o poder de compra e deste modo acelerar o índice de desenvolvimento centrado sobre um maior consumo pelo próprio mercado interno. Conseqüentemente, o mercado motivou novas formas de competição entre Estados procurando atrair centros produtivos de empresas estrangeiras através de variados instrumentos tais como impostos favoráveis e a desregulamentação do mundo do trabalho. Estes processos implicaram a redução das redes de segurança social em troca de maiores vantagens competitivas no mercado global, acarretando grave perigo para os direitos dos trabalhadores, os direitos fundamentais do homem e a solidariedade atuada nas formas tradicionais do Estado social."
Pouco depois, o Papa ataca de sindicalista:
"Aqui, as políticas relativas ao orçamento com os seus cortes na despesa social, muitas vezes fomentados pelas próprias instituições financeiras internacionais, podem deixar os cidadãos impotentes diante de riscos antigos e novos; e tal impotência torna-se ainda maior devido à falta de proteção eficaz por parte das associações dos trabalhadores. O conjunto das mudanças sociais e econômicas faz com que as organizações sindicais sintam maiores dificuldades no desempenho do seu dever de representar os interesses dos trabalhadores, inclusive pelo fato de os governos, por razões de utilidade econômica, muitas vezes limitarem as liberdades sindicais ou a capacidade negociadora dos próprios sindicatos."
Não satisfeito, o Papa prega a simbiose entre economia e governo:
"A atividade econômica não pode resolver todos os problemas sociais através da simples extensão da lógica mercantil. Esta há de ter como finalidade a continuação do bem comum, do qual se deve ocupar também e, sobretudo a comunidade política. Por isso, tenha-se presente que é causa de graves desequilíbrios separar o agir econômico — ao qual competiria apenas produzir riqueza — do agir político, cuja função seria buscar a justiça através da redistribuição."
Por fim, o Papa acaba defendendo a tese do “governo mundial” através da ONU:
"Perante o crescimento incessante da interdependência mundial, sente-se imenso — mesmo no meio de uma recessão igualmente mundial — a urgência de uma reforma quer da Organização das Nações Unidas quer da arquitetura econômica e financeira internacional, para que seja possível uma real concretização do conceito de família de nações. De igual modo sente-se a urgência de encontrar formas inovadoras para atuar o princípio da responsabilidade de proteger e para atribuir também às nações mais pobres uma voz eficaz nas decisões comuns. Isto se revela necessário precisamente no âmbito de um ordenamento político, jurídico e econômico que incremente e guie a colaboração internacional para o desenvolvimento solidário de todos os povos. Para o governo da economia mundial, para sanar as economias atingidas pela crise de modo a prevenir o agravamento da mesma e, em conseqüência, maiores desequilíbrios, para realizar um oportuno e integral desarmamento, a segurança alimentar e a paz, para garantir a salvaguarda do ambiente e para regulamentar os fluxos migratórios urge a presença de uma verdadeira Autoridade política mundial, delineada já pelo meu predecessor, o Beato João XXIII."
Não há mais o que comentar. Aqueles que pensavam que teriam na Igreja Católica, com o Papa Bento XVI, um obstáculo ao avanço dos governos, precisam urgentemente de um choque de realidade. A história da Igreja Católica está manchada por relacionamentos sombrios com governos, mesmo os mais autoritários. A simbiose sempre existiu entre Estado e Igreja, com o clero defendendo o direito divino dos reis, e recebendo em troca inúmeros privilégios. “Dá a César o que é de César”, diz o catolicismo, contemporizando com o poder. O novo Papa apenas segue uma milenar tradição católica ao defender mais governo em nossas vidas. Para os mais atentos aos fatos, apenas mais do mesmo. Para os que nutriam esperança libertária no novo Papa, uma grande decepção.
Rodrigo Constantino
07/07/2009
"A esquerda política nunca entendeu que, se você dá ao governo poder suficiente para criar a ‘justiça social’, você deu a ele poder suficiente para criar o despotismo." (Thomas Sowell)
O Papa Bento XVI divulgou sua nova encíclica Caritas in Veritate, enaltecendo a mais socialista de todas as encíclicas anteriores, Populorum Progressio, escrita pelo Papa Paulo VI em 1967 (ver meu artigo “Altruísmo ou Socialismo?”, no livro Egoísmo Racional). Muitos católicos anticomunistas ainda depositavam esperança de que o novo Papa fosse permanecer razoavelmente afastado da “onda vermelha” que vem conquistando o mundo. No entanto, o fato é que o catolicismo ambíguo oferece farto material para socialistas também, dependendo da preferência do crente. E o Papa Bento XVI parece ter escolhido a crença no governo.
