Uma grande tese de história na França:
Vingtcinquante@cines.fr , Liste de diffusion en Histoire Politique
SOUTENANCE DE THESE
Mme Caroline PIQUET soutiendra sa thèse de Doctorat (Université de Paris IV) sur le sujet suivant:
La Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez en Egypte, 1888-1956. Une concession française dans la tourmente d’une nation en marche
Lundi 11 décembre 2006
9 heures
En Sorbonne, Centre Administratif, Salle des Actes
1, rue Victor Cousin 75005 Paris
En présence du Jury :
Mme ALLEAUME (CNRS)
M. BARJOT (PARIS 4)
M. FREMEAUX (PARIS 4)
M. MARSEILLE (PARIS 1)
M. SAUL (QUEBEC)
Résumés :
Cette étude présente l’histoire de l’une des plus importantes entreprises de l’Égypte contemporaine, la Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, de 1888 à 1956. Cette période correspond à l’émergence de l’État-nation égyptien et à la construction d’une économie nationale. Durant près d’un siècle, l’activité de la Compagnie de Suez se déroule en Égypte et sa concession constitue un véritable domaine privé. Cette présence marque durablement la région de l’isthme de Suez, en particulier dans le domaine du transfert de compétences et de technologies, du bassin d’emploi et des réalisations urbaines. Sous cet angle, l’entreprise peut être envisagée comme un acteur de développement économique de la région. Cependant, l’entreprise adopte un fonctionnement de type colonial et marginalise les intérêts de l’autorité concédante. Le gouvernement égyptien et les groupes nationalistes et syndicaux réagissent en réclamant une gestion nationale de la voie maritime. L’étude de Suez renvoie à l’action de l’État égyptien sur le capital étranger et plus largement aux contradictions de la concession européenne en Égypte.
The study examines the history of one of the biggest firm of Modern Egypt, the Suez Canal Company from 1888 to 1956. This period corresponds in Egypt to the emergence of the Nation-State and the build up of national economy. For over than a century, all the activity of the Suez Company set up on Egypt and its concession was a real preserve. Then, the economic and social impact of this Company on the region was enormous, especially on labour market, technology transfer and urban realisations ; it can be considered as an actor of development of the Suez Isthmus. However, at the same time, the firm adopted a colonial attitude and denied the country any benefit from these infrastructures : the canal had to serve financial and strategic interests, not to serve local economy. In this context, Egyptian government, nationalist and unionist groups demanded return of the canal to national management. Suez reflects the role of the Egyptian State on foreign business and, in the widest sense, the contradictions of the European concession system in Egypt.
Position de thèse :
Ce travail propose d’étudier la Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, de 1888 à 1956, selon une approche nouvelle privilégiant l’étude de cette concession française dans son environnement égyptien, alors que l’historiographie a plutôt mis l’accent sur les aspects diplomatiques et stratégiques liés au canal de Suez. Au cœur de cette recherche, se pose la question de la concession outre-mer, qui représente à la fois un instrument d’expansion européenne et une opportunité de développement. L’interrogation porte en particulier sur la tension entre la logique commerciale de l’entreprise et les notions de service public et d’intérêt général. Le malentendu entre Suez et l’Égypte concerne tout particulièrement la fonction de la concession : Suez défend une mission internationale quand l’autorité concédante l’envisage sous l’angle de l’intérêt national. Ce dernier point s’avère essentiel dans une période de construction nationale : le canal doit participer au développement du pays et à l’émergence d’une économie égyptienne. Pour replacer la Compagnie dans cette dynamique, l’étude fait appel à une méthodologie spécifique relevant à la fois de l’histoire des entreprises, de l’histoire sociale et de l’histoire coloniale. Le plan retenu privilégie l’analyse de cette concession sous trois aspects : un enjeu politique, un lieu de travail et un territoire.
La première partie étudie la Compagnie dans son rapport à l’environnement politique du pays. Le premier chapitre analyse la Compagnie de 1888 à 1918, dans le contexte d’une Égypte soumise à l’occupation britannique. L’entreprise profite de la stabilité de l’Égypte coloniale pour se forger une tradition et acquérir un statut pour le moins particulier : entreprise concessionnaire égyptienne, elle est constituée, depuis 1876, pour l’essentiel de capitaux français et britanniques, avec un siège social installé à Paris. En 1888, la conférence de Constantinople en déclarant le canal de Suez international permet à l’entreprise de se revendiquer d’une mission mondiale, reléguant ainsi sa nationalité égyptienne au second plan. Par ailleurs, l’autorité concédante se fait très discrète et n’inquiète que peu les dirigeants de Suez. Toutefois, la légitimité de l’entreprise auprès de la population demeure bien fragile : une crise politique en 1909 portant sur la prolongation de la concession le souligne et révèle la triste réputation de parasite associée à l’entreprise.
Le second chapitre s’étend de 1918 à 1945, période marquée par la volonté d’indépendance du pays. Prise dans la tourmente d’un nationalisme économique, Suez se fait bousculer par la construction nationale égyptienne. En outre, la Compagnie doit affronter la nouvelle donne politique issue de l’accord anglo-égyptien de 1936 et de la liquidation du système des capitulations. L’autorité concédante est désormais en mesure d’exiger des gestes significatifs de la Compagnie. Cette dernière amorce dès lors une évolution notable de son statut financier et juridique : elle accepte le principe de la redistribution d’une partie de ses revenus tirés du canal et l’entrée d’Égyptiens dans son conseil d’administration. Elle reconnaît en outre sa fonction d’entreprise concessionnaire égyptienne, en admettant la nécessité de recruter et de former des employés nationaux. Toutefois, cette évolution vers une plus grande intégration de la Compagnie dans la société égyptienne se voit bloquée par la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le canal se trouve de nouveau placé au devant de la scène internationale. Alors que Le Caire espère profiter de la crise pour étendre son contrôle sur l’entreprise, les Britanniques dénient au gouvernement égyptien toutes ses prétentions. Un repli s’effectue alors sur l’entreprise européenne disputée en coulisse entre Britanniques et Français. Cette tension sur la direction de l’entreprise explique, après la guerre, une ferme reprise en main de l’organisation par les Français. En outre, la nouvelle équipe dirigeante brise définitivement la dynamique de collaboration avec l’Égypte effectuée durant les années trente, en réorientant Suez vers une mission internationale et un statut d’exception.
Le troisième chapitre traite des dix dernières années de l’entreprise dans le pays, de 1945 à 1956, lorsque l’Égypte libérale connaît ses ultimes moments, balayée ensuite par l’Égypte militaire. Le pays, depuis les années trente, affirme sa volonté de préparer la transition vers une régie directe. Dans les années cinquante, l’Égypte est en outre placée devant la nécessité de trouver des moyens de financement pour ses projets de développement. Le Caire cherche donc à placer Suez, à l’image des autres sociétés étrangères, dans un processus d’égyptianisation. Cela se traduit pour l’entreprise par l’intensification de la pression de l’État sur sa gestion et sur sa trésorerie. Au début des années cinquante, la Compagnie prend conscience que la possibilité d’un renouvellement de la concession en 1968 est bel et bien enterrée, du moins en l’absence de pression internationale. Elle s’engage par conséquent dans une double stratégie : garder le canal par une offensive diplomatique tout en se préparant à l’éventualité de sa perte. La Compagnie défend son monopole sur le canal par son argument classique de société internationale garante de la navigation et, en parallèle, elle amorce sa mutation financière par une stratégie de placements à l’étranger.
Ainsi, souveraine jusque dans les années vingt, l’entreprise subit l’affirmation du nationalisme égyptien dans les années trente, puis la tourmente des dernières années de l’Égypte monarchique et libérale, pour connaître un renforcement des difficultés sous la période militaire. Cette périodisation ne correspond que peu à sa chronologie économique ; ses revenus dépendent en effet moins de ses rapports avec l’autorité concédante que des fluctuations de l’économie mondiale. Néanmoins, à la fin de la période d’exploitation, le renforcement de l’autorité concédante se fait sentir sur l’évolution de sa rentabilité. Mais ces dernières années correspondent aussi à un grand dynamisme financier avec une amorce d’internationalisation sur les places européennes et américaines.
Dans une seconde partie, la Compagnie est analysée sous l’angle de l’organisation du travail et des hommes de l’exploitation. La monographie sociale de l’entreprise permet de présenter le personnel comme un vecteur de changement de l’entreprise, jouant sur ses évolutions internes et externes, sous la pression de la question nationale. Le chapitre 4 s’attache à l’étude de l’organisation du travail de la Compagnie afin de souligner les spécificités de la main-d’œuvre. Le travail y présente un caractère hétérogène par la multiplicité des chantiers et des personnels. Cependant, on peut y dégager deux organisations dominantes : une première, assez sommaire, sur les chantiers de voirie et de terrassement et une autre, moderne et rationalisée, au sein des ateliers. Cela entraîne une distinction nette entre d’une part une main-d’œuvre sous-qualifiée, majoritairement égyptienne et employée dans le cadre du tâcheronnat et, d’autre part, une population ouvrière qualifiée pour l’essentiel européenne et bénéficiant d’avantages sociaux en tant qu’ouvriers inscrits. Cette distinction est renforcée par la politique de recrutement : la Compagnie privilégie le recrutement à partir de l’immigration d’ouvriers méditerranéens. Cette immigration au caractère permanent dès la fin du dix-neuvième siècle a permis d’assurer la transmission du métier au sein du cadre familial. La formation d’ouvriers spécialisés n’apparaît comme une préoccupation sociale que tardivement, dans les années vingt.
Dans le chapitre 5, il s’agit de voir comment la Compagnie répond aux spécificités de sa main-d’œuvre par une politique sociale paternaliste. Celle-ci est chargée de fidéliser le personnel et de créer un consensus au sein de l’entreprise ; or, ce consensus est progressivement fragilisé par les enjeux de la construction nationale. La politique sociale de Suez est née d’un souci de conserver une main-d’œuvre étrangère, après la désaffection des Égyptiens recrutés dans le cadre de la corvée. De la fin du dix-neuvième siècle au premier conflit mondial, l’entreprise procède à la mise en place d’une législation interne très en avance sur le reste du pays, en accordant un statut avantageux à ses ouvriers étrangers. Durant l’entre-deux-guerres, cette politique sociale connaît à la fois son apogée et ses limites. Le paternalisme triomphant des années vingt repose sur la distinction entre les ouvriers inscrits et non-inscrits. Grâce à cela, la Compagnie assure à la fois la paix sociale et une gestion efficace des coûts de personnel. Cependant, la crise des années trente montre les limites de l’encadrement ouvrier au moment où les préoccupations financières de l’entreprise l’emportent au sein de la direction. Les années trente constituent une période de rupture entre un paternalisme hérité du dix-neuvième siècle et des méthodes de gestion du personnel plus modernes. La Seconde Guerre mondiale représente une nouvelle étape puisque désormais la population égyptienne dépasse la population émigrée au sein du personnel : le consensus entre patrons et ouvriers s’en trouve profondément affecté. De plus, l’intervention de l’État constitue un frein à la politique sociale de l’entreprise. Le discours paternaliste traditionnel s’oriente désormais vers l’action psychologique et la diffusion d’un journal d’entreprise. En dépit de ces mesures, les autorités accusent le modèle social de l’entreprise de se réaliser au détriment des Égyptiens. Elles considèrent désormais avoir un rôle à jouer dans ce qui relevait jusqu’alors des affaires internes de l’entreprise, en particulier le niveau des salaires, la cadence de l’égyptianisation et la formation du personnel.
Le chapitre 6 s’intéresse à l’étude des conflits ouvriers ; ceux-ci replacent l’entreprise dans le cadre de ses relations avec les syndicats et les associations de la région et permettent de mesurer les conséquences de la montée du nationalisme égyptien sur l’entreprise. L’histoire du mouvement ouvrier de Suez est celle d’une rencontre entre les méthodes d’action des ouvriers européens et le nationalisme du personnel égyptien. La configuration du mouvement évolue selon la composition du personnel ouvrier et du contexte politique. Au dix-neuvième siècle, les Européens, alors majoritaires, apportent une tonalité anarcho-syndicaliste au mouvement. Durant l’entre-deux-guerres, un rééquilibrage s’effectue au sein du personnel entre les Européens et les Égyptiens tandis que le nationalisme égyptien devient le sentiment le mieux partagé du pays : le syndicat de la Compagnie associe alors la lutte ouvrière aux inégalités politiques. De leur côté, les ouvriers égyptiens, pour beaucoup non-inscrits dans le cadre, se mobilisent d’eux-mêmes pour revendiquer des droits similaires aux Européens inscrits. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le personnel égyptien constitue l’écrasante majorité du personnel de Suez : l’accent est naturellement mis sur les problèmes spécifiques à cette catégorie. En outre, la Compagnie devient une des cibles privilégiées de la propagande nationaliste. Le personnel égyptien y est sensible et représente désormais un contre-pouvoir au sein de l’entreprise. Dans les dernières années de l’exploitation, les ouvriers ne luttent plus contre l’entreprise mais accompagnent l’action de l’État pour en disputer la direction aux étrangers.
Dans la troisième partie, l’étude s’attache à l’entreprise comme un acteur de développement de la région, en soulignant les ambiguïtés entre concession et colonisation. Suez représente une fusion des idéaux saint-simoniens et francs- maçons avec la pensée libérale, associée à l’expansion de l’Occident chrétien. La Compagnie entend lier son activité d’exploitation du canal à une mission de colonisation : elle entreprend la modélisation de son environnement sur le territoire de sa concession, en érigeant villes, hôpitaux, mais aussi écoles et églises. Le chapitre 7 met l’accent sur la concession de Suez entendue comme un prolongement de l’Empire français, une ambition toutefois contestée par d’autres puissances. Les premiers à s’y opposer sont les Britanniques : leur antagonisme se manifeste surtout dans la seconde moitié du dix-neuvième siècle. Avec l’entrée de leurs représentants au sein du conseil d’administration en 1883, l’hostilité franco-britannique s’apaise pour se transformer en une rivalité plus sournoise, mais sans incidence sur le fonctionnement de l’entreprise. Le fascisme, quant à lui, atteint l’entreprise en son cœur en divisant fortement son personnel ; le conflit se joue jusque dans les couloirs du Saint-Siège, avec pour cadre plus général la question de l’influence française et italienne en Afrique orientale. Par ailleurs, la Compagnie s’érige en véritable autorité politique. Elle n’est ni l’instrument de la France, ni celui des Anglais ; mais pragmatique, elle s’appuie sur l’occupation britannique contre le danger égyptien. Après l’évacuation britannique, la Compagnie souligne plus fortement son image d’entreprise française en espérant un soutien des autorités hexagonales. Cela l’entraîne dans une situation paradoxale : elle refuse des liens trop marqués avec la France au nom de son statut international, clé de son indépendance et de sa liberté d’action, tout en affirmant son identité française.
Le chapitre 8 se concentre sur l’organisation de la concession comme un domaine privé de l’entreprise. La Compagnie contribue à développer la région de l’isthme de Suez, bien qu’une tension demeure entre la logique d’extraterritorialité, découlant du statut international du canal, et celle de territoire égyptien. Sur l’ensemble de la période d’exploitation, la Compagnie impulse un élan plus qu’elle ne contrôle le développement de la région : celle-ci se construit de concert avec les populations et les autres activités commerciales et industrielles de l’isthme. Néanmoins, la Compagnie demeure un élément moteur de l’organisation de la région jusqu’à la nationalisation. Elle appose son sceau dans le paysan urbain et poursuit un idéal de société bien organisée.
Le chapitre 9 s’attache à l’entreprise sous sa dimension de colonie française. L’entreprise prolonge la mission de civilisatrice de la France outre-mer à travers sa politique sociale, en favorisant l’installation des missions catholiques et en développant la langue française dans la région. En outre, s’installe une colonie de cadres français qui présente les aspects de la plupart des sociétés coloniales : un style de vie petit bourgeois, des inégalités sociales, la vie entre soi et le culte de la patrie. L’action de la Compagnie encadre cette petite société par une généreuse politique de subventions et contribue à reproduire dans la vie sociale l’organisation de l’entreprise. Mais cette communauté française paraît à bien des égards anachronique après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, tant par rapport à la situation de l’Égypte qu’à celle de l’Europe.
