260) A origem do termo terrorista

Boa lembrança por um professor de historia...

Bush’s Dangerous Liaisons
By FRANÇOIS FURSTENBERG
The New York Times, October 28, 2007
Op-Ed Contributor
Montreal

MUCH as George W. Bush’s presidency was ineluctably shaped by Sept. 11, 2001, so the outbreak of the French Revolution was symbolized by the events of one fateful day, July 14, 1789. And though 18th-century France may seem impossibly distant to contemporary Americans, future historians examining Mr. Bush’s presidency within the longer sweep of political and intellectual history may find the French Revolution useful in understanding his curious brand of 21st- century conservatism.

Soon after the storming of the Bastille, pro-Revolutionary elements came together to form an association that would become known as the Jacobin Club, an umbrella group of politicians, journalists and citizens dedicated to advancing the principles of the Revolution.

The Jacobins shared a defining ideological feature. They divided the world between pro- and anti-Revolutionaries — the defenders of liberty versus its enemies. The French Revolution, as they understood it, was the great event that would determine whether liberty was to prevail on the planet or whether the world would fall back into tyranny and despotism.

The stakes could not be higher, and on these matters there could be no nuance or hesitation. One was either for the Revolution or for tyranny.

By 1792, France was confronting the hostility of neighboring countries, debating how to react. The Jacobins were divided. On one side stood the journalist and political leader Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, who argued for war.

Brissot understood the war as preventive — “une guerre offensive,” he called it — to defeat the despotic powers of Europe before they could organize their counter-Revolutionary strike. It would not be a war of conquest, as Brissot saw it, but a war “between liberty and tyranny.”

Pro-war Jacobins believed theirs was a mission not for a single nation or even for a single continent. It was, in Brissot’s words, “a crusade for universal liberty.”

Brissot’s opponents were skeptical. “No one likes armed missionaries,” declared Robespierre, with words as apt then as they remain today. Not long after the invasion of Austria, the military tide turned quickly against France.

The United States, France’s “sister republic,” refused to enter the war on France’s side. It was an infuriating show of ingratitude, as the French saw it, coming from a fledgling nation they had magnanimously saved from foreign occupation in a previous war.

Confronted by a monarchical Europe united in opposition to revolutionary France — old Europe, they might have called it — the Jacobins rooted out domestic political dissent. It was the beginning of the period that would become infamous as the Terror.

Among the Jacobins’ greatest triumphs was their ability to appropriate the rhetoric of patriotism — Le Patriote Français was the title of Brissot’s newspaper — and to promote their political program through a tightly coordinated network of newspapers, political hacks, pamphleteers and political clubs.

Even the Jacobins’ dress distinguished “true patriots”: those who wore badges of patriotism like the liberty cap on their heads, or the cocarde tricolore (a red, white and blue rosette) on their hats or even on their lapels.

Insisting that their partisan views were identical to the national will, believing that only they could save France from apocalyptic destruction, Jacobins could not conceive of legitimate dissent. Political opponents were treasonous, stabbing France and the Revolution in the back.

To defend the nation from its enemies, Jacobins expanded the government’s police powers at the expense of civil liberties, endowing the state with the power to detain, interrogate and imprison suspects without due process. Policies like the mass warrantless searches undertaken in 1792 — “domicilary visits,” they were called — were justified, according to Georges Danton, the Jacobin leader, “when the homeland is in danger.”

Robespierre — now firmly committed to the most militant brand of Jacobinism — condemned the “treacherous insinuations” cast by those who questioned “the excessive severity of measures prescribed by the public interest.” He warned his political opponents, “This severity is alarming only for the conspirators, only for the enemies of liberty.” Such measures, then as now, were undertaken to protect the nation — indeed, to protect liberty itself.

If the French Terror had a slogan, it was that attributed to the great orator Louis de Saint-Just: “No liberty for the enemies of liberty.” Saint-Just’s pithy phrase (like President Bush’s variant, “We must not let foreign enemies use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself”) could serve as the very antithesis of the Western liberal tradition.

On this principle, the Terror demonized its political opponents, imprisoned suspected enemies without trial and eventually sent thousands to the guillotine. All of these actions emerged from the Jacobin worldview that the enemies of liberty deserved no rights.

Though it has been a topic of much attention in recent years, the origin of the term “terrorist” has gone largely unnoticed by politicians and pundits alike. The word was an invention of the French Revolution, and it referred not to those who hate freedom, nor to non-state actors, nor of course to “Islamofascism.”

A terroriste was, in its original meaning, a Jacobin leader who ruled France during la Terreur.

François Furstenberg, a professor of history at the University of Montreal, is the author of "In the Name of the Father: Washington’s Legacy, Slavery and the Making of a Nation."

259) Carga Tributaria Brasileira

Carga Tributária Brasileira 016

Carga Tributária Brasileira - % PIB - Fonte MF
Ano 1990 1992 1994 2002 2006
Federal 20,53 17,50 19,90 22,08 23,75
Estadual 9,02 7,35 7,76 8,40 9,02
Municipal 0,95 1,00 0,95 1,38 1,46
Total 30,50 25,85 28,61 31,86 34,23

1 – Em 1990 o Governo Collor assumiu o governo com uma carga tributária de 30,50% do PIB, entregando o governo em 1992 com uma carga tributária de 25,85% do PIB. Redução de 15,24% em relação ao ano de 1990.

2 – Em 1992 o Governo Itamar Franco assumiu o governo com uma carga tributária de 25,85% do PIB, entregando o governo em 1994 com uma carga tributária de 28,61% do PIB. Aumento de 10,68% em relação ao ano de 1992.

3- Em 1995 o governo FHC assumiu o governo com uma carga tributária de 28.61% do PIB, entregando governo em 2002 com uma carga tributária de 31,86% do PIB. Aumento de 11,36% em relação ao ano de 1994.

4 – Em 2003 o governo Lula assumiu o governo com uma carga tributária de 31,86% do PIB, em 2006 a carga tributária migrou para 34,23% do PIB. Aumento de 7,43% em relação ao ano de 2002.

5 – Do ano de 1992 até o ano de 2006 a carga tributária brasileira teve um aumento de 32,42%.

258) Reivindicacoes nacionais sobre a Antartica

Atrás de commodities, países reivindicam áreas da Antártida
Rodrigo Uchoa
Valor Econômico, 24/10/2007

A sede por petróleo e minérios vêm levando os países a tentar garantir acesso privilegiado aos dois extremos do planeta, mesmo que atualmente convenções internacionais protejam os pólos.

Em agosto, uma expedição russa cercada de muita publicidade fincou uma bandeira do país de titânio inoxidável a 4.261 metros de profundidade, sob o Pólo Norte, e virtualmente tornou pública uma corrida por soberania que já vinha latente pela região, envolvendo Canadá e Noruega, entre outros.

Agora o foco se volta para o sul: o Reino Unido está preparando uma série de reivindicações territoriais sobre a Antártida, que devem ser apresentadas até maio de 2009, data-limite imposta pela ONU para pleitos sobre a área. Os britânicos devem reclamar cerca de 1 milhão de quilômetros quadrados de leito oceânico, numa região em que há alta probabilidade de existência de petróleo.

A Argentina disse que pretende reivindicar a plataforma submarina em torno das ilhas Malvinas (Falklands, para os britânicos), enquanto o Chile anunciou que também fará novas reivindicações. "Ainda temos tempo, mas estamos trabalhando com as instituições que têm de estar envolvidas nessas questões territoriais, como as Forças Armadas, cientistas, especialistas, assessores jurídicos etc. Estamos dentro do prazo", disse ontem o chanceler chileno, Alejandro Foxley.

É uma situação delicada, pois as reivindicações desses três países têm extensas áreas comuns. O modo como cada um defende suas aspirações é que cria a controvérsia, pois, para delimitar a área que considera sua, o país traça uma linha do ponto mais ocidental e outra do ponto mais oriental de seu território projetando-a até o Pólo Sul. O problema é que a Argentina, por exemplo, diz que seu ponto mais oriental fica em ilhas que hoje são administradas pelos britânicos - e esses, por sua vez, as contam para a sua pretensão territorial.

Sete países (Argentina, Austrália, Chile, França, Noruega, Nova Zelândia e Reino Unido) têm reivindicações sobre áreas da Antártida. Essas reivindicações não são reconhecidas, e o continente é na prática administrado pelos 45 países signatários do Tratado da Antártida, entre eles o Brasil.

Hoje, uma convenção internacional proíbe qualquer exploração de petróleo, gás ou minério na Antártida. Os países, entretanto, tomam iniciativas como forma de salvaguardar direitos para o caso de a convenção ser revista.

Organizações não-governamentais alertam que essa nova corrida pretende levar a um fato consumado: os territórios seriam reconhecidos e, depois, ficaria mas fácil revisar os acordos. "É absurdo [o Reino Unido] lançar essa nova corrida por petróleo do outro lado do mundo, quando deveria estar liderando o movimento mundial pela diminuição dos gases-estufa", disse Charles Kronick, do Greenpeace. A organização qualificou a pretensão britânica de "colossalmente irresponsável" e diz temer a piora da situação ambiental.

Segundo um trabalho do glaciólogo Jorge Arigony-Neto, pesquisador da UFRGS (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul), de 2001 a 2005 um grupo de 30 geleiras da península Antártida chegou a perder 4 mil metros quadrados de área por ano.

O governo brasileiro também se diz preocupado.

O oceanógrafo brasileiro Renato Capelini afirma que a cobiça dos países vem sendo alimentada pela comprovação de jazidas riquíssimas na região e na plataforma marítima que a circunda. Urânio, manganês, carvão e ferro já foram identificados. A existência de petróleo, por enquanto, ainda é só provável - mas de alta probabilidade, segundo ele.

(Com agências internacionais)

Corrida territorial no Pólo Sul preocupa o Brasil
De São Paulo, 24/10/2007

Diplomatas familiarizados com as disputas sobre a Antártida dizem que há uma preocupação do governo brasileiro de que uma eventual demarcação territorial desemboque na "exploração voraz dos recursos naturais" da região e prejudique os interesses do país no continente gelado.

O Brasil não tem uma reivindicação territorial, mas defende haver uma zona de interesse brasileira que coincide com as áreas pretendidas por argentinos, chilenos e britânicos. Para definir essa zona de interesse, uma linha foi traçada a oeste seguindo do Arroio Chuí até o Pólo Sul, enquanto a leste a linha projeta-se a partir das ilhas de Trindade e Martim Vaz, que ficam a aproximadamente 1,2 mil quilômetros do litoral do Espírito Santo.

"O país não tem a intenção de entrar numa 'corrida territorial' nem numa 'corrida por petróleo', mas deve defender seus interesses ante os fóruns internacionais adequados", disse um diplomata, que pediu para não ser identificado pela reportagem do Valor.

O Brasil aderiu ao Tratado da Antártida, em 16 de maio de 1975, e foi admitido como membro consultivo do tratado, com direito a voto, a partir de 12 de setembro de 1983, após a realização de sua primeira Operação Antártica. Para isso, teve de demonstrar o propósito de ampliar suas pesquisas no continente, inclusive com a instalação de uma estação brasileira. Atualmente, o Brasil mantém suas atividades concentradas no arquipélago das Shetlands do Sul, onde está a Estação Antártica Comandante Ferraz.

Até os anos 80, houve envolvimento da Petrobras em pesquisas para viabilizar uma eventual prospecção petrolífera, abandonadas após o país aderir ao tratado.

257) Uma analise do "socialismo" de Chavez

Um texto que tenta discernir as fontes do pensamento e a natureza do suposto "socialismo" do presidente da Venezuela, por um especialista da Costa Rica.

Venezuela: Chávez e o socialismo “sincrético”
por Destaque Internacional, Costa Rica, em 15 de dezembro de 2006

Resumo: Chávez não é mais que um instrumento a serviço do socialismo “sincrético”, que é uma mescla contraditória e ambígua de religião, de anarquismo, de indigenismo, pós-gramscismo e de comunismo.