Logo no começo, Bento XVI afirma que seu “venerado predecessor Paulo VI iluminou o grande tema do desenvolvimento dos povos com o esplendor da verdade e com a luz suave da caridade de Cristo”. Essa luz toda não passa de uma condenação direta ao capitalismo, ao lucro e ao livre mercado. E eis que o novo Papa “economista” condena uma “atividade financeira mal utilizada e majoritariamente especulativa” pela crise atual, palavras que costumam sair da boca populista do presidente Lula com freqüência. Não obstante as impressões digitais dos governos em todas as cenas do crime nessa crise, o Papa acha que a solução passa por mais planejamento central: “Assim, a crise torna-se ocasião de discernimento e elaboração de nova planificação”.
Em seguida, o Papa faz uma defesa do welfare state, que seria aplaudido por quase todos os esquerdistas do mundo:
"O mercado, à medida que se foi tornando global, estimulou antes de mais nada, por parte de países ricos, a busca de áreas para onde deslocar as atividades produtivas a baixo custo a fim de reduzir os preços de muitos bens, aumentar o poder de compra e deste modo acelerar o índice de desenvolvimento centrado sobre um maior consumo pelo próprio mercado interno. Conseqüentemente, o mercado motivou novas formas de competição entre Estados procurando atrair centros produtivos de empresas estrangeiras através de variados instrumentos tais como impostos favoráveis e a desregulamentação do mundo do trabalho. Estes processos implicaram a redução das redes de segurança social em troca de maiores vantagens competitivas no mercado global, acarretando grave perigo para os direitos dos trabalhadores, os direitos fundamentais do homem e a solidariedade atuada nas formas tradicionais do Estado social."
Pouco depois, o Papa ataca de sindicalista:
"Aqui, as políticas relativas ao orçamento com os seus cortes na despesa social, muitas vezes fomentados pelas próprias instituições financeiras internacionais, podem deixar os cidadãos impotentes diante de riscos antigos e novos; e tal impotência torna-se ainda maior devido à falta de proteção eficaz por parte das associações dos trabalhadores. O conjunto das mudanças sociais e econômicas faz com que as organizações sindicais sintam maiores dificuldades no desempenho do seu dever de representar os interesses dos trabalhadores, inclusive pelo fato de os governos, por razões de utilidade econômica, muitas vezes limitarem as liberdades sindicais ou a capacidade negociadora dos próprios sindicatos."
Não satisfeito, o Papa prega a simbiose entre economia e governo:
"A atividade econômica não pode resolver todos os problemas sociais através da simples extensão da lógica mercantil. Esta há de ter como finalidade a continuação do bem comum, do qual se deve ocupar também e, sobretudo a comunidade política. Por isso, tenha-se presente que é causa de graves desequilíbrios separar o agir econômico — ao qual competiria apenas produzir riqueza — do agir político, cuja função seria buscar a justiça através da redistribuição."
Por fim, o Papa acaba defendendo a tese do “governo mundial” através da ONU:
"Perante o crescimento incessante da interdependência mundial, sente-se imenso — mesmo no meio de uma recessão igualmente mundial — a urgência de uma reforma quer da Organização das Nações Unidas quer da arquitetura econômica e financeira internacional, para que seja possível uma real concretização do conceito de família de nações. De igual modo sente-se a urgência de encontrar formas inovadoras para atuar o princípio da responsabilidade de proteger e para atribuir também às nações mais pobres uma voz eficaz nas decisões comuns. Isto se revela necessário precisamente no âmbito de um ordenamento político, jurídico e econômico que incremente e guie a colaboração internacional para o desenvolvimento solidário de todos os povos. Para o governo da economia mundial, para sanar as economias atingidas pela crise de modo a prevenir o agravamento da mesma e, em conseqüência, maiores desequilíbrios, para realizar um oportuno e integral desarmamento, a segurança alimentar e a paz, para garantir a salvaguarda do ambiente e para regulamentar os fluxos migratórios urge a presença de uma verdadeira Autoridade política mundial, delineada já pelo meu predecessor, o Beato João XXIII."
Não há mais o que comentar. Aqueles que pensavam que teriam na Igreja Católica, com o Papa Bento XVI, um obstáculo ao avanço dos governos, precisam urgentemente de um choque de realidade. A história da Igreja Católica está manchada por relacionamentos sombrios com governos, mesmo os mais autoritários. A simbiose sempre existiu entre Estado e Igreja, com o clero defendendo o direito divino dos reis, e recebendo em troca inúmeros privilégios. “Dá a César o que é de César”, diz o catolicismo, contemporizando com o poder. O novo Papa apenas segue uma milenar tradição católica ao defender mais governo em nossas vidas. Para os mais atentos aos fatos, apenas mais do mesmo. Para os que nutriam esperança libertária no novo Papa, uma grande decepção.
Assinar:
Postagens (Atom)