L’étude de la Compagnie souligne ainsi une grande réussite financière qui bénéficie en premier lieu aux actionnaires européens alors que l’État égyptien, malgré les accords passés, demeure le grand perdant. Négligeant sa fonction de concessionnaire, Suez met un point d’honneur à affirmer sa vocation d’entreprise commerciale privée et indépendante. Par conséquent, d’un point de vue politique et financier, l’apport de cette entreprise à l’Égypte s’avère plutôt médiocre ; cette histoire est faite de pressions et de contraintes plutôt que de volonté de collaboration. De plus, l’entreprise fait preuve d’une difficulté d’adaptation aux nouveaux schémas politiques. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la décolonisation est mal appréhendée. Suez vit toujours sur les principes du dix-neuvième siècle : statut d’exception et conférence de Constantinople. Cette adaptation ratée peut s’expliquer par la culture de ses dirigeants issus des milieux coloniaux et par une structure assez rigide, construite sur le modèle des administrations françaises et toujours dirigée depuis Paris. Mais se pose aussi une question de volonté et de choix quant à la stratégie de l’entreprise : Suez n’a jamais voulu se limiter à une entreprise égyptienne comme le prévoient ses statuts ; elle se définit comme une entreprise commerciale internationale. Cette attitude se traduit jusque dans le paysage : la Compagnie prend très vite l’allure d’une société coloniale, sorte de citadelle fermée sur l’extérieur. Toutefois, cette situation mérite d’être nuancée en raison de l’ampleur de son action sociale et de l’aménagement de la région. Aussi peut-on affirmer que la concession de Suez a représenté un moyen de développement de la région et de diffusion technique, mais ceci n’a pu se faire que grâce à la pression et au contrôle exercés par l’autorité concédante à partir des années trente.
domingo, dezembro 03, 2006
sábado, dezembro 02, 2006
162) Dissuasao Nuclear: a visao britanica
Nuclear deterrence may still have role
Lawrence Freedman
Financial Times, November 30 2006
A striking feature of the debate on the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent – in which the government is to announce proposals on Monday – is continuity with past debates. The story began during the second world war when the fear was that Germany would make the first vital breakthroughs, moved through the early stages of the cold war and then on to the complex debates about sustaining deterrence as the east-west confrontation settled down. When the UK government took decisions on its Trident nuclear missile system in the early 1980s, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, relations with Moscow were tense. By the time Trident was fully operational in 1994, the Soviet Union and its European empire had collapsed. Now the world seems less benign.
Throughout, three core arguments have been used to justify Britain’s possession of these terrible weapons. First, enemies, actual and potential, are committed to developing nuclear capabilities. Only the threat of retaliation ensures they will not be turned against Britain and its allies. Second, while the main provider of nuclear deterrence is bound to be the US, an independent capability underpins the “special relationship” and confirms Britain’s status as one of the world’s most influential powers. Third, however difficult it is to imagine a plausible scenario where it would be necessary to threaten, let alone use, nuclear weapons, the future is horribly uncertain. This is therefore an essential insurance policy.
For now, the government presents the third of these as the clincher. The public mood may be too sceptical to proclaim the benefits of the special relationship: nor is it evident that only nuclear weapons these days provide a “seat at the top table”. A degree of scepticism may also be expected about the insurance argument. The price of the insurance policy is high, but not unaffordable. If a new policy was being taken out it would seem far too high, but years of investment in technology and infrastructure provide the equivalent of a “no claims bonus”.
Indeed, given that successive governments have been paying out regularly over the past six decades, the real departure would be to decide suddenly to cash it in. What is it about our current strategic environment that suggests that this is the time to abandon the deterrent? The obvious answer is “very little”. Russia is in a bad temper, North Korea has declared its nuclear capability and little seems to have been done to stop Iran acquiring one. There is evidence that al-Qaeda is interested in weapons to cause mass slaughter and mayhem.
Yet the government must be careful about depending too much on these current sources of insecurity. With al-Qaeda, there is a problem with how a full-blown British nuclear capability is going to deter a suicidal sub-state group. The official line is that good relations with Moscow remain both likely and important, while it is far too soon to give up on the possibility of persuading North Korea and Iraq to abandon their nuclear ambitions.
Furthermore, anticipating proliferation also raises the “drunkards preaching abstinence” argument that it is hypocritical to demand that others refrain from developing a capability that we insist on retaining.
As India and Pakistan may be demonstrating, the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict can introduce a welcome element of caution. Some conflicts, of course, may become so unstable that mutual deterrence will collapse and catastrophe will ensue, which is why proliferation is not to be encouraged. Nonetheless, they make clear the horrific consequences of full-scale war or even a big miscalculation and so encourage states to resolve disputes without resort to armed force.
Established nuclear powers do not need to dream up circumstances in which they might feel a need to threaten, let alone use, nuclear weapons. The aim must be to encourage these weapons to remain marginal to the everyday conduct of international affairs. If the security debate is no longer preoccupied by big wars, we should be grateful but not take it for granted. This focus on conditions that continue to rule out major war, however, is more appropriate than one on conditions in which one may threaten to break out. This leaves open the questions of the importance of a specifically British nuclear capability and “value for money” set against other national needs. It argues, though, for care with the claim that we no longer need to think about nuclear deterrence because we no longer worry about major war.
Sir Lawrence Freedman is professor of war studies and vice principal (research) at King’s College London
Lawrence Freedman
Financial Times, November 30 2006
A striking feature of the debate on the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent – in which the government is to announce proposals on Monday – is continuity with past debates. The story began during the second world war when the fear was that Germany would make the first vital breakthroughs, moved through the early stages of the cold war and then on to the complex debates about sustaining deterrence as the east-west confrontation settled down. When the UK government took decisions on its Trident nuclear missile system in the early 1980s, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, relations with Moscow were tense. By the time Trident was fully operational in 1994, the Soviet Union and its European empire had collapsed. Now the world seems less benign.
Throughout, three core arguments have been used to justify Britain’s possession of these terrible weapons. First, enemies, actual and potential, are committed to developing nuclear capabilities. Only the threat of retaliation ensures they will not be turned against Britain and its allies. Second, while the main provider of nuclear deterrence is bound to be the US, an independent capability underpins the “special relationship” and confirms Britain’s status as one of the world’s most influential powers. Third, however difficult it is to imagine a plausible scenario where it would be necessary to threaten, let alone use, nuclear weapons, the future is horribly uncertain. This is therefore an essential insurance policy.
For now, the government presents the third of these as the clincher. The public mood may be too sceptical to proclaim the benefits of the special relationship: nor is it evident that only nuclear weapons these days provide a “seat at the top table”. A degree of scepticism may also be expected about the insurance argument. The price of the insurance policy is high, but not unaffordable. If a new policy was being taken out it would seem far too high, but years of investment in technology and infrastructure provide the equivalent of a “no claims bonus”.
Indeed, given that successive governments have been paying out regularly over the past six decades, the real departure would be to decide suddenly to cash it in. What is it about our current strategic environment that suggests that this is the time to abandon the deterrent? The obvious answer is “very little”. Russia is in a bad temper, North Korea has declared its nuclear capability and little seems to have been done to stop Iran acquiring one. There is evidence that al-Qaeda is interested in weapons to cause mass slaughter and mayhem.
Yet the government must be careful about depending too much on these current sources of insecurity. With al-Qaeda, there is a problem with how a full-blown British nuclear capability is going to deter a suicidal sub-state group. The official line is that good relations with Moscow remain both likely and important, while it is far too soon to give up on the possibility of persuading North Korea and Iraq to abandon their nuclear ambitions.
Furthermore, anticipating proliferation also raises the “drunkards preaching abstinence” argument that it is hypocritical to demand that others refrain from developing a capability that we insist on retaining.
As India and Pakistan may be demonstrating, the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict can introduce a welcome element of caution. Some conflicts, of course, may become so unstable that mutual deterrence will collapse and catastrophe will ensue, which is why proliferation is not to be encouraged. Nonetheless, they make clear the horrific consequences of full-scale war or even a big miscalculation and so encourage states to resolve disputes without resort to armed force.
Established nuclear powers do not need to dream up circumstances in which they might feel a need to threaten, let alone use, nuclear weapons. The aim must be to encourage these weapons to remain marginal to the everyday conduct of international affairs. If the security debate is no longer preoccupied by big wars, we should be grateful but not take it for granted. This focus on conditions that continue to rule out major war, however, is more appropriate than one on conditions in which one may threaten to break out. This leaves open the questions of the importance of a specifically British nuclear capability and “value for money” set against other national needs. It argues, though, for care with the claim that we no longer need to think about nuclear deterrence because we no longer worry about major war.
Sir Lawrence Freedman is professor of war studies and vice principal (research) at King’s College London
quarta-feira, novembro 29, 2006
161) O salazarismo: uma ditadura sui-generis
Tese apresentada em Paris:
Vingtcinquante@cines.fr , Liste de diffusion en Histoire Politique
SOUTENANCE DE THESE
M. Jose de Jesus DA COSTA soutiendra sa thèse de Doctorat (Université de Paris IV Sorbonne) sur le sujet suivant :
Les discours politiques de Salazar (1928-1936) : de l’équilibre des comptes à la conversion des âmes
Vendredi 8 décembre 2006, 14 heures
A la Maison de la Recherche, Salle D116
28, rue Serpente 75006
En présence du Jury :
Mme BESSE (Paris 4)
M. Gomez (Paris 10)
M. PAGEAUX (PARIS 3)
Mme PIWNIK (PARIS 4)
Position de thèse :
Parmi les dictatures que l’Europe a connues dans la période d’entre-deux-guerres, le salazarisme figure en place ‘honorable’ sinon par sa spécificité tout au moins par sa longévité. Contemporain du bolchevisme, du fascisme et du nazisme, le salazarisme est à la fois proche de ces régimes dictatoriaux et s’en distingue par certains traits spécifiques. Ceux-ci sont souvent à l’origine de débats taxinomiques interminables et parfois stériles tant il est vrai que les contextes dans lesquels toutes ces dictatures se sont développées présentent des différences notables entre eux. Bien qu’un certain nombre de causes soient concomitantes dans l’émergence des dictatures en Europe, elles n’ont pas produit des réponses identiques partout et bien des pays européens n’ont pas succombé aux sirènes dictatoriales.
Le salazarisme, terme imprécis pour désigner la dictature qui a sévi au Portugal durant presque cinquante années du XXe siècle, comprend différentes étapes et des développements assez disparates. Après sa constitutionnalisation en 1933, le régime salazariste connaîtra bien des difficultés, à commencer par la Guerre Civile espagnole, mais aussi la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, la période de la guerre froide et, dans les années 1950-1960, les revendications d’indépendance et les guerres de libération des colonies portugaises. Malgré ces changements importants, le régime salazariste saura s’adapter aux nouvelles réalités et survivre même à son mentor principal jusqu’en 1974. Comment expliquer cette longévité ?
L’identité revendiquée par le salazarisme, qui l’éloigne tant des totalitarismes de gauche que de ceux de droite, est pour Salazar la marque d’un régime sui generis, c’est-à-dire éminemment national. Salazar, dans cette lignée, condamnera dans ses discours la déification de l’État et du Parti dans les régimes fascistes et trouvera le paganisme nazi inconciliable avec la morale chrétienne et le respect dû à la personne humaine. Formé au sein de l’Église et nourri par les principes idéologiques de la pensée européenne contre-révolutionnaire et par le catholicisme social des encycliques, Salazar se soucie, dès ses premiers articles dans la presse régionale, de la formation et de l’instruction des Portugais. Réformateur plus que révolutionnaire, il ne croit guère aux changements de gouvernement sans une profonde régénération intérieure de l’individu. Ce qui demeure de cet ensemble idéologique est la conviction qu’une vraie réforme politique du pays ne pourra avoir lieu en dehors de la morale religieuse et des enseignements de l’Église.
Les premiers discours officiels du nouveau ministre des Finances placent la période qu’il inaugure sous le signe du sacrifice d’une génération appelée à s’immoler sur l’autel d’une Patrie qui a retrouvé, après le coup d’État militaire de 1926, le fil perdu de son histoire ancienne, de ses héros légendaires, de ses saints et de sa mission divine, œcuménique et évangélisatrice. Son action politique, considérée comme ‘l’ascension douloureuse d’un calvaire’, était pour ce catholique convaincu un temps de régénération à l’issue duquel les Portugais, touchés par la grâce divine, devraient finalement réintégrer la ‘maison du Père’ dont ils s’étaient éloignés depuis le libéralisme de 1820. Cette ‘cure’ ou cet « aportuguesamento » (‘portuguisation’) des individus et des institutions se traduira par des exigences d’amour envers tout ce qui était portugais, un nationalisme quelque peu irréel lorsqu’on considère la traditionnelle dépendance économique du pays vis-à-vis de l’extérieur. Cette ‘thérapie’ est très proche du concept chrétien de conversion, c’est-à-dire le passage d’une vie de péché à une vie de grâce, l’abandon de l’état de perdition au profit d’une nouvelle vie créée et gouvernée par l’Esprit de Dieu. Le message véhiculé par les discours de Salazar ne fait que répéter inlassablement la nécessité pour les Portugais de réintégrer le nouveau royaume (la nation chrétienne et l’État nouveau) après une période d’exil (le parlementarisme), un message qui renvoie incontestablement à la parabole de l’Enfant prodigue, texte central du Nouveau Testament sur la conversion. La période sur laquelle nous travaillons, les années 1928-1936, n’est pas un choix arbitraire. Elle correspond à l’âge d’or de la biographie politique de Salazar qui coïncide avec son entrée aux Finances et qui s’achève en 1936, année où Salazar et l’Europe abordent une nouvelle époque.
Quatre grandes parties structurent notre travail :
1 - La première partie analyse l’environnement dans lequel la solution dictatoriale s’est imposée au Portugal. La participation du pays au premier conflit mondial, les crises politiques successives, l’inflation, etc., constituent la toile de fond où va se développer un discours virulent contre le régime parlementaire. Ce discours contre le régime des partis n’est pas nouveau mais, dans la conjoncture de l’époque, il prépare le terrain à l’émergence d’une réponse dictatoriale à la crise. En outre, en réduisant les problèmes économiques à la seule question de l’équilibre budgétaire, ce discours sur la crise restreint définitivement la discussion sur l’avenir du pays au seul secteur des Finances et, dans ces circonstances, l’arrivée de Salazar au ministère des Finances, en avril 1928, est considérée comme une réponse adéquate à la crise.
Le rétablissement de l’équilibre budgétaire rapidement entrepris par Salazar dans ce pays traditionnellement déficitaire est perçu comme un miracle, et la divinisation du ministre peut ainsi commencer. Entamée sous le signe du sacrifice, la régénération financière entreprise par Salazar est conçue comme une vaste ‘campagne de rachat’, c’est-à-dire une période d’expiation nécessaire à la réintégration du pays dans le fil interrompu de son histoire, après les déboires du libéralisme et de la République parlementaire.
Désormais, cette république christianisée en laquelle le pays s’est transformé peut fédérer autour d’une seule ecclesia tous les Portugais de bonne volonté. Fils de la même ‘église’ (le parti de l’Union nationale) réunis autour d’une même liturgie (l’évangile de l’État nouveau) le pays retrouve l’équilibre. Cette vaste manipulation des esprits est la première étape de la mise en œuvre de l’appareil étatique salazariste et de ses principales organisations d’encadrement des populations.
2 - La deuxième partie de notre travail explore les fondements des idées de Salazar telles qu’elles sont présentées dans ses discours officiels. Une rapide incursion dans la biographie de Salazar nous permet d’observer ses rapports avec la Ire République, sa formation universitaire et sa participation à des organisations catholiques tout en dégageant les traits principaux de son idéologie avant sa nomination aux Finances.
Dans un deuxième temps, nous présentons les idées principales de Salazar telles qu’elles apparaissent dans ses discours officiels. Cela nous permet de dégager la structure de ses allocutions, les arguments utilisés, d’analyser sa conception de la rhétorique, ainsi que le travail de la propagande autour de la ‘voix’ du chef.
3 - La troisième partie explore deux composantes du discours rhétorique : l’ethos et le pathos. En nous appuyant sur les images que Salazar donne de lui-même (son ethos) nous démontrons comment celles-ci répondent parfaitement aux attentes de l’auditoire ou plus exactement aux attentes que la propagande a su créer au sein de la population. L’ethos de l’homme du silence, de l’homme pauvre et modeste, du rural, etc., fait partie d’une construction fictive tendant à fabriquer l’image du héros positif et entraînant des adhésions inconditionnelles au chef de la révolution nationale. Néanmoins, et en dépit de la censure et de la répression, ces images positives sont souvent mises en branle par les oppositions, phénomène qu’on étudie aussi dans l’innombrable correspondance anonyme reçue par Salazar. En étudiant les images de l’autre dans les discours de Salazar, nous constatons que pour renforcer l’identité des points de vue entre l’orateur et l’auditoire celui-ci recourt à une vision manichéenne du monde afin de créer des irréductibilités et donc de simplifier la réalité. Cette démarche passionnelle conduit à des sentiments de crainte, d’espoir et de désespoir et donc à renforcer les liens (fictifs) entre l’orateur et l’auditoire.
4 - Enfin, la quatrième partie approche d’une façon globale les traditions et les luttes entre le pouvoir religieux et le pouvoir temporel et les relations ambiguës entre l’Église et le pouvoir politique dans le contexte de la rechristianisation du pays. Le discours de Salazar en se situant entre la raison et la foi, entre les désordres du monde et le dessein de Dieu, entre le politique et le religieux devient un formidable outil de conviction, et dans la perspective de la conversion, un instrument de salut.