O presidente reeleito da Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, em seu primeiro discurso depois de anunciados os resultados eleitorais de 3 de dezembro pp., estabeleceu a meta de seu novo mandato ao tempo em que deixou entrever os obstáculos que deverá enfrentar para alcançá-la. A meta de Chávez será o “aprofundamento” da “via venezuelana para o socialismo” e esta se justificaria, segundo o presidente venezuelano, pelo fato de que a Venezuela seria compactamente “vermelha, vermelhinha”.
Não obstante, na continuação, sugeriu em tom cauteloso e conciliador que “ninguém tenha medo do socialismo”, porque “o socialismo é humano, o socialismo é amor”. Se a Venezuela fosse totalmente “vermelha, vermelhinha” como o presidente reeleito se encarregou de proclamar, nenhum venezuelano deveria temer o socialismo e o presidente não teria tido necessidade de tranqüilizar os venezuelanos alegando o suposto lado “humano” e de “amor” do socialismo. Na realidade, a verdade histórica sobre as alegadas “bondades” do socialismo é outra, e para isso basta olhar para Cuba comunista, tão admirada por Chávez.
O presidente venezuelano está usando uma demagógica e multimilionária política assistencialista, valendo-se dos gigantescos recursos petrolíferos do Estado venezuelano. Além disso, somado aos mecanismos de controle dos meios de imprensa que lhe permitiram ter uma exposição televisiva 20 vezes maior que o candidato derrotado nas últimas eleições, permitiram-lhe arrastar uma parte considerável das camadas mais humildes. Porém, nem sequer isto seria possível se Chávez manifestasse abertamente uma meta comunista.
Por isso, o presidente venezuelano recorreu a um socialismo “sincrético”, cheio de ambigüidades e de elementos contraditórios que incluem desde invocações a Jesus Cristo, a Virgem de Chiquinquirá e São Miguel Arcanjo, passando por sua apologia do indegenismo e da teologia da libertação, com suas conseqüentes afirmações de que o “reino de Deus” se identificaria com o socialismo, mesclando ingredientes pós-gramscianos e das teorias do caos, tomados do Fórum Social Mundial (FSM) e condimentando o anterior com elogios estridentes ao sanguinário ditador Castro e à revolução cubana.
O socialismo “sincrético” chavista deixa para trás o racionalismo exacerbado que caracterizou o socialismo chamado “científico” e que desabou como categoria de pensamento junto com a derrubada da Cortina de Ferro. Vive-se uma época histórica marcada, cada vez mais, pelo que se denominou “pensamento fraco”, que deixa de lado as relações de causa e efeito, assim como a própria lógica. Neste contexto, a fórmula chavista de socialismo “sincrético” tem demonstrado uma capacidade de atrelamento que não se pode subestimar, na Venezuela e em outros países como a Bolívia, o Equador e a Nicarágua, onde candidatos que aplicaram as mesmas estratégias “sincréticas” chegaram ao poder por meio do sufrágio.
Não obstante o que foi dito anteriormente, Chávez, mesmo que venha a ser apresentado como o sucessor de Fidel Castro, não é o elemento mais importante do panorama. O próprio presidente venezuelano não é mais que um instrumento a serviço desse socialismo “sincrético” que, como já se disse, constitui uma mescla contraditória e ambígua de religião, de anarquismo, de indigenismo, de estratégias pós-gramscianas do Fórum Social Mundial (FSM) e de comunismo. O teórico anarquista norte-americano Michael Hardt, que junto com o italiano Toni Negri escreveu a obra “Império”, livro de cabeceira das novas gerações revolucionárias, encarregou-se de esclarecê-lo por ocasião do Fórum Social Mundial (FSM) realizado em Caracas em 2006.
Hardt mostrou um enorme interesse nos experimentos de des-organização social, com as características auto-gestionárias e anárquicas, quase se diria de pequenas tribos urbanas que se desenvolvem nas populações periféricas de Caracas. O mencionado teórico anarquista explicou, nesse sentido, que “Chávez é algo que se conhece, um inimigo dos norte-americanos, como Castro ou os sandinistas” e que, por sua visibilidade, acabará se desgastando da mesma maneira como se desgasta um pugilista à medida que recebe golpes. Por outro lado, explica Hardt, os novos movimentos auto-gestionários, como os das periferias de Caracas, teriam a vantagem de ser como “vírus incontroláveis”, “difíceis de ser identificados” e capazes de “passar através das fronteiras”, com o qual passariam a ser as grandes armas “anti-imperialistas”, mais do que Chávez, Morales, Ortega e Lula.
Dificilmente se compreenderá as complexidades do atual panorama latino-americano, assim como recentes fenômenos de manipulação de setores hispânicos dos Estados Unidos, se não se levar em consideração as novas estratégias revolucionárias “sincréticas”, com sua estratégia de expansão de “vírus” difíceis de ser identificados e neutralizados, em curso na Venezuela e em outros países da região.

Publicado por Destaque Internacional – Informes de Conjuntura – Ano IX – nº 203 – São José da Costa Rica 09 de dezembro de 2006 – Responsável : Javier González.
Tradução: Graça Salgueiro
© 2006 MidiaSemMascara.org

256) Um debate sobre as elites

Blog do Tambosi:
Segunda-feira, 3 de Setembro de 2007
Diga aí, presidente, o que é "elite"?

Tem gente acordada no Itamaraty. Ao que parece, nem tudo foi apetralhado. Em artigo corajoso, publicado hoje na Folha - que reproduzo a seguir -, o diplomata Marcelo Otávio Dantas bota os pingos nos ii. Que diabo é essa "elite", que é culpada por tudo e paga a conta de tudo? Por trás desse oportunismo conceitual, o viés autoritário...

Excelência, defina "elite"
MARCELO OTÁVIO DANTAS
Folha de São Paulo, Segunda-feira, 3 de Setembro de 2007

Quando alguém me pergunta qual o principal problema do Brasil atual, não hesito em responder: a falta de precisão vocabular. Vivemos sob o império dos sofismas, em que toda ilegalidade tem direito a um eufemismo, todo impostor, livre acesso à honradez, e toda bravata, o status de argumento. Num ambiente semelhante, o debate público, sério e fundamentado, se torna inviável.
Exemplos existem aos montes, mas talvez nenhum deles seja tão grave quanto a utilização que se vem fazendo do termo "elite".
Toda vez que um de nossos dirigentes precisa livrar-se de acusações, desqualificar opositores ou simplesmente neutralizar qualquer crítica, a palavra "elite" surge como o pecado feito verbo. Ela encarna tudo o que há de ruim e malvado, o dolo em essência, o egoísmo mais nocivo, a traição sempre à espreita.
Curiosamente, essa "elite" não tem rosto. Ela é sempre o outro -o inimigo, o desafeto, o adversário, o opositor. Em suma: o dissenso. Diz-se pertencer à "elite" o indivíduo ou instituição que ouse questionar os atos do poder. Em qualquer língua do planeta, esse substantivo afrancesado -"elite"- inclui o estamento dirigente da nação. Salvo no idioma falado pelos próceres de nossa República.
Aqui, ministros de Estado, secretários de governo, parlamentares, magistrados, diretores de bancos e empresas estatais, nenhum se julga parte da "elite". Tampouco são vistos como integrantes da "elite" usineiros heróicos, empreiteiros amigos, marqueteiros audazes ou banqueiros satisfeitos.
Já o cidadão de classe média que manifesta publicamente o seu desagrado com o Estado de anomia do país é, de imediato, acusado de tramar o eterno retorno das desigualdades sociais e da concentração de renda. A ofensa é absurda, mas poucos se dão conta disso.
Ora, quem paga os elevadíssimos impostos que, já de algum tempo, são cobrados no Brasil não pode ser acusado de responsável pelo atraso da nação. Os verdadeiros culpados são aqueles que tomam esses impostos sem investir corretamente na educação do povo e no desenvolvimento de nossas forças produtivas.
As "bandas podres" existem, disso não resta a menor dúvida. Mas hoje, tal como ontem, elas vivem em conúbio com o Estado. O atual governo não moveu uma palha para mudar tal quadro. Pelo contrário, especializou-se em lotear cargos e apadrinhar o fisiologismo. Além disso, encampou a ortodoxia monetária tucana, continuando a desperdiçar o arrocho fiscal no enriquecimento dos grandes investidores nacionais e estrangeiros.
Como pode então que os dirigentes continuem a ver nas vaias de alguns ou nas críticas da imprensa a mão conspiratória da "elite"? Dá vontade de dizer: "Excelência, defina elite!". O uso sofístico do conceito de "elite" teve sua origem em nossa intelectualidade. Foi ela quem ensinou aos atuais homens de poder a conveniente manipulação da antinomia elite-povo e quem primeiro se auto-excluiu da tão odiosa "elite brasileira".
Ao passar décadas tratando a "elite" como um bloco monolítico e, sobretudo, ao fazer de conta que um país justo se possa estruturar sem elites técnicas, científicas, intelectuais, políticas, burocráticas, artísticas e econômicas, nossa intelectualidade transformou o conceito em um mero clichê ao dispor das lideranças populistas de viés autoritário.
Basta-lhes agora dizer "eu sou o povo" e todo questionamento passa a estar identificado com a insatisfação da "elite reacionária". Basta-lhes repetir "o povo chegou ao poder" e o papel histórico da democracia se cumpre, tornando-se ela um instrumento obsoleto. Para que alternância de partidos se quem está de fora é a "elite"? O atual debate sobre a crise aérea espelha à perfeição os efeitos nefastos desse pântano conceitual. Todas as críticas são ditas "provenientes da elite". O próprio tema dos aeroportos em pane e do caos regulatório do setor é tratado como um assunto menor, de exclusivo interesse da "elite".
Dois aviões já caíram. Quantos mortos a mais serão necessários para que os governistas de plantão acordem de seu transe?
Nenhum povo jamais foi redimido pelo sucateamento dos setores de ponta da economia. Em um debate público sério, estaríamos agora discutindo a crônica incapacidade de nossos governos em assegurar a modernização da infra-estrutura do país. Ao insistirmos na utilização oportunista de conceitos, continuaremos enfrentando crise após crise. O Brasil ficará para trás. A pobreza se eternizará. E a democracia descerá pelo ralo.

MARCELO OTÁVIO DANTAS , 43, formado em ciências econômicas pela UFRJ (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro), é escritor, roteirista e diplomata de carreira, autor do livro "Três Vezes Mago" (no prelo). É chefe da Divisão de Assuntos Multilaterais Culturais do Ministério das Relações Exteriores.