Vingtcinquante@cines.fr , Liste de diffusion en Histoire Politique
SOUTENANCE DE THESE
M. Jose de Jesus DA COSTA soutiendra sa thèse de Doctorat (Université de Paris IV Sorbonne) sur le sujet suivant :
Les discours politiques de Salazar (1928-1936) : de l’équilibre des comptes à la conversion des âmes
Vendredi 8 décembre 2006, 14 heures
A la Maison de la Recherche, Salle D116
28, rue Serpente 75006
En présence du Jury :
Mme BESSE (Paris 4)
M. Gomez (Paris 10)
M. PAGEAUX (PARIS 3)
Mme PIWNIK (PARIS 4)
Position de thèse :
Parmi les dictatures que l’Europe a connues dans la période d’entre-deux-guerres, le salazarisme figure en place ‘honorable’ sinon par sa spécificité tout au moins par sa longévité. Contemporain du bolchevisme, du fascisme et du nazisme, le salazarisme est à la fois proche de ces régimes dictatoriaux et s’en distingue par certains traits spécifiques. Ceux-ci sont souvent à l’origine de débats taxinomiques interminables et parfois stériles tant il est vrai que les contextes dans lesquels toutes ces dictatures se sont développées présentent des différences notables entre eux. Bien qu’un certain nombre de causes soient concomitantes dans l’émergence des dictatures en Europe, elles n’ont pas produit des réponses identiques partout et bien des pays européens n’ont pas succombé aux sirènes dictatoriales.
Le salazarisme, terme imprécis pour désigner la dictature qui a sévi au Portugal durant presque cinquante années du XXe siècle, comprend différentes étapes et des développements assez disparates. Après sa constitutionnalisation en 1933, le régime salazariste connaîtra bien des difficultés, à commencer par la Guerre Civile espagnole, mais aussi la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, la période de la guerre froide et, dans les années 1950-1960, les revendications d’indépendance et les guerres de libération des colonies portugaises. Malgré ces changements importants, le régime salazariste saura s’adapter aux nouvelles réalités et survivre même à son mentor principal jusqu’en 1974. Comment expliquer cette longévité ?
L’identité revendiquée par le salazarisme, qui l’éloigne tant des totalitarismes de gauche que de ceux de droite, est pour Salazar la marque d’un régime sui generis, c’est-à-dire éminemment national. Salazar, dans cette lignée, condamnera dans ses discours la déification de l’État et du Parti dans les régimes fascistes et trouvera le paganisme nazi inconciliable avec la morale chrétienne et le respect dû à la personne humaine. Formé au sein de l’Église et nourri par les principes idéologiques de la pensée européenne contre-révolutionnaire et par le catholicisme social des encycliques, Salazar se soucie, dès ses premiers articles dans la presse régionale, de la formation et de l’instruction des Portugais. Réformateur plus que révolutionnaire, il ne croit guère aux changements de gouvernement sans une profonde régénération intérieure de l’individu. Ce qui demeure de cet ensemble idéologique est la conviction qu’une vraie réforme politique du pays ne pourra avoir lieu en dehors de la morale religieuse et des enseignements de l’Église.
Les premiers discours officiels du nouveau ministre des Finances placent la période qu’il inaugure sous le signe du sacrifice d’une génération appelée à s’immoler sur l’autel d’une Patrie qui a retrouvé, après le coup d’État militaire de 1926, le fil perdu de son histoire ancienne, de ses héros légendaires, de ses saints et de sa mission divine, œcuménique et évangélisatrice. Son action politique, considérée comme ‘l’ascension douloureuse d’un calvaire’, était pour ce catholique convaincu un temps de régénération à l’issue duquel les Portugais, touchés par la grâce divine, devraient finalement réintégrer la ‘maison du Père’ dont ils s’étaient éloignés depuis le libéralisme de 1820. Cette ‘cure’ ou cet « aportuguesamento » (‘portuguisation’) des individus et des institutions se traduira par des exigences d’amour envers tout ce qui était portugais, un nationalisme quelque peu irréel lorsqu’on considère la traditionnelle dépendance économique du pays vis-à-vis de l’extérieur. Cette ‘thérapie’ est très proche du concept chrétien de conversion, c’est-à-dire le passage d’une vie de péché à une vie de grâce, l’abandon de l’état de perdition au profit d’une nouvelle vie créée et gouvernée par l’Esprit de Dieu. Le message véhiculé par les discours de Salazar ne fait que répéter inlassablement la nécessité pour les Portugais de réintégrer le nouveau royaume (la nation chrétienne et l’État nouveau) après une période d’exil (le parlementarisme), un message qui renvoie incontestablement à la parabole de l’Enfant prodigue, texte central du Nouveau Testament sur la conversion. La période sur laquelle nous travaillons, les années 1928-1936, n’est pas un choix arbitraire. Elle correspond à l’âge d’or de la biographie politique de Salazar qui coïncide avec son entrée aux Finances et qui s’achève en 1936, année où Salazar et l’Europe abordent une nouvelle époque.
Quatre grandes parties structurent notre travail :
1 - La première partie analyse l’environnement dans lequel la solution dictatoriale s’est imposée au Portugal. La participation du pays au premier conflit mondial, les crises politiques successives, l’inflation, etc., constituent la toile de fond où va se développer un discours virulent contre le régime parlementaire. Ce discours contre le régime des partis n’est pas nouveau mais, dans la conjoncture de l’époque, il prépare le terrain à l’émergence d’une réponse dictatoriale à la crise. En outre, en réduisant les problèmes économiques à la seule question de l’équilibre budgétaire, ce discours sur la crise restreint définitivement la discussion sur l’avenir du pays au seul secteur des Finances et, dans ces circonstances, l’arrivée de Salazar au ministère des Finances, en avril 1928, est considérée comme une réponse adéquate à la crise.
Le rétablissement de l’équilibre budgétaire rapidement entrepris par Salazar dans ce pays traditionnellement déficitaire est perçu comme un miracle, et la divinisation du ministre peut ainsi commencer. Entamée sous le signe du sacrifice, la régénération financière entreprise par Salazar est conçue comme une vaste ‘campagne de rachat’, c’est-à-dire une période d’expiation nécessaire à la réintégration du pays dans le fil interrompu de son histoire, après les déboires du libéralisme et de la République parlementaire.
Désormais, cette république christianisée en laquelle le pays s’est transformé peut fédérer autour d’une seule ecclesia tous les Portugais de bonne volonté. Fils de la même ‘église’ (le parti de l’Union nationale) réunis autour d’une même liturgie (l’évangile de l’État nouveau) le pays retrouve l’équilibre. Cette vaste manipulation des esprits est la première étape de la mise en œuvre de l’appareil étatique salazariste et de ses principales organisations d’encadrement des populations.
2 - La deuxième partie de notre travail explore les fondements des idées de Salazar telles qu’elles sont présentées dans ses discours officiels. Une rapide incursion dans la biographie de Salazar nous permet d’observer ses rapports avec la Ire République, sa formation universitaire et sa participation à des organisations catholiques tout en dégageant les traits principaux de son idéologie avant sa nomination aux Finances.
Dans un deuxième temps, nous présentons les idées principales de Salazar telles qu’elles apparaissent dans ses discours officiels. Cela nous permet de dégager la structure de ses allocutions, les arguments utilisés, d’analyser sa conception de la rhétorique, ainsi que le travail de la propagande autour de la ‘voix’ du chef.
3 - La troisième partie explore deux composantes du discours rhétorique : l’ethos et le pathos. En nous appuyant sur les images que Salazar donne de lui-même (son ethos) nous démontrons comment celles-ci répondent parfaitement aux attentes de l’auditoire ou plus exactement aux attentes que la propagande a su créer au sein de la population. L’ethos de l’homme du silence, de l’homme pauvre et modeste, du rural, etc., fait partie d’une construction fictive tendant à fabriquer l’image du héros positif et entraînant des adhésions inconditionnelles au chef de la révolution nationale. Néanmoins, et en dépit de la censure et de la répression, ces images positives sont souvent mises en branle par les oppositions, phénomène qu’on étudie aussi dans l’innombrable correspondance anonyme reçue par Salazar. En étudiant les images de l’autre dans les discours de Salazar, nous constatons que pour renforcer l’identité des points de vue entre l’orateur et l’auditoire celui-ci recourt à une vision manichéenne du monde afin de créer des irréductibilités et donc de simplifier la réalité. Cette démarche passionnelle conduit à des sentiments de crainte, d’espoir et de désespoir et donc à renforcer les liens (fictifs) entre l’orateur et l’auditoire.
4 - Enfin, la quatrième partie approche d’une façon globale les traditions et les luttes entre le pouvoir religieux et le pouvoir temporel et les relations ambiguës entre l’Église et le pouvoir politique dans le contexte de la rechristianisation du pays. Le discours de Salazar en se situant entre la raison et la foi, entre les désordres du monde et le dessein de Dieu, entre le politique et le religieux devient un formidable outil de conviction, et dans la perspective de la conversion, un instrument de salut.
160) Debate sobre aquecimento global: economistas esquentam os motores...
Nordhaus vs. Stern
posted by Jerry Taylor
When the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change was released a few weeks back, I got a bevy of calls from reporters asking what I thought of it. Of course, it’s hard to say anything intelligent about a 700+ page report that was released only hours earlier, so all I could do was quickly peruse the executive summary, speed-glance through the most pertinent sounding chapters, and opine like the wind. While I thought I did a reasonable enough job summarizing the main issues at hand given the circumstances, the experience demonstrates a fundamental problem with journalism that is unlikely to ever go away. To whit, reporters demand an immediate reaction when some new study or paper comes out, and the news cycle doesn’t last long enough to allow for particularly informed and/or careful review of many of these said studies or papers. By the time that informed and careful response is ready, reporters have moved on to something else. The deck is stacked in favor of the authors, who seldom have to defend against anything but superficial or relatively poorly-informed criticism in the popular press.
One of the things I was most interested in at the time was what economists who specialized in the economics of climate change had to say about the Stern Review. The leading academic on this subject is William Nordhaus, an economist at Yale (another is Prof. Robert Mendelsohn at the same university. Prof. Mendelsohn’s response to the Stern Review will be published in the next issue of Cato’s Regulation magazine). When I emailed Prof. Nordhaus about the Stern Review, I got a rather short and vague reply. Nicholas Stern is a good economist, Prof. Nordhaus said, and the report looked like a serious undertaking; the right questions were asked and the answers provided looked interesting. Beyond that, little else. Reporters I talked to told me this is what he had sent them as well. Apparently, Nordhaus was not ready to jump into the discussion yet.
Reporters moved on, but Nordhaus did not. Over the next several weeks, he apparently went to work on the document and by last week he was ready to offer up some thoughts. Despite the fact that this highly credentialed economist finds that ”it is impossible for mortals outside the group that did the modeling to understand the detailed results of the Review,” his analysis is illuminating. While no reporter is likely to write about Nordhaus’ take on Stern now, it is worth your time if you wonder whether an economic disaster of epic proportions really awaits us lest we do something drastic to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The answer; probably not.
The gist of the matter is this: Academic economists who specialize in climate change generally agree that warming - if the “consensus” of scientific opinion as reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is correct - will only reduce global GDP by 0-3% per year and that those costs won’t be evident until well into the future. The Stern Review, however, reports that losses may total as much as 20% of global GDP if warming is left unaddressed. Why the disagreement?
While there are a number of issues in play, the main thing explaining the differing calculations is the extent to which future warming is discounted into the present. Most economist use discount rates ranging from 3-5% when trying to put a price tag on future damages. Stern argues that this is ethically indefensible - losses tomorrow, or even 200 years from tomorrow, are just as worth worrying about as losses today. If you apply a 0.1% discount rate (Stern’s figure) rather than, say, a 5% discount rate (my suggestion, which matches the return on Treasury bills - or, put another way, the figure people apply themselves when considering the value of money today versus the value of money tomorrow) or a 3% discount rate (Nordhaus’s figure, although he is happy to confess that other figures are perfectly defensible), then you’re going to get a huge price tag for global warming. Apply higher discount rates, and the price tag deflates to such an extent that it’s impossible to justify spending anything near what Stern wants us to spend to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Is Stern right to argue that we are morally required to treat losses to future generations in exactly the same manner that we treat losses to present generations? Not necessarily:
Quite another ethical stance would be to hold that each generation should leave at least as much total societal capital (tangible, natural, human, and technological) as it inherited. This would admit a wide array of social discount rates. A third alternative would be a Rawlsian perspective that societies should maximize the economic well-being of the poorest generation. Under this policy, current consumption would increase sharply to reflect likely future improvements in productivity. Yet a fourth perspective would be a precautionary (minimax) principle in which societies maximize the minimum consumption along the riskiest path; this might involve stockpiling vaccines, grain, oil, and water in contemplation of possible plagues and famines. Without choosing among these positions, it should be clear that alternative perspectives are possible.
Note that if you are an admirer of political philosopher John Rawls - as most of the Left most definitely is - then you should probably embrace the use of a high discount rate.
Anyway, what if we use Stern’s discount rate regardless? Nordhaus thinks it leads to palpably ridiculous policy prescriptions:
Suppose that scientists discover that a wrinkle in the climatic system will cause damages equal to 0.01 percent of [global] output starting in 2200 and continuing at that rate thereafter. How large a one-time investment would be justified today to remove the wrinkle starting after two centuries? The answer is that a payment of 15 percent of [the] world’s consumption today (approximately $7 trillion) would pass the [Stern] Review’s cost-benefit test. This seems completely absurd.
Still happy with a near-zero discount rate? What if we applied that philosophy in other policy arenas where the same issue arises - like, say, foreign policy? Nordhaus echoes an argument I made myself several years ago:
While this feature of low discounting might appear benign in climate-change policy, we could imagine other areas where the implications could themselves be dangerous. Imagine the preventative war strategies that might be devised with low social discount rates. Countries might start wars today because of the possibility of nuclear proliferation a century ahead; or because of a potential adverse shift in the balance of power two centuries ahead; or because of speculative futuristic technologies three centuries ahead. It is not clear how long the globe could long survive the calculations and machinations of zero-discount rate military powers.
Nordhaus’s commentary on Stern is only 21 pages double-spaced, and there’s more intellectual goodies therein. Read it. Learn it. Live it.
posted by Jerry Taylor on 11.28.06 @ 6:03 pm Email
Filed Under: General, Environment & Climate, Government & Politics
posted by Jerry Taylor
When the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change was released a few weeks back, I got a bevy of calls from reporters asking what I thought of it. Of course, it’s hard to say anything intelligent about a 700+ page report that was released only hours earlier, so all I could do was quickly peruse the executive summary, speed-glance through the most pertinent sounding chapters, and opine like the wind. While I thought I did a reasonable enough job summarizing the main issues at hand given the circumstances, the experience demonstrates a fundamental problem with journalism that is unlikely to ever go away. To whit, reporters demand an immediate reaction when some new study or paper comes out, and the news cycle doesn’t last long enough to allow for particularly informed and/or careful review of many of these said studies or papers. By the time that informed and careful response is ready, reporters have moved on to something else. The deck is stacked in favor of the authors, who seldom have to defend against anything but superficial or relatively poorly-informed criticism in the popular press.
One of the things I was most interested in at the time was what economists who specialized in the economics of climate change had to say about the Stern Review. The leading academic on this subject is William Nordhaus, an economist at Yale (another is Prof. Robert Mendelsohn at the same university. Prof. Mendelsohn’s response to the Stern Review will be published in the next issue of Cato’s Regulation magazine). When I emailed Prof. Nordhaus about the Stern Review, I got a rather short and vague reply. Nicholas Stern is a good economist, Prof. Nordhaus said, and the report looked like a serious undertaking; the right questions were asked and the answers provided looked interesting. Beyond that, little else. Reporters I talked to told me this is what he had sent them as well. Apparently, Nordhaus was not ready to jump into the discussion yet.
Reporters moved on, but Nordhaus did not. Over the next several weeks, he apparently went to work on the document and by last week he was ready to offer up some thoughts. Despite the fact that this highly credentialed economist finds that ”it is impossible for mortals outside the group that did the modeling to understand the detailed results of the Review,” his analysis is illuminating. While no reporter is likely to write about Nordhaus’ take on Stern now, it is worth your time if you wonder whether an economic disaster of epic proportions really awaits us lest we do something drastic to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The answer; probably not.
The gist of the matter is this: Academic economists who specialize in climate change generally agree that warming - if the “consensus” of scientific opinion as reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is correct - will only reduce global GDP by 0-3% per year and that those costs won’t be evident until well into the future. The Stern Review, however, reports that losses may total as much as 20% of global GDP if warming is left unaddressed. Why the disagreement?
While there are a number of issues in play, the main thing explaining the differing calculations is the extent to which future warming is discounted into the present. Most economist use discount rates ranging from 3-5% when trying to put a price tag on future damages. Stern argues that this is ethically indefensible - losses tomorrow, or even 200 years from tomorrow, are just as worth worrying about as losses today. If you apply a 0.1% discount rate (Stern’s figure) rather than, say, a 5% discount rate (my suggestion, which matches the return on Treasury bills - or, put another way, the figure people apply themselves when considering the value of money today versus the value of money tomorrow) or a 3% discount rate (Nordhaus’s figure, although he is happy to confess that other figures are perfectly defensible), then you’re going to get a huge price tag for global warming. Apply higher discount rates, and the price tag deflates to such an extent that it’s impossible to justify spending anything near what Stern wants us to spend to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Is Stern right to argue that we are morally required to treat losses to future generations in exactly the same manner that we treat losses to present generations? Not necessarily:
Quite another ethical stance would be to hold that each generation should leave at least as much total societal capital (tangible, natural, human, and technological) as it inherited. This would admit a wide array of social discount rates. A third alternative would be a Rawlsian perspective that societies should maximize the economic well-being of the poorest generation. Under this policy, current consumption would increase sharply to reflect likely future improvements in productivity. Yet a fourth perspective would be a precautionary (minimax) principle in which societies maximize the minimum consumption along the riskiest path; this might involve stockpiling vaccines, grain, oil, and water in contemplation of possible plagues and famines. Without choosing among these positions, it should be clear that alternative perspectives are possible.
Note that if you are an admirer of political philosopher John Rawls - as most of the Left most definitely is - then you should probably embrace the use of a high discount rate.
Anyway, what if we use Stern’s discount rate regardless? Nordhaus thinks it leads to palpably ridiculous policy prescriptions:
Suppose that scientists discover that a wrinkle in the climatic system will cause damages equal to 0.01 percent of [global] output starting in 2200 and continuing at that rate thereafter. How large a one-time investment would be justified today to remove the wrinkle starting after two centuries? The answer is that a payment of 15 percent of [the] world’s consumption today (approximately $7 trillion) would pass the [Stern] Review’s cost-benefit test. This seems completely absurd.
Still happy with a near-zero discount rate? What if we applied that philosophy in other policy arenas where the same issue arises - like, say, foreign policy? Nordhaus echoes an argument I made myself several years ago:
While this feature of low discounting might appear benign in climate-change policy, we could imagine other areas where the implications could themselves be dangerous. Imagine the preventative war strategies that might be devised with low social discount rates. Countries might start wars today because of the possibility of nuclear proliferation a century ahead; or because of a potential adverse shift in the balance of power two centuries ahead; or because of speculative futuristic technologies three centuries ahead. It is not clear how long the globe could long survive the calculations and machinations of zero-discount rate military powers.
Nordhaus’s commentary on Stern is only 21 pages double-spaced, and there’s more intellectual goodies therein. Read it. Learn it. Live it.
posted by Jerry Taylor on 11.28.06 @ 6:03 pm Email
Filed Under: General, Environment & Climate, Government & Politics
segunda-feira, novembro 27, 2006
159) Carta de Milton Friedman ao ditador Pinochet
Aquí está el texto completo de la carta que le envió Milton Friedman al Presidente Pinochet el 21 de Abril de 1975, despues de una visita de una semana a Chile. Ella aparece, por cierto en inglés, en el libro de memorias de Milton y Rose Friedman titulado "Two Lucky People" (The University of Chicago Press, 1998).
21 de Abril, 1975.
Personal Excmo. Sr. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte Presidente Edificio Diego Portales Santiago, Chile
Estimado señor Presidente:
Durante la visita que le hiciéramos el viernes 21 de Marzo, realizada con el objeto de discutir la situación económica de Chile, Usted me pidió que le transmitiera mi opinión acerca de la situación y polític! as económicas chilenas luego de completar mi estancia en su país. Esta carta responde a tal requerimiento.
Permítame primero decirle cuán agradecidos estamos mi esposa y yo de la cálida hospitalidad que nos brindaran tantos chilenos durante nuestra breve visita; nos hicieron sentir como si realmente estuviéramos en casa. Todos los chilenos que conocimos estaban muy conscientes de la seriedad de los problemas que su país enfrenta, dándose cuenta de que el futuro inmediato iba a ser muy difícil. Sin embargo, todos mostraban una firme determinación en aras de superar dichas dificultades y una especial dedicación en el trabajo por un futuro más próspero.
El problema económico fundamental de Chile tiene claramente dos aristas: la inflación y la promoción de una saludable economía social de mercado. Ambos problemas están relacionados: cuánto más efectivamente se fortalezca el sistema de libre mercado, menores serán los costos transicionales de terminar con la inflación. Sin embargo, y pese a estar relacionados, se trata de dos problemas diferentes: el fortalecimiento del libre mercado no culminará con la inflación per se, como tampoco terminar con la inflación derivará automáticamente en un vigoroso e innovador sistema de libre mercado.
La causa de la inflación en Chile es muy clara: el gasto público corresponde, aproximadamente, a un 40% del ingreso nacional. Cerca de un cuarto de este gasto no deriva de impuestos explícitos y, por lo tanto, debe ser financiado emitiendo una mayor cantidad de dinero; en otras palabras, a través del impuesto oculto de la inflación. El impuesto inflación, utilizado para levantar una cantidad de dinero equivalente al 10% del ingreso nacional es, por ende, extremadamente gravoso - una tasa impositiva de 300% a 400% (es decir, la tasa de inflación)- impuesta sobre una estrecha base de cálculo- 3% a 4% del ingreso nacional (es decir, el valor de la cantidad de dinero que circula en Chile como efectivo y depósitos en cuentas corrientes).
Este impuesto inflación genera un enorme daño al inducir a las personas a dedicar un gran esfuerzo por limitar su posesión de dinero en efectivo. Esa es la razón por la cual la base es tan estrecha. En la mayoría de los países, desarrollados y subdesarrollados, la cantidad de dinero es más cercana al 30% del ingreso nacional que al 3% o 4% de éste. Desde la perspectiva del gasto total, que es un múltiplo del ingreso, el dinero en Chile alcanza sólo a algo así como 3 días de gasto, lo que fuerza a realizar nada más que operaciones de subsistencia en el rubro comercio, además de estrangular al mercado de capitales.
Existe solo una manera de terminar con la inflación: reducir drásticamente la tasa de incremento en la cantidad de dinero. En la situación de Chile, el único modo para lograr la disminución de la tasa de incremento en la cantidad de dinero es reducir el déficit fiscal. Por principio, el déficit fiscal puede ser reducido disminuyendo el gasto público, aumentando los impuestos o endeudándose dentro o fuera del país. Exceptuando el endeudamiento externo, los otros tres métodos tendrían los mismos efectos transitorios en el empleo, aunque afectando a diferentes personas -disminuir el gasto público afectaría inicialmente a los empleados públicos, aumentar los impuestos afectaría inicialmente a las personas empleadas por quienes pagan impuestos, y endeudarse afectaría inicialmente a las personas empleadas por los titulares de los créditos o por la las personas que, de ot! ro modo, hubieran conseguido esos fondos prestados.
En la práctica, disminuir el gasto público es, por lejos, la manera más conveniente para reducir el déficit fiscal ya que, simultáneamente, contribuye al fortalecimiento del sector privado y, por ende, a sentar las bases de un saludable crecimiento económico.
La disminución del déficit fiscal es requisito indispensable para terminar con la inflación. Un problema menos ! claro es cuán rápidamente debe terminarse con el la. Para un país como Estados Unidos, en el cual la inflación es de alrededor del 10%, yo aconsejo una política gradual de eliminación en dos o tres años. Pero para Chile, en que la inflación se mueve entre el 10% y 20% mensual, creo que graduar su eliminación no es viable; conllevaría una tan gravosa operación por un periodo de tiempo tan largo, que temo la paciencia no acompañaría el esfuerzo.
No existe ninguna manera de eliminar la inflación que no involucre un periodo temporal de transición de severa dificultad, incluyendo desempleo. Sin embargo, y desafortunadamente, Chile enfrenta una elección entre dos males, un breve periodo de alto desempleo o u! n largo periodo de alto desempleo, aunque sutilmente inferior al primero. En mi opinión, las experiencias de Alemania y Japón luego de la II Guerra Mundial, de Brasil más recientemente, del reajuste de postguerra en Estados Unidos, cuando el gasto público fue reducido drástica y rápidamente, argumentan en pro de un tratamiento de shock. Todas estas experiencias sugieren que este periodo de severas dificultades transicionales sea breve (medible en meses) para que así la subsecuente recuperación sea rápida.
Para mitigar los costos de la transición y facilitar la recuperación, creo que las medidas fiscales y monetarias debieran ser parte de un paquete que incluya medidas! que eliminen los obstáculos a la empresa privada y q ue alivien la aguda angustia.
Para acotar, haré un bosquejo de los contenidos de un paquete de propuestas específicas. Mi conocimiento de Chile es muy limitado como para permitirme ser tanto preciso como exhaustivo, de modo que estas medidas deben ser consideradas más bien como ilustrativas.
Si este enfoque de shock fuera adoptado, creo que debiera ser anunciado pública, muy detalladamente y, además, entrar en vigor en una fecha muy cercana! a dicho anuncio. Cuánto mejor informado se encuentre el público, más contribuirán sus reacciones al ajuste. A continuación propongo una muestra de las medidas que debieran ser tomadas:
1.- Una reforma monetaria que reemplace el escudo por el peso, con 1 peso = 10.000 escudos (o quizás 1.000 escudos). Por sí misma, esta medida no produciría ningún efecto sustancial, pero cumpliría una valiosa función sicológica.
2.- Un compromiso del gobierno de reducir su gas to en 25% dentro de seis meses; reducción que debiera tomar la forma de una disminución transversal del presupuesto de cada repartición en 25%, con los relativos a personal a tomarse cuán pronto como sea posible. Sin embargo, las reducciones de gasto debieran ser escalonadas en base a un periodo de seis meses para permitir el pago de generosas indemnizaciones. (Cualquier intento de ser selectivo o parcial tiene la probabilidad de fracasar debido a las posibles manipulaciones de cada repartición por lograr que la reducción presupuestaria afecte a otra de ellas. Es preferible hacer primero una reducción transversal, para luego reasignar el total ya reducido).
3.- Un crédito nacional de! estabilización otorgado por el público para complementar la reducción del gasto durante los seis primeros meses para permitir así una más rápida reducción en la emisión de dinero que en el gasto. Las condiciones debieran incluir un reajuste por inflación para lograr la confianza del público en la determinación del gobierno de terminar con la inflación.
4.- Si fuera posible, un crédito externo de estabilización para el mismo propósito.
5.- Un cate górico compromiso del gobierno de que después de seis meses no financiará más gasto alguno a través de la emisión de dinero. (Así como la recuperación económica se vaya dando, la cantidad de dinero deseable en términos reales, esto es, la cantidad consistente con precios estables, aumentará. Sin embargo, este incremento debiera servir como base para la expansión de un mercado de capitales privado en vez de utilizarse para financiar gasto público).
6.- Continuar con vuestra política actual de un tipo de cambio diseñado para aproximarse a un tipo de cambio de libre mercado.
7.- La eliminación de la mayor cantidad posible de obstáculos que, hoy por hoy, entorpecen el desarrollo del libre mercado. Por ejemplo, suspender, en el caso de las personas que van a emplearse, la ley actual que impide el despido de los trabajadores. En la actualidad, esta ley causa desempleo. También, eliminar los obstáculos a la creación de nuevas instituciones financieras. Asimismo, eliminar la mayor cantidad posible de controles sobre los precios y salarios. El control de precios y salarios no sirve como medida para eliminar la inflación; por el contrario, es una de las peores partes de la enfermedad. (Eliminar obstáculos, pero no sustituir subsidios. La empresa privada tendrá la facultad de gozar de las recompensas del éxito sólo si tambi�=! A9n arriesga soportar los costos del fracaso. Todo hombre de negocios cree en la libre empresa para todos, pero busca también favores especiales para sí mismo. Ningún obstáculo, ningún subsidio; esa debiera ser la regla).
8.- Tome las providencias necesarias para aliviar cualquier caso de real dificultad y severa angustia que se de entre las clases más pobres. Tome en cuenta que las medidas tomadas no producirán, por sí mismas, daño en estos grupos. El despido de empleados públicos no reducirá la producción, sino que simplemente eliminará gasto- sus despidos no significarán la producción de un pan o un par de zapatos menos. Pero indirectamente, algunas de las clases menos privilegiadas serán afectadas! y, séanlo o no, el programa de medidas será señalado como el culpable de sus angustias. Por lo tanto, sería beneficioso tomar ciertas providencias de este tipo en dicho programa. En este aspecto, mi ignorancia de la situación y acuerdos actuales vigentes en Chile me hacen imposible ser más específico.
Un programa de shock tal como este podría eliminar la inflación en cuestión de meses. También fundaría las bases necesarias para lograr la solución de su segundo problema- la promoción de una efectiva economía social de mercado.
Este no es un problema de reciente origen, sino que surge de tendencias al socialismo que comenzaron hace 40 años y que alcanzaron su lógico, y terrible clímax, durante el régimen de Allende. Ustedes han sido extremadamente sabios en la aplicación de las muchas medidas que ya han tomado para revertir esta tendencia.
La eliminación de la inflación llevará a una rápida expansión del mercado de capitales, lo cual facilitará en gran medida la privatización de empresas y actividades que aún se encuentran en manos del Estado.
El más importante paso en este sentido es la liberalización del comercio internacional para, de este modo, proveer de una efectiva competitividad a las empresas chilenas y promover la expansión tanto de las importaciones como de las exportaciones. Lo anterior no sólo mejorará el bienestar del chileno común al permitirle adquirir todos los bienes al menor costo, sino que también disminuirá la dependencia de Chile en un sola exportación de importancia: el cobre. Quizás la mayor recompensa en esta área se obtendría a través de la liberalización de la importación de vehículos motorizados.
Estoy conciente de que su Gobierno ya ha dado pasos importantes y planea otros futuros en orden a reducir las barreras al comercio internacional y a liberalizarlo, y que, como resultado de ello, la ventaja competitiva real de Chile se refleja mejor en éste hoy que en las décadas pasadas. Este es un gran logro. También veo que en esta área existe un fuerte argumento a favor de una gradualización para entregar a los productores chilenos una oportunidad para ajustarse a las nuevas condiciones. No obstante, gradualismo no debe significar quedarse estancado. En mi opinión personal, creo que un buen consejo para Chile sería dirigirse a la liberalización del comercio a una velocidad y en una extensión mucho mayores de las que hasta ahora han sido propuestas. Un comercio totalmente libre es el objetivo final deseable, aunque no sea posible de alcanzar en el m! ás cercano futuro.
Quisiera concluir esta carta diciendo que estoy seguro que Chile tiene un gran potencial. Ha sido un pueblo capaz, letrado, creativo y lleno de energía, que tiene una larga historia y tradición de orden y paz social. Hace unos cuarenta años atrás, Chile, como muchos otros países, incluyendo el mío, se encausó en la ruta equivocada- por buenas razones y sin maldad, ya que fueron errores de hombres buenos y no malos. El mayor error, en mi opinión, fue concebir al Estado como el solucionador de todos los problemas, de creer que es posible administrar bien el dinero ajeno.
Si Chile toma hoy la senda correcta, creo que puede lograr otro milagro económico: despegar hacia un crecimiento económico sostenido que proveerá una ampliamente compartida prosperidad. Pero para aprovechar esta oportunidad, Chile deberá primero superar un muy dificultoso periodo de transición.
Sinceramente,
Milton Friedman
21 de Abril, 1975.
Personal Excmo. Sr. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte Presidente Edificio Diego Portales Santiago, Chile
Estimado señor Presidente:
Durante la visita que le hiciéramos el viernes 21 de Marzo, realizada con el objeto de discutir la situación económica de Chile, Usted me pidió que le transmitiera mi opinión acerca de la situación y polític! as económicas chilenas luego de completar mi estancia en su país. Esta carta responde a tal requerimiento.
Permítame primero decirle cuán agradecidos estamos mi esposa y yo de la cálida hospitalidad que nos brindaran tantos chilenos durante nuestra breve visita; nos hicieron sentir como si realmente estuviéramos en casa. Todos los chilenos que conocimos estaban muy conscientes de la seriedad de los problemas que su país enfrenta, dándose cuenta de que el futuro inmediato iba a ser muy difícil. Sin embargo, todos mostraban una firme determinación en aras de superar dichas dificultades y una especial dedicación en el trabajo por un futuro más próspero.
El problema económico fundamental de Chile tiene claramente dos aristas: la inflación y la promoción de una saludable economía social de mercado. Ambos problemas están relacionados: cuánto más efectivamente se fortalezca el sistema de libre mercado, menores serán los costos transicionales de terminar con la inflación. Sin embargo, y pese a estar relacionados, se trata de dos problemas diferentes: el fortalecimiento del libre mercado no culminará con la inflación per se, como tampoco terminar con la inflación derivará automáticamente en un vigoroso e innovador sistema de libre mercado.