Postado por Orlando Tambosi às 11:50

Debate postado:
14 comentários:

Aluízio Amorim disse...
Tambosi: o artigo de Dantas está bom. Mas não é nenhuma novidade. Já me reportei ao fato dessa mistificação de conceditos inúmeras vezes no meu blog e no site do Diego Casagrande e venho fazendo isso há muito tempo. De toda sorte é bom que o artigo tenha saído na grande mídia que continua atrasada neste debate. E é uma ótima pauta para os jornalistas. Só não é executada porque a maioria acredita nessas histórias do PT.
12:36 PM

Orlando Tambosi disse...
Falamos disso longamente, Aluízio. Mas é importante que alguém de dentro do governo fale isto. Não é comum, principalmente no Itamaraty sob o tacão do secretário-geral que mandava a turma ler livros antiamericanos, por exemplo.
12:47 PM

Aluizio Amorim disse...
Não estou dizendo que o post não seja oportuno. Noto apenas que estão atrasados no debate. Como o meu blog não está alojado num desses grandes portais o que eu escrevo conta pouco, além do quê não sou funcionário do Itamaraty nem medalhão da grande mídia, não estou ungido nem pelo poder do Estado e nem pelo status de integrar a grande mídia. Mas estou na frente deles, muito à frente...hehehe...e quero crer que vc mesmo já escreveu também sobre isso além do que falamos mil vezes sobre esta questão, sim.
1:26 PM

SHERLOCK disse...
O Presidente e sua corte deve entender muito bem o que é ser da 'elite', posto que hoje eles só tomam vinho de R$ 6.000,00 a garrafa, usam avião de luxo específico para seus passeios no exterior, ternos Armani etc. Ser da elite é isso aí. Agora, nós, pobres mortais, que bancamos todo esse luxo, pagamos a conta e o pato, levando a culpa pela incompetência dos nossos governantes.
Só no Brasil é que uma coisa desse fica impune!
1:49 PM

Leticia disse...
Olha, vou no popular mesmo. Os pobres morreriam não fosse a elite. Sem ela, eles não têm capacidade de arrancar um pé de mandioca da frente de casa. Se não fossem as elites, eles também não saberiam o que é reclamar.
2:19 PM

Orlando Tambosi disse...
Letícia, não fossem a malditas elites não teríamos inteligência, ciência, tecnologia, empresas etc.
Comeríamos rapadura dia e noite...
2:22 PM

Aristokraut disse...
Se tivéssemos alguns Marcelo Otávio Dantas no Parlamento, nas cátedras da Universidade, nas redações da grande mídia, nos púlpitos daS igrejas,o pt não estaria com essa corda toda. Todo mundo sabe, por exemplo, que falar de zelo pelo estado democrático de direito e estímulo das forças produtivas do país como condições sine qua non do progresso econõmico e social do país é considerado no meio academico um pecado capital. Quem o comete sofre toda sorte de represália, torna-se proscrito e, no extremo, pode até ser vítima da completa aniquilação moral. O único meio de se ter sucesso na luta honesta contra esse estado de coisas é desmascarar a novilíngua esquerdista, da qual o discurso do pt é o dialeto oficial em que o brasileiro médio, em especial o jovem, está forjando um repertório confuso de idéias, cuja expressão peca pela ´falta de precisão vocabular´ e pelo atentado á lógica.
3:09 PM

Maria do Espírito Santo disse...
Desculpe-me Aluízio, mas percepção do problema é uma coisa e tratamento do tema é outra. Creio que todos os que por aqui transitam têm a mesma percepção do problema mas a abordagem do Marcelo Dantas foi precisa, exata. O carinha diplô não é só corajoso e lúcido: escreve estupendamente bem. Bem melhor do que qualquer um de nós. A questão do "defina Elite" é o cerne do problema. É nela que se cruzam o político, o filosófico, o lingüístico e o ideológico. E o diplozinho (Só 43 aninhos? Sai de baixo!) mostrou todos estes nós num texto curto e muito bem estruturado. É isso.
4:49 PM

Aluizio Amorim disse...
Maria, inteligência independe de idade. Há jovens brilhantes e velhos estúpidos e vice-versa. O que Dantas está dizendo com ares de originalidade já cansei de escrever. Reafirmo que ele é faísca atrasada. Seu escrito é valioso porque ele é ungido pelo poder da diplomacia, detém cargo de importância e destaque e está escrevendo num dos maiores jornais do país. Aliás, acho ótimo que a discussão finalmente chegue à grande mídia, embora não veja nada de extraordinário no seu texto. É apenas uma bom artigo.
5:10 PM

Zappi disse...
Olá Tambosi.
Primeiro, queria parabenizá-lo pelos 200.000! Aqui vai um presentinho, a localização dos Tambosi na Itália aqui
Segundo, o artigo desse diplomata que trabalha no ministério de Relações Exteriores está muito bem escrito.
Terceiro, ele vai ser chutado. Com certeza.
5:28 PM

Orlando Tambosi disse...
Minha gente vem de lá, sim.
De um lugarejo chamado Pergine, próximo a Trento.
Obrigado.
5:47 PM

Aristokraut disse...
Eu não vejo no texto do Dantas afetação de originalidade, vejo, sim, uma análise rigorosa e uma sólida argumentação, expostas com rara elegãncia estilística, que prima pela concisão e clareza. Justamente o oposto da impostura intelectual dos petistas e ideólogos da esquerda. Estes, empoleirados em universidades e jornais, se arrogam legisladores da língua, que, junto com a lógica, a retórica, o direito e tudo o mais que concerne ao emprego da palavra, é instrumentalizada para servir aos seus vis propósitos. E o que eles fazem/Impregnam as palavras com todo tipo de conotação, de modo que fique difícil, ou até impossível, defini-las. Assim, em qualquer debate, se não apelam feio para argumentos ad personam, como é de praxe, podem se servir dos mais variados sofismas; silosgismos com mais de tr~es termos, induções apressadas, inversão do modus tollens, conclusões tiradas de premissas ocultas, argumentação indireta construída a partir de proposições contrárias ou até sub-contrárias........ Mas a situação ainda é muito pior,pois, nessa novilingua, a contradição não é mais condição necessária e suficiente da falsidade do discurso. E ´num ambiente semelhante, o debate público, sério e fundamentado, se torna inviável´ Se o artigo do Otávio Dantas não atinge a perfeição, é porque se limita á análise de apenas um caso, sem dúvida gritante, de empulhação linguística, deixando uma vasta gama de conceitos á merc~e do terrorismo cultural esquerdista. Seja como for, esse Otávio Dantas é, além de inteligente, muito corajoso, pois, com 43 anos, provavelmente está em início de carreira, e, não tenham dúvidas, vão infernizá-lo. Deus o proteja.
7:26 PM

debora disse...
Aluizio, faz tanta diferença assim ser reconhecido como o primeiro a ter levantado determinada questão? Que ótimo que você esteja à frente de muita gente mas a sua reação ao texto do Otávio Dantas soa um tanto ressentida. Este tipo de reação desvia qualquer discussão de seu mérito para a paternidade de quem levantou o assunto. Posso estar errada, mas seus comentários me parecem tentativas de desqualificar o artigo de Otávio Dantas e sinceramente, isso passa longe de ser o ponto dessa questão.
12:41 AM

Aristokraut disse...
ERRATA -Corrijo-me no meu último comentário. Onde se le condição necessária e suficiente, leia-se condição suficiente, pois um discurso que não encerre nenhuma contradição conceitual pode ainda ser falso.
E uma dica para o Aluízio. Se vc. já se cansou de escrever sobre esse assunto, agradeça ao Otávio Dantas, porque ele parece ter muito fõlego
1:39 AM

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Defina elite, presidente!
Do Blog do Tambosi. Diga aí, presidente, o que é "elite"? Tem gente acordada no Itamaraty. Ao que parece, nem tudo foi apetralhado. Em artigo corajoso, publicado hoje na Folha - que reproduzo a seguir -, o diplomata Marcelo Otávio ...
Postado por Marta Bellini às 7:54 PM

255) Impunidade privilegiada: poderosos só podem ser indiciados com autorização de juizes do STF

Transcrevendo uma matéria que sem dúvida alguma merece registro:

Impunidade: STF decide que PF não pode indiciar, sem autorização prévia, quem tem foro privilegiado
Jorge Serrão
Quinta-feira, Outubro 11, 2007

Seis dos onze ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal deram ontem mais uma contribuição para a impunidade no País em que o respeito à lei e a ordem é algo seletivo. Os todo-poderosos ministros do STF decidiram ontem que a Polícia Federal não pode indiciar autoridades com direito a foro privilegiado, sem autorização da Corte. A medida serve de recurso à impunidade ou à protelação na punição de deputados, senadores e ministros que cometem desvios ou praticam atos de corrupção. Decidindo assim, o Supremo foge de sua atribuição legal de julgar questões constitucionais para se meter na avaliação técnica de questões criminais, administrativas ou políticas.

Os ministros do STF ainda se deram mais poderes políticos protegidos sob a capa jurídico-constitucional. No julgamento de ontem, eles também concordaram que o STF tem poderes para abrir investigações criminais contra agentes públicos, mesmo que o procurador-geral da República discorde disso. O Supremo resolveu que, no futuro, quando o inquérito for concluído, caberá ao chefe do Ministério Público decidir se apresenta ou não denúncia no caso. Se a resposta for negativa, só então a investigação poderá ser arquivada.

A votação foi apertada. Terminou em seis votos a quatro a favor da impunidade. A suprema sabedoria jurídica de seis ministros definiu que os policiais federais não podem indiciar agentes públicos com direito a foro privilegiado sem o aval prévio do próprio STF. O ministro Gilmar interpretou que, se a Constituição Federal concedeu foro especial a certas autoridades, é de competência exclusiva do STF supervisionar as investigações. Concordaram com a tese dele os ministros Carlos Alberto Direito, Cármen Lúcia Antunes Rocha, Ricardo Lewandowski, Eros Grau e Cezar Peluso. Na tese de Gilmar Mendes, “a Polícia Federal não está autorizada a abrir inquérito contra parlamentares ou o presidente da República. Isso levaria ao total esvaziamento da prerrogativa de foro”.

Na corrente oposta, estiveram Marco Aurélio Mello, Joaquim Barbosa, Carlos Ayres Britto e Celso de Mello. Mesmo apresentando um argumento de extrema precisão constitucional, o ministro Marco Aurélio não conseguiu convencer outros gênios jurídicos daquela Corte que tem poderes quase divinos: “A Polícia Federal e a Polícia Civil devem atuar no campo investigativo independentemente de qualquer autorização. A prerrogativa de foro se refere a processar e julgar. Na fase de inquérito, nós não temos processos, nós temos autos da investigação. Inquérito policial só pode ser instaurado pela polícia”.

Solução de cidadania urgente
A decisão de seis ministros do STF só contribui para a impunidade e a injustiça no Brasil.
È hora de a sociedade brasileira se mobilizar para que seja criado um órgão especial para julgar crimes da administração pública, sem privilégios ou rigores seletivos.
A sociedade brasileira precisa pressionar para que se acabe com o foro privilegiado.
Afinal, uns não podem ser mais iguais que os outros – conforme ironia da fábula “animal Farm (A Revolução dos Bichos), do inglês George Orwell – mesmo autor de “1984” – livro que mostra como funciona um Estado autoritário, mas pretensamente democrático, como o atual Estado brasileiro da República Sindicalista

254) China e Russia como dois modelos de economias de mercado, mas nao de democracias liberais

Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: The Russian Model
Do Russia and China Provide an Alternative to Liberal Democracy?
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Russia Profile, October 5, 2007
link: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20071009/83042487.html

Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan S. Burger, Vlad Ivanenko, Eugene Kolesnikov, Eric Kraus, Andrew Kuchins, Andrei Lebedev, Ira Straus, Andrei Tsgyankov

Freedom House, a U.S.-based public advocacy institution, recently released its annual "Countries at the Crossroads" report for 2007. The report basically recognizes that Russia and China are pursuing similar and so far quite successful development models that have almost nothing to do with liberal democracy, but very much to do with competitive market systems.

The report draws the conclusion that Russia and China represent a well thought-out and consistently implemented alternative to the Western model –an alternative that some in the U.S. policy community have already dubbed "authoritarian capitalism."

The model borrows from the West what makes it so successful economically – market capitalism based on private property and reasonable state regulation. But it rejects the second, political component - liberal democracy.

The report states: "The emergence of a 21st Century authoritarian-capitalist model is not limited to China. Russia, another regional power with ambitions on the global stage, is developing a model of governance that denies basic political rights for its citizens and shuns democratic accountability, while charting an economic course that is capitalist, albeit with deep state involvement in economic affairs. President Vladimir Putin's Kremlin presents what it calls 'sovereign democracy' as its paradigm for governance. This concept, which in practice contains little in the way of genuine democratic governance, is also held out as an example for hybrid regimes and autocracies on the Russian Federation's periphery."

Freedom House is concerned that the economic success and rapid social progress of Russia and China would provide a tempting development path for many countries in the world. Indeed, former Soviet nations like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are already developing, by and large, according to the Russian model, while democratic Ukraine or Georgia are mired in a perpetual power struggle that ensures instability and harms growth.

Freedom House fears the Chinese and Russian efforts to project their model and influence abroad, and finds this to be enough grounds to accuse Russia and China of irresponsible international behavior: "China and Russia are also actively exerting influence abroad.

China, for example, provides material and political support to odious regimes in Sudan, Burma, North Korea and Zimbabwe. Russia, for its part, works to undermine nascent democratic reform in neighboring countries such as Georgia and Ukraine. Energy plays a pivotal role in these countries' international approaches. Russia, rich in crude oil and natural gas, exerts influence in neighboring former Soviet states by using its energy resources to subsidize politically friendly, autocratic countries and pressure states that display disloyalty to the Kremlin. Energy hungry Beijing, on the other hand, is scouring the globe in pursuit of oil and gas to fuel its economy, and is willing to do whatever it takes to enter into energy deals with some of the world's worst governments. There is little to suggest that the government in either one of these countries is yet prepared to act consistently as a 'responsible stakeholder' on the international stage."

This does not appear to be fair – Russia and China have been acting quite responsibly on the international scene, working quietly to defuse major political crises by exercising multilateral diplomacy, as opposed to Washington's preference for a unilateral use of force. The case of Iraq clearly undermines the U.S. claim to being a responsible international stakeholder.

The reason behind such accusations is genuine fear that the success of the Russian model would make the democracy promotion agenda, and with it Freedom House itself, largely irrelevant.

As Andrew Kuchins writes in the latest issue of the National Interest, "If the authoritarian capitalist system promotes economic growth and raises living standards for millions—or in the Chinese case, hundreds of millions—democracy promotion will be in trouble. It would appear that most people living in relative poverty will prioritize prosperity over political activism."

What exactly is "the Russian Model"? How successful economically and politically is it going to be? How many admirers and followers will it inspire to follow suit? Is it endemically incompatible with the "Western Model" or, as Freedom House asserts, hostile to it? Could the two systems coexist peacefully or maybe even converge?
________________________________

Vlad Ivanenko, Ph.D. Economics, Statistics Canada, Ottawa

The ranking of countries by the level of democratization provided by Freedom House suffers from two shortcomings. First, its methodology is based on subjective evaluation made by independent experts, which is an inferior method to those used in competing indices. For example, the index calculated within the Polity IV project and, of late, the MGIMO index, which are based on formalization and quantification of democratic traits, which allows less space for human error. Second, the assumption of independence on the part of Freedom House experts has been violated. According to an interview with a formerly high-ranking Freedom House employee published last year, the organization's index was biased, sometimes deliberately, to prompt a specific policy response in Washington. This action was justified on the grounds that it helped to speed up changes in former socialist countries, but as soon as such intent became public, the credibility of Freedom House's work was ruined.

Freedom House places Russia at the bottom of its list, which is incredible. In alternative surveys, Russia is ranked somewhere between the developed European countries and obvious autocracies, nearer its fellow BRIC countries, below India and Brazil but above China. This outlook appears to be closer to reality.

The work on democratization indices should not stop here. Investigation of sub-indices reveals positions in which Russia performs the worst. Low accountability of public servants, their corruption and propensity to support local monopolies are the main factors that determine the country's relatively low rank. It should be noted that these deficiencies do not form a basis of a specifically Russian system of governance – or a model alternative to democracy – but represent deviations from the pattern established in the West. No one will argue in Russia that it is not in the national interests to raise state accountability; however, at the moment there is neither pressure from the middle class – the main benefactor of democratic innovations – nor sharp realization on the part of the Russian elite of the danger that poor standards of governance bring about.

The current dynamic indicates that Russia will move closer to Western standards, which is unsurprising. Because Russia continues to develop economically, the demand for public accountability will increase as the number of middle class swells. A growing national outreach of formerly regional monopolies raises pressure on internal barriers erected by local officials. This is exactly the correct sequence of democratization - standards of living come first and democratic institutions follow, building on this base. According to empirical literature, a survey of which was made by Martin Paldam and Erich Gundlach in Two Views on Institutional Development, economic growth has historically preceded the demand for democratic institutions and not vice versa.

The West has both the interest and means to speed up this process; however, the current sequence of its interventions isn't working, and with good reason. It is pointless to attempt to play on the differences among the Russian elite to invoke changes, and it is dangerous to concentrate on the promotion of human rights that do not command popular support in this country. The concept of "sovereign democracy" is a stern warning to outsiders not to press Russia into accepting changes that the country doesn't want. The formation of the middle class is the key to successful democratization and the introduction of good business practices is a contributing factor. In both areas, the West commands significant expertise that it can employ bringing Russia closer to its standards.
________________________________

Andrew Kuchins, Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.

(reprinted with the author's permission from Etat Terrible, his review of Robert Kagan's book Dangerous Nation, The National Interest, Aug. 29, 2007)

If the authoritarian capitalist system promotes economic growth and raises living standards for millions—or in the Chinese case, hundreds of millions—democracy promotion will be in trouble. It would appear that most people living in relative poverty will prioritize prosperity over political activism. Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the role model for authoritarian capitalists as the leader who brought his country from the Third World to the First, commented on the Chinese system's durability in an interview in 2004: "If in 20 years they bring China's progress, not just in the coastal areas, but also the interior, to conditions like those of Korea of the 1980s, the Chinese people will buy that. The people's ambition at present is not to achieve political rights or representative government. They just want to arrive as a developed nation."

Putin has capitalized similarly on the Russian peoples' desire for prosperity and international respect to bolster his authoritarian-capitalist regime. Putin's Russia is on an extraordinary historical roll fueled by remarkable economic-growth levels that have increased Russia's nominal dollar GDP from less than $200 billion in 1999 to more than $1 trillion in 2007. Incomes have grown by a factor of four times over this period. While modernization theories have argued that growing prosperity will be accompanied by a more plural, even democratic, political system, Putin has defied this by systematically weakening the fragile democratic institutions he inherited. Even without controlling national TV, with economic numbers like these, Mr. Putin would probably still be wildly popular among his citizens. With his convincing performance before the International Olympic Committee that won the 2014 Winter Olympics for the Russian city of Sochi, Putin has probably transcended rock-star status in Russia. Russians would likely be perfectly happy if he decided to stay on beyond his constitutionally mandated second term in 2008 and preside as Russian president when those Olympic Games take place in seven years.

Russia and China have been united in their efforts to break the momentum of democratic color revolutions that appeared to be sweeping Eurasia when President Bush spoke so eloquently about democracy and peace in his second inaugural in 2005. As Thomas Carothers argued in 2006, "The growing backlash has yet to coalesce into a formal or organized movement. But its proponents are clearly learning from and feeding off of one another." From Eurasia to Africa to the Middle East, the promising wave of democratization of only a few years ago appears to have lost momentum while the authoritarian capitalists have mobilized.

The alignment between the Beijing Consensus and the Kremlin's sovereign democracy produces several significant implications for foreign policy and international relations. First, there is not just one correct path to development. A country must innovate and experiment to find the path best suited to its cultures and traditions, and no country or organization should seek to impose external models. The majority of Russians today view the advice of Western advisors and multilateral organizations as a failure that exacerbated Russia's socioeconomic problems. The typical Chinese interpretation of Russian development over the past 15 years suggests that Moscow took the wrong path in the 1990s, but that the Putin Administration has learned many things from the Chinese reform experience and has begun to correct those past mistakes that devolved too much power from the state.

The other similarity between Moscow's and Beijing's views of the world concerns the ongoing shifting balance of power away from the unipolar moment of the 1990s to a genuinely multipolar world. This rhetoric is not new, but the difference today is that there is a lot more evidence to support the conclusion that the global balance of power is shifting, and the Russians feel themselves to be one of the emerging powers. For several years now the financial and investment community has used the term BRIC to describe the large emerging economic world powers: Brazil, Russia, India and China.

Putin himself recently alluded to the emergence of the BRIC as a powerful stimulus towards a reordered multipolar world in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007: "The combined GDP measured in purchasing power parity of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts, this gap will only increase in the future. There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centers of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity."
________________________________

Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C.

While in the short term, the Russian and Chinese economic models appear to be succeeding, both countries' futures depend on their ability to evolve both economically and politically, including not pursuing foreign and military policies that alienate potential customers and suppliers.

Russia is a raw materials exporter. If the price for energy were low, Russia would be suffering extreme economic problems. It must not be overlooked that it was during the first two years of President Vladimir Putin's rule that the country progressed the most – when he was operating in large part with holdovers from the Yeltsin era. Moscow and St. Petersburg are not representative of Russia. Its industry is not competitive. The vast majority of the wealth in the country is in the hands of relatively few individuals. It has a political system based on personalities, not political parties; the transition to a situation that is really stable is a long way off.

Far more important than its macro-economic data are its quality of life figures. While there have been small gains in this area, a huge amount remains to be done. The country has major demographic, environmental and health problems. If well-being is measured by quality of life, Russians are not doing well. One highlight worth noting, however, is Putin's call for a $1-trillion infrastructure program. If successful, the concerns expressed above may not be as severe as they presently appear.

China is a country of contrasts. Beijing and Shanghai are certainly impressive, but the bulk of the Chinese population lives in the rural part of the country and has not benefited from the country's recent successes. China depends on exports for its income rather than a domestic market. There is global concern about the health and safety of Chinese goods. Will Western industrial companies feel confident using Chinese-produced goods as inputs for industrial products as a means to stay competitive in today's global market?

China received a large share of its foreign investment due to low labor costs, which is partially the result of an undervalued currency. Yet China faces greater competition from other low wage countries such as Vietnam. It also suffers from significant demographic and environmental problems. As a communist country, its regulatory bodies are incapable of regulating state controlled industries and those controlled by persons with ties to the leadership.

Charles Edward Lindblom's Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic System is as true today as it was more than 25 years ago. Both Russia and China can develop up to a certain level, but without good long-range economic policies and political reform, they are bound to fail. Both countries need not be liberal democracies or even functioning democracies in order to succeed economically. Nonetheless, neither state will fulfill its potential without meeting the needs of its people, respecting international human and labor rights, and establishing a real rule of law in the country. At a minimum, greater predictability is needed in order to ensure continued investment and prevent capital flight. For example, Gazprom should not only be investing in its own operations, but also acquiring assets abroad.

Both countries need to strengthen their own education systems and also offer their most talented individuals, who are not necessarily its most wealthy (most of the wealthy having gained their wealth through connections rather than ingenuity), an incentive to remain in the country. Hosting the Olympics is no measure of future success.
________________________________

Andrei Tsygankov, Professor of Political Science, San Francisco State University, San Francisco

What Freedom House doesn't know or doesn't want to know about democracy is that it cannot function without proper economic and security conditions in place. These conditions include a strong middle class and an environment relatively free from threats. In the absence of these conditions, an authoritiarian regime will not progress to democracy, and a democracy will be vulnerable to left or right wing demagogues. Time and again, the world demonstrates how even well-established democratic systems, such as the United States, fall short of democratic standards when threatened by terrorism.

Should we be surprised that countries like Russia and China have other things to worry about than democracy? Russia lacks both security and a middle class, and the memory of the "democracy" of the 1990s is still fresh in people's mind. China has fewer issues with security – apart from its continuous problems with Taiwan – but is under far more serious pressure to provide decent living standards for its huge population. In addition, both Russia and China are civilizations, rather than merely states, and therefore need to formulate civilizational ideas in order to be genuinely successful in their economic and political development. Those who insist that there are no Russian or Chinese models of democracy are correct. However, there are special Russian and Chinese cultural conditions, and they dictate that there must be special models of adaptation to democracy.