La causa de la inflación en Chile es muy clara: el gasto público corresponde, aproximadamente, a un 40% del ingreso nacional. Cerca de un cuarto de este gasto no deriva de impuestos explícitos y, por lo tanto, debe ser financiado emitiendo una mayor cantidad de dinero; en otras palabras, a través del impuesto oculto de la inflación. El impuesto inflación, utilizado para levantar una cantidad de dinero equivalente al 10% del ingreso nacional es, por ende, extremadamente gravoso - una tasa impositiva de 300% a 400% (es decir, la tasa de inflación)- impuesta sobre una estrecha base de cálculo- 3% a 4% del ingreso nacional (es decir, el valor de la cantidad de dinero que circula en Chile como efectivo y depósitos en cuentas corrientes).
Este impuesto inflación genera un enorme daño al inducir a las personas a dedicar un gran esfuerzo por limitar su posesión de dinero en efectivo. Esa es la razón por la cual la base es tan estrecha. En la mayoría de los países, desarrollados y subdesarrollados, la cantidad de dinero es más cercana al 30% del ingreso nacional que al 3% o 4% de éste. Desde la perspectiva del gasto total, que es un múltiplo del ingreso, el dinero en Chile alcanza sólo a algo así como 3 días de gasto, lo que fuerza a realizar nada más que operaciones de subsistencia en el rubro comercio, además de estrangular al mercado de capitales.
Existe solo una manera de terminar con la inflación: reducir drásticamente la tasa de incremento en la cantidad de dinero. En la situación de Chile, el único modo para lograr la disminución de la tasa de incremento en la cantidad de dinero es reducir el déficit fiscal. Por principio, el déficit fiscal puede ser reducido disminuyendo el gasto público, aumentando los impuestos o endeudándose dentro o fuera del país. Exceptuando el endeudamiento externo, los otros tres métodos tendrían los mismos efectos transitorios en el empleo, aunque afectando a diferentes personas -disminuir el gasto público afectaría inicialmente a los empleados públicos, aumentar los impuestos afectaría inicialmente a las personas empleadas por quienes pagan impuestos, y endeudarse afectaría inicialmente a las personas empleadas por los titulares de los créditos o por la las personas que, de ot! ro modo, hubieran conseguido esos fondos prestados.
En la práctica, disminuir el gasto público es, por lejos, la manera más conveniente para reducir el déficit fiscal ya que, simultáneamente, contribuye al fortalecimiento del sector privado y, por ende, a sentar las bases de un saludable crecimiento económico.
La disminución del déficit fiscal es requisito indispensable para terminar con la inflación. Un problema menos ! claro es cuán rápidamente debe terminarse con el la. Para un país como Estados Unidos, en el cual la inflación es de alrededor del 10%, yo aconsejo una política gradual de eliminación en dos o tres años. Pero para Chile, en que la inflación se mueve entre el 10% y 20% mensual, creo que graduar su eliminación no es viable; conllevaría una tan gravosa operación por un periodo de tiempo tan largo, que temo la paciencia no acompañaría el esfuerzo.
No existe ninguna manera de eliminar la inflación que no involucre un periodo temporal de transición de severa dificultad, incluyendo desempleo. Sin embargo, y desafortunadamente, Chile enfrenta una elección entre dos males, un breve periodo de alto desempleo o u! n largo periodo de alto desempleo, aunque sutilmente inferior al primero. En mi opinión, las experiencias de Alemania y Japón luego de la II Guerra Mundial, de Brasil más recientemente, del reajuste de postguerra en Estados Unidos, cuando el gasto público fue reducido drástica y rápidamente, argumentan en pro de un tratamiento de shock. Todas estas experiencias sugieren que este periodo de severas dificultades transicionales sea breve (medible en meses) para que así la subsecuente recuperación sea rápida.
Para mitigar los costos de la transición y facilitar la recuperación, creo que las medidas fiscales y monetarias debieran ser parte de un paquete que incluya medidas! que eliminen los obstáculos a la empresa privada y q ue alivien la aguda angustia.
Para acotar, haré un bosquejo de los contenidos de un paquete de propuestas específicas. Mi conocimiento de Chile es muy limitado como para permitirme ser tanto preciso como exhaustivo, de modo que estas medidas deben ser consideradas más bien como ilustrativas.
Si este enfoque de shock fuera adoptado, creo que debiera ser anunciado pública, muy detalladamente y, además, entrar en vigor en una fecha muy cercana! a dicho anuncio. Cuánto mejor informado se encuentre el público, más contribuirán sus reacciones al ajuste. A continuación propongo una muestra de las medidas que debieran ser tomadas:
1.- Una reforma monetaria que reemplace el escudo por el peso, con 1 peso = 10.000 escudos (o quizás 1.000 escudos). Por sí misma, esta medida no produciría ningún efecto sustancial, pero cumpliría una valiosa función sicológica.
2.- Un compromiso del gobierno de reducir su gas to en 25% dentro de seis meses; reducción que debiera tomar la forma de una disminución transversal del presupuesto de cada repartición en 25%, con los relativos a personal a tomarse cuán pronto como sea posible. Sin embargo, las reducciones de gasto debieran ser escalonadas en base a un periodo de seis meses para permitir el pago de generosas indemnizaciones. (Cualquier intento de ser selectivo o parcial tiene la probabilidad de fracasar debido a las posibles manipulaciones de cada repartición por lograr que la reducción presupuestaria afecte a otra de ellas. Es preferible hacer primero una reducción transversal, para luego reasignar el total ya reducido).
3.- Un crédito nacional de! estabilización otorgado por el público para complementar la reducción del gasto durante los seis primeros meses para permitir así una más rápida reducción en la emisión de dinero que en el gasto. Las condiciones debieran incluir un reajuste por inflación para lograr la confianza del público en la determinación del gobierno de terminar con la inflación.
4.- Si fuera posible, un crédito externo de estabilización para el mismo propósito.
5.- Un cate górico compromiso del gobierno de que después de seis meses no financiará más gasto alguno a través de la emisión de dinero. (Así como la recuperación económica se vaya dando, la cantidad de dinero deseable en términos reales, esto es, la cantidad consistente con precios estables, aumentará. Sin embargo, este incremento debiera servir como base para la expansión de un mercado de capitales privado en vez de utilizarse para financiar gasto público).
6.- Continuar con vuestra política actual de un tipo de cambio diseñado para aproximarse a un tipo de cambio de libre mercado.
7.- La eliminación de la mayor cantidad posible de obstáculos que, hoy por hoy, entorpecen el desarrollo del libre mercado. Por ejemplo, suspender, en el caso de las personas que van a emplearse, la ley actual que impide el despido de los trabajadores. En la actualidad, esta ley causa desempleo. También, eliminar los obstáculos a la creación de nuevas instituciones financieras. Asimismo, eliminar la mayor cantidad posible de controles sobre los precios y salarios. El control de precios y salarios no sirve como medida para eliminar la inflación; por el contrario, es una de las peores partes de la enfermedad. (Eliminar obstáculos, pero no sustituir subsidios. La empresa privada tendrá la facultad de gozar de las recompensas del éxito sólo si tambi�=! A9n arriesga soportar los costos del fracaso. Todo hombre de negocios cree en la libre empresa para todos, pero busca también favores especiales para sí mismo. Ningún obstáculo, ningún subsidio; esa debiera ser la regla).
8.- Tome las providencias necesarias para aliviar cualquier caso de real dificultad y severa angustia que se de entre las clases más pobres. Tome en cuenta que las medidas tomadas no producirán, por sí mismas, daño en estos grupos. El despido de empleados públicos no reducirá la producción, sino que simplemente eliminará gasto- sus despidos no significarán la producción de un pan o un par de zapatos menos. Pero indirectamente, algunas de las clases menos privilegiadas serán afectadas! y, séanlo o no, el programa de medidas será señalado como el culpable de sus angustias. Por lo tanto, sería beneficioso tomar ciertas providencias de este tipo en dicho programa. En este aspecto, mi ignorancia de la situación y acuerdos actuales vigentes en Chile me hacen imposible ser más específico.
Un programa de shock tal como este podría eliminar la inflación en cuestión de meses. También fundaría las bases necesarias para lograr la solución de su segundo problema- la promoción de una efectiva economía social de mercado.
Este no es un problema de reciente origen, sino que surge de tendencias al socialismo que comenzaron hace 40 años y que alcanzaron su lógico, y terrible clímax, durante el régimen de Allende. Ustedes han sido extremadamente sabios en la aplicación de las muchas medidas que ya han tomado para revertir esta tendencia.
La eliminación de la inflación llevará a una rápida expansión del mercado de capitales, lo cual facilitará en gran medida la privatización de empresas y actividades que aún se encuentran en manos del Estado.
El más importante paso en este sentido es la liberalización del comercio internacional para, de este modo, proveer de una efectiva competitividad a las empresas chilenas y promover la expansión tanto de las importaciones como de las exportaciones. Lo anterior no sólo mejorará el bienestar del chileno común al permitirle adquirir todos los bienes al menor costo, sino que también disminuirá la dependencia de Chile en un sola exportación de importancia: el cobre. Quizás la mayor recompensa en esta área se obtendría a través de la liberalización de la importación de vehículos motorizados.
Estoy conciente de que su Gobierno ya ha dado pasos importantes y planea otros futuros en orden a reducir las barreras al comercio internacional y a liberalizarlo, y que, como resultado de ello, la ventaja competitiva real de Chile se refleja mejor en éste hoy que en las décadas pasadas. Este es un gran logro. También veo que en esta área existe un fuerte argumento a favor de una gradualización para entregar a los productores chilenos una oportunidad para ajustarse a las nuevas condiciones. No obstante, gradualismo no debe significar quedarse estancado. En mi opinión personal, creo que un buen consejo para Chile sería dirigirse a la liberalización del comercio a una velocidad y en una extensión mucho mayores de las que hasta ahora han sido propuestas. Un comercio totalmente libre es el objetivo final deseable, aunque no sea posible de alcanzar en el m! ás cercano futuro.
Quisiera concluir esta carta diciendo que estoy seguro que Chile tiene un gran potencial. Ha sido un pueblo capaz, letrado, creativo y lleno de energía, que tiene una larga historia y tradición de orden y paz social. Hace unos cuarenta años atrás, Chile, como muchos otros países, incluyendo el mío, se encausó en la ruta equivocada- por buenas razones y sin maldad, ya que fueron errores de hombres buenos y no malos. El mayor error, en mi opinión, fue concebir al Estado como el solucionador de todos los problemas, de creer que es posible administrar bien el dinero ajeno.
Si Chile toma hoy la senda correcta, creo que puede lograr otro milagro económico: despegar hacia un crecimiento económico sostenido que proveerá una ampliamente compartida prosperidad. Pero para aprovechar esta oportunidad, Chile deberá primero superar un muy dificultoso periodo de transición.
Sinceramente,
Milton Friedman
sexta-feira, outubro 13, 2006
158) Transicoes para a democracia no leste europeu: uma analise
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
www.fpri.org
E-Notes
Distributed Exclusively via Fax & Email
UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
by Adrian A. Basora
October 11, 2006
Adrian A. Basora (abasora@fpri.org) is former U.S.
ambassador to Czechoslovakia and chair of FPRI's Project on
Democratic Transitions, which aims to better understand the
patterns of postcommunist transformation and to derive
lessons that can be applied elsewhere, particularly in the
transitional countries of Europe and Eurasia that are not
yet consolidated democracies. This e-note is adapted from
his introduction to the Fall 2006 issue of Orbis, which
focuses on East European Democratization. Orbis is available
electronically to subscribers to Elsevier's Science Direct
service. It is also available through standard subscription.
FPRI members at the $125 level or above receive a
complimentary subscription to Orbis.
----------------------------------------------------------
UPCOMING FPRI EVENTS: for details, contact: lux@fpri.org
Oct. 17 - Lawrence Husick on Terrorism, Disruption and
Continuity Planning
Oct. 21-22 History Institute for Teachers on Understanding China
Oct. 24-26 Trilateral Conference on Regional Security
with Shanghai Institute for International Studies
and Japan Institute for International Affairs
Oct. 26 Bart Jan Spruyt, Edmund Burke Foundation,
on Liberalism and the Challenge of Islam:
The Case of the Netherlands
(Exclusively for members of FPRI's West Study Group
and FPRI Fellows)
Oct. 30 Mary Habeck on Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology
and the War On Terror (BookTalk)
For details, contact lux@fpri.org.
TICKETS AVAILABLE FOR THE FPRI ANNUAL DINNER
Honoring Charles Krauthammer
November 14, 2006 at the Westin Hotel, Philadelphia
Contact lux@fpri.org or call 215 732 3774, ext. 105
FPRI MONOGRAPHS ON THE WEB
Succeeding in Phase IV: British Perspectives on the U.S.
Effort to Stabilize and Reconstruct Iraq, by Andrew Garfield
Changing Tires on the Fly: The Marines and Postconflict
Stability Ops, by Frank G. Hoffman
----------------------------------------------------------
UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
by Adrian A. Basora
Fall 2006 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian
Revolution. It is thus fitting that we renew our focus on
the history and geopolitics of Europe and on the role these
factors should play in Western strategy. The transatlantic
strategic consensus that guided foreign policy in Western
Europe and North America during the Cold War has largely
dissolved. Once again, it is easy for policymakers to
succumb to the temptation to focus on the present and the
politically expedient, given popular concerns with
terrorism, energy prices, immigration, and other sources of
insecurity. Accordingly, Western leaders tend to focus on
Iraq, counterterrorism, and short-term cures for political
and economic instability. And yet it is as essential today
as it was fifty years ago to ensure that American and
European foreign policies are firmly based on the lessons of
the history, geopolitics, and political economy of the past
fifty years.
The Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution
epitomized the broad reach of communism throughout Europe.
Life behind the Iron Curtain was grim, and Cold War tensions
characterized not only the 1950s but also much of the three
subsequent decades. During that period democracy seemed
fragile in most of continental Europe, where a few non-
democratic regimes were viewed as essential allies in the
West's attempt to halt the spread of communism. The
authoritarian governments of Greece, Turkey, Spain, and
Portugal have since become a distant memory, but as recently
as twenty years ago, the communist dictatorships of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union still seemed firmly entrenched.
Even as late as 1986 it would have seemed wildly optimistic
to predict that in less than a generation Eastern Europe
would be largely democratic and integrating rapidly with the
West.
Yet today, in the landmass once controlled by just nine
Marxist-Leninist dictatorships (the nearly-monolithic Soviet
empire--the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria--plus Yugoslavia and
Albania), there are 28 noncommunist states, many of which
are either emerging or consolidated democracies with
prospering market economies and a high degree of association
with Western institutions. This is a remarkable historic
achievement involving a profound set of transformations.
In the space that had been the western phalanx of the Warsaw
Pact (plus a sliver of what was once Tito's Yugoslavia),
there are now eight fully consolidated democracies: the
three former Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania), four Central European countries (Poland, Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia), and the one former
Yugoslav republic left relatively unscathed by the civil war
that erupted in the early 1990s (Slovenia). All are now
stable democracies with prospering market economies, and all
are established members of both NATO and the EU.
Close behind these eight frontrunners in the transformation
process are five other emerging democracies--Bulgaria,
Romania, Croatia, Serbia (from which Montenegro just gained
independence this year), and Macedonia--that seem likely to
move towards full democratic consolidation within the next
few years. Bulgaria and Romania are already members of NATO
and will become EU members in 2007; Croatia is an EU
candidate. Serbia and Macedonia are somewhat further behind,
partly as a result of the prolonged warfare that followed
the break-up of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, while the
democracies of these two countries are less robust than the
others, Belgrade and Skopje have entered negotiations with
Brussels, and both countries seem headed in a positive
direction.
Five additional countries have also made significant
progress in creating pluralistic societies and more open
economies. This group, rated by Freedom House as
"transitional governments," includes most notably Ukraine
and Georgia, whose Orange and Rose revolutions make
reversion to full authoritarianism unlikely. The other
three--Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Moldova--also appear
to have good momentum. While each has a considerable
distance to go before attaining a fully functioning and
stable democracy, major regression is unlikely.
In sum, 19 of the 28 formerly communist countries of the
region are either solidly democratic or at least well along
the path to pluralism and unlikely to revert to
authoritarianism.
Lest this tour through the former Soviet and Eastern
European communist space seem too rosy, however, it is
important to discuss the nine remaining postcommunist
countries, which Freedom House rates as either semi-
consolidated or fully consolidated authoritarian regimes.
These include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the
five Central Asian republics (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). While all of these
countries are now officially noncommunist and some have
taken important steps towards pluralism, several have
recently manifested serious regression toward stronger
authoritarianism. An antidemocratic trend has taken hold
over last few years, perhaps most blatantly in Belarus, but
also in Russia. This should not be surprising, given the
antidemocratic "counter-waves" that Samuel Huntington
documented in his study of democratization trends.[1] But
the fact that this reaction now includes and is abetted by
Russia is ominous. This underlines the need for a concerted
strategy to protect the gains in democracy and stability
achieved since 1989 and, we can hope, to build upon these
gains over time.