Unfortunately, not infrequently, democracy and human rights are no more than a rhetorical tool of exerting pressures on non-compliant states. Upon closer scrutiny, democratizers turn out to be the same people who wish to weaken, not strengthen, Russia and China's economic and security conditions. They have already done their share of destroying Russia's economy and middle class by recommending that Moscow adopt standards of neoliberalism. They have also promoted independence for Chechnya and Taiwan, and they used every opportunity to castigate Moscow and Beijing for brutal human rights violations. Today they say that Russia doesn't have to worry about being surrounded by NATO bases and anti-ballistic missiles, as long as these are deployed on territories of democratic states. Clearly,

this kind of democracy promotion is in trouble, as neither Russia nor China is eager to buy the "democratic" advice.
________________________________

Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands

In his article 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers," recently published in Foreign Affairs, Azar Gat posed the question whether authoritarian capitalism can lead to retreat of liberal democracy in the world or even to formation of a "second world" of authoritarian capitalist powers. Unlike Freedom House, which just repeated his thesis on the rise of authoritarian capitalism and quipped about Russia's and China's authoritarian rules, Gat was more cautious in his analysis. He admitted "liberal democracy's supposedly inherent economic advantage is far less clear than is often assumed," and "authoritarian capitalist regimes are at least as successful—if not more so—in the early stages of development, but they tend to democratize after crossing a certain threshold of economic and social development."

Putting aside politically motivated labeling of Russia as an authoritarian capitalist power and presenting it as belonging to the same league as China, we should look into the main driving force behind the phenomenon of authoritarian capitalism, considered, however, in a broader sense of the decisive role of the state in economic and social development.

This driving force, as tension between electric poles, is created by the imperative to catch up with the West in the areas of economic development and modernization. If the economic and modernization gap between, for example, Russia and the West was not so significant, Russia could afford to rely on self-organizing mechanisms of liberal democracy and the free market. But this is not the case. Catch-up modernization necessitates implementation of mobilization strategies, which is impossible without the state playing a strong role. Such strategies were successfully implemented by South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and some other countries. Russia and China are pursuing the same inevitable approach.

Liberalization and democratization will progress as the catch-up modernization progresses. In Russia, this relationship is more or less straightforward. It would not be surprising if in 15-20 years Russia becomes the model of democracy and morally restrained liberalism. The Chinese case, however, is much more complicated. Uncontrolled democratization in China may lead to collapse and chaos. Avoiding such an outcome is as important a priority for the Chinese regime as modernization itself. Success of the catch-up modernization in purportedly democratic India is far from assured, given the tremendous and quite explosive structural and societal issues it faces.

There is no example of successful catch-up modernization without a strong state role or massive external help. Even the revival of Western Europe after World War II was based on the mechanisms of significant state intervention and extensive Marshall Plan aid. Russia and China cannot count on massive external aid, so they have to rely on state mobilization strategies.

It is very disconcerting that Freedom House, which traditionally articulates the opinion of the U.S. State Department, is missing the key point in the debate about authoritarian capitalism—what drives it. This means that the most influential country in the world remains in the grip of ideological constructs and refuses to face real global challenges.
________________________________

Ira Strauss, US Coordinator, Committee on Russia in NATO

It is disappointing to see, from the question, how even some of the most reasonable Russian foreign policy writers tend to define themselves and their country by way of polemic with Western authorities or quasi-authorities, in this case Freedom House. And to half-embrace the very polemic against Russia, one that lumps Russia together with China, as long as it serves to make Russia feel strong and successful vis-à-vis its great enemy Freedom House.

Freedom House's comment amounts to boosting Russia as a major enemy of world freedom; not a pigeonhole that Russia would presumably want for itself. The willingness to embrace this can only suggest a wish among Russians for being attributed a greatness of any kind, no matter how prone to bring hostility down upon Russia or damage upon its interests.

Similarly, the question accepts Freedom House's designation of the Putin regime as authoritarian. I have to wonder if this is possible only because it sneaks through in a context of saying that Russia is a major power and a kind of successful model, even if a negative one.

No less significant is the attempt to dismiss valid criticisms of Russian and Chinese irresponsibility in international affairs by pointing to wrong and irresponsible U.S. actions. This is not significant logically, to be sure. It does however have a psychological significance, as a part of the emerging Russian national spirit of complaining whenever there is any criticism of Russia for anything about being treated unfairly by the United States and accusing the West of double standards. There are three things that can be said to bring us back to elementary Aristotelian logic.

First, that Freedom House's criticisms of Russia are fair and pretty accurate, and the substance of them is important.

Second, Freedom House is not the United States. Americans are free to speak; so is the U.S. government. It does not exactly create conditions for good faith discussion to suggest they should shut up because the U.S. government has done some things wrong.

Third, bad American policies do not justify bad Russian policies, nor excuse Russian policies when they are not merely bad but motivated in a noticeable degree by malice, nor deprive Americans of a right to criticize those policies.

Russians criticize American policies all the time. It is time for them to accept that it goes both ways. People all around the world criticize both countries and rightly so; the policies of any major power affect everyone. Russians deserve no exemption. It is taken for granted that American policy will be criticized, no matter what the policy is. It is time for Russians to grow some thicker skin and stop complaining when they are criticized far more mildly.

There is not a Russia-China model, they have followed opposite paths away from communism. China, while gradually introducing economic pragmatism, has retained a Communist Party dictatorship, excluding the formation of other parties, massively censoring the media, and retaining political and religious repression on a scale several orders of magnitude higher than Russia.

Russia sent the Communist Party out of power and abolished the entire Communist political system. It has recently reverted toward hegemonial rule from the Kremlin and a one-party hegemonial system that it hoped would be like the Japanese model, but has ended up at this stage more like the Mexican one. This is simply not a thought-out authoritarian exit from communism. It is a reaction that needs to be considered in a different context.

Both countries are still in a political transition that is rapid in historical terms, although of course not as fast in Russia today as it had been in 1989-91.

There has been a scandalous lack of scientific method in comparisons of "models". For 15 years "the Chinese model" has been a synonym for equating authoritarianism with successful reform. But what is "the Chinese model"? Equally unscientific has been the comparison of the gradualism and economic reform first of "the Chinese model" to Russia with its political democracy first and subsequent "shock therapy." Which period in Russia should be examined: the Kosygin period, which was one precisely of gradualism and economic reform first, and which hit a dead end due largely to the lack of political reform? Or the Gorbachev period, which was also gradual but not economic? Or only Yeltsin? And why compare only Russia and China? There seems to be no reason except a desire to reach a foreordained pro-authoritarian conclusion. That conclusion could not be sustained if the comparative effort were even marginally scientific.

Russians long ago figured out that the Chinese model wouldn't work for them because, as the joke went, "we don't have enough Chinese." The same goes for the Japanese model of consensus democracy: not enough Japanese.

Russia is Russia: European, Slavic and Christian. Its development and its stable system, if it ever arrives at one, will be a variant of European models ones, with all the inherent intellectual pluralism that derives from a millennium of participation in European cultural development, coupled with elements held in common with other post-communist states. If that happens, it will finally be possible to say what model it is, or adheres to. Until then, we are talking only trends and developments, and - sadly - misplaced pride.
________________________________

Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow

The "Russian model," to be fair, is hardly devoted to private property – the cornerstone of the market economy. The latest examples are the "Olympic corporation" bill, now being passed by the State Duma, and the growing number of mammoth state corporations.

The Olympic corporation bill provides for unconditional requisitioning of real estate in case of "state necessity." Such requisition would be irrevocable and not even subject to appeal in court. This is hardly a market measure.

State corporations swiftly become as fashionable in Russia as they have become in other countries – both in liberal and not-so-liberal democracies. The catch is that state corporations are neither state nor private. The state gives them the right to use property, thus stripping itself of the main features of the property holder: the right to possession, use and disposal. The managers of state corporations become quasi-oligarchs, devoid of the need to compete and to prove market effectiveness, but subject to the political will of the state. In other words, state corporations are an ideal economic base for the vertical of power.

Neither liberal democracy nor market economy, the Russian model is a tool designed to safeguard and promote state interests, both inside the country and abroad. Of course it is vastly different from the Western model, though claims close kinship with it. The two models are not hostile; they compete.

This reminds me of "peaceful coexistence and competition of the two systems" – a popular slogan of Soviet propaganda. In this sense, the two models are compatible all right. More than that, the more centralized Russian model may happen to be more powerful, at least initially. But that depends.

Russia's economic model is at an important crossroads now. If private property survives, the model will be qualified to compete. If state corporations abound and the Olympic bill passes and is used unscrupulously, incentives for economic effectiveness might be lost. That's what ruined the Soviet economy eventually.
________________________________

Stephen Blank, The U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA

(Dr. Blank's views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government)

I would challenge the notion that Russia presents much of a model to anyone whereas China does, following in the footsteps of Japan and the Asian tigers. Ukraine and Georgia are not suffering from low growth – quite the opposite. Indeed, relative to other members of the CIS, Russia's growth is lower, which does not say much for the model. Moreover, two other factors are relevant here. First, Russia's growth is largely founded on energy. While foreign portfolio investment has taken off and the domestic market is growing due to industrial production rising to meet rising demand, Russian goods are still not competitive abroad as opposed to China. Second, Russia is not a capitalist state. The rights of private property and of contracts are not ensured and the presence of high-ranking government officials as CEOs and CFOs in key state-controlled firms, whose number is growing as state controls spread, reveals that we have here merely an updating of the tsarist paradigm established in Muscovy, renovated and intensified by Lenin and Stalin, and now regenerated in less intense, late imperial form by Putin. Neither of these models provided stability, and when the terms of trade turned against commodities like grain or oil the country was adversely affected. Moreover, the Soviet model, with its decreasing returns to investment and excessive military burden (another factor that appears to be growing and if the military had its way would grow still more) undermined the system from within. Authoritarianism might be a "political model" for other states, but close examination of their political economy will suggest that Russia is not a model for anyone, but rather a regeneration of a past model.
________________________________

Eric Kraus, Managing Director, Anyatta Capital, advisor to the Nikitsky Russia/CIS Opportunities Fund

As the sun sets on America's Cold War empire, it is hardly surprising that it should lash out at those countries that have chosen not to fight the United States, but rather - the supreme insult – to ignore its lessons. That these countries now enjoy surging growth rates as the United States slips into recession simply adds insult to injury.

The Western propaganda machine – from The Economist to Neocon think-tanks – remains in a glibly self-congratulatory mode, apparently unaware that the West's monopoly on the global mind-space is being increasingly eroded by new voices and new technologies. They are in danger of becoming a legend in their own minds.

Before defending the Asian dirigiste model as it is being applied in Russia – a model which, in its various formulations, has been applied by all of those countries that have gone from deeply impoverished traditional agrarian societies to industrial powerhouses in a single generation (first Japan, then Korea and Taiwan, then the post-Communist regimes of China and Vietnam) we must first examine the results of the Washington model where it has been applied almost totally free from external influence – Latin America.

By the middle of the 20th Century, the "free-market" capitalist ideology had been adopted almost universally throughout the Americas, with the exception of Cuba. Occasional deviations from that model were quickly crushed by the CIA, which variously put an end to leftist experiments in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Nicaragua, among others.

And yet Latin America is a region of the world, where one-half of the population still lives in dire poverty. Central American human development statistics range from the mediocre to the truly disastrous thanks to extreme social inequality. Economic growth has been painfully slow and badly distributed; the region severely lags behind Asia. And not only is political dissent muzzled, but in the worst cases, such as Guatemala, human rights abuses exceed even the miseries visited upon the unfortunate Burmese or Tibetans.

Strikingly, this failure has never shaken the faith of the courtesans of U.S. economic power – Freedom House serves its masters – the U.S. corporate sector and its political wing in Washington. The slaughter of Guatemalan Indians or Mexican students in no way imperils the role of the United States as the dominant global power.

Of course, citing the United States as an example of liberal democracy invites ridicule, and indeed, the Iraqi debacle undermines any international legitimacy that U.S. foreign policy may have once had. But that is not the point – the United States is neither better nor worse than its predecessors; every empire develops its own justification: the White Man's Burden, God's Word, the Master Race, Liberal Democracy…and in every case, as the empire crumbles, its ideology fades.

That the developing world is increasingly turning away from – not "turning against" – the West is to be expected. Russia gave the Washington model a try in the 1990s and the resulting disaster nearly doomed the country as a unitary state. Russia is most unlikely to repeat the experiment. Although a recent issue of the International Herald Tribune featured no fewer than eight negative stories about China, China is soundly thrashing the West at its own game.

There can be no reasonable argument that some variant on economic liberalism – from New Zealand-style laissez-faire to European Social Democracy – has been most successful in the industrialized countries. They will thus continue to refine its application, and will be joined by new recruits as selected emerging economies finally emerge. But as an export commodity to the developing nations, economic liberalism has proved a wretched failure.

A unipolar world is inherently unsustainable. As the center of global growth shifts away from the G7 towards the new economic powers, the global political architecture will surely reflect a new dynamic.

253) Tres artigos dissonantes sobre neoliberalismo

Você també é um neoliberal?
Pois saiba que já não se sabe ao certo quem é ou quem não é, tantas são as contradições da política econômica, ou o descompasso entre o que se diz e o que se faz.
Abaixo, três amostras da confusão reinante no debate (??!!) sobre posições de política econômica:

(1) O economista Márcio Pochmann, atual presidente do IPEA, publicou um artigo que começa com a observação pertinente de que " o Brasil não está condenado à mediocridade, embora tenha recebido contribuições nesse sentido". A seguir, discorre
sobre o debate recente entre "mais Estado versus menos setor privado ou vice versa".

(2) O jornal O Estado de São Paulo comentou o artigo do Pochmann em duro editorial do domingo 7 de outubro de 2007.

(3) O ex-presidente do Banco Central e um dos principais teóricos dos economistas (neo) liberais brasileiros, Gustavo Franco, também participa do debate com um artigo bastante elucidativo das posições desta corrente. A esquerda merece aplausos, diz Gustavo, porque agora passou a citar Schumpeter - e " não está citando Gramsci, nem Rosa Luxemburgo, Hilferding, ou outro economista marxista esquecido, obsoleto e irrelevante".

Três artigos bem estruturados, que expõem com clareza as posições em debate sobre os caminhos do desenvolvimento brasileiro...

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(1) Economia pós-neoliberal
Marcio Pochmann
FSP, 4/10/2007

"O Brasil não está condenado à mediocridade, embora tenha recebido contribuições nesse sentido. A pequenez do pensamento neoliberal parece ser um bom exemplo disso, especialmente quando difunde a equivocada visão acerca da falsa disjuntiva entre mais Estado e menos setor privado ou vice-versa.
Como se sabe, a implementação dessa orientação no país não resultou numa economia maior, pelo contrário. O esvaziamento do Estado foi acompanhado pelo abandono da capacidade do país de planejar seu futuro, bem como pela contínua deterioração da infra-estrutura nacional, comprometedora da expansão do setor privado.
Veja-se, por exemplo, a trajetória apática dos investimentos. Lembre-se que um dos principais argumentos adotados na defesa da privatização do setor produtivo estatal durante a década de 1990 seria a ampliação, por conseqüência, dos investimentos no Brasil. Essa promessa do neoliberalismo, entre outras, terminou não sendo cumprida, mesmo com a transferência de 15% do Produto Interno Bruto do Estado para o setor privado.
Após a privatização, em 2002, a taxa de investimento atingiu a vergonhosa situação de 15,3% de todo o Produto Interno Bruto. Em outras palavras, a Formação Bruta de Capital Fixo da década de 1990 conseguiu ser ainda menor que a vigente nos anos 80, a chamada década perdida.
Essa concepção "hidráulica" acerca de menos Estado, mais setor privado, não contribuiu para o engrandecimento da economia nacional, apenas condenou o país a sucessão de apagões decorrentes da inépcia dos investimentos. Na realidade, assistiu-se a prevalência de uma asfixia do setor privado na dinâmica de curto prazo, simultânea à lógica de financeirização da riqueza e à desatualização de novos e sofisticados projetos de modernização e expansão econômico-financeira nacional. O
resultado disso tudo não poderia ser outro: a defasagem brasileira em relação ao conjunto do mundo.
Ademais, o desmanche do setor estatal não levou ao fortalecimento do setor privado nacional. O vazio deixado pelas estatais terminou sendo ocupado imediatamente pelas empresas transnacionais. Em 2006, por exemplo, as estatais respondiam por menos de uma a cada grupo de cinco grandes empresas que operavam no país, enquanto em 1990 eram responsáveis por mais de um quarto do total.
Nesse mesmo sentido, percebeu-se a evolução do enfraquecimento do capital privado nacional. Entre 1990 e 2006, por exemplo, o peso da empresa privada nacional no interior das grandes empresas em operação no país caiu 15%. Se aliada à participação do Estado na economia, constata-se que o capital transnacional, que era representado por menos de uma empresa a cada grupo de três grandes empresas no Brasil em 1990, aproximou-se de quase a metade na primeira metade da década de 2000.
Por conseqüência do esvaziamento do Estado na economia nacional, ocorreu o encolhimento do setor privado nacional sem que o capital transnacional tivesse capacidade de potencializar a ampliação do investimento produtivo, pedra angular do crescimento econômico sustentado. Diante da desaceleração e da contida taxa de investimento no Brasil, observa-se que o importante ingresso de mais de US$ 300 bilhões proporcionados pelos Investimentos Diretos do Exterior nos últimos 16 anos
não se mostrou suficiente nem mesmo para ocupar o espaço anteriormente preenchido pelas estatais e pelas empresas privadas nacionais.
Embora a internacionalização do parque produtivo nacional na década de 1990 somente possa ser comparável à abertura empresarial ocorrida durante o Plano de Metas de JK (1956-1960), não se observou, como naquela oportunidade, o engrandecimento do país. Aqui, evidentemente, não se trata de um posicionamento contrário ao capital transnacional, tampouco antagônico ao setor privado nacional, mas, pelo contrário, o reconhecimento a respeito da necessidade de recuperação do papel do Estado enquanto possibilidade de abandono da condenação à mediocridade imposta pelo pensamento neoliberal no Brasil.
Trata-se, em síntese, de preparar o país para a reorganização de sua economia nesse período pós-neoliberal. A prevalência de uma economia mista pressupõe a reinvenção do mercado, capaz de possibilitar a ampliação do setor privado (nacional e transnacional) com a revisão do papel do Estado.
Para isso, inclusive, o país precisa contar com a implantação de uma nova rodada de geração de empresas estatais. Nas décadas de 1950 e 1960, o país demonstrou maturidade política tanto para privatizar o que seria função do setor privado (setor automobilístico) como para fortalecer com recursos públicos o que deveria ser estratégico ao desenvolvimento nacional (elétrico, petróleo, telefonia, entre outros).
Nos dias de hoje, cabe repensar o que seria estratégico ao desenvolvimento nacional. O que foi privatizado terminou por cumprir o papel de uma época. Agora, precisa-se avançar e fortalecer os setores portadores de futuro, nos quais o país ainda segue distante. No curso da nova revolução tecnológica, em que se destacam a nanotecnologia, a biotecnologia, a nova matriz energética, os novos materiais, entre outros, o Brasil precisa se reposicionar. O tecnoglobalismo, como se sabe, é mais
uma promessa descumprida. Ou o Estado se recoloca como vem demonstrando com o PAC nos setores de infra-estrutura nacional, ou o país perde, novamente, uma oportunidade histórica de reduzir a distância que separa o que poderia ser em relação ao que realmente é."

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(2) A ARTE DE PLANEJAR O PASSADO
EDITORIAL
O ESTADO DE S. PAULO, 7/10/2007

O Brasil precisa de "uma nova rodada de geração de empresas estatais", afirmou num artigo ominoso o recém-nomeado presidente do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea), Márcio Pochmann. O texto seria apenas curioso como ilustrativo de uma mentalidade, se não fosse assinado por um dos escolhidos pelo governo para traçar o roteiro da economia nacional para os próximos 15 anos. Pochmann, professor da Unicamp, foi indicado para o cargo pelo então chefe da extinta Secretaria de Planejamento de Longo Prazo (Sealopra), Roberto Mangabeira Unger, recém-convertido em ministro extraordinário de Assuntos Estratégicos. Nomeado para comandar um dos, até agora, mais respeitados centros de pesquisa e análise da economia brasileira, o professor acena com uma "reinvenção do mercado" a partir de uma redefinição do papel do Estado.
Seu artigo começa com uma crítica do período rotulado como neoliberal e marcado, segundo ele, pelo esvaziamento do Estado, pelo enfraquecimento do setor privado e pelo aumento da distância entre o Brasil e as economias mais avançadas. Nessa parte, as poucas observações pertinentes são soterradas por um gigantesco entulho de impropriedades. Nenhuma referência é feita ao trabalho de estabilização de uma economia desorganizada pela irresponsabilidade e pela inépcia de políticas auto-intituladas desenvolvimentistas.
Para começar, o setor privado não é hoje mais fraco do que antes da abertura econômica e da privatização. Ao contrário: as companhias aprovadas no teste da liberalização competem como nunca no mercado internacional e têm mostrado vigor apesar do câmbio valorizado. São tecnicamente modernas, fabricam produtos de nível internacional (porque a proteção é muito menor) e adaptaram-se à vida sem inflação.
Com raras exceções, as empresas privatizadas cresceram, modernizaram-se e várias conquistaram status de multinacionais. As siderúrgicas que formavam a catastrófica Siderbrás estão entre as mais eficientes do mundo e vêm criando bases de valor estratégico em vários países. A Vale do Rio Doce é a terceira empresa de mineração do mundo. A Embraer diversificou sua produção e compete em mais de um segmento da indústria aeronáutica.
Estrangeiras ganharam espaço principalmente na área de telecomunicações, com resultados espetaculares. Poderiam ter investido mais na eletricidade se, para essa área, ainda sob controle do governo, se houvesse traçado uma política menos preconceituosa. O problema, aí, não é a privatização, mas a indefinição do poder público.
Os investimentos ainda são insuficientes para as necessidades nacionais, mas não porque o setor privado se tenha tornado mais tímido. Também nesse caso os fatos desmentem o presidente do Ipea. É absurda a imputação da queda do investimento às privatizações. Em primeiro lugar, o governo pouco investe porque se recusa a conter o gasto corrente, cada vez mais pesado e mais improdutivo.
Em segundo lugar, o capital particular refreia sua participação na infra-estrutura e nos serviços de utilidade pública porque as autoridades, durante a gestão petista, foram incapazes de ampliar a cooperação entre o setor público e o privado, como mostram o atraso dos leilões de rodovias, a demora na implantação das Parcerias Público-Privadas e o emperramento do programa elétrico.
"Nas décadas de 1950 e 1960", escreveu o professor Pochmann, "o País demonstrou maturidade política tanto para privatizar o que seria função do setor privado (setor automobilístico) quanto para fortalecer com recursos públicos o que deveria ser estratégico ao desenvolvimento (sic) nacional (elétrico, petróleo, telefonia, entre outros)"" Ora, o setor automobilístico não foi privatizado, simplesmente porque nunca foi estatal. Foi criado no governo Juscelino com empresas trazidas de fora.
Se o longo prazo for planejado com base nessa percepção do passado, os brasileiros correrão o risco de ver a história repetir-se não como farsa,mas como tragicomédia.
A criação da efêmera Secretaria de Planejamento de Longo Prazo, para acomodar um companheiro de partido do vice-presidente, já foi uma farsa. A subordinação do Ipea a essa Secretaria foi um erro que poderá custar caro ao País. O presidente da República teria feito um bem ao Brasil se referendasse a liquidação da Sealopra pelo Senado e devolvesse o Ipea ao Ministério do Planejamento.