There are two fundamentally divergent perspectives as to
whether lessons of post-authoritarian transition learned in
one country can successfully be applied in another. One view
holds that each country is unique, and thus that attempts to
transfer successful approaches from one country to another
are misguided. The contrary view, to which we at the Project
on Democratic Transitions generally subscribe, is that both
the challenges and the keys to success in building effective
democracies and market economies are parallel in important
ways from one country to another. These parallels are
particularly striking for the postcommunist transitions of
countries in Europe and Eurasia because of their similar
communist legacies and experiences. Since 1989, when the
West initiated a policy of systematic support for these
countries' political and economic transformations, they have
also been subject to similar influences from the West and
from international financial institutions.
As one looks more closely at the consolidated and emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe and their transition
experiences, several similarities emerge. A few of them are
worth noting in particular.
BREAK WITH PAST. The countries that have made the transition
successfully managed to engineer a sharp break with the
past. This has generally involved episodes of mass
mobilization and/or "electoral revolutions" sufficiently
powerful to oust the prior communist ruling elite at least
temporarily. Breakthroughs of this type have in most cases
been critical in accelerating the pace of democratization
and in helping to anchor its sustainability.
ELITES. New or reformed elites have played major roles.
These "counter-elites" have both helped to instigate the key
mass mobilizations and electoral movements that produced a
break with the past and themselves been further shaped by
these movements. In some cases, the new reformist elites had
their origins in splits within the former communist
leadership. In other cases, the popular emotions that drove
mass protests brought forth new champions or empowered older
leaders who had previously languished after earlier
dissident movements were suppressed.
FORMER COMMUNIST PARTIES. Some former communist parties have
played a positive role, most notably in the case of Hungary.
While in some cases communists have remained unreconstructed
and marginalized, in others they have changed tack and
evolved into Western-style social democratic parties. Thus,
one important phenomenon throughout much of the region is
the reshaping of the former communist parties and their
leaders through elections. An electoral loss that leaves
open the possibility of a comeback in the next election can
thus produce a healthy transformational dynamic.
MEDIA. The rapid emergence of free and diverse media is
important, particularly in the early stages of transition
and in the consolidation phases. However, maintaining
sufficient readership and relatively neutral sources of
financial support has often proven to be a challenge in the
later, "post-euphoric" stages of democratic consolidation.
CIVIL SOCIETY. While an essential underpinning of a strong
democracy, the emergence of the not-for-profit,
nongovernmental sector has generally proven a slow and
difficult process in this region. Developing an independent
and well-rooted civil society where none existed before is
inevitably an arduous task. A few countries that had been
able to retain or regain some degree of domestic pluralism
during the communist period, such as Poland and Hungary, had
an important head start. Others, such as Romania, Belarus,
or other post-Soviet states, inherited much less of a
foundation to start with, given the extent to which their
societies had been atomized by harsher communist regimes.
POLITICAL PARTIES. As with the NGO sector, durable political
parties have in most cases developed only slowly and tend to
be consolidated only in the later phases of transition.
Often they have been built up from the fragments of the
prior regime: mass movements, splits within prior elites,
and defeated communist parties. External assistance, while
sorely needed, is hard to deliver effectively.
EARLY ECONOMIC REFORMS. While economic reforms are not of
themselves sufficient to ensure democracy's success, a
society that enjoys some degree of private ownership,
entrepreneurship, and individual wealth is better able to
support free media and a vigorous civil society than a
society based upon a state-dominated economy. Conversely,
continuing government control of the economy and the absence
of privatization and other economic reforms can severely
undercut prospects for democratization. Belarus and the
Central Asian republics are notable examples of the latter
phenomenon, and over the past few years Russia itself has
taken several significant steps backwards in this area.
NO ESSENTIAL PRECONDITIONS. Democratization can move ahead
reasonably well even in states lacking prior democratic
legacies or a strong middle class. While Western cultural,
religious, and historic traditions and prior democratic
experience are helpful, they are not essential preconditions
for democratic consolidation if other factors are
propitious. Romania and Bulgaria exemplify promising
transitions involving largely Orthodox countries that had
long been a part of the Ottoman Empire; Albania and Bosnia
are largely Islamic countries that also offer promising
examples.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. The international community can
play a crucial role in fostering successful transitions to
democracy and viable market economies. The lure of NATO
membership has been a powerful factor in accelerating
Eastern Europe's reforms, particularly so in the 1990s. By
the latter part of that decade, as Brussels gradually geared
up for its eastward expansion, the EU became an even more
powerful magnet than NATO, and prolonged EU accession
negotiations became an effective source of leverage for
accelerated reform. Even now, with the EU suffering from
"enlargement fatigue," the United States and Western Europe
are still able to exert considerable influence by promptly
recognizing and rewarding effective steps towards democratic
reform.
"STICKINESS." A further positive conclusion is that
democracy has proven quite "sticky" once the transition has
moved past a certain threshold. Regression towards
authoritarianism has occurred mainly in countries where the
initial reforms were inadequate. In countries where the
conditions outlined above have been largely met, the
democratic trajectory has so far proven difficult to
reverse. Vladimir Meciar's attempt to do so in Slovakia is a
case in point.
These lessons are encouraging. Unfortunately, however,
experience to date has also produced important lessons on
the negative side. Two of these merit particular comment.
DOMINANT PRESIDENTS. As the cases of Russia and Belarus
vividly demonstrate, regression towards authoritarianism can
move ahead quickly where there is a president with strong
powers and an absence of any strong counterbalance in the
legislative or judicial branches of government, or in civil
society. Similar dynamics are apparent in the Central Asian
and Caucasian republics. The threats to success of the Rose
Revolution represented by a strong concentration of
presidential power. Therefore, in promoting enduring
democratization, it is important that firm constitutional
limits on presidential power are set and that strong
legislatures are established.
MINERAL RICHES. Excessive mineral riches in the hands of the
state can prove a strong negative factor. Not surprisingly,
autocracy seems to thrive particularly well in countries
with rich oil or gas reserves or other extractive wealth
that is easily controlled by the state. Russia, Kazakstan,
and Azerbaijan demonstrate how ample flows of easy cash into
the state treasury can be used to consolidate increasingly
autocratic rule.
On balance, however, there is a good case for cautious
optimism, particularly if reformers in the postcommunist
countries themselves, and those in the West who wish to aid
them, apply the lessons derived from the best practices of
the past decade and a half. Numerous promising opportunities
for further democratic consolidation remain, particularly in
"hybrid cases": countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova,
Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia, which are not yet
consolidated democracies but do have regular elections, some
degree of press freedom, emerging civic sectors, and
openness to outside assistance and advice. Even the region's
more entrenched autocracies offer opportunities for gradual
evolution, particularly if both domestic reformers and
Western governments and NGOs play their hands carefully.
It is clearly in the strategic interest of both the United
States and the EU and its member states to continue to work
systematically to foster democracy and open economies
throughout postcommunist Europe and Eurasia. However, for
some of these countries the timeframe will be a very long
one. Just as democratic consolidation has taken nearly a
generation even in frontrunner countries such as Poland,
Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia--and much work still remains
to be done even in these countries--so it is likely that
countries in the region that are much further behind in
their transitions will require at least another ten, fifteen
or twenty years to consolidate.
Focusing the attention of policymakers in Washington,
Brussels, and other Western capitals on such a prolonged
project will be a challenge. But success would have enormous
potential strategic benefits. Just as the West is
dramatically better off today than in 1986 when it still
faced massive Warsaw Pact armies based in Eastern Europe, so
in 2026 it could be distinctly better off than is the case
today, especially given the economic and strategic
importance of the transatlantic relationship to both Europe
and the United States. Even though democracy is not a cure-
all, the combination of democracy with a viable security
system and open-market economies that we have nurtured over
the past fifty-plus years in the transatlantic space has
worked remarkably well. Within the next twenty years it
seems quite reasonable to project the emergence of stable,
responsive governments and viable market economies in
Ukraine, Belarus, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. To the
extent that this endeavor proves successful, one can also
imagine progress in Russia and the Central Asian republics
over the coming decades.
However, even if democracy were to be consolidated only in
the European and Caucasian regions of the former Soviet
Union, there would be major benefits to the stability,
security, and prosperity of Europe and the entire
transatlantic region. A less direct, but no less important,
effect would be the spread of greater political stability
and prosperity, through the process of democratic diffusion,
to the next concentric circle of countries. This could well
include important parts of the greater Middle East. In sum,
U.S. and Western European persistence in long-term support
of the postcommunist democratic transitions would make an
important contribution to addressing many of the problems
that currently most concern Europeans and Americans.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in
the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1991).
----------------------------------------------------------
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Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
www.fpri.org
E-Notes
Distributed Exclusively via Fax & Email
UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
by Adrian A. Basora
October 11, 2006
Adrian A. Basora (abasora@fpri.org) is former U.S.
ambassador to Czechoslovakia and chair of FPRI's Project on
Democratic Transitions, which aims to better understand the
patterns of postcommunist transformation and to derive
lessons that can be applied elsewhere, particularly in the
transitional countries of Europe and Eurasia that are not
yet consolidated democracies. This e-note is adapted from
his introduction to the Fall 2006 issue of Orbis, which
focuses on East European Democratization. Orbis is available
electronically to subscribers to Elsevier's Science Direct
service. It is also available through standard subscription.
FPRI members at the $125 level or above receive a
complimentary subscription to Orbis.
----------------------------------------------------------
UPCOMING FPRI EVENTS: for details, contact: lux@fpri.org
Oct. 17 - Lawrence Husick on Terrorism, Disruption and
Continuity Planning
Oct. 21-22 History Institute for Teachers on Understanding China
Oct. 24-26 Trilateral Conference on Regional Security
with Shanghai Institute for International Studies
and Japan Institute for International Affairs
Oct. 26 Bart Jan Spruyt, Edmund Burke Foundation,
on Liberalism and the Challenge of Islam:
The Case of the Netherlands
(Exclusively for members of FPRI's West Study Group
and FPRI Fellows)
Oct. 30 Mary Habeck on Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology
and the War On Terror (BookTalk)
For details, contact lux@fpri.org.
TICKETS AVAILABLE FOR THE FPRI ANNUAL DINNER
Honoring Charles Krauthammer
November 14, 2006 at the Westin Hotel, Philadelphia
Contact lux@fpri.org or call 215 732 3774, ext. 105
FPRI MONOGRAPHS ON THE WEB
Succeeding in Phase IV: British Perspectives on the U.S.
Effort to Stabilize and Reconstruct Iraq, by Andrew Garfield
Changing Tires on the Fly: The Marines and Postconflict
Stability Ops, by Frank G. Hoffman
----------------------------------------------------------
UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
by Adrian A. Basora
Fall 2006 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian
Revolution. It is thus fitting that we renew our focus on
the history and geopolitics of Europe and on the role these
factors should play in Western strategy. The transatlantic
strategic consensus that guided foreign policy in Western
Europe and North America during the Cold War has largely
dissolved. Once again, it is easy for policymakers to
succumb to the temptation to focus on the present and the
politically expedient, given popular concerns with
terrorism, energy prices, immigration, and other sources of
insecurity. Accordingly, Western leaders tend to focus on
Iraq, counterterrorism, and short-term cures for political
and economic instability. And yet it is as essential today
as it was fifty years ago to ensure that American and
European foreign policies are firmly based on the lessons of
the history, geopolitics, and political economy of the past
fifty years.
The Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution
epitomized the broad reach of communism throughout Europe.
Life behind the Iron Curtain was grim, and Cold War tensions
characterized not only the 1950s but also much of the three
subsequent decades. During that period democracy seemed
fragile in most of continental Europe, where a few non-
democratic regimes were viewed as essential allies in the
West's attempt to halt the spread of communism. The
authoritarian governments of Greece, Turkey, Spain, and
Portugal have since become a distant memory, but as recently
as twenty years ago, the communist dictatorships of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union still seemed firmly entrenched.
Even as late as 1986 it would have seemed wildly optimistic
to predict that in less than a generation Eastern Europe
would be largely democratic and integrating rapidly with the
West.
Yet today, in the landmass once controlled by just nine
Marxist-Leninist dictatorships (the nearly-monolithic Soviet
empire--the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria--plus Yugoslavia and
Albania), there are 28 noncommunist states, many of which
are either emerging or consolidated democracies with
prospering market economies and a high degree of association
with Western institutions. This is a remarkable historic
achievement involving a profound set of transformations.
In the space that had been the western phalanx of the Warsaw
Pact (plus a sliver of what was once Tito's Yugoslavia),
there are now eight fully consolidated democracies: the
three former Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania), four Central European countries (Poland, Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia), and the one former
Yugoslav republic left relatively unscathed by the civil war
that erupted in the early 1990s (Slovenia). All are now
stable democracies with prospering market economies, and all
are established members of both NATO and the EU.
Close behind these eight frontrunners in the transformation
process are five other emerging democracies--Bulgaria,
Romania, Croatia, Serbia (from which Montenegro just gained
independence this year), and Macedonia--that seem likely to
move towards full democratic consolidation within the next
few years. Bulgaria and Romania are already members of NATO
and will become EU members in 2007; Croatia is an EU
candidate. Serbia and Macedonia are somewhat further behind,
partly as a result of the prolonged warfare that followed
the break-up of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, while the
democracies of these two countries are less robust than the
others, Belgrade and Skopje have entered negotiations with
Brussels, and both countries seem headed in a positive
direction.
Five additional countries have also made significant
progress in creating pluralistic societies and more open
economies. This group, rated by Freedom House as
"transitional governments," includes most notably Ukraine
and Georgia, whose Orange and Rose revolutions make
reversion to full authoritarianism unlikely. The other
three--Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Moldova--also appear
to have good momentum. While each has a considerable
distance to go before attaining a fully functioning and
stable democracy, major regression is unlikely.
In sum, 19 of the 28 formerly communist countries of the
region are either solidly democratic or at least well along
the path to pluralism and unlikely to revert to
authoritarianism.
Lest this tour through the former Soviet and Eastern
European communist space seem too rosy, however, it is
important to discuss the nine remaining postcommunist
countries, which Freedom House rates as either semi-
consolidated or fully consolidated authoritarian regimes.
These include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the
five Central Asian republics (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). While all of these
countries are now officially noncommunist and some have
taken important steps towards pluralism, several have
recently manifested serious regression toward stronger
authoritarianism. An antidemocratic trend has taken hold
over last few years, perhaps most blatantly in Belarus, but
also in Russia. This should not be surprising, given the
antidemocratic "counter-waves" that Samuel Huntington
documented in his study of democratization trends.[1] But
the fact that this reaction now includes and is abetted by
Russia is ominous. This underlines the need for a concerted
strategy to protect the gains in democracy and stability
achieved since 1989 and, we can hope, to build upon these
gains over time.
There are two fundamentally divergent perspectives as to
whether lessons of post-authoritarian transition learned in
one country can successfully be applied in another. One view
holds that each country is unique, and thus that attempts to
transfer successful approaches from one country to another
are misguided. The contrary view, to which we at the Project
on Democratic Transitions generally subscribe, is that both
the challenges and the keys to success in building effective
democracies and market economies are parallel in important
ways from one country to another. These parallels are
particularly striking for the postcommunist transitions of
countries in Europe and Eurasia because of their similar
communist legacies and experiences. Since 1989, when the
West initiated a policy of systematic support for these
countries' political and economic transformations, they have
also been subject to similar influences from the West and
from international financial institutions.
As one looks more closely at the consolidated and emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe and their transition
experiences, several similarities emerge. A few of them are
worth noting in particular.
BREAK WITH PAST. The countries that have made the transition
successfully managed to engineer a sharp break with the
past. This has generally involved episodes of mass
mobilization and/or "electoral revolutions" sufficiently
powerful to oust the prior communist ruling elite at least
temporarily. Breakthroughs of this type have in most cases
been critical in accelerating the pace of democratization
and in helping to anchor its sustainability.
ELITES. New or reformed elites have played major roles.
These "counter-elites" have both helped to instigate the key
mass mobilizations and electoral movements that produced a
break with the past and themselves been further shaped by
these movements. In some cases, the new reformist elites had
their origins in splits within the former communist
leadership. In other cases, the popular emotions that drove
mass protests brought forth new champions or empowered older
leaders who had previously languished after earlier
dissident movements were suppressed.
FORMER COMMUNIST PARTIES. Some former communist parties have
played a positive role, most notably in the case of Hungary.
While in some cases communists have remained unreconstructed
and marginalized, in others they have changed tack and
evolved into Western-style social democratic parties. Thus,
one important phenomenon throughout much of the region is
the reshaping of the former communist parties and their
leaders through elections. An electoral loss that leaves
open the possibility of a comeback in the next election can
thus produce a healthy transformational dynamic.
MEDIA. The rapid emergence of free and diverse media is
important, particularly in the early stages of transition
and in the consolidation phases. However, maintaining
sufficient readership and relatively neutral sources of
financial support has often proven to be a challenge in the
later, "post-euphoric" stages of democratic consolidation.