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(3) A inovação que faz falta ao governo
Gustavo Franco)
Época n. 490, 8/10/2007

O economista fala sobre as inovações que fazem falta ao governo atual

Na semana que passou, o presidente Lula nos explicou o que significa "choque de gestão", a ministra Dilma reabilitou o "empresário schumpeteriano" e a bolsa de valores no dia seguinte subiu, parecendo ignorar a suposta crise das hipotecas americanas e oferecendo uma indicação de que as referidas autoridades estão cobertas de razão, ou então de que essas idéias -- erradas ou muito erradas -- não têm mesmo a menor importância.
As palavras e os conceitos parecem vítimas inocentes de balas perdidas de um debate ideológico já terminado. O capitalismo venceu, e o socialismo foi uma catástrofe, ao contrário do que dizem os livros didáticos que o governo distribui. Talvez por isso se diga que, no Brasil, a História é lenta. As autoridades parecem sempre se equilibrar entre um passado idealizado, um "futuro do pretérito" e um presente de onde não podem escapar.
O presidente e a ministra não defendem as idéias perdedoras, descontadas lambugens atiradas na direção de uma angustiada militância. Pelo contrário, alinham-se ao "choque de gestão", à eficiência da máquina pública, ao capitalismo e às empresas. E contra essa bobagem de reestatizar a Vale do Rio Doce.
Pode haver certo contorcionismo retórico nessas manifestações, como as imortalizadas pelo Grande Irmão no 1984 orwelliano, onde o dicionário também trabalhava para o governo. Com efeito, o significado das palavras tem a ver com os usos e costumes do passado. Mas, como a história começou em 2003, o dicionário vai sendo refeito.
O verbete clientelismo, por exemplo, caiu em desuso, de tal sorte que todos os atos antigamente pertinentes a essa acepção passam a ser designados, a partir desta semana, como "choque de gestão". Quem lê apenas as manchetes verá que o presidente é pelo "choque de gestão" e está, por conseguinte, a favor dos ventos neoliberais globalizantes.
No assunto do empresário "schumpeteriano", saiba o leitor que a ministra alude a Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950), célebre economista austríaco, ex-ministro das Finanças de seu país durante a hiperinflação (1919-1920), depois professor na Alemanha e emigrado para Harvard, onde se estabeleceu em 1932. Notabilizou-se pelo estudo da inovação como mola mestra do capitalismo.
A ministra merece aplausos, pois não está citando Gramsci, nem Rosa Luxemburgo, Hilferding, ou outro economista marxista esquecido, obsoleto e irrelevante. Candidamente, ela reconhece:
"Não é simples ter uma burguesia nacional."
Empresários o Brasil tem. Só é preciso que haja reformas que melhorem o clima para os negócios. É louvável o genuíno empenho em compreender o admirável mundo novo, embora com as ferramentas erradas. Schumpeter é um bom começo, embora haja um bom par de coisas a observar sobre o "muso" da área de História do Negócio da Harvard Business School, o pior dos antros formadores de quadros para o capitalismo globalizante.
A primeira é que a inovação vem principalmente por meio de reformas que alteram aspectos institucionais importantes da vida econômica. Não está faltando empresário schumpeteriano no Brasil, mas governo inovador que implemente reformas para melhorar o clima de negócios, onde nossa posição nos "rankings" internacionais só faz piorar.
A segunda é mais básica e, com algum exagero, proposital: não existe mais burguesia. Quem tem os "meios de produção" são os fundos de pensão, expressão fiduciária da classe operária. O empreendedor inovador se institucionalizou em divisões de pesquisa e desenvolvimento e tem o apoio da indústria do capital de risco. Não vamos esquecer uma lição do próprio Marx: o capital não é uma pessoa, é uma relação social, tal qual o "empresário schumpeteriano". Ao personalizar essa figura, corremos o risco de criar o "empresário chapa branca", uma distorção que está para a inovação assim como o clientelismo está para o "choque de gestão".

252) Arquitetura financeira internacional, Jean-Claude Trichet, presidente do BCE

Reflections on the international financial architecture
Keynote address by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the 2007 Salzburg Seminar “Challenges to the International Monetary System: Rebalancing currencies, institutions, and rules”
Salzburg, 29 September 2007.
BIS Review, 108/2007

I. Introduction:
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be here at Schloss Leopoldsbrunn in
Salzburg. Both the Schloss and the city are places with a lot of history and famous
inhabitants! I am sure that this wonderful location will inspire your work over the coming days. The Salzburg Seminars have long been a forum for discussion of global issues and the focus of this particular seminar promises very interesting exchanges of views on very topical issues. As you know, Salzburg traditionally has been a facilitator of cultural exchanges across European countries and beyond since the 18th century. I am afraid that by its very nature, my talk tonight might be less “entertaining” than most other events taking place here in this wonderful city.
I would like to offer some reflections on the various changes in the set up of the global economic and financial system. Over the last two decades the international community has been confronted with tremendous challenges arising from important structural changes in the global system linked to technological advances and trade and financial integration. During this period the international community has learnt critical lessons and has launched profound adjustments to what has been termed the international financial architecture that is the network of institutions and fora with varying degrees of coordination at the global or sometimes regional level.
As in other parts of life, the most radical changes to structures and to behaviour are often launched during or after times of crisis. This has also been the case at the global level. The Asian crisis, which started exactly 10 years ago, is one case in point. The crisis that began in summer of 1997 with the fall of the Thai baht – and by the end of 1997 had engulfed Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines with spill over effects felt in Singapore and Hong Kong – did not remain confined to emerging markets but affected the global system.
Remember that by August 1998, we had the Russian default, followed by the LTCM crisis in September the same year.
I do not want to enter into a discussion of the Asian crisis tonight. It is clear, this crisis was not the first one – we had to deal with the debt crisis in the 1980s and witnessed in 1994/5 how Tesobonos in Mexico developed from a local phenomenon into an issue for the international community. And it was certainly not the last one; the global system had to digest crises in Turkey and Argentina as well as shocks in the private sector such the stock exchange fall and the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000. But it was the Asian crisis that revealed a number of vulnerabilities in national and international financial systems and that led to an enormous reform agenda at the international level.
All these crisis episodes that we were confronted with brought to the fore new insights and lessons. They illustrated forcefully the challenges linked to a more globalised world and the increasing importance of private capital flows. I would like to highlight two more general lessons which have remained still important today:
First, one about the interlinkages between countries and the implications for the institutional set up. The world has changed dramatically over the past decades. The steady opening up of goods and capital markets has led to the growing integration of countries around the globe. Integration is of course a welcome development in itself because more and more countries participate in the global exchange of goods and services and can benefit from the transfer of know how and technologies. As proven by the experience of many economies, including in the EU, trade openness is the best catching up strategy for developing countries.
But the contagion effects we have seen from time to time demonstrate the main challenges associated with interdependence. Globalisation has put all countries around the globe into one boat. Something that happens in one economy is often not just a local event but can have implications for the global system. From this fact it follows that all economies which have a systemic importance should be involved in discussing and participating in the collegial response of the international community as regards issues of global relevance.
Second, another important lesson from my point of view is the fact that efforts to improve the resilience of the global international system are not a static matter for which one can claim a lasting victory at one point in time. The globalisation and catching up process is far from being completed; likewise, very rapid technological and financial innovations will continue to be a feature of the modern world for dozens of years to come. Thus, trying to ensure the public good of global stability is a constant task that requires continuous scrutiny and effort.
Each crisis, or episode of significant market correction, is different from the one before. They differ in origin, nature and magnitude. Each time new insights are gained about potential root causes of crises – often painful ones that go beyond simply lax macroeconomic policies and point to a lack of transparency or appropriate oversight.
These two lessons – that is, the need to involve all important players and to undertake continuous effort to prevent crises and ensure global stability – are in my view the driving force of all reform efforts at the international level since the 1990s, be they focused on frameworks for dialogue and cooperation or on actual policy matters. I will come back to these two aspects in a short while, but I would first like to highlight some facts which illustrate the changing global landscape we are living in, and give cause to reflect on the course and stewardship of the global economy.

II. Changing landscape
There has been a dramatic increase in trade integration over the past two or three decades that has simultaneously increased opportunities and vulnerabilities. World trade has grown four-fold in real terms since 1980; its share of world GDP has risen from 36 percent to 55 percent over this period. Part of this impressive development is explained by the integration of the former communist countries into the global trading system in the 1990s. Also developing Asia progressively dismantled barriers to trade. Over the past two decades, many emerging and developing countries have been catching up with advanced economies that shifted earlier to more open trading regimes.
Likewise, financial globalisation has proceeded at a dizzying pace over the past two
decades. Take the sum of countries’ gross external assets and liabilities relative to GDP as a proxy for financial integration. Since the creation of the euro in 1999 until 2005, total cross-border financial assets increased from 87 % of GDP to 124 % in the euro area, and from 80% to 90% in the US; international liabilities increased in the euro area from 92% of GDP to 137% and from 91% to 110% of GDP in the US. Advanced economies still continue to be the most financially integrated. Yet other regions of the world have also increased their cross border asset and liabilities positions, albeit at a much more moderate pace. These differences can be explained with different capital control regimes as well as a range of other factors, including different degrees of institutional quality and domestic financial development.
But globalisation does not only imply the exchange of final goods, services and capital, but also outsourcing and off shoring of parts of the production chain. It is probably especially this aspect of globalisation that often leads to negative perceptions in the general public since it entails distributional effects among and within countries despite the fact that technological innovations probably played a more important role in that respect.

One of the most important changes in the global landscape concerns the role of emerging market economies. (1) They have become increasingly significant players on the global scene and are catching up with advanced countries through continued strong growth. Over the past five years, these economies grew at about 7% per annum on average; emerging Asia has been growing faster, at close to 8% per annum. This rapid growth has made emerging markets the main engine of world growth. Last year China, India and Russia alone accounted for about one half of global growth (in PPP terms). Likewise, the share of emerging economies in world exports of goods and services doubled between the early 1990s and 2006, to reach roughly 30%. As mentioned before, their share in financial integration is still lagging behind advanced economies, but is constantly improving.
What does the present tell us about the future? Will emerging markets overtake those
countries that are currently the major economies in the world? China has already risen from the 9th largest economy in 1980 to become the second largest (in PPP terms). There are several studies that try to analyse this question and that deliver interesting results regarding the growth prospects of emerging markets over the next decades. According to one study, the so-called BRICs, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and China, could account for over half the size of today’s six largest economies in 2025 (at market exchange rates), and by 2039 they could be larger than these countries. (2) Similarly, another study concludes that seven emerging markets will by 2050 be around 25% larger than the current G7 countries when measured at markets exchange rates, or around 75% larger in PPP terms. This contrasts dramatically with the situation in 2005 when they were only around 20% the size of the G7 at market exchange rates and around 75% of its size in PPP terms. According to this study, China will rank
number two on the list of largest economies in 2050 (measured at market exchange rates), India number three and Brazil number five. Of the current G7 economies, only the US, the euro area and Japan would remain among the largest economies, the others would be replaced by emerging market economies. (3)
Certainly, any projection is subject to a large degree of uncertainty. This holds even more for projections that try to cover very distant horizons; they are inevitably somewhat speculative. But such studies might nevertheless provide some indications as to how the global economy could look like in 30 or 40 years. Even if you do not take their results at face value, the projections point to a profound rebalancing in the distribution of global output if these countries make full use of their potential for growth. In any way, they leave no doubt that the prospects of emerging markets will be critical to how the world economy evolves over the next decades. The current discussions on the appropriate representation of emerging
markets at the International Monetary Fund show that policy makers do take seriously the current setting and these future prospects.
Returning to today’s world, let us consider the implications of the emergence of these fast growing countries for the euro area. Growth in emerging markets increases the demand for those euro area goods and services where the euro area has competitive advantages. And since the euro area is much more open than other major economies both with respect to trade and financial openness the euro area has the potential to take advantage of the new opportunities. Our exports and imports of goods and services account for around one fifth of GDP, more than in the US or Japan. And indeed, our trade relations with emerging markets have strengthened considerably over the time. The share of emerging markets in euro area trade has grown from about one third in 1999 to more than 40% today. Moreover, the euro area has become a destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) from emerging markets.
For example, the stock of FDI from the BRIC countries in the euro area tripled in the period 1999-2005 to reach the still modest amount of €12 billion. Conversely, the amount of euro area FDI in emerging market economies also rose quickly: between 1999 and 2005, the stock of outward FDI to the BRICs rose by 111% to €133bn.
All in all, we can only benefit from increasing our trade and financial relations with these countries. While it often entails adjustments to former configurations, one should not forget that competition from emerging markets strengthens the incentives for structural reforms in our economies. These reforms have to be undertaken in any case not only to improve efficiency but also to improve flexibility and resilience in a world where different kind of shocks can hit an economy.