CIVIL SOCIETY. While an essential underpinning of a strong
democracy, the emergence of the not-for-profit,
nongovernmental sector has generally proven a slow and
difficult process in this region. Developing an independent
and well-rooted civil society where none existed before is
inevitably an arduous task. A few countries that had been
able to retain or regain some degree of domestic pluralism
during the communist period, such as Poland and Hungary, had
an important head start. Others, such as Romania, Belarus,
or other post-Soviet states, inherited much less of a
foundation to start with, given the extent to which their
societies had been atomized by harsher communist regimes.
POLITICAL PARTIES. As with the NGO sector, durable political
parties have in most cases developed only slowly and tend to
be consolidated only in the later phases of transition.
Often they have been built up from the fragments of the
prior regime: mass movements, splits within prior elites,
and defeated communist parties. External assistance, while
sorely needed, is hard to deliver effectively.
EARLY ECONOMIC REFORMS. While economic reforms are not of
themselves sufficient to ensure democracy's success, a
society that enjoys some degree of private ownership,
entrepreneurship, and individual wealth is better able to
support free media and a vigorous civil society than a
society based upon a state-dominated economy. Conversely,
continuing government control of the economy and the absence
of privatization and other economic reforms can severely
undercut prospects for democratization. Belarus and the
Central Asian republics are notable examples of the latter
phenomenon, and over the past few years Russia itself has
taken several significant steps backwards in this area.
NO ESSENTIAL PRECONDITIONS. Democratization can move ahead
reasonably well even in states lacking prior democratic
legacies or a strong middle class. While Western cultural,
religious, and historic traditions and prior democratic
experience are helpful, they are not essential preconditions
for democratic consolidation if other factors are
propitious. Romania and Bulgaria exemplify promising
transitions involving largely Orthodox countries that had
long been a part of the Ottoman Empire; Albania and Bosnia
are largely Islamic countries that also offer promising
examples.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. The international community can
play a crucial role in fostering successful transitions to
democracy and viable market economies. The lure of NATO
membership has been a powerful factor in accelerating
Eastern Europe's reforms, particularly so in the 1990s. By
the latter part of that decade, as Brussels gradually geared
up for its eastward expansion, the EU became an even more
powerful magnet than NATO, and prolonged EU accession
negotiations became an effective source of leverage for
accelerated reform. Even now, with the EU suffering from
"enlargement fatigue," the United States and Western Europe
are still able to exert considerable influence by promptly
recognizing and rewarding effective steps towards democratic
reform.
"STICKINESS." A further positive conclusion is that
democracy has proven quite "sticky" once the transition has
moved past a certain threshold. Regression towards
authoritarianism has occurred mainly in countries where the
initial reforms were inadequate. In countries where the
conditions outlined above have been largely met, the
democratic trajectory has so far proven difficult to
reverse. Vladimir Meciar's attempt to do so in Slovakia is a
case in point.
These lessons are encouraging. Unfortunately, however,
experience to date has also produced important lessons on
the negative side. Two of these merit particular comment.
DOMINANT PRESIDENTS. As the cases of Russia and Belarus
vividly demonstrate, regression towards authoritarianism can
move ahead quickly where there is a president with strong
powers and an absence of any strong counterbalance in the
legislative or judicial branches of government, or in civil
society. Similar dynamics are apparent in the Central Asian
and Caucasian republics. The threats to success of the Rose
Revolution represented by a strong concentration of
presidential power. Therefore, in promoting enduring
democratization, it is important that firm constitutional
limits on presidential power are set and that strong
legislatures are established.
MINERAL RICHES. Excessive mineral riches in the hands of the
state can prove a strong negative factor. Not surprisingly,
autocracy seems to thrive particularly well in countries
with rich oil or gas reserves or other extractive wealth
that is easily controlled by the state. Russia, Kazakstan,
and Azerbaijan demonstrate how ample flows of easy cash into
the state treasury can be used to consolidate increasingly
autocratic rule.
On balance, however, there is a good case for cautious
optimism, particularly if reformers in the postcommunist
countries themselves, and those in the West who wish to aid
them, apply the lessons derived from the best practices of
the past decade and a half. Numerous promising opportunities
for further democratic consolidation remain, particularly in
"hybrid cases": countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova,
Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia, which are not yet
consolidated democracies but do have regular elections, some
degree of press freedom, emerging civic sectors, and
openness to outside assistance and advice. Even the region's
more entrenched autocracies offer opportunities for gradual
evolution, particularly if both domestic reformers and
Western governments and NGOs play their hands carefully.
It is clearly in the strategic interest of both the United
States and the EU and its member states to continue to work
systematically to foster democracy and open economies
throughout postcommunist Europe and Eurasia. However, for
some of these countries the timeframe will be a very long
one. Just as democratic consolidation has taken nearly a
generation even in frontrunner countries such as Poland,
Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia--and much work still remains
to be done even in these countries--so it is likely that
countries in the region that are much further behind in
their transitions will require at least another ten, fifteen
or twenty years to consolidate.
Focusing the attention of policymakers in Washington,
Brussels, and other Western capitals on such a prolonged
project will be a challenge. But success would have enormous
potential strategic benefits. Just as the West is
dramatically better off today than in 1986 when it still
faced massive Warsaw Pact armies based in Eastern Europe, so
in 2026 it could be distinctly better off than is the case
today, especially given the economic and strategic
importance of the transatlantic relationship to both Europe
and the United States. Even though democracy is not a cure-
all, the combination of democracy with a viable security
system and open-market economies that we have nurtured over
the past fifty-plus years in the transatlantic space has
worked remarkably well. Within the next twenty years it
seems quite reasonable to project the emergence of stable,
responsive governments and viable market economies in
Ukraine, Belarus, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. To the
extent that this endeavor proves successful, one can also
imagine progress in Russia and the Central Asian republics
over the coming decades.
However, even if democracy were to be consolidated only in
the European and Caucasian regions of the former Soviet
Union, there would be major benefits to the stability,
security, and prosperity of Europe and the entire
transatlantic region. A less direct, but no less important,
effect would be the spread of greater political stability
and prosperity, through the process of democratic diffusion,
to the next concentric circle of countries. This could well
include important parts of the greater Middle East. In sum,
U.S. and Western European persistence in long-term support
of the postcommunist democratic transitions would make an
important contribution to addressing many of the problems
that currently most concern Europeans and Americans.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in
the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1991).
----------------------------------------------------------
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quarta-feira, outubro 11, 2006
157) Um retrato do Brasil: indenizacoes politicas milionarias
Uma só palavra, em face desse festival de indenizações milionárias, para supostos perseguidos políticos: tristeza.
Talvez eu deva acrescentar mais uma: indignação!
Nota de quem me enviou: São aproximadamente 98 Portarias; relaciono apenas as que possuem maior vulto em relação a valores. Sem comentário.
Diário Oficial da União - Seção I.
Ministério da Justiça
GABINETE DO MINISTRO
PORTARIA No- 1.604, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 39ª Sessão realizada no dia 15 de maio de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.01662, resolve: Declarar SÉRGIO CAPOZZI anistiado político, concedendolhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Supervisor de Área Jornalística, no valor de R$ 9.154,36 (nove mil, cento e cinqüenta e quatro reais e trinta e seis centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 15.05.2006 a 31.07.1990, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 1.878.627,17 (hum milhão, oitocentos e setenta e oito mil, seiscentos e vinte e sete reais e dezessete centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 16.05.1971 e 28.08.1979, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.605, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 24ª Sessão realizada no dia 07 de abril de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.01497, resolve: Declarar IZA BARRETO DE SALLES anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Editora de empresa Jornalística, no valor de R$ 8.973,00 (oito mil, novecentos e setenta e três reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 07.04.2006 a 10.03.1990, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 1.875.506,55 (um milhão, oitocentos e setenta e cinco mil, quinhentos e seis reais e cinqüenta e cinco centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 23.06.1970 e 29.06.1976, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.714, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Terceira Câmara da Comissão de Anistia na sessão realizada no dia 13 de outubro de 2004, no Requerimento de Anistia n° 2003.01.21054, resolve: Retificar a Portaria n° 0874 de 13 de Maio de 2005, e declarar WILSON DE SAMPAIO MENEZES anistiado político “post mortem”, reconhecendo o direito às promoções ao posto de Coronel com os proventos do posto de General-de-Brigada e as respectivas vantagens, e conceder em favor da requerente LIGIA LEMME DE MENEZES, e demais dependentes econômicos, se houver, a reparação econômica em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada no valor de R$ 9.024,00 (nove mil e vinte e quatro reais). Os efeitos financeiros retroativos somente incidirão sobre a diferença de proventos desse posto e os do posto de Aspirante-a-Oficial, que a requerente já percebe no valor de R$ 3.049,36 (três mil, quarenta e nove reais e trinta e seis centavos), o que perfaz a diferença de R$ 5.974,64 (cinco mil, novecentos e setenta e quatro reais e sessenta e quatro centavos), com efeitos pretéritos a contar de 05.10.1988 até a data do julgamento em 13.10.2004, completando 192 (cento e noventa e dois) meses e 08 (oito) dias, totalizando o valor líquido de R$ 1.244.318,36 (hum milhão, duzentos e quarenta e quatro mil, trezentos e dezoito reais e trinta e seis centavos), e conceder acesso a todos os benefícios indiretos mantidos pelo Exército Brasileiro, em conformidade com o art. 14 da supracitada lei, bem como a isenção de Imposto de Renda, nos termos do artigo 1°, incisos I e II, e artigo 9°, Parágrafo Único da Lei no- 10.559 de 13 de novembro de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.607, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na sessão realizada no dia 19 de outubro de 2005, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.00609, resolve: Declarar ONDINA FELISBINO DA SILVA PREGNOLATTO anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professora de Curso Supletivo do Estado de São Paulo, no valor de R$ 5.885,03 (cinco mil, oitocentos e oitenta e cinco reais e três centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 19.10.2005 a 28.08.1993, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 929.050,07 (novecentos e vinte e nove mil, cinqüenta reais e sete centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 07.12.1968 e 28.02.1984, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.638, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 39ª Sessão realizada no dia 15 de maio de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.01.05118, resolve: Declarar JOSÉ MARIA DE NORONHA anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Chefe de Seção da Ishikawajima do Brasil, no valor de R$ 4.853,10 (quatro mil, oitocentos e cinqüenta e três reais e dez centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 15.05.2006 a 30.04.1992, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 885.691,30 (oitocentos e oitenta e cinco mil, seiscentos e noventa e um reais e trinta centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 04.04.1964 e 31.12.1967, nos termos do artigo 1o-, incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.666, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 19ª Sessão - Plenário, realizada no dia 29 de março de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.01.00902, resolve: Dar provimento ao recurso interposto por ALETE RAMOS DE OLIVEIRA anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professora Universitária, Adjunto IV - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro - UFRJ, no valor de R$ 6.341,07 (seis mil, trezentos e quarenta e um reais e sete centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 29.03.2006 a 24.09.1996, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 784.179,00 (setecentos e oitenta e quatro mil, cento e setenta e nove reais), devendo ser descontado R$ 79.200,00 (setenta e nove mil e duzentos reais) já recebidos por força de anistia, conforme a Portaria n.° 478 de 6 de Fevereiro de 2004, totalizando R$ 704.979,00 (setecentos e quatro mil, novecentos e setenta e nove reais) e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 23.04.1976 e 08.09.1986, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.665, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 19ª Sessão - Plenário, realizada no dia 29 de março de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.01.00908, resolve: Dar provimento ao recurso interposto por IVANDRO DA COSTA SALES anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professor Universitário Adjunto IV - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro - UFRJ, no valor de R$ 6.341,07 (seis mil, trezentos e quarenta e um reais e sete centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 29.03.2006 a 24.09.1996, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 784.179,00 (setecentos e oitenta e quatro mil, cento e setenta e nove reais), devendo ser descontado R$ 79.200,00 (setenta e nove mil e duzentos reais) já recebidos por força de anistia, conforme a Portaria n.° 476 de 6 de Fevereiro de 2004, totalizando R$ 704.979,00 (setecentos e quatro mil, novecentos e setenta e nove reais) e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 23.04.1976 e 08.09.1986, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.593, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 48ª Sessão realizada no dia 02 de junho de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2002.01.06597, resolve: Declarar MARCIA YAJGUNOVICH MAFRA anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professora do Curso Madureza Santa Inês - São Paulo, no valor de R$ 5.885,03 (cinco mil, oitocentos e oitenta e cinco reais e três centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 02.06.2006 a 13.02.1997, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 712.089,20 (setecentos e doze mil, oitenta e nove reais e vinte centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 26.02.1971 e 16.12.1973, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.669, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 48ª Sessão realizada no dia 02 de junho de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2004.01.41053, resolve: Declarar CARLOS GILBERTO PEREIRA anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Gerente de Vendas da empresa Ação Comunitária do Brasil, no valor de R$ 7.158,91 (sete mil, cento e cinqüenta e oito reais e noventa e um centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 02.06.2006 a 11.03.1999, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 672.818,68 (seiscentos e setenta e dois mil, oitocentos e dezoito reais e sessenta e oito centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.619, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 60ª Sessão realizada no dia 05 de Julho de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.00641, resolve: Ratificar a condição de anistiado político de PEDRO PEREIRA NASCIMENTO, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Manutenção de Mecânica, no valor de R$ 3.791,00 (três mil, setecentos e noventa e um reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 05.07.2006 a 08.01.1993, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 664.941,40 (seiscentos e sessenta e quatro mil, novecentos e quarenta e um reais e quarenta centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III e art. 14 da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.691, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Primeira Câmara da Comissão de Anistia, na sessão realizada no dia 14 de dezembro de 2005, no Requerimento de Anistia no-2001.02.00983, resolve: Declarar MÁRIO COUTINHO anistiado político, concedendo- lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Chefe de Sessão - Encarregado de Carpintaria da empresa Companhia Comércio e Navegação, no valor de R$ 4.098,00 (quatro mil, noventa e oito reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 14.12.2005 a 16.06.1994, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 612.377,80 (seiscentos e doze mil, trezentos e setenta e sete reais e oitenta centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.685, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 39ª Sessão realizada no dia 15 de maio de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.01549, resolve: Declarar JOSÉ MARIA DE ALMEIDA anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Fresador da COFAP - Cia Fabricadora de Peças, no valor de R$ 3.421,41 (três mil, quatrocentos e vinte e um reais e quarenta e um centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 15.05.2006 a 24.11.1992, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 599.431,66 (quinhentos e noventa e nove mil, quatrocentos e trinta e um reais e sessenta e seis centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.678, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 45ª Sessão realizada no dia 24 de maio de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2002.01.09498, resolve: Declarar MARTA MARIA RODRIGUES DA COSTA anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Analista Pleno, no valor de R$ 4.222,00 (quatro mil, duzentos e vinte e dois reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 24.05.2006 a 17.06.1997, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 490.385,30 (quatrocentos e noventa mil, trezentos e oitenta e cinco reais e trinta centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.628, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela da Comissão de Anistia, na 47ª Sessão realizada no dia 01 de junho de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2002.01.06048, resolve: Declarar ABRÃO MARCOS DA SILVA anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Médico Clínico Geral, no valor de R$ 3.699,00 (três mil, seiscentos e noventa e nove reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 01.06.2006 a 25.03.1997, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 441.660,60 (quatrocentos e quarenta e um mil, seiscentos e sessenta reais e sessenta centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 01.01.1973 e 01.01.1975, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.686, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela da Comissão de Anistia, na 27ª Sessão realizada no dia 12 de abril de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2002.01.08782, resolve: Declarar LUZIA REIS RIBEIRO anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professora da rede estadual de ensino da Bahia, no valor de R$ 2.417,90 (dois mil, quatrocentos e dezessete reais e noventa centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 12.04.2006 a 06.05.1992, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 437.921,99 (quatrocentos e trinta e sete mil, novecentos e vinte e um reais e noventa e nove centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.662, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei n.o- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 13ª Sessão realizada no dia 16 de março de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia n.o- 2003.01.22931, resolve: Reconhecer a condição de anistiado político de NEWTON EDUARDO DE OLIVEIRA “post mortem”, conceder à viúva ODETE MENEZES DE OLIVEIRA, e demais dependentes econômicos, se houver, à reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, no valor de R$ 3.276,33 (três mil, duzentos e setenta e seis reais e trinta e três centavos), em substituição à pensão por morte de anistiado político, que recebe no valor de R$ 1.404,14 (um mil, quatrocentos e quatro reais e quatorze centavos), referente ao benefício do INSS no- 59/044.067.649-5, o que perfaz a diferença de R$ 1.872,19 (um mil, oitocentos e setenta e dois reais e dezenove centavos), com efeitos financeiros retroativos da data do julgamento em 16.03.2006 a 05.10.1988, totalizando 209 (duzentos e nove) meses e 11 (onze) dias, perfazendo um total líquido de R$ 424.580,73 (quatrocentos e vinte e quatro mil, quinhentos e oitenta reais e setenta e três centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I e II, da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
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PORTARIA No- 1.702, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Terceira Câmara da Comissão de Anistia na sessão realizada no dia 08 de dezembro de 2005, no Requerimento de Anistia n° 2002.01.06809, resolve: Declarar NELSON MACHADO FILHO anistiado político “post mortem”, reconhecendo o direito às promoções a graduação de Segundo-Sargento com os proventos da graduação de Primeiro-Sargento e as respectivas vantagens, e conceder em favor da requerente MIRYAM CARVALHO MACHADO, e demais dependentes econômicos, se houver, a reparação econômica em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada no valor de R$ 3.339,87 (três mil, trezentos e trinta e nove reais e oitenta e sete centavos), com efeitos financeiros retroativos a partir de 25.03.1997 até a data do julgamento em 08.12.2005, totalizando 104 (cento e quatro) meses e 13 (treze) dias, perfazendo um total de R$ 377.739,30 (trezentos e setenta e sete mil, setecentos e trinta e nove reais e trinta centavos), e conceder acesso a todos os benefícios indiretos mantidos pela Força Aérea Brasileira, em conformidade com o art. 14 da supracitada lei, bem como a isenção de Imposto de Renda, nos termos do artigo 1°, incisos I e II, e artigo 9°, Parágrafo Único da Lei no- 10.559 de 13 de novembro de 2002.
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PORTARIA No- 1.591, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela da Comissão de Anistia, na 14° Sessão realizada no dia 22 de março de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.01.05640, resolve: Declarar FRANCISCO RUBENS COELHO DE FIGUEIREDO anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Analista de Crédito de Instituição Financeira, no valor de R$ 2.525,00 (dois mil, quinhentos e vinte e cinco reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 22.03.2006 a 29.09.1994, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 376.730,00 (trezentos e setenta e seis mil, setecentos e trinta reais), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.675, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 3ª Sessão realizada no dia 16 de janeiro de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2003.02.24035, resolve: Reconhecer a condição de anistiado político de CESAR EDUARDO GINO CERQUEIRA, concedendo-lhe a reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, no valor de R$ 6.410,48 (seis mil, quatrocentos e dez reais e quarenta e oito centavos), em substituição a Aposentadoria Excepcional de Anistiado, que recebe no valor de R$ 4.762,07 (quatro mil, setecentos e sessenta e dois reais e sete centavos), referente ao benefício do INSS no- 58/029.301.773-5, o que perfaz a diferença de R$ 1.648,41 (hum mil, seiscentos e quarenta e oito reais e quarenta e um centavos), com efeitos financeiros retroativos da data do julgamento em 16.01.2006 a 05.10.1988, totalizando 207 (duzentos e sete) meses e 11 (onze) dias, perfazendo um total líquido de R$ 370.260,10 (trezentos e setenta mil, duzentos e sessenta reais e dez centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I e II, da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
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Talvez eu deva acrescentar mais uma: indignação!
Nota de quem me enviou: São aproximadamente 98 Portarias; relaciono apenas as que possuem maior vulto em relação a valores. Sem comentário.
Diário Oficial da União - Seção I.
Ministério da Justiça
GABINETE DO MINISTRO
PORTARIA No- 1.604, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 39ª Sessão realizada no dia 15 de maio de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.01662, resolve: Declarar SÉRGIO CAPOZZI anistiado político, concedendolhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Supervisor de Área Jornalística, no valor de R$ 9.154,36 (nove mil, cento e cinqüenta e quatro reais e trinta e seis centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 15.05.2006 a 31.07.1990, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 1.878.627,17 (hum milhão, oitocentos e setenta e oito mil, seiscentos e vinte e sete reais e dezessete centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 16.05.1971 e 28.08.1979, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.605, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 24ª Sessão realizada no dia 07 de abril de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.01497, resolve: Declarar IZA BARRETO DE SALLES anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Editora de empresa Jornalística, no valor de R$ 8.973,00 (oito mil, novecentos e setenta e três reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 07.04.2006 a 10.03.1990, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 1.875.506,55 (um milhão, oitocentos e setenta e cinco mil, quinhentos e seis reais e cinqüenta e cinco centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 23.06.1970 e 29.06.1976, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.714, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Terceira Câmara da Comissão de Anistia na sessão realizada no dia 13 de outubro de 2004, no Requerimento de Anistia n° 2003.01.21054, resolve: Retificar a Portaria n° 0874 de 13 de Maio de 2005, e declarar WILSON DE SAMPAIO MENEZES anistiado político “post mortem”, reconhecendo o direito às promoções ao posto de Coronel com os proventos do posto de General-de-Brigada e as respectivas vantagens, e conceder em favor da requerente LIGIA LEMME DE MENEZES, e demais dependentes econômicos, se houver, a reparação econômica em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada no valor de R$ 9.024,00 (nove mil e vinte e quatro reais). Os efeitos financeiros retroativos somente incidirão sobre a diferença de proventos desse posto e os do posto de Aspirante-a-Oficial, que a requerente já percebe no valor de R$ 3.049,36 (três mil, quarenta e nove reais e trinta e seis centavos), o que perfaz a diferença de R$ 5.974,64 (cinco mil, novecentos e setenta e quatro reais e sessenta e quatro centavos), com efeitos pretéritos a contar de 05.10.1988 até a data do julgamento em 13.10.2004, completando 192 (cento e noventa e dois) meses e 08 (oito) dias, totalizando o valor líquido de R$ 1.244.318,36 (hum milhão, duzentos e quarenta e quatro mil, trezentos e dezoito reais e trinta e seis centavos), e conceder acesso a todos os benefícios indiretos mantidos pelo Exército Brasileiro, em conformidade com o art. 14 da supracitada lei, bem como a isenção de Imposto de Renda, nos termos do artigo 1°, incisos I e II, e artigo 9°, Parágrafo Único da Lei no- 10.559 de 13 de novembro de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.607, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na sessão realizada no dia 19 de outubro de 2005, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.00609, resolve: Declarar ONDINA FELISBINO DA SILVA PREGNOLATTO anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professora de Curso Supletivo do Estado de São Paulo, no valor de R$ 5.885,03 (cinco mil, oitocentos e oitenta e cinco reais e três centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 19.10.2005 a 28.08.1993, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 929.050,07 (novecentos e vinte e nove mil, cinqüenta reais e sete centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 07.12.1968 e 28.02.1984, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
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PORTARIA No- 1.638, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 39ª Sessão realizada no dia 15 de maio de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.01.05118, resolve: Declarar JOSÉ MARIA DE NORONHA anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Chefe de Seção da Ishikawajima do Brasil, no valor de R$ 4.853,10 (quatro mil, oitocentos e cinqüenta e três reais e dez centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 15.05.2006 a 30.04.1992, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 885.691,30 (oitocentos e oitenta e cinco mil, seiscentos e noventa e um reais e trinta centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 04.04.1964 e 31.12.1967, nos termos do artigo 1o-, incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.666, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 19ª Sessão - Plenário, realizada no dia 29 de março de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.01.00902, resolve: Dar provimento ao recurso interposto por ALETE RAMOS DE OLIVEIRA anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professora Universitária, Adjunto IV - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro - UFRJ, no valor de R$ 6.341,07 (seis mil, trezentos e quarenta e um reais e sete centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 29.03.2006 a 24.09.1996, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 784.179,00 (setecentos e oitenta e quatro mil, cento e setenta e nove reais), devendo ser descontado R$ 79.200,00 (setenta e nove mil e duzentos reais) já recebidos por força de anistia, conforme a Portaria n.° 478 de 6 de Fevereiro de 2004, totalizando R$ 704.979,00 (setecentos e quatro mil, novecentos e setenta e nove reais) e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 23.04.1976 e 08.09.1986, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.665, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 19ª Sessão - Plenário, realizada no dia 29 de março de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.01.00908, resolve: Dar provimento ao recurso interposto por IVANDRO DA COSTA SALES anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professor Universitário Adjunto IV - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro - UFRJ, no valor de R$ 6.341,07 (seis mil, trezentos e quarenta e um reais e sete centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 29.03.2006 a 24.09.1996, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 784.179,00 (setecentos e oitenta e quatro mil, cento e setenta e nove reais), devendo ser descontado R$ 79.200,00 (setenta e nove mil e duzentos reais) já recebidos por força de anistia, conforme a Portaria n.° 476 de 6 de Fevereiro de 2004, totalizando R$ 704.979,00 (setecentos e quatro mil, novecentos e setenta e nove reais) e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 23.04.1976 e 08.09.1986, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.593, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 48ª Sessão realizada no dia 02 de junho de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2002.01.06597, resolve: Declarar MARCIA YAJGUNOVICH MAFRA anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professora do Curso Madureza Santa Inês - São Paulo, no valor de R$ 5.885,03 (cinco mil, oitocentos e oitenta e cinco reais e três centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 02.06.2006 a 13.02.1997, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 712.089,20 (setecentos e doze mil, oitenta e nove reais e vinte centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 26.02.1971 e 16.12.1973, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.669, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 48ª Sessão realizada no dia 02 de junho de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2004.01.41053, resolve: Declarar CARLOS GILBERTO PEREIRA anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Gerente de Vendas da empresa Ação Comunitária do Brasil, no valor de R$ 7.158,91 (sete mil, cento e cinqüenta e oito reais e noventa e um centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 02.06.2006 a 11.03.1999, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 672.818,68 (seiscentos e setenta e dois mil, oitocentos e dezoito reais e sessenta e oito centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
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PORTARIA No- 1.619, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 60ª Sessão realizada no dia 05 de Julho de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.00641, resolve: Ratificar a condição de anistiado político de PEDRO PEREIRA NASCIMENTO, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Manutenção de Mecânica, no valor de R$ 3.791,00 (três mil, setecentos e noventa e um reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 05.07.2006 a 08.01.1993, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 664.941,40 (seiscentos e sessenta e quatro mil, novecentos e quarenta e um reais e quarenta centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III e art. 14 da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.691, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Primeira Câmara da Comissão de Anistia, na sessão realizada no dia 14 de dezembro de 2005, no Requerimento de Anistia no-2001.02.00983, resolve: Declarar MÁRIO COUTINHO anistiado político, concedendo- lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Chefe de Sessão - Encarregado de Carpintaria da empresa Companhia Comércio e Navegação, no valor de R$ 4.098,00 (quatro mil, noventa e oito reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 14.12.2005 a 16.06.1994, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 612.377,80 (seiscentos e doze mil, trezentos e setenta e sete reais e oitenta centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.685, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 39ª Sessão realizada no dia 15 de maio de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.02.01549, resolve: Declarar JOSÉ MARIA DE ALMEIDA anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Fresador da COFAP - Cia Fabricadora de Peças, no valor de R$ 3.421,41 (três mil, quatrocentos e vinte e um reais e quarenta e um centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 15.05.2006 a 24.11.1992, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 599.431,66 (quinhentos e noventa e nove mil, quatrocentos e trinta e um reais e sessenta e seis centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.678, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 45ª Sessão realizada no dia 24 de maio de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2002.01.09498, resolve: Declarar MARTA MARIA RODRIGUES DA COSTA anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Analista Pleno, no valor de R$ 4.222,00 (quatro mil, duzentos e vinte e dois reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 24.05.2006 a 17.06.1997, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 490.385,30 (quatrocentos e noventa mil, trezentos e oitenta e cinco reais e trinta centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.628, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela da Comissão de Anistia, na 47ª Sessão realizada no dia 01 de junho de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2002.01.06048, resolve: Declarar ABRÃO MARCOS DA SILVA anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Médico Clínico Geral, no valor de R$ 3.699,00 (três mil, seiscentos e noventa e nove reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 01.06.2006 a 25.03.1997, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 441.660,60 (quatrocentos e quarenta e um mil, seiscentos e sessenta reais e sessenta centavos), e a contagem do tempo, para todos os efeitos, do período compreendido entre 01.01.1973 e 01.01.1975, nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.686, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela da Comissão de Anistia, na 27ª Sessão realizada no dia 12 de abril de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2002.01.08782, resolve: Declarar LUZIA REIS RIBEIRO anistiada política, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Professora da rede estadual de ensino da Bahia, no valor de R$ 2.417,90 (dois mil, quatrocentos e dezessete reais e noventa centavos), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 12.04.2006 a 06.05.1992, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 437.921,99 (quatrocentos e trinta e sete mil, novecentos e vinte e um reais e noventa e nove centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.662, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei n.o- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 13ª Sessão realizada no dia 16 de março de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia n.o- 2003.01.22931, resolve: Reconhecer a condição de anistiado político de NEWTON EDUARDO DE OLIVEIRA “post mortem”, conceder à viúva ODETE MENEZES DE OLIVEIRA, e demais dependentes econômicos, se houver, à reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, no valor de R$ 3.276,33 (três mil, duzentos e setenta e seis reais e trinta e três centavos), em substituição à pensão por morte de anistiado político, que recebe no valor de R$ 1.404,14 (um mil, quatrocentos e quatro reais e quatorze centavos), referente ao benefício do INSS no- 59/044.067.649-5, o que perfaz a diferença de R$ 1.872,19 (um mil, oitocentos e setenta e dois reais e dezenove centavos), com efeitos financeiros retroativos da data do julgamento em 16.03.2006 a 05.10.1988, totalizando 209 (duzentos e nove) meses e 11 (onze) dias, perfazendo um total líquido de R$ 424.580,73 (quatrocentos e vinte e quatro mil, quinhentos e oitenta reais e setenta e três centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I e II, da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.702, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Terceira Câmara da Comissão de Anistia na sessão realizada no dia 08 de dezembro de 2005, no Requerimento de Anistia n° 2002.01.06809, resolve: Declarar NELSON MACHADO FILHO anistiado político “post mortem”, reconhecendo o direito às promoções a graduação de Segundo-Sargento com os proventos da graduação de Primeiro-Sargento e as respectivas vantagens, e conceder em favor da requerente MIRYAM CARVALHO MACHADO, e demais dependentes econômicos, se houver, a reparação econômica em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada no valor de R$ 3.339,87 (três mil, trezentos e trinta e nove reais e oitenta e sete centavos), com efeitos financeiros retroativos a partir de 25.03.1997 até a data do julgamento em 08.12.2005, totalizando 104 (cento e quatro) meses e 13 (treze) dias, perfazendo um total de R$ 377.739,30 (trezentos e setenta e sete mil, setecentos e trinta e nove reais e trinta centavos), e conceder acesso a todos os benefícios indiretos mantidos pela Força Aérea Brasileira, em conformidade com o art. 14 da supracitada lei, bem como a isenção de Imposto de Renda, nos termos do artigo 1°, incisos I e II, e artigo 9°, Parágrafo Único da Lei no- 10.559 de 13 de novembro de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.591, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela da Comissão de Anistia, na 14° Sessão realizada no dia 22 de março de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2001.01.05640, resolve: Declarar FRANCISCO RUBENS COELHO DE FIGUEIREDO anistiado político, concedendo-lhe reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, correspondente ao cargo de Analista de Crédito de Instituição Financeira, no valor de R$ 2.525,00 (dois mil, quinhentos e vinte e cinco reais), com efeitos retroativos da data do julgamento em 22.03.2006 a 29.09.1994, perfazendo um total retroativo de R$ 376.730,00 (trezentos e setenta e seis mil, setecentos e trinta reais), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I, II e III da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
PORTARIA No- 1.675, DE 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2006
O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DA JUSTIÇA, no uso de suas atribuições legais, com fulcro no artigo 10 da Lei no- 10.559, de 13 de novembro de 2002, publicada no Diário Oficial de 14 de novembro de 2002 e considerando o resultado do julgamento proferido pela Comissão de Anistia, na 3ª Sessão realizada no dia 16 de janeiro de 2006, no Requerimento de Anistia no- 2003.02.24035, resolve: Reconhecer a condição de anistiado político de CESAR EDUARDO GINO CERQUEIRA, concedendo-lhe a reparação econômica, de caráter indenizatório, em prestação mensal, permanente e continuada, no valor de R$ 6.410,48 (seis mil, quatrocentos e dez reais e quarenta e oito centavos), em substituição a Aposentadoria Excepcional de Anistiado, que recebe no valor de R$ 4.762,07 (quatro mil, setecentos e sessenta e dois reais e sete centavos), referente ao benefício do INSS no- 58/029.301.773-5, o que perfaz a diferença de R$ 1.648,41 (hum mil, seiscentos e quarenta e oito reais e quarenta e um centavos), com efeitos financeiros retroativos da data do julgamento em 16.01.2006 a 05.10.1988, totalizando 207 (duzentos e sete) meses e 11 (onze) dias, perfazendo um total líquido de R$ 370.260,10 (trezentos e setenta mil, duzentos e sessenta reais e dez centavos), nos termos do artigo 1o- , incisos I e II, da Lei no- 10.559, de 2002.
MÁRCIO THOMAZ BASTOS
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