III. International rules of the game
After this quick snapshot of the changing global landscape I would like to turn now to the implications for the governance of the global system. It is obvious that the systemic changes we are observing in the world’s economic and financial system require systematic changes in the policy framework. The rules of the game need to adapt in order to keep pace with developments. This recognition is not new. It was felt already in the 1970s with the break down of the Bretton Woods system. And it was felt very strongly in the aftermath of the Asian crisis ten years ago. At that juncture, the work on improving the international architecture – which had started with the G7 Ministers and Governors and the summit of industrialised nations taking place after the Mexican crises in 1995 – was considerably stepped up. This links me to the two lessons that I outlined at the beginning of this talk, namely the need to
adapt the institutional set up and to involve all important players in a fruitful policy dialogue and the need for continuous efforts to preserve global stability. One can consider the reform efforts that have taken place over the years from these two angles. The question is thus what changes to the international rules of the game have been introduced over time in terms of format and substance. These two aspects are often interwoven, i.e. institutional changes often go hand in hand with and are aimed at improving the resilience the global system. Yet I will try to deal with them one after the other.
Let’s first consider the changes in terms of format: With the growing importance of emerging markets for the global economy – which was felt quite profoundly during and after the Asian crisis – it became obvious that new ways had to be found to integrate them better into the international policy dialogue. In response, finance ministers and central bank governors from 22 systemically important countries met in April 1998 to examine issues related to the functioning of the international financial system. (4) This “Group of 22” became in 1999 the “Group of 20”. Since 1999, the G20 has developed into an important international forum for dialogue and consensus-building among systemically important countries, both industrialised and emerging. Discussions in the G20 have facilitated consensus on important elements of the international reform agenda. It has held numerous workshops to deepen the understanding of issues of global relevance and has engaged in a process of peer reviews to promote countries’ implementation of market-based economic systems. In the early years of
its existence, emphasis was placed on financial stability and crisis prevention, including issues such as prudent debt management, domestic financial deepening, and exchange rate regimes. Over time however, the range of topics on the agenda has widened, and now includes issues such as development, energy, climate change. The G20 has also played a decisive role in leading by example to promote the wider compliance with standards and codes in various areas and was instrumental in the process leading to the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”. At present, the G20 is also actively involved in the efforts to reform the IMF and the World Bank, especially in the current discussions on reforming the IMF’s quota and voice system. In my view, it is the composition and size of the membership that strike a good balance between giving this informal forum a rather high degree of legitimacy while at the same time also allowing for frank dialogue between the members.
Frank dialogue is also one of the important aspects of the continued relevance of the G7. The G7/G8 process is often criticised for no longer reflecting the political and economic realities of the 21st century. But the meetings of G7 finance ministers and central bank governors that I have attended over the past 18 years have proven an invaluable forum for policy cooperation on macroeconomic policies and when appropriate signals given to foreign exchange markets. G7 countries have also recognised the need to involve emerging markets in their discussions, and it is now standard practice for finance ministers and governors from emerging economies – and at times also from developing countries – to be invited to join the discussions of their G7 colleagues.
A very recent example of a new form of informal cooperation is the Heiligendamm process that started at the G8 summit this summer. Here again the G8 acknowledged that there can be no solution to global challenges without active participation of emerging market economies. At that meeting, along with heads of state and government of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa, all countries committed to embark on a high-level dialogue on a number of global challenges, specifically in the fields of cross-border investment, research and innovation, energy efficiency, and development. (5) Such a process is welcome because it provides the chance to listen to different views on global challenges, to build a shared understanding and to develop joint proposals to address these challenges.
Also at the International Monetary Fund there are currently major reform efforts underway in the context of the medium-term strategy to adjust the institution to a changed environment and new constellations of players. One of these reforms – the quota and voice reform I already mentioned – concerns the representation of members in the institution and is thus considered as crucial for the future governance and the credibility of the Fund. Moreover, the introduction of multilateral consultations last year constituted a new approach to bring together countries with a shared responsibility for global issues. The first of these consultations was dedicated to global imbalances and involved the euro area, the US, Japan, China and Saudi Arabia. We at the ECB welcomed these discussions as a way to foster the implementation of the agreed strategy to address global imbalances. More related to substance than to procedures, let me also mention the recent reform of the Fund’s framework for surveillance, which should help to strengthen this important part of the IMF’s
mandate given the current climate of reduced IMF lending.
Before moving on from important changes in the institutional set-up of the international system, I would like to highlight the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). Its creation back in 1999 was also motivated by the Asian crisis. The FSF is today the only forum which enables cross-sectoral cooperation among national and international entities in charge of supervision.
Since it includes the major financial centres and holds regular regional meetings involving countries in the Asia-Pacific region as well as in Latin America, it has a particularly large reach out to a number of systemically important countries.
Let me turn now to the changes in terms of substance which have been introduced since the crisis events in the 1990s. Here I have to be selective because initiatives have been undertaken in many areas to improve countries’ macroeconomic and financial sector institutions and policies and thus their resilience to crisis. The increased focus on financial sector issues, such as in the framework of the FSF or the changes in progress in the IMF to place much greater emphasis in surveillance on this matter, is certainly very welcome.
But I would like to highlight three more general concepts which I consider to be of utmost importance. Firstly, greater transparency, both in the public and private sector, has been one of the major achievements since the 1990s. Transparency is a precondition for well-functioning markets since it facilitates better risk management and leads to strengthened market discipline, which in turn has a positive impact on the conduct of macroeconomic and structural policies. Enhanced transparency also enables investors to better differentiate between economies and thus helps to counter herding behaviour and contagion effects. The IMF’s special standard for dissemination of economic and financial data has become a widely recognised benchmark to which a large and increasing number of countries have subscribed. Transparency in the private sector is also crucial for well-functioning global financial markets. All in all, I am pleased to note that considerable progress has been achieved over the years. But there are still areas where there is room for improvements, including in the reporting to the IMF on the currency composition of countries’ foreign exchange reserves.
My second point relates to standards and codes, which have been internationally agreed for a wide variety of areas such as macroeconomic and data transparency, banking supervision, corporate governance, accounting, payment and settlement systems, to name just a few.
The IMF and the FSF have designated twelve of these standards as being of particular
importance for sound and stable economic and financial systems. Such standards distil and set out what is widely accepted as good practices or guidelines in a given area. Here the international community had made large strides over the years in the development of new standards and their implementation as well as in systematically and often publicly examining countries’ compliance. In my view, standard setting and implementation can help to promote domestic and international stability. The attractiveness of this approach is the fact that is does not rely solely on rules set and enforced by authorities but also on voluntary standards adopted by economic agents of the private sector.
My third and last point is linked to the previous one and concerns the fruitful dialogue between the public and the private sector. Sometimes it might be wise to have principles voluntarily agreed by the private sector rather than aiming at a heavy-handed public approach. One prominent example are the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets” I referred to earlier. These Principles have been set up at a time when the international community was discussing seriously the proposal for an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism that was meant to improve the resolution of financial crises. The Principles are also aiming at this objective but follow a different route. Debtor countries and private investors agreed on best practices and guidelines for information-sharing, dialogue and close cooperation both in normal times and
in periods of financial distress. Since I suggested myself such a voluntary code of conduct at the IMF Annual Meetings in 2002, I am very pleased to see that the Principles are increasingly becoming an important framework for cooperative actions by debtors and creditors. These Principles might also set an example for a similar approach adopted in other areas, such as the hedge fund industry – the highly leveraged institutions and other non regulated entities – which should develop as actively as possible voluntary benchmarks for good practices, as also recommended by the Financial Stability Forum for hedge funds.

IV. Concluding remarks
Ladies and gentlemen, over the past two decades we have been witnessing the incredible transformations of the global economy, such as impressive technological advances, deeper and wider trade and financial integration, and the emergence of powerful economic giants.
These are all great successes of today’s interlinked world. Success, however, does not come without major challenges and we have been confronted with risks to the global economic and financial stability more than once over the past 25 years. With each crisis or turbulent episode we had to cope with, we have learnt numerous lessons. Amongst the most important ones that are very much common to all of these episodes I will mention four:
First, be as lucid as possible from the outset. It is always a recipe for additional difficulty to over-assess the gravity of a particular situation and therefore to over-react. But it is equally dangerous to misjudge a particular situation by underestimating its gravity and the risks that are at stake. Therefore the quality of the first appreciation, the lucidity of the judgement which is worked out at the beginning is always of the essence. And for this judgement to be as just and pertinent as possible my experience is that you need three ingredients: an excellent
analytical preparation, a confrontation of various views within a college of wise persons, and a great deal of experience within that college. Particularly in those hectic circumstances that are always complex and multi-dimensional, with a great deal of non-linearities, the textbook solution might not be of great use. Experience is of the essence.
Second, often the lucidity and pertinence of the judgement – and depending on this
judgement – is the rapidity of action. In the development of a very complex situation a slight change at the start turns out in very significant discrepancies after a certain period of time and these significant discrepancies can make all the difference between a situation which would be under control and a situation clearly out of control. So time is absolutely of the essence in regaining control of a hectic situation: acting expeditiously is a must.
Third, whatever the nature of the turbulences, which would hit the global financial system, the multiplicity of entities and parties involved, whether private of public makes it necessary to agree as much as possible ex-ante on the appropriate ways for handling the situation. From that standpoint stress-tests are extremely useful. Also useful would be the working out of voluntary “Principles” stating ex-ante what would be expected from each parties concerned in a difficult situation. This working out of voluntary principles has already been done, as I have already mentioned, in the domain of the private financing of emerging economies.
Fourth, and finally, let me mention one constant lesson that we have drawn from all previous turbulent episodes: to minimise contagion in all compartments of global finance, whether in the domain of sovereign risks, or in the financial markets of industrialised countries, transparency appears to be the key principle. In hectic times, when fear dominates, absence of transparency foster herd behaviour and amplifies considerably the initial shock that triggered the turbulences. It was one of the main lessons we draw rightly from the Asian crisis. Transparency vis-à-vis investors and savers, transparency vis-à-vis surveillance authorities, appears to be the best vaccine against contagion which is at the heart of the epidemic.
I thank you for your attention.

Notes:
(1) There is no single definition of the group of emerging markets. In line with the article entitled “Financial flows
to emerging market economies: changing patterns and recent developments” published in the ECB’s Monthly
Bulletin of Janaury 2005, the term emerging markets here is meant to comprise Russia and Turkey in Europe;
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela in Latin America; and China, Hong Kong SAR,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand in Asia.

(2) See “Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050”, Global Economics paper No. 99, Goldman Sachs, 1 October 2003.

(3) See John Hawksworth, “The world in 2050 – How big will the major emerging market economies get and how can the OECD compete?”, Price Waterhouse Coopers, March 2006. In a speech on “The new global economic geography”, dated 25 August 2006, Stanley Fischer, Governor of the Bank of Israel, referred to a study by Angus Maddison, Evidence to the Select Committee on Economic Affairs, House of Lords, February 2005.

(4) This grouping consisted of: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singpaore, South Africa, Thailand, the UK and the US. The heads of the BIS, IMF, OECD and the World Bank, as well as the Chair of the Interim Committee (was has been transformed later in the International Monetary and Financial Committee), attended as observers.

(5) The Joint Statement of 8 June 2007 envisages that the discussion will be continud in a structured manner for a period of two years untile the G7 summit in 2009 where they will review progress made. The OECD was asked to provide a platform for dialogue between the G8 and the five other countries